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Full text of "Battles and leaders of the Civil War : being for the most part contributions by Union and Confederate officers, based upon "The Century war series.""

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Johnson & Buel v.3,pt.l 
Battles and leaders L468439 
of the Civil War 






3 1833 01348 0337 















]^ J Ct)c €tntmp Co. 

Copyright, 1884, 1888, 
By The Century Co. 







LIST OF ENGRAVERS «... M. r>.r* M. c\.n XIX 

t^ 468439 



ILLDSTKATIONS: lu the Van (W. Taber)—Ma.^ of North Mississippi and West Tennessee (Jacob Wells) — 
Map of the Corinth and luka Region (reproduction from an official map) — Map of Bragg's Invasion of 
Kentucky (Jacob WeZ/s; — Brigadier-General Preston Smith, C. S. A., from photo.— Union Fort at Muu- 
fordville, from photo. (E. J. J/ee/rer^ — Lieutenant-General E. Kirby Smith, C. S. A., from Brady photo.— 
Lieutenant-General .Joseph Wheeler, C. S. A., from Brady photo.— M:yor-General B. F. Cheatham, C. B. A., 
from photo.— Spring near Terry ville which helped to relieve Bragg's parched Army ; and Pear-tree, One 
Hundred Years Old, at tlic T.eft of Rousseau's Position. Perry ville, from photos, hy E. H. Fox (Harry Fenn) 
— Corner of the Confederate Cemetery at PerryvlUe, from photo, by E. H. Fox (Tlarry Fenn/ — Map of 
theBattle-fleld of Perrj^ville (Jacob Wells) —DeteuBe of Cage's Ford, on the Cumberland River, November 
21, 18G2, from a lithograph of a war-time sketch by A. E. Mathews, lent by Major E. C. Dawes (Harry 

""^.mCTI.o."""-^'' """"^ ™' '^'"^ } C^W-^i BASIL U'.DUKE 26 


THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PERRYVILLE, KY. Composition, Strength, and Losses 29 


Illustrations : On the Skinuish Line ( W. Taber) — Brevet Majjor-General James B. Fry, from a photo.— 
Brigadier-General James 8. Jackson, from a photo.— Brigadier-General William R. Terrill, from photo, 
lent by Mrs. G. A. Porterfield. 


ILLUSTKATIONS: PcrryviUe, Kentucky, looking South-east from the Mackville Pike, from photo, by E. 
H. Fox (Harry Fenn)— Ridge on the Union Left Occupied by Stone's and Bush's Batteries — the Scene of 
Starkweather's Contest, and Tree near where General James S. Jackson Fell, from photos, by E. II. Fox 
(Harry Fcnn)—y\GV} looking North-east from the Position of Loomis's Battery, tlu' Center of Rousseau's 
Line ; and Position of Loomis's Battery on Rousseau's Line, looking across Doctor's Creek, frcmi photos, by 
E. H. Fox C//«r/v/ FcM»0—Eiirm-housc of H. P. Bottom, from i)hoto. by E. H. Fox (Harry /^V/ih;- Engjjge- 
ment of Starkweather's Brigade on the Extreme Union Left, from lithograph of a war-time sketch 
by A. E. Mathews (Harry Fenn). 



ILLDSTRATIONS: BHgadlor-General (JeorgoW. Morgan, fnuu photo. by Hickcox — Plan of the Confederate 
Works at Cumberland Gap. from a drawing by Captain W. F. Patterson (Jacob U>//s; — View of Cumber- 
land (iap from the South, from a lithograph lent by Mrs. Carrie Buekner (E. J. Meeker). 


\ In order to save much repetition, particular credit is here given to tlie Massachusetts Couiumndery of the 
I^Wal Legion, to Colonel Arnold A. Rand, (Jeueral .Mbert Onlway. and Cliarles B. Hall for the use of ph.itographs 
and drawings. War-time phofograidiers whose wmk is of tlu^ greatest liistoii( al value, and lias l)eeu freely drawn 
upou in the preparation of the illustrations, are M. B. Brady, .\h-xauder (iardiier, and Captain A. J. Russell in the 
North; and D. 11. .\nderson of Rieliinond. Va., and Georg.' S. Cook of Charleston, S. C— the latter, 8iuc«- th(- war. 
having succeeded to the ownership of the Aiuleisoii negatives. 






iLLirsTRATiONS : Confederate Picket witli Blanket-Capote and Eaw-liide Moccasins (Allen C. Redu-ood) 
— Brigadier-General Maxcy Gregg, C. 8, A., from Anderson-Cook photo.— Map of the Battle of Fredericks- 
burg (Jacob TTcW/,; — Front of the Maryo Mansion, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber)—Tlxe Sunken Road 
under Marye's Hill, from photo, by Betz & Kichards — House by the Stone Wall, in which General Cobb 
died, from photo. ( W. Taber) — Cobb's and Kershaw's Troops behind the Stone Wall (Allen C. Redwood) — 
Brigadier (iciieral Thomas R. R. Cobb, C. S. A., from photo. — Confederate Works on Willis's Hill, now 
the Site of tlie National Cemetery, from Brady photo. (Harry Fenn) — WeUord's Mill on Hazel Run and 
the Telegraph Road, from photo. (J. D. Woodward). 


Illustrations: Barksdale's Mississippians Opposing the Laying of the Pontoon Bridges (A. C. Red- 
,<.oofO — Fredericksburg from the Foot of WilUs's HiU, from Brady photo. (E. J. Ifecfcer; — Brigadier- 
General Robert Ransom, C. S. A., from photo. 




Illustrations : The Washington Artillery on Marye's Hill Firing upon the Union Columns forming 
for the Assault (A. C. Red icood) — James A. Seddon, Secretary of War to the Southern Confederacy, from 
photo, lent by James Blair — Winter Sport in a Confederate Camp (A. C. Redtcood). 


Illistkation: Confederate Theatricals (A. C. Redwood). 


Illustration : Newspapers in Camp (Edwin Forbes). 


Illustrations: Hot Work for Hazard's Battery (W. Tafter^ — Chatham, opposite Fredericksburg, also 
known as the " Lacy House," and The Phillips House, Burnside's Headquarters, from Gardner photo. 
(W. rafter;— General A. E. Burnside, from photo., with autograph — Fredericksburg from the East 
Bank of the Rappahannock (two views) (Jo.seph I'ennell) — The Bomljardment of Fredericksburg, and 
Crossing the River in Pontoons to Dislodge the Confederate Sharp-shooters (R. F. Zogbaum) —The Ninth 
Corps crossing by the Pontoon Bridge (R. F. Zo()baum ) — Warehouse in Fredericksburg used as a Hospi- 
tal, from photo, lent by W. H. Whiton (W. Taber)— The Ground between Fredericksburg and Marye's 
Heights, from photo. (J. D. Woodward) — Stncb in the Mud — a Flank March across Country (Edivin 
Forbe8) — The Grand Review at Falmouth during President Lincoln's Visit (Edwin Forbes). 


Tuc Tu MAccAruiicuT-rc i CAPTAIN H. G. O. IVEYMOUTH 121 








li.LUfTUATioNs: Franklin's Men Charging across the Railroad iW. Tuber) — The Pontoon Bridges at 
Franklin's Crossing, from Gardner photo. C//«r/-// Fejiu;- Franklin's Battle-Held, as seen from Hamil- 
ton's Crossing (A. C. Retlwood) — (ieueval W. B. Franklin, from photo, by De Lamater, Avith autograph — 
Kuins of •' Mansfield," also known as the " Bernard House," from Gardner photo. (.L D. Woodward) — A 
.Tack-kuifc Record on the Htone Wall of the "Bernard House" (A. C. iierfjroorf; — Brigadier-General 
(icorge 1). Bayard, from an engraving by H. B. Hall — Brigadier-General C. F. .lackson, from photo., 
with autograph. 


Illustrations: Trallic Between the Lines during a Truce (Edwin Forftes; — Hays's Brigade of Stone- 
wall Jackson's Corps, at Hamilton's Crossing (A. C. Redwood). 





THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FREDERICKSBURG. Composition, Strength, and Losses 143 


Illcstratioxs : Union Camp Scene : A Quiet Game ( Winsloio Homer j— Colonel Joliu S. Mosby, C. S. A., 
tiom plioto. lent bj- James Blair, 



ILLLSTKATION : Major-Geueral George Stonemau, from photo, by Anthony. 


iLLUSTRATioxs : Coips Badges of the Army of the Potomac under Hoolier (H. A. Ogden) — Outline Map 
of the ChancellorsviUe Campaign (Jacob Wells) — T\ie Kight Wing of Hooker's Army Crossing the Rappa- 
hannock at Kelly's Ford (Edwin Forbes) — Map of the ChancellorsviUe Campaign (Jacob Wells) — General 
Joseph Hooker, from Brady photo., with autograph — Hooker's Headquarters at ChancellorsviUe (Edicin 
J'orftes;— Stampede of the Eleventh Corps on the Plank Road (A. C. ieedwoorf; — Staying Jackson's Ad- 
vance, Saturday evening. May 2d, 1863 (Edwin Forbes) —The 29th Pennsylvania in the Trenches under 
Artillery Fire, May 3d, 1863, from original picture in possession of Capt. W. L. Stork (W. L. Sheppard) — 
Second Lineof Union Defense at the Junction of the Roads to Ely's and United States Fords (Edwin Forbes). 



Illcstratioxs: Union Cavalryman's Hat, from photo. (W. Tafter) — Parade at Falmouth of the llOth 
Pcnusylvauia Volunteers, from photo, lent by W. H. Whiton (W. Tafte/'; — Abandoning the Winter Camp 
at Falinouth (Edwin Forbes) —Vniou Troops Crossing the Rapidan at Ely's Ford (Edicin Forbesj — Miijor- 
(icncral Hiram G. Berry, from Brady photo. ; Repulse of Jackson's Men at Hazel Grove by ArtiUery under 
General Pleasonton (T. de T}mlstntp) — ^hi}or-Geiieviil Amiel W. Whipple, from Brady photo. 


iLLUSTRATioxs : Major Peter Keenan, from photo, lent by Samuel Wilson — General Howard striving to 
rally his Troops (R. F. Zogbaum). 





Illcstratioxs : Race on the Plank Road for Right of Way. between the Ninth Massachusetts Battery 
and a Baggage Train, from a war-time sketch by C. W. Reed C"'. Taber) — T\w Old Chancellor House, 
from photo, lent by Theodore Miller iC. A. Yanderhoof) —^lap of the Position of the Eleventh Corps 
(Jacob Wells) — Dowdall's Tavern, Howard's Headquarters, from Gardner photo. ( W. Jafter; —Do wdall's 
TavciTi in 1884 (Joseph Penuell) — The Wilderness Church and Hawkins's Farm, from photo, made in 188* 
(Hurry Fenn)— The Wilderness Church, from photo. (Thomas Ho(jan) — Tht: Confederates Charging 
Howard's Breastworks (W. L. Sheppard) —Major-GeneTiil Carl Schurz, from photo, by Brady— Union 
Breastworks in the Woods between Dowdall's Tavern and ChancellorsviUe — Relics of the Dead in the 
Woods near the Plank Road; and the Plank Road near where Jackson Fell, from war-time photos. 
(Georye 6i?»s«»0 — Map of tlio Positions of the Twelfth Corps and iiart of the Third Corps, covering 
the ChancellorsviUe Plateau, May 2d and 3d (Jacob jr«>//»; -Rescuing the Wounded on Sunday, May 3d. 
from the Burning Woods (Edicin Forbes). 


Illcstratioxs: Stonewall Jackson's Cap, from photo. — Lee and Jackson in Council on the Night of 
Jlay ist (W. L. Sheppard) —VAC-«hni\e of General Jackson's Last letter. In possession of the Virginia 
State Library — Lieutenant-(;eneral Thomas J. Jackson, C. S. A., from photo, lent by Major Jed. Hotch- 
klBs — Stonewall Jackson's "Old Sorrel," from photo.— Brigadier-General E. F. Paxton, from ambrotype 
lent by J. G. Paxton — Stonewall Jackson Going Forwanl on tlie Plank RoatI in Advance of his Line of 
Battle (A. C. ifprfiroof/;- Mi»jor-General R. E. Colston, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.— Brigadier- 
General F. T. Nicholls, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.— The New Chanrellor House, from photo. 
(Harry Fenn) — Stonewall Jackson's Grave, Lexington, Vu., from photo, by M. Miley ( W. Taber \ 




Illustrations: Lance used by the Sixth Peunsylvania Cavalry (Rush's Lancers), from photo. (G. R. 
Halm) — Retreat of the Union Army across the Rappahannock at United States Ford (Edwin Forbes) — 
Foraging in the Wilderness (W. H. Shelton). 

Illustrations : Feeling the Enemy (Winslow Homer) —'ilm Stone Wall under Marye's Heights, from 
a photo, by Brady taken immediately after Sedgwick Carried the Position by Assault (W. Taber) — Cap- 
ture of a Gun of the Washington Artillery, on Marye's Heights (R. F. Zogbaum) — Salem Church, from 
photo, taken In 188i (W. Taber) —The Attack on Sedgwick at Banks's Ford, Monday evening, May 4th 
(Edumi Forbes). 



Strength, and Losses . 




Illustrations : Breaking up the Union Camp at Falmouth, from photo. (W. Taftcr; — Major- General 
George G. Meade, from Brady photo. 



Illustrations : Union Cavalry Scouting in Front of the Confederate Advance ( W. Taber) — Map of the 
Gettysburg Campaign (Jacob 17c?;s; — Relief Map of the Gettysburg Campaign, from photo, of original 
cast by A. E. Lehman — General Robert E. Lee, C. S. A., from photo, taken after the war — Confederates 
at a Ford (A. C. Redioood). 



Illustration : General James Longstreet, C. 8. A., from Anderson-Cook photo., with autograph, 


Illustrations: Buford's Cavalry Opposing the Confederate Advance upon Gettysburg (W. Taber) — 
General Meade in the Field, from photo.— Major-General John F. Reynolds, from Brady photo.— Fifteen 
Maps Relating to the Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, compiled by General Abner Doubleday (Jacob 
Wells) — Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, from photo, by W. H. Tipton ( W. Taber) — The Lutheran Semi- 
nary, from war-time photo. ; and View of Seminary from Chambersburg Pike, from photo, by W. H. Tipton 
(W. rafter^ — Gettysburg from Oak Hill, from photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Taber) — Geneva] Lee's Head- 
quarters on the Chambersburg Pike, from photo. (W. Taber) — North-east Corner of the McPherson Woods, 
where General Reynolds was killed, from photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Tuber) — Confederate Dead on the 
Field of the First Day, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber) -Union Dead West of the Seminary, from Gard- 
ner photo. (W. Taber) — Union Dead near McPherson's Woods, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber) — John 
L. Burns, " The Old Hero of Gettysburg," from photo.— Malor-General Abner Doubh^lay, from Brady 
photo.— Assault of Brockenbrough's Confederate Brigade (Heth's Division) upon the Stone Barn of the 
McPherson Farm (A. C. Redwood )— Confederate Dead gathered for Burial near the McPherson Woods, 
from Gardner photos. ( W. Taber) — Lieutenant Bayard Wilkeson holding his Battery to its Work in an 
Exposed Position (A. R. TTaMcZ^ — The Line of Defense at the Cemetery Gate-House, from Gardner photo. 
(W. Taber). 


Illustrations: Counting the Scars in the Colors (W. L. SJieppard j —Qeneral Wiulield 8. Hancock, 
from photo, by Gurney & Son, with autograph. 


FIGHT. Extracts from Official Reports ♦ 



Illustrations: Hall's Battery on the First Day resisting the Confedcrnto Advance on tue Chambers- 
burg Road CTT. Taber; — Relief Map of the Battle-field of Gettysburg, from photo, of original cast by A. E. 
Lehman; General Meade's Headquarters on the Taneytown Road, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber) — 
Miyor-<Jeueral Daniel E. Sickles, from photo.— View frofli the Position of Ilazlett's Battery on Little 
Round Top, from photo, by W. H. Tipton (Hurry Fenn) — Tvfo Maps of Positions on July 2d, compiled by 




General Abner Doubleday (Jacob TTeWs^ — Union Breastworks on Little Round Top — Big Round Top in 
the Distance, from Gardner photos. (W. Tafter^ — Colonel Edward E. Cross, from Brady photo.— Weed's 
Position on Little Round Top (C. W. Reed) — General G. K. Warren at the Signal Station on Little Round 
Top (A. B. TFawtZ^ — Brigadier-General Stephen H. Weed, from Brady photo.— Brigadier-General Strong 
Vincent, from Brady photo.— Trostle's Barn and Trostle's House, the Scene of the Fighting of Bigelow's 
Battery, from Gardner photos. Cl^- Taftcr^ — Monument of Bigelow's Ninth Massachusetts Battery, 
from photo, by W. H. Tipton ( W. Taftery —Colonel George L. Willard, from Brady photo.— Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Samuel K. Zook, from Brady photo.— View of Gulp's Hill from the Position of the Batteries near the 
Cemetery Gate, from photo, by W. H. Tipton CTF. Ta6er;— Early's Charge on the evening of July 2d, upon 
East Cemetery Hill (Edwin Forbes) — Confederate Skirmishers at the Foot of Gulp's Hill (Edwin Forbes). 




Illustration: Uniform of the 146th New York Regiment, from photo, by Whiteley & Co. (W. Taber). 


THE BREASTWORKS AT GULP'S HILL I rcKip^ji rcr^orv c r-Dccx,n o-.^ 



Illustrations: At Close Quarters on the First Day at Gettysburg C4. C. Redwood) — Brevet Ma,jor- 
General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, from Brady photo.— The Strug- 
gle for Devil's Den (A. B. Waud)— The "Slaughter Pen" at the Base and on the Left Slope of Little 
Round Top, from Gardner photos. (JV. Taber) —Dead Confederate Sharp-shooter in the Devil's Den, from 
Gardner photo. (W. Tabe/-; — Brigadier-General William N. Pendleton, C. S. A., Lee's Chief of Artillery, 
from photo, by Tanner & Vanness, lent by Commander John M. Brooke — Major-General J. B. Kershaw, 
C. S. A., from photo, by G. W. Minnus. 


Illustrations: Devil's Den, facing Little Round Top (CW. Reed) —Major-General E. M. Law, C. S. A., 
from photo, by Lee — Major-General Lafayette McLaws, C. S. A., from photo.— Sickles's Position at 
the Peach Orchard, viewed from the Emmitsburg Road, looking South — The "Wheat-Field," looking 
toward Kershaw's Position in Front of Rose's House — The Peach Orchard, viewed from Longstreet's 
Extreme Right on the Emmitsburg Road — Sickles's Angle at the Peach Orchard, as seen from the Road 
leading from the Wheat-Field to the Peach Orchard, four sketches made in 1885 (C. TT. Reed). 


Illustrations: The Last Confederate Gun at Gettysburg, on Longstreet's Right, opposite Round 
Top (A. R. TTaHf/;- Lutheran Church on Chambersburg Street, Gettysburg, used as a Hospital, from 
photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Taftcr; — Brigadier-General WiUiam Barksdale, C. S. A., from Brady photo. 
— Brigadier-General Paul Semmes, C. S. A., from photo. — Dead in the " AATieat-Field " gathered for 
Burial, from Gardner photos. CTF. Taber) -Map of Positions July 3d, 3:15 to 5 : 30 r. m., compiled l)y 
GtMieral Abner Doubleday (Jacob TTeW."}) — Major-General William D. Pender, C. S. A., from photo.— Pro- 
file of Cemetery Ridge as seen from Pickett's Position before the Charge, from sketch made in 1884 (C. 
W. iJecrf;- Brigadier-General Lewis A. Armistead, C. 8. A., from photo.— The Charge of Pickett, Petti- 
grew, and Trimble (Edwin For&csJ — Major-General George E. Pickett, C. 8. A., from Anderson-Cook 





FIGHTING AT GETTYSBURG } ^^^^^^^ ^- ''• ^^^'^'"^^^^^ ^^^ 

Illustrations: Charge of Alexander's Artillery CTT. T«&ri-; — Confederate Artillerjnnen at Dinner 
(A. C. AVf/ir«ofO— Confederates Waiting for the End of the Artillery Du.l (1. C Jffrftroorfj — Migor- 
General Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. 8. A., from Anderson-Cook photo. 


Illustrations: Hand-to-hand for Rieketts's Guns on the Evening of the Second Tn\y (W. Taber) — 
Steuart's Brigade renewing the Confederate Attack on Gulp's Hill, Morning of the Third Day (A. C. Red- 
wood)— The 29tli Pennsylvania forming Line of Battle on Cnli/s Hill at 10 a. m.. July 3d, from artist's 
l)icture in possession of Captain W. L. Stork (W. L. Slirppard) -Ureyet Major-GeniTal George S.Greene, 
from ambrotype lent by Captain F. V. Greene — Gettysburg from CuMi's Hill, from photo, taken about 
188f. / E. J. .IffrAr;-) — Monument of the 2d Massachusetts Infantry, facing the East Base of Gulp's Hill, 
from photo, ( W. Taber) — Slocum's Headquarters, Power's Hill, from photo, by W. II. Tipton ( W. Taber) — 



Mencheys Spring, between Gulp's Hill and tbe Cemetery Gate ; and Spangler's Spring, East of Gulp's 
HiU, from sketches by C. W. Reed (W. Ta&er; — Golonel Eliakim SlieiTill, fi-om photo.— (Pickett's Charge, 
I.— Looking down the Union Lines from the '• Climip of Trees " ; Pickett's Charge, II.— The Main Collision 
to the Right of the " Clump of Trees " ; Pickett's Charge, III. (continuation of the foregoing) — three pic- 
tures, from photos, of the Gettysburg Cyclorama) — Inside Evergreen Cemetery, Cemetery Hill (Edwin 
Forbes) — Nine Maps [Nos. 21 to 29] of the Confederate Retreat from Gettysburg, compiled by General 
Abner Doubleday (Jacob TFe/?s; — Confederate Prisoners on the Baltimore Pike (Edwin Forbes). 




Illustrations : Ground over which Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble Charged, from photo, hy W. H. 
Tipton CTF. Ta&er; — Cemetery Ridge after Pickett's Charge (Edwin Forbes). 


II. From the Official Report of COLONEL NORMAN J. HALL 390 

III. From the Report of GENERAL ALEXANDER S. IVEBB 391 



Illustrations : Farnsworth's Charge (W. Ta6er; — Map of Farnsworth's Charge, compiled by Captain 
H. C. Parsons (Jacob TfeWs; — Brigadier-General Elon J. Farusworth, from Brady photo. 


Illustrations : Monument on tlie Field of the Cavalry Fight between the Forces of Gregg and Stuart, 
from photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Tuber)— 'Breyet Major-General D. McM. Gregg, from Brady photo.— Two 
Maps [Nos. 19 and 20] of the Cavalry Battle, compiled by General Abner Doubleday (Jacob TTe/Zs;- Bat- 
tle between the Union Cavali-y imder Gregg and the Confederate Cavalry under Stuart (A. R. Waud). 


Illustration : Monument to the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, on the Site of Sedgwick's Headquarters, 
from photo. ( W. Taber). 


Illustration : Monimientin the Gettysburg Cemetery, from photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Taber). 

I. A Letter from GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE 413 

u. Comment by GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES 414 

THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT FROM ) ^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ 

GETTYSBURG ^ ■■■ ■ j 

Illustrations : " Carry me Back to Die Virginny," Good-bye ! and The Retreat from Gettysbm-g (A. C. 
Redwood) — General J. Johnston Pettigrew, C. S. A., from photo. 


TO STAUNTON )■••■./ 

Illustrations: Confederate Vidette CTF. i. -S'/tei^pa/vO— Confederates Captured at Gettysburg, from 
war-time photo. (W. Taber). 

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT GETTYSBURG, PA. Composition, Strength, and Losses 434 

Illustration : Consecration of the Gettysburg Cemetery, November 19th, 1863 — The Gathering that 
President Lincoln Addressed, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber). 



Illustrations : Union Cavalrymen : the Watcr-Call ( Wiiislom i/o»ir/-; -Map of the Campaigns of the 
Mississippi Valley (Jacob Tl'c^s; - Lieutenant Geii.'ral T. II. Holnios, G. S. A., from photo, by Anthouy- 
Major-General T. C. Ilindmau, C. S. A., from plioto.-Major-GciH-ral John S. Marmaduke, C. S. A., from 
Brady photo. — Miijor-General James G. Blunt, from photo.- Fayetteville, Arkansas, from photo, by 
Hansard & Osborn (C. A. VaHderhoof)-Unv of the Battle of Prairie Grove (J. von Oliimer) -Bvisn- 
dier-Gencral T. J. GhnrchiU, C. S. A., from photo.- Map of the Battle of Arkansas Post (.Tacob Wells) — 
Plan of Fort Hindniaii. Arkansas Post; section of a Casemate of Fortlllndman; and Casemate on the 
Eastern Curtain of Fort Hindman, showing the eflfect of Shot from the Union Guns (Jacob Wem) - 
Helena, Arkansas, from photo. (O. A. Tanderhoof) - Map of the Battle of Helena, Arkansas (Jacob Wells) 
-Map of the Capture of Little Rock (Jacob Wells) - Major-General Frederick Steele, fx'om photo, lent by 
Colonel Thomas L. Snead. 



THE OPPOSING FORCES IN ARKANSAS. Composition, Strength, and Losses 459 


ILLUSTKATIONS : CMckasaw Bayou and the Vicksburg BUiffs, from a sketch lent by Dr. E. Wyllys 
Andrews (Harry Fenn) — Map of the First Vicksburg Campaigu or Chickasaw Bayou (Jacob Wells) — 
Lieutenant-Geuei-al S. D. Lee, C. S. A., from photo.— Major-Geueral Dabney H. Maurj', C. S. A., from 
Auderson-Cook photo. 

position, Strength, and Losses 471 


ILLUSTKATIONS : Lieutenant-General J. C. Pemberton, C. S. A., from photo.— Major-General Martin L. 
Smith, C. S. A., from Brady photo.— Vicksburg Court House, from photo, by A. L. Blanks (C. A. 
Vamlerhoof J —Colonel S. H. Lockett, C. S. A., from oil portrait by Nicolo Marschall, made in 1863. 


Illustrations: Confederate Lines in the Rear of Vicksburg, from jy^oto.— (Harry Fenn)— Major- 
General C. L. Stevenson, C. 8. A., from photo.— Passage of Gun-boats and Steamers at Vicksburg on the 
Night of April 16th, 1863, from oil sketch by Colonel Lockett (J. O. Davidson)— " Sky Parlor Hill," a Confed- 
erate Signal-Station during the Siege, and Caves of the kind in which Residents of Vicksburg sought 
Refuge during the Bombardment by the Fleet, from photos. (Harry J'cmm;— Brigadier-General Edward 
Higgins, C. S. A., from photo.— Effect of the Gun-boat shells on Vicksburg houses (Theo. R. Dai'is; — First 

' Monument that stood on the Spot of the Interview between Generals Grant and Pemberton, and Monu- 
ment' now on the Spot of the Interview, from photos. (Harry Fenn) — Logan's Division entering Vicks- 
burg by the Jackson Road, July 4th, 1863 (Theo. R. Davis). 


Illustrations : Vicksburg from the North, after the Surrender (Theo. R. Davis) —Map of the Campaign 
against Vicksburg, from General Badeau's "Military History of U. S. Grant "— Fimeral on the Levee at 
the Duckport Canal, April, 1863 (Theo. R. X>apts; — Rear- Admiral Porter's Flotilla passing the Vicksburg 
Batteries, Night of April 16th, 1863, fi-om a sketch by Rear- Admiral Walke (F. H. Schell and Thos. Hogan) — 
Rear- Admiral Porter's Flotilla arriving below Vicksburg on the night of April 16, 1863, from a sketch (J. A. 
Davidson).— Majov-Geneval William W. Loriug, C. S. A., from photo.— Major-General J. S. Bowen, C. S. A., 
from photo.— Major-General Andrew J. Smith, fiom Bradj' photo.— Major-General Richard J. Ogleeby, 
fi-om Brady photo.— Map of the Battles of Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Big Black River 
Bridge (Jacob Wells j — Map of the Battle-fleld of Big Black River Biidge, fac-siiuile of the official map.— 
General Blair's Division crossing Big Black River ("J^awes ^. Taylor) -Map of the Siege of Vicksburg, 
from General Badeau's " Military History of U. S. Grant "— Headquarters of the Union Signal Corps, 
Vicksburg, from photo. (W. Taber ) —V,'ooden Coehorn on Grant's Lines (TJieo. R. Davis) — Poaitiou of 
Hovey's Division of McClernand's Corps, and Position of Qninby's Division of McPherson's Corps, two 
pictures, after lithographs of war-time sketches by A. E. Mathews (E. J. ^eeA-cr;- Position of Logan's 
Division of McPherson's Corps — The Fight in the Crater after the Explosion of the Uni(m Mine under 
the Confederate Fort on the Jackson Road, June 25th, 1863, two pictures, after lithographs, of war-time 
sketches, by A. E. Mathews (Harry Fenn) — In the Saps between the White House and the Vicksburg 
Crater, July 2d, 1863; First Conference between Grant and Pemberton, July 3d, 1863, and Union Headquar- 
ters, July 3d ; General Grant Receiving General Pemberton's Message, three pictiires (Theo. R. Davis) — 
Extract in Fac-simile from a Letter of General Grant to General Marcus J. Wright, C. S. A., dated New 
York, Novembei- 30th, 1884. 


Illustrations : The White House, or Shirley, at the Entrance to McPherson's Saps against the "Third 
Louisiana Redan," Vicksburg ( Theo. R. Davis) — Plan of the Approaches to the Vicksburg Mine (looking 
west), from a drawing by General Hickenlooper — Explosion of the Mine under the Confederate Fort on 
the Jackson Road (Theo. R. X»«»is; — Vicksburg, from the River, from a photo. (W. Tabcr). 


Illustration : Arrival of General Grant at General Pemberton's Vicksburg House. July 4th, 1863 (Theo. 
R. Davis). 



111. Correspondence between GENERAL PEMBERTON AND GENERALS 

THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN. Composition, Strength, and Losses . .54(5 
Illustrations: Confederate River-battery on the Ridge South of Vicksburg (Theo. li. Dans; —Wreck 
of the "Star of the West," in the Tallahatchie River, Opposite the Site of Fort Pemberton, from photo, 
lent by 8. B. Morgan (C. A. Vanderhoof). 





Illustrations : Colonel Charles Rivers Ellet, from aiiibrotype lent by Mrs. Mary V. E. Cabell — The Con- 
fedciratc Ram " Arkansas " running through the Union Fleet at Vicksburg, July 15th, 1862 (J. O. Davidson) 
—The "Black Hawk," Admiral Porter's Flag-ship, Vicksburg, 1863 (F.B. Schell), and the "Osage" and 
"Choctaw," from photos.— The Union Vessels "Mississippi" and "Winona" at Baton Rouge, from 
photos. C W. Taber) — Battle of Grand Gulf (second position) , from a sketch by Rear- Admiral Walke (F. H. 
Schell and Tfiomas //o(/«>0 — Lieutenant-Comuiander Januis M. Prichett, from photo. 



Illustrations: Building the "Arkansas " (J. O. Z)at)if/so/0— The Confederate Ram "Arkansas" along- 
side the Union Gun-boat " Caroudelet," from a sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. II. Schell and Thomas 
Hogan ) —Cajttam I. N. Brown, C. 8. N., from photo.— Lieutenant John Grimball, C. 8. N., from photo, by 
W. Kurtz, lent by Captain Isaac N. Brown —Commodore W. D. Porter, from photo, by Fredericks.— 
Destruction of the Confederate Ram "Arkansas" (J. O. Davidson). 





Illustration: Private Houses in New Orleans in which Confederate Officers were Confined, from 
photos (E. J. Meeker). 

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT BATON ROUGE, LA. Composition, Strength, and Losses 585 

Illustration : Burning of the State-House, Baton Rouge, on Sunday, December 28th, 1862 (Frank 
H. Schell). 


Illustrations: Magruder's men boarding the " Harriet Lane" at Galveston (J. O. Davidsonj —Shvir\)- 
shooters of the 75th N. Y. Volunteers picking off the Gimuers of the Confederate Gun-boat " Cotton," in 
the Action at Bayou Teche, La., January 14th, 1863 (Frank H. Schell) — Return of a Foraging Party of the 
24th Connecticut Volunteers to Baton Rouge (Frank H. Schell) —March of the Nineteenth Army Corps by 
the Bayou Sara Road toward Port Hudson (Frank H. Schell) — The Baggage Train of General Augur's 
Division crossing Bayou Montecino on the March to Port Hudson (Frank H. Schell) — Opening of the 
Naval Attack on Port Hudson (A. B. TF^wrf; — Map of the Siege of Port Hudson, La. (Jacob Wells). 

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PORT HUDSON, LA. Composition, Strength, and Losses 598 



Illustrations: General Braxton Bragg, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.— Buildings at Murfrees- . 
boro'— General Rosecrans's Headquarters — Christian Church, used as a Post Chapel by the Union 
Army — Soule Female College, need as a Hospital— Ileadqiiartors of General Bragg, afterward of Gen- 
erals Thomas and Garfield — Union University, uwcd as a Hospital, from photos, taken in lH8i(C.A. 
Vanderhoof) —The Nashville Pike out of Murfreesboro' and View of Minfrecsboro' from the Vicinity of 
Fortress Rosecraus, from photos, taken in 1884 (E. J. J/ecA:e/'; — Brigadier-General James E. Rains, C. S. A., 
from photo.— Brigadier-General R. W. Hanson, C. 8. A., from Brady photo. 

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT STONE'S RIVER, TENN. Composition, Strength, and Losses. .. .610 


Illustrations: Monument to the Dead of tlie Regular Brigade, Stone's River Cemetery — Cannon In- 
scribed with the Number Buried in Stone's River Cemetery — Stone's River Cemeterj-, thcNashvill(> Rail- 
road in tlie Foreground, from pliotos. taken in 1884 (E. J. Meeker) — Mixp of the Battle-fields of Stone's 
River, Tenn. (Jacob Wells) —View on the Nashville Pike at the Union Cemetery, and Monument to the 
Dead of llazf-n's Brigade, on the Position held by his Brigade in the Angle between the Pike and the Rail- 
road, from photos, taken in 1884 (E. J. Jfee/i-er)- Brigatlier-General Edward N. Kirk, from Bi-ady photo.— 
Briga<lier-(Jeneral Joshua W. Sill, from a steel engraving — General Rosecrans's Headquarters at Stone's 
River, and Bridge over Overall's Creek, from photos, taken in 1884 (C. A. FaJirff r/ioo/; — General Samuel 
Beatty's Brigade (Van Cleve's Division) advancing to Sustain the Union Right near the Nashville Pike, 
from litlmgrapli of war-time sketch by A. E. Atathcws (E. J. ifeckcr) — Scone of the Fighting of Palmer's 
and Rousseau's Divisions, from lithograph of war-time sketch l)y A. E. Mathews (W. Taber ) -Volition 
of Starkweather's and Seribner's Brigades on January l8t,2d, and 3d, from lithograph of war-time sketch 
by A. E. Mathews (TTarri/ Fe;iH) — Position of Mendenhall's Fifty-eight Guns (as seeti from the East Bank 
above the Ford) which Repelled the Clnirgo of Breckinridge, January 2d, 1863, from photo, taken in 1884 
(0. A. Vanderhoof) — Advnnce Colonel M. B. Walker's Union brigade on January 2d, from lithograph 
of war-time sketch by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker). 




Illustration : Brigadier-General Jobu H. Morgan, C. S. A., from photo, by W. E. Jolins of picture 
taken at Eiclimond in 1864. 


Illustration : Map of Morgan's Ohio Raid (Jacob Wells), 



Illustrations : Map of the Tullahoina Campaign (Jacob Wells) — The Old John Ross House at Rose- 
ville, from Brady photo. (Hurry Fenn). 


Illustrations : Confederate Line of Battle in the Chickamauga Woods ( W. Tuber) — Map of the Chicka- 
mauga Campaign (Jacob Wells) — Alexander's Bridge, from the Confederate Side of the Chickamauga 
looking Up-stream, from photo, taken in 1884 (Harry Fenn) —Jjee and Gordon's Mills on the Chicka- 
mauga, from Brady photo. (Harry Fenn) — Map of the Battle-tield of Chickamauga (Jacob Wells) — 
Crawfish Springs, from photo, taken in 1884 (Harry Fenn)— GenaTal Thomas's Bivouac after the First 
Day's Battle (Gilbert Gaul) —Tha Sink-Hole near Widow Glenn's House, from photo, taken in 1884 (Harry 
fcwn; — General W. H. Lytle, from Brady photo.— General J. M. Brannan, from photo. 




Illustration: The Suodgrass Farm-house, General Thomas's Headquarters, from photo, taken in 
1884 (Harry Fenn). 


Illustration : House of J. M. Lee, Crawfish Springs, Rosecrans's Headquarters before the Battle, 
and Site of the Union Field Hospital for the Right Wing, from photo, taken in 1884 (W. Tuber). 

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT CHICKAMAUGA, GA. Compositiou, Strength, and Losses 672 


THE LITTLE STEAMBOAT THAT OPENED THE J ^^,,^„ ,, „,„,,,., ^ ,^ ^,,^ 

a ^D A^i/cD I iMcn \ GENERAL IVILLIAM G. LE DUG 676 


Illustration: The Steamer "Chattanooga" unloading Forage at Kelley's Landing, from war-time 
photo, lent by General W. G. Le Due ( W. Taber). 


Illustrations : The Army of the Cumberland in Front of Chattanooga, from lithograph of war-time 
sketch by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Mcclccr)—Mn\t of the Battle of Chattanooga, from (ieneral Badeau's 
"Military History of U. S. Grant"— Ilazcn's men Landing from I'oiitoon-boats at Brown's Ferry (Theo. 
It. Davis) —Panoramic View of the Chattanooga region from Point Lookout, on Lookout Mountain, from 
lithograph lent by J. B. Linn (E. J. Meeker) — View of Chattanooga and Moccasin Point from the side of 
Lookout Mountain, from photo, lent by J. B. Linn (Hurry Fenn) — View of Lookout Mountain from the 
Hill to the North, which was General Hooker's position during the Battle on the Mountain, November 
24th, 1863, from photo, lent liy General W. G. Le Due (Hurry Fenn) — Bridging Lookout Creek preparatory 
to the assault by Hooker ("77. ^. JSro?*'*?; — The Battle of Lookout IMountain (W. L. Sheppard)— The 
Fight East of the Palisades on Lookout :\ronnt:iin (H. E. J?/v)ir>0 — Baird's Divisiim Fighting for the 
Crest of Missionary Ridge, and Confedeiatcs Resisting Baird's Division on Missionary Ridge, fi-om 
photos, of Cyclorama of Missi<mary Ridge — D.parture of the First Hospital Train from Chattanooga, 
.January, 1864, and Interior of a Ilositital Car (Tluo. It. Duvis). 



Illustration: Umbrella Rock, Point of Lookout Mountain, from war-time photo. ( ir. Taber). 





Illustrations: Military Bridge over the Tennessee River at Chattanooga, built in Octol)er, 18C3, fnuu 
photo, by R.M.Cressey, lent by General G. P. ThrustonCTT. rafter^ — General Hooker and Staff on the Ulll 



North of Lookout Creek, from whicli lie directed tlie Battle of Lookout Mountain, from plioto. lent by 
General W. G. Le Due (W. Taber) — The Charge up Missionary Kidge of Baird's, Wood's, Sheridan's, 
and Johnson's Divisious, from a sketch for the Cyclorama of Missionary Ridge. 



TAMPAirN \ Composition, Strength, and Losses 727 


Illustrations: Confederate Assault on Fort Sanders (W. Tafter^ — Map of the Approaches and 
Defenses of Knoxville, Tenn., from drawing lent by General O. M. Poe — The North-western Bastion of 
Fort Sanders, Viewed from the North, from photo. (W. Taber)— Mav of the Immediate Vicinity of Fort 
Sanders, from drawing lent by General O. M. Poe — Brigadier-General William P. Sanders, from photo, 
lent by General Poe — North-western Bastion of Fort Sanders, Viewed from the South-western Bastion, 
fi'om photo, lent by General Poo (W. Ta^c/-;— Brigadier-General E. P. Alexander, C. S. A., from photo, 
by E. Wearn (V. Gribayedoff). 


Illustrations : The North-western Bastion of Fort Sanders, showing the Ground over which the Con- 
federates Charged, from war-time photo. (W. Taier) — Fort Stanley, Knoxville, from war-time photo, 
lent by General Poe (E. J. Meeker) —Yevtical Section of Fort Sauders (Fred. E. Sitis). 

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT KNOXVILLE. Composition, Strength, and Losses 751 

Illustration : Knoxville in 1870 (Harry Venn). 

















POSITIONS JULY 1ST, 8 TO 10 A. M., 10:10 TO 10:30 A. M., 3:30 P. M , ABOUT 4 P. M. 272 


POSITIONS JULY 2D, ABOUT 3 : ^jo P. M 299 


POSITIONS JULY 3D, 3:15 TO 5 : 30 P. M 344 

POSITIONS JULY 4TH, ^TH, 6TH, 7TH, 8TH, qTH, i iTH 381 





























DAyiDSON, J. O. 
DAl^lS, THEO. R. 










HELD, E. C. 


KING, F. S. 

REED, C. H. 






GENEKAL BRAGGr succeeded General Beauregard in command of the 
Confederate troops at Tupelo, Miss., about fifty miles south of Corinth, 
on June 27th, 1862. The field returns of June 9th, a week after our army 
reached Tupelo, reported it at 45,080. J This return included the Army of 
Mississippi, reenforced by the troops brought from Arkansas by Generals 
Price and Van Dorn, together with detachments gathered from various locali- 
ties. About two thousand cavalry not included in this return also belonged 
to the army. This was the maximum force General Bragg could expect to 
concentrate at that point. General Halleck, immediately confronting Bragg 
with the armies of Grant, Pope, and Buell, had in and about Corinth a force 
of 128,315 men, of which the field return of June 1st showed 108,538 present 
for duty. A division reporting 8682 for duty, under the Federal General 
George W. Morgan, was at Cumberland Gap ; a division with 6411 for duty, 
under General Ormsby M. Mitchel, was in north Alabama, and three bri- 
gades were located at Nashville, Murfreesboro', and other points in middle 
Tennessee. Buell soon started en route to north Alabama, General Halleck 
remaining at or near Corinth with seventy thousand men for duty, a force 
strong enough to hold Corinth and west Tennessee, while Buell could menace 
or even invade Alabama or north Georgia. 

The changed condition of the opposing armies during four months should 
now be considered. In January, 1862, the Confederates had held all of 

J To prevent misconception, and to avoid fre- retiirnsof Confederate troops I shall always include 
quent repetitions, I will here state that through- all officers, all non-coimuissioned officers, and all 
out this paper when I mention the figures of field privates who are reported present for duty.— J. W. 


Tennessee and most of Kentucky, and the Mississippi River from Colnmbus 
to the delta. Now, after a series of Confederate reverses, both States were 
virtually under the control of the armies under General Halleck, and the 
Federal flotilla sailed unmolested from St. Louis to Vicksburg. The Federal 
right was thrown forward into Mississippi. Its center occupied north Ala- 
bama, and its left was pressing the Confederates to the southern border of 
east Tennessee. 

The Confederate problem was to devise some plan to turn the tide of dis- 
aster and recover at least a portion of our lost territory. Our soldiers had 
expected a battle at Corinth, in which they felt confident of as decisive a vic- 
tory as was won by them on the first day of Shiloh ; and the withdrawal to 
Tupelo had at last forced upon them a conviction that the numerical prepon- 
derance of the enemy was such that they could not expect to cope success- 
fully with the combined armies then commanded by General Halleck. 

Already the army had suffered much from sickness, and we could hardly 
expect any improvement while it remained idle in the locality where it had 
halted after its retreat from Corinth. An advance into west Tennessee 
would not afford protection to Alabama or Georgia. An advance into middle 
Tennessee by crossing the river at Florence, Decatur, or any neighboring point, 
would have the disadvantage of placing the Confederates between the armies 
of Grant and Buell under circumstances enabling these two commanders to 
throw their forces simultaneously upon General Bragg, who could not, in this 
event, depend upon any material cooperation from the army in east Tennessee 
under General Kirby Smith. There was another line for an aggressive move- 
ment. A rapid march through Alabama to Chattanooga would save that city, 

protect Georgia from invasion, and 
open the way into Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky, without the disadvantage of an 
intervening force between the column 
commanded by Bragg and that under 
the orders of General Kirby Smith. 
This movement was determined upon 
and resulted in what is called the 
Kentucky Campaign of 1862. 

Major-General E. Kirby Smith had 
reached Knoxville March 8th, 1862, 
and assumed command of the Confed- 
erate troops in east Tennessee. The 
retm*ns for June reported his entire 
force at 11,768 infantry, 1055 cav- 
alry, 5> and 635 artillery. The occu- 
pation of Cumberland Gap, June 18tli, 
by a Federal division, and the approach 
of Buell's forces toward Chattanooga 
seriously threatened his department. 

30 'so l(io 


^ Not includiug Allstou's brigade. — Editors. 



General Bragg recognized the inadequacy of General Smith's force, and on 
June 27th he transferred the division commanded by Major-Geueral John P. 
McCown from Tupelo to Chattanooga. | Forrest and John H. Morgan had 
already been sent into middle Tennessee and Kentucky, and the operations 
of these enterprising officers materially lessened the pressure upon General 
Smith. Correspondence between Generals Bragg and Smith resulted in an 
order, dated July 21st, transferring the entire Army of Mississippi to Chatta- 
nooga. To mislead the enemy and to prevent an advance upon Tupelo, 
Bragg had, on the 19th, sent Colonel Joseph A\nieel(n- with a In-igade of cav- 
alry into west Tennessee, and Brigadier-General Frank C. Armstrong ^vith 
a like force into north Alabama. Wheeler's operations in west Tennessee 
may be briefly summarized as a rapid march from Holly Springs, Mississippi, 

4 General Kirby Smith, in a letter dated July 14tb, 18 02, estimated Stevenson's division at 10.000, 
Heth's and McCown's at 10,000, Morgan's cavalry 1300. "Official Records," Vol. XVI., Pt. II., p. 
727.— Editors. 


to Bolivar, Tennessee ; an attack upon the outposts at that place ; the destruc- 
tion of bridges on the line of communications of the troops at Bolivar and 
Jackson ; a number of slight affairs with the enemy's cavalry, and the burn- 
ing of a quantity of cotton in transit to the North. 

One week was thus occupied behind the enemy's lines, the main object of 
the movement being to create the impression of a general advance. On July 
31st Bragg and Kirby Smith met at Chattanooga, and a joint movement into 
middle Tennessee was determined upon. Price and Van Dorn being left to 
confront Grant in northern Mississippi. On August 5th Bragg sent two of 
his brigades (Cleburne's and Preston Smith's) to General Smith at Knoxville. 
General C. L. Stevenson, with nearly nine thousand men, was ordered to watch 
the Federal General G. W. Morgan, who occupied Cumberland Gap. General 
Smith started on the 14th en route to Rogers's Gap, with 4 brigades, 6000 
strong. The brigades of Preston Smith and B. J. Hill were commanded by 
General P. E. Cleburne, and the brigades of McCray and McNair were under 
command of General T. J. Churchill. General Henry Heth, with a force 
nearly 4000 strong, was ordered to march direct to Barboursville by way of 
Big Creek Gap, and the army was preceded by 900 cavahy under Colonel 
John S. Scott. General Smith had at first contemplated cutting off the sup- 
plies of the garrison at Cumberland Gap, but learning that they were well 
provisioned, and seeing the difficulty of supplying his own troops in the poor 
and barren region of south-eastern Kentucky, he determined to push rapidly 
on to the rich blue-grass country in the central part of the State. This deter- 
mination had been communicated to General Bragg, and a march toward 
Lexington was commenced. 

On the evening of the 29th, having reached Madison County, Kentucky, 
Colonel Scott found the enemy about half way between the small village of 
Kingston and the town of Richmond. The force displayed and resistance 
offered indicated that they were resolved to contest any farther advance of 
the Confederates. Although his troops were quite weary and General Heth 
was far to the rear, General Smith determined upon an immediate attack. 
He was in the heart of Kentucky, and the Confederate commander rightly 
judged that boldness was the sui'est road to victory. 

Early on the 30th, General Cleburne, being in advance with his two bri- 
gades, found that the Federal force had moved forward and was in line of 
battle about a mile north of Kingston and probably five miles south of Rich- 
mond. The extreme advance-guard of the enemy, about six hundred yards in 
front of their main line, became engaged with Cleburne's leading brigade, com- 
manded by Colonel Hill, but after a light brush retired upon the main body 
of the Federal army. Hill's brigade was soon formed in lino behind the crest 
of a low ridge which was nearly parallel with and about five hundred yards 
south of the position occupied by the enemy. Cleburne also brought up 
Douglas's battery, which he placed in a favorable position near the center of 
his line. A fire of artillery and infantry commenced, and Captain Martin, with 
a second battery, having arrived, it was also brought into action, and for two 
hours both infantry and artillery were engaged from their respective positions. 


General Mahlon D. Manson, who was in command of the Federal army 
before G-eneral Nelson arrived, and who commenced the battle, now pushed 
his left forward to turn our right. Cleburne met this with one reg- 
iment of Preston Smith's brigade, which had been formed behind a crest 
in his rear, but the persistence of the enemy in that quarter made it neces- 
sary to reenforce the right with all of the reserve brigade under Preston 

In the meantime Greneral Kirby Smith had reached the field with the two 
brigades (McCray's and McNair's) forming General Churchill's division. He 
promptly dispatched that officer with one brigade to turn the enemy's right. 
The Federal commander, apparently disregarding this movement, still boldly 
advanced his own left to carry out his plan of tui'ning the Confederate flank. 
This well-conceived manoeuvre at first seemed to endanger the Confederate 
army, but Colonel Preston Smith with his brigade stood firm, and after a 
severe struggle checked and finally drove back the advancing enemy. Gen- 
eral Cleburne, who up to this time had displayed both skill and gallantry, was 
severely wounded and left the field. General Churchill had now gained the ene- 
my's right, and by a bold and determined charge threw the enemy into disorder. 

Two miles farther north the Federal force made a stand, and McCray's 
gallant brigade, by a rapid march, struck their right, while Cleburne's division, 
now commanded by Colonel Preston Smith, moved to the attack in front. The 
celerity of McCray's movements brought him into action before the other 
troops reached the field, and he suffered from the concentration of a galling and 
destructive fire ; but the approach of Preston Smith, with troops cheering as 
they advanced again, caused a rout of the Federal army, closely followed by om* 
victorious soldiers. When in sight of the town of Richmond the enemy were 
seen forming for a final struggle upon a commanding ridge, which had been 
judiciously selected by the Federal commander, Major-General William 
Nelson, both of the enemy's flanks being protected by skirts of woods. 
General Smith promptly sent McNair's brigade again to turn the Federal 
flank, and with the remaining force attacked directly in front. A warm fusil- 
lade lasted a few moments, when the Federal army again retreated. Early in 
the morning Colonel Scott had been sent to gain the rear of the town. His 
arrival at this moment increased the dismay of the enemy, and assisted 
materially in securing prisoners. The reports of the di\ision and brigade 
commanders show that General Smith's entire force was about five thousand. 
The enemy supposed it much greater, their estimate including General Hetli, 
but his division did not join General Smith until the day after the battle. ^ 
Kirby Smith's loss was 78 killed, 372 wounded, and 1 missing. 

Nelson in his report speaks of his own command on the Kentucky River as 
16,000 strong,\ and the official report of casualties is given as 20(3 killed, 844 
wounded, and 4303 captured. The Federal official reports admit that nine 
pieces of artillery and all their wagon trains were captured by the Confederates. 

^In a letter to General Bragg dated August 24th, 1862, General Kirby Smith says ho will have 
with him, in his advance to Lexington, "about 12,000 effective men." — Editors. 
\ This is the total force spoken of by Nelson as being on the Confederate flank.— Editors. 


Bragg s 




BRAGG — >t — X— SMITH — t— ♦- 



scale: of miles 

10 20 30 40 50 




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A*;** Sonora 



Bowline Greeii 

Colum'biaiy,'- -^-;,"V= ~ ~ - 
|k6lasgow , V f^^ 



[ Tompkinswille 

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Franklin/ ^' 

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^1 I'^^'fi^^^P''''^^ ^''■^°^'>^^;(#\^'f' V^' > 

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AliT A ii^ Af M a\4a# \ 


G \_^ O 

General Manson contends that the Federals en- 
gaged did not exceed 6500. i^Ir General Horatio 
G. Wright, who commanded the department, in his report of Sept. 2d, saj^s : 

" The force engaged in the battle in front of Richmond was utterly broken up, and after all 
the exertions that could be made to collect the stragglers, only some 800 or 900 could be found. 
The remainder of the force were killed, captured, or scattered over the country." 

7^ According to the official reports tho Union force only been mustered into service a few (Jays. Gen- 
engaged consisted of Hanson's and Cruft's bri- eral Nelson says in his report that he had ordered 
gades, eight regiments and two detachments of in- General Manson not to fight, but to fall back, so as 
fantry, one regiment and a battalion of cavalry and to concentrate on the Confederate flank. See the 
two batteries of artillery, all neiu troops xcho had previous note.— Editors. 


Elated with success, and reenforced by about four thousand troops just 
arrived under Heth, the victorious army moved forward to Lexington, and 
was designated by its commander as " The Army of Kentucky." During che 
month of September the greater portion of the army remained in that \dcinity. 

On September 4th Colonel Scott, with a brigade of cavalry, was ordered 
to push on as near as practicable to Louisville, and to destroy the Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad. Heth, with a division of infantry and a brigade of 
cavalry, marched north ; some of his troops, on September 6th, reached the 
suburbs of Covington, but his instructions were not to make an attack upon 
the city. Smith used vigorous efforts to gather and concentrate supplies, 
arouse the people, and raise and organize troops for the Confederacy. 

General Gleorge W. Morgan (Federal), who was left at Cumberland Gap 
with 8682 men, seeing these active movements in his rear, evacuated that 
position on September 17th and made his way through eastern Kentucky to 
the Ohio River at Greenupsburg, arriving there October 3d. 

While these events were haj)pening, Bragg had organized his army at 
Chattanooga into two wings. The right, commanded by General Polk, con- 
sisted of Cheatham's and Withers's divisions of infantry and Colonel Lay's 
brigade of cavalry. The left wing, commanded by General Hardee, consisted 
of Buckner's and Anderson's divisions of infantry and Wheeler's brigade of 
cavalry. This entu'e force, on August 27th, reported 27,816 ofi&cers and men 
for duty. J On the 28th the army was fairly in motion, but up to this time 
General Bragg had not positively determined upon his plan of cam.paign, 
and much depended upon the course pursued by the Federal army. 

As early as the 22d General Buell had established his headquarters at 
Decherd, on the Nashville Railroad, thirty miles north-west of Stevenson, and 
had all the supplies at Stevenson transferred to that place. % Two parallel 
mountain ranges, running north-east and south-west, separated him from 
Chattanooga. A railroad, connecting McMinnville and Tullahoma, ran nearly 
parallel to the north-west slope of these mountain ranges. Already he had 
located General Thomas at McMinnville with Wood's and Ammen's divisions, 
while the divisions of Schoepf, McCook, and Thomas L. Crittenden were 
near the Nashville and Stevenson Raih'oad within easy call of headquarters 
at Decherd. Buell seemed impressed with the belief that Bragg's objective 
point was Nashville, and that he would take the short route over the moun- 
tain by way of Altamont, which movement, if made, would have placed Bragg 
between the force under Thomas and the ]*est of Buell's army. To prevent 
this Buell, on the 23d, ordered these five divisions to concentrate at Altamont. 
General Thomas reached his destination on the 25th, but, finding no enemy 
to confront him and learning that there was no enemy on the mountains, the 
nearest Confederates being at Dunlap's in the Sequatchie Valley, he reported 

\ This return reports a total of 431 officers and ^ On August Gth, during this advance from Ste- 

men in the cavalry. September 1 0th (O. R., XVI., venson to Declierd, Brig. -Gen. Kobert L. McCook 

893) Colonel Joseph Wheeler reported his com- (of Thomas's division; brother to Alex. McD. Mc- 

mand on the march (apparently a part of it) as 700 Cook), who, being ill, was riding in an ambulance, 

strong, and (p. 890) part of Colonel Lay's brigade is was mortally wounded by the enemy's scouts near 

mentioned as 550 strong, August 27th.— Editors. New Market.— Editors. 


these facts to Buell and returned to 
McMinnville. Crittenden's division 
halted near Pelham, and Schoepf at 
Hillsboro'. McCook pressed on and 
reached Altamont on the 29th, where, 
on the 30th, Wheeler attacked his out- 
posts, and McCook retired down the 
mountain. The same day General 
Buell ordered his entire army to con- 
centrate at Murfreesboro'. 

By September 5th, the five divisions 
just mentioned had reached that place, 
together with all detachments from 
along the lines of railroad except 
Rousseau's division, which, being on 
the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, 
marched directly to Nashville. The 
strength of Buell's forces during the 
months of July, August, and Septem- 
ber was estimated by witnesses before 
the Buell Commission, in 1863, at from 
45,000 to 59,309. His own returns for 
June, deducting the force at Cumber- 
land Gap, showed 56,706 present for 
duty, and his October returns, with 
the same deduction, 66,595. | General Buell presented a paper to the Com- 
mission which does not question any of these statements regarding strength, 
but states that he could not have concentrated more than 31,000 men at 
McMinnville to strike the Confederate forces as they debouched from the 
mountains ; and the same paper estimated Bragg's army at 60,000, while his 
retm-ns on August 27th showed but 27,816 officers and men for duty. ^ These 
facts prove the large preponderance of the Federals. 

At Murfreesboro' Buell heard of Nelson's defeat at Richmond, and without 
halting he marched to Nashville. On September 7th he intrusted General 
Thomas with the defense of that city with the divisions of Palmer, Negley, 
and Schoepf, while with the infantry divisions of McCook, Crittenden, 
Ammen, Wood, Rousseau, and R. B. Mitchell, and a cavahy division under 
Kennett, General BueU determined to race with Bragg for Louisville. 

4. The October returns include the heavy reen- 
foreements, placed by General Buell at 22,000, 
that were added to Buell's army on its arrival at 
Louisville, at the end of September. — Editors. 

J^ In his official report, dated November 4th, 
1862, General Buell estimated his whole effective 
force on the 7th and 8th of October, at 58,000, 
including 22,500 raw troops, with little or no 
instruction. He also estimated the total Confed- 
erate force engaged in the invasion at from 55,000 
to 65,000. In "The Army under Buell " (N. Y. : 


D. Van Nostrand), General James B. Fry, Assist- 
ant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff of the Army 
of the Ohio, after a careful study of all the 
data, estimates the force with which Buell moved 
against Bardstown (exclusive of Sill's division 
that moved against Frankfort) at 58,000 ; and 
Bragg's, including Kirby Smith's, at 68,000. 
By this estimate, when Sill joined the main 
body of Buell's army after the battle of Perry- 
ville, the armies were about equal in number. 



It was a fair race, as on that day most of Bragg's army was south of 
the Cumberland Eiver, at Carthage and Grreensboro'. Bragg was nearest to 
Louisville by some twenty-five miles, but Buell had the advantage of a bridge 
at Nashville and the assistance of the railroad to aid in his march. With 
seven hundred cavalry, I hastened to strike and break the raihoad at points 
between Bowling Green and Nashville, and otherwise sought to retard the 
northern march of the Federal army. By the 12th it was e^ddent to Buell 
that no attack would be made on Nashville, and he ordered Greneral Thomas 
to join him with his own division, which had been commanded by General 

r ■ <yf%':."*r"^; ';%:^. 


Schoepf. Buell reached Bowling Green with his cavalry and two divisions 
of infantry on the 14th, and turned his column in the direction of Mun- 
fordville. I interposed my cavalry on the Munfordville road, and also on 
the roads leading to Glasgow, and reported Buell's movements to Bragg. 
General Chalmers, with Bragg's advance, reached Munfordville at daylight 
on the 14th and learned that Colonel Scott, with a cavalry brigade, had 
demanded the surrender on the night previous.\ Chalmers was misinformed 
regarding the strength of the garrison and the character of the defensive 
works. He attacked with vigor, but was repulsed. He reported his force at 
1913 men, and his loss at 35 killed and 253 wounded. On the 14th all of 
Buell's six divisions had reached Bowling Green, and on the 16th he advanced 
vigorously to succor the garrison at Munfordville, the head of his column 
being opposed by cavalry. Bragg, hearing of Chalmers's attack and of Buell's 
movements, ordered his entire army, which had rested two days at Glasgow, 
to start early on the 15th en route for Munford\dlle. On the next day he 
reached that place, boldly displayed his army, and on the 17th at 2 p. M. the 

\ The post was commanded by Colonel J. T. Wilder (17th Indiana), whose force consisted of foiu- regi- 
ments of infantry, a battery, and several detachments, aggregating about 4000 men. — Editors. 
VOL III. ft 


fort and garrison surrendered. The Federals reported their loss at 15 killed, 
57 wounded, and 4076 prisoners. We also captured their armament, 10 pieces 
of artillery, and 5000 stand of small-arms. As might be expected, the Con- 
federate army was much elated, and were eager to grapple with the dispirited 
army under General Buell. 

Bragg placed his troops in a strong position south of the river, using the 
fort as a part of his line of defense. My command was thrown forward to meet 
and skirmish with the enemy, who, on the 19th, commenced preparations for an 
attack. On the 20th General Thomas joined the Federal army with his division. 
General Bragg, in referring to the situation of September 20th, wrote : 

'' With my effective force present reduced by sickness, exhaustion, and the recent affair before 
the intrenchments at Munfordville to half that of the enemy, I could not prudently afford to 
attack him there in his selected position." 

If Kirby Smith's command had been ordered from Lexington to Munford- 
ville even as late as the 12th, a battle with Buell could not have been other 
than a decided Confederate victory. Bragg at first had determined to fight 
with his four divisions, and no doubt would have done so had Buell advanced 
on the 17th, or 18th, or 19th. Early on the morning of the 18th, General Bragg 
sent for me and explained his plans. I never saw him more determined or 
more confident. The entire army was in the best of spirits. I met and 
talked with Generals Hardee, Polk, Cheatham, and Buckner ; all were enthu- 
siastic over our success, and our good luck in getting Buell where he would 
be compelled to fight us to such a disadvantage. It is true our back was to a 
river, but it was fordable at several places, and we felt that the objection to 
having it in our rear was fully compensated by the topographical features, 
which, with the aid of the fort, made our position a strong one for defense. 
So anxious was Bragg for a fight that he sent Buckner's division to the 
front in the hope that an engagement could thus be provoked ; but after the 
arrival of General Thomas, Bragg did not deem it advisable to risk a battle 
with the force then under his command, believing that another opportunity 
would offer after being joined by Kirby Smith. ,He therefore withdrew to 
Bardstown, sending to me, who still confronted Buell, the following order, 
dated September 20th, through General Hardee : 

'' General Bragg directs that, if possible, the enemy be prevented from crossing Green 
River to-morrow, and General Hardee instructs me to say that he expects you wiU contest the 
passage of that river at Munfordville to that end." 

Buell heard of Bragg's movements and pressed forward with determina- 
tion. My small brigade of cavalry contested his advance on the 20th and 
21st, in efforts to comply with the instructions from General Bragg. On 
the afternoon of the 21st, Buell's right approached the river above the town, 
and at the same time he pressed forward his line of battle so rapidly as 
almost to command the only ford by which I could cross Green River with 
both artillery and cavalry. Allen's 1st Alabama Regiment, being directly in 
front, was thrown into column and, charging gallantly, defeated the opposing 
cavalry and broke through their infantry. Among our killed was the noble 


Lieutenant-Colonel T. B. Brown, but the charge sufficiently checked the 
advance to enable the command to cross the ford in good order. The fol- 
lowing note, referring to this engagement, explains itself : 

''Headquarters, Sixth DmsiON, Army of the Ohio, September 22d, 1862. General 
Wheeler, Commanding Cavalry Brigade. General : I am directed by General Buell to say, 
in answer to your request to admit the brother of Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, killed in the 
affair of yesterday within our lines, he regi-ets he cannot, on account of the present state of 
the service, accede to youi' wishes. General Buell has referred your note to me to give you 
the desired information in regard to the fate of Colonel Brown. He was killed outright in the 
handsome cavahy charge executed by your troops yesterday afternoon. His body was taken to 
a neighboring house and cared for. He wUl be interred to-day, and doubtless in the vicinity. 
His watch was taken charge of by an officer of rank in our service, and I will make it a 
point to have it forwarded to you. I am not now informed whether there were any other val- 
uables on the person of Colonel Brown. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient sei-vant, 
Th. J. Wood, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding." 

The watch was subsequently sent to Colonel Brown's daughter. 

On the 22d, with a clear road to Louisville, Buell moved with celerity in 
that direction. My cavahy contested his advance, but the country was 
too open to allow of effective opposition with so small a force. On the 
25th the leading Federal column reached the city, and the seven divisions 
were all up on the 27th. Bragg, Polk, and Hardee had been kept thoroughly 
informed of Buell's march and of the exposure of his flank, which presented 
an inviting opportunity for attack, but so worn and wearied was the con- 
dition of our army that these officers did not feel justified in attempting 
an aggressive movement. On the 28th Bragg left Bardstown with his 
staff to confer with Kirby Smith at Lexington, and then proceeded to 
Frankfort, where, on the 4tli of October, a day was occupied in the instal- 
lation of the Hon. Richard Hawes as Confederate Provisional Goverrior of 
the Commonwealth. 

While these events were happening Buell was making active preparations 
for an aggressive campaign. On the 26th Major-General Wright, command- 
ing the Department of the Ohio, went from Cincinnati to Louisville to confer 
with him, and on the 27th General Halleck issued an order placing Buell in 
command of the troops of both departments, then in Louisville. There has 
been much controversy as to the " strength of the opposing armies." After 
the most careful study of Federal and Confederate official statements, I 
have reached the following conclusions : 


Collected at Cincinnati 45,000 

Collected at Louisville 30,000 

Canied to Louisville by Buell, September 25th to 29th 54,198 

Morgan's Seventh Division 8,084 

Total under BueU's and Wright's command 137,282 \ 

it It will be contended, with some force, that most meager guard would have sufficed to protect 

a portion of these troops was necessary to guard those cities had the main body moved vigorously 

Cincinnati and Louisville. But on the other hand against the Confederates. — J. W. 

it may be insisted, just as strenuously, that the J But see other estimates, p. 31.— Editors. 


To these we might with propriety add the 26,351 men which General Wright 
could have drawn from his command in West Virginia. 

These stupendous armies did not include the 12,397 troops left at Nashville, 
which would make the entire force subject to Buell's and Wright's orders 
176,030. , 


General E. Kirby Smith's column taken to Kentucky 10,000 

Humphrey Marshall, from West Virginia 2,100 

Stevenson, joining after PeiTyviUe 7,500 

John H. Morgan 1,300 

Bragg's largest force before crossing Tennessee River — officers and 

men, for duty 27,816 

Bragg, Smith, and Marshall 48,776 g> 

The above was the reported strength of the Confederate troops when the 
campaign began, but to make sure and to compensate for any omitted cavalry 
let us add 1000, making the entire force 49,776. The losses at Richmond and 
Muufordville were very slight, compared to the daily depletion caused by 
dropping out along the route. Some were allowed to organize in squads and 
make their way back to east Tennessee ; some sought shelter among the kind 
and hospitable people ; some struggled along with the ambulance trains, and 
some were left at temporarily established hospitals, one of which, containing 
two hundred inmates, was captured by the enemy at Glasgow. 

This character of loss always attends a rapidly moving army, and its extent 
can be realized when we see that Hardee's wing left Chattanooga 12,825 
strong, was reenforced by Cleburne's brigade early in October; yet, even 
with Cleburne included, Hardee, in stating officially the force with which 
he fought at Perry ville, says: "Thinned by battle and long and arduous 
service, my effective force did not exceed 10,000 men." It will be seen, there- 
fore, that these causes reduced the Confederate ranks in much greater pro- 
portion than they were increased by enlistments and other accretions, and 
General Bragg in his official report of the campaign asserts that we were able 
"at no time to put more than forty thousand men of all arms and at all places in 
battle." This included Bragg's, Smith's, and Marshall's columns, and although 
it is probably true that their aggregate strength in August was 48,776, it 
would have been as difficult for Bragg and Smith to have concentrated that 
number as it would have been for Buell and Wright to have concentrated the 
163,633 which they commanded. Even with such a force available to drive 
40,000 men out of Kentucky, General Wright on the 16th appealed to the 
governors of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan for additional troops. 
What troops came in answer to these calls I would not venture to say; but 
leaving these and the troops in West Virginia under General Wright out of 
the calculation, our strength, even after Stevenson joined us, was less than 
half, and but little more than one-third that of the enemy, and that powerful 
enemy was directly on its base of supplies, with unlimited commissary and 

% But see other estimates, p. 31.— Editors. 



ordnance stores, while the Confederate army had no base, was living off the 
country, and had no possibility of replenishing ammunition. Bragg felt very 
keenly the misfortune caused by his inability to concentrate and gain a 
victory over Buell before he should reach the reenforcements which awaited 
him at Louisville. 
In writing to the Government, September 25th, Bragg says : 

" I regret to say we are sadly disappointed in the want of action by our friends in Kentucky. 
We have so far received no accession to this army. General Smith has secured about a brigade 
— not half our losses by casualties of different kinds. 
Unless a change occurs soon we must abandon the gar- 
den spot of Kentucky. . . ." 

On September 18th, Kirby Smith writes to 
General Bragg : 

'' The Kentuckians are slow and backward in rally- 
ing to our standard. Then- hearts are evidently with 
us, but their blue-grass and fat-grass are against us. 
Several regiments are in process of organization, and 
if we remain long enough recruits will be found for all 
the disposable arms in our possession." 

These letters illustrated why a victory over 
Buell was necessary. 

Although Kentucky maintained her neu- 
trality as long as it was possible, the chivalric 
spirit of her gallant sons was fully manifested 
at the earliest opportunity — each obeying 
only the dictates of his own convictions of duty. While thousands united 
their fortunes with the South, other and more thousands flocked to the 
standard of the North. 

The proud old families — descendants of the pioneers of the Common- 
wealth — each sent sons to do battle in the opposing armies. Friends, 
neighbors, kinsmen, and even brothers bade each other adieu — one to the 
Northern army, the other to the Confederate. | Wherever daring courage, 
rare intelligence, extraordinary fertility of resource, or fortitude under pri- 
vation and suffering were displayed, Kentuckians were conspicuous; and 
when the fight was over and the battle-rent banner of the vanquished Con- 


4. The remarkable division of sentiment, upon 
the issue presented by the secession of the South, 
that existed in Kentucky is clearly illustrated by 
the course of some of her leading families. The 
three most prominent families in the State were 
the Breckinridges, the Clays, and the Crittendens, 
and each of them had representatives in both 
armies. Major-Gen eral Thomas L. Crittenden and 
Colonel Eugene W. Crittenden served in the army 
of the Nortli, while their brother, Major-Greneral 
George B. Crittenden, served in the army of tlie 
South. Of Henry Clay's grandchildren, I recall 
three who espoused the Federal cause, and four 
who joined the Southern army. Vice-President 
Breckinridge and three sons adhered to the South, 

while his two distinguished cousins, the eminent 
Presbyterian divines, were uncompromisiug in 
their devotion to the Union. The elder, and per- 
haps more famous of these cousins. Dr. Eobert J. 
Breckinridge, had two sons in the Confederate and 
two in the Federal army; one of whom (CoIouelJ. 
C. Breckinridge, now [ISSS] of the regular army), 
in the fierce battle at Atlanta, July 22d, 1S04, 
became a prisoner to his brother, W. C. P. Breckin- 
ridge, the present member of Congress, who made 
as brilliant a record as a soldier as he lias since made 
as a statesman. They passed the night following that 
sanguinary battle with as much warmth of fraternal 
affection as though visiting each other from neigh- 
boring armies engaged in the same cause. — J. W. 


f ederacy fui'led about its shattered staff was buried in that grave from which 
a resurrection is no less unwished for than impossible, the survivors of 
the contest from that State returned to their homes with no feelings of 
animosity, no brooding hopes of vengeance to be wreaked upon their late 

On October 1st Buell commenced his march from Louisville upon Bragg at 
Bardstown. On September 29th General Thomas had been assigned by Presi- 
dent Lincoln to the command of the army, but at Thomas's request the order 
was revoked, and he was announced in orders as second in command. 

Buell organized his infantry into three army corps, of three divisions each. 
The First Corps on the left, under Major-G-eneral McCook, marched through 
Taylorsville. The Second Corps, under Major-General Crittenden, marched 
through Mount Washington, and the Third Corps, under Major-Oeneral Gil- 
bert, which formed the Federal right, took the route by way of Shepherdsville. 
General Sill, of McCook's corps, reenforced by Dumont's independent division, 
marched direct to Frankfort to threaten Kirby Smith. 

Buell, in his official report, says : 

" Skiitnisliing with the enemy's cavah-y and artillery marked the movement of each column 
from within a few miles of LouisviUe. It was more stubborn and formidable near Bardstown, 
but the rear of the enemy's infantry retired from that place eight hours before oui- arrival, when 
his rear-guard of cavalrj^ and artillery retreated after a sharp engagement with my cavalry. 
The pursuit and skirmishing with the enemy's rear-guard continued toward Springfield." 

General Smith prepared to meet Sill and Dumont, and on October 2d Bragg 
ordered General Polk to move the entire army from Bardstown via Bloom- 
field toward Frankfort, and to strike Sill's column in flank while Smith met 
it in front. For reasons which were afterward explained that order was 
not complied with, but, on the approach of Buell^^ Polk marched via Perry- 
ville toward Harrodsburg, where he expected the entire army would be con- 
centrated. ^ General Smith, confronted by Sill and Dumont near Frankfort, 
had several times on the 6th and 7th called upon Bragg for reenforcements, 
and Wither s's division of Polk's corps was ordered to him. Reports reached 
Bragg exaggerating the strength of the movement upon Frankfort. He was 
thus led to believe that the force behind Polk was not so heavy as represented, 
and on the evening of October 7th he directed him to form the cavalry 
and the divisions of Cheatham, Buckner, and Patton Anderson at Perry^ille, 
and vigorously attack the pursuing column. Since October 1st our cavalry 
had persistently engaged the two most advanced of Buell's columns. 

The reader should now observe, by the map [p. 6], that McCook's corps 
approached Perryville by the road through Bloomfield, Chaplin, and Mack- 
ville, its general direction being nearly south-east. General Gilbert's corjis 
approached by the road from Springfield, its general direction being east, but 
bearing north-east as it approached the town. Crittenden's corps, accom- 
panied l)y General Thomas and preceded by cavalry, having crossed Gilbert's 
line of march, was on a road which runs due east from Le])anon to Danville. 

i General Polk, finding his own front threatened, availed himself of previous instruetions as to how- 
he should handle his force in certain contingencies, and retired slowly.— Editors. 


At a point about five miles south-west of Perryville this road has a branch 
which turns north-east to that place. Now remember that our stores and 
supplies were at Bryantsville and Camp Dick Robinson about eighteen miles 
east of Perryville, and that Kirby Smith was at McCown's Ferry, on the 
Kentucky River, en route for Versailles, menaced by two divisions under 
General Sill. Also observe the important feature that McCook was at Mack- 
ville during the night of the 7th, at which place a road forks, running east to 
Harrodsburg and thence to om* depot at Bryants^ille ; and also consider that 
Mack\dlle was as near Bryants\alle as were our troops in front of Perrj^ille. 
On the 7th our cavalry fought with considerable tenacity, particularly in 
the evening, when the enemy sought to get possession of the only accessible 
supply of water. General Buell, in his report, says : 

" The advanced guard, consisting of cavalry and artillery, supported toward evening by two 
regiments of infantry, pressed successfully upon the enemy's rear-guard to within two miles 
of the town, against a somewhat stubborn opposition." 

After dark, at General Hardee's request, I went to his bivouac and dis- 
cussed the plans for the following day. I explained to him the topogi-aphy 
of the country and the location of Buell's columns. I understood from him 
that the attack would be made very early the next morning, and I endeavored 
to impress upon him the great advantage which must follow an early com- 
mencement of the action. An early attack on the 8th would have met only 
the advance of Gilbert's corps on the Springfield road, which was four or five 
miles nearer to Perryville than any other Federal troops, and their overthrow 
could have been accomphshed with little loss, while every hour of delay was 
bringing the rear divisions of the enemy nearer to the front, besides bringing 
the corps of MeCook and Crittenden upon the field. I explained, also, that 
Thomas and Crittenden on the Lebanon and Dan^dlle road could easily gain 
our rear, while all our forces were engaged with McCook and Gilbert. For 
instance, if Crittenden turned toward Perryville at the fork five miles from 
that place, he would march directly in the rear of our troops engaged with 
Gilbert's corps. If he kept on toward Danville and Camp Dick Robinson, 
our position would be turned, and a rapid retreat to our depot of supplies, 
closely followed by McCook and Gilbert, would be the ine\4table result. With 
equal ease, McCook, by marching from Mackville to Harrodsburg, could 
reach our depot, thus turning our right flank. 

The reader will plainly see that Perryville was not a proper place for six- 
teen thousand men to form and await the choice of time and manner of 
attack by Buell, with his tremendous army, and that every moment's delay 
after daylight was lessening the probabilities of advantage to the Confeder- 
ates. The cavalry under my command was pressed forward at dawn on the 
8th, and skirmished with the outposts of the enemy, until, on the approach 
of a Federal brigade of cavalry supported by a line of infantry, we charged, 
dispersing the cavalry, and, breaking through both infantry and artillery, 
drove the enemy from their guns and took 140 prisoners. 

The Federal army was now being placed in line : McCook's corps on tlie 
left, Gilbert's in the center, and Crittenden's corps, which reached the field 



at 11 o'clock,\ on the right, its 
flank being covered by Edward 
M. McCook's brigade of cav- 
ahy. The management of the 
Federal right wing was un- 
der the supervision of General 

General Bragg reached Per- 
ryville about 10 o'clock. Gen- 
eral Liddell's brigade, of 
Buckner's division, had been 
advanced with his left near 
the Springfield road, and his 
skirmish line became engaged. 
The cavalry on the Confederate 
left apparently being able to 
hold their own against the ene- 
my upon that part of the field, 
Cheatham's division, composed 
of Donelson's, Stewart's, and 
Maney's brigades, was ordered 
to the right, where, between 1 
and 2 o'clock, with its right 
supported by cavalry, it moved 
forward to the attack. Gen- 
erals Hardee and Buckner, see- 
ing Cheatham fairly in action, 
ordered General Bushrod John- 
son's and Cleburne's brigades 
forward. There being considerable space between Cheatham's left and 
Buckner's right. General John C. Brown's and Colonel Jones's brigades, of 
Anderson's division, and General S. A. M. Wood's, of Buckner's division, had 
been placed in position to fill the vacancy. Adams's and Powell's brigades, of 
Anderson's division, were to the left of Buckner, and the line thus arranged 
with cavalry on both flanks gallantly advanced upon the enemy. Cheatham 
was first in action and was almost immediately exposed to a murderous fire of 
infantry and artillery, which soon spread to the left of our line. 

Our artillery, handled with great skill, told fearfully on the enemy, who 
sought, when practicable, to take shelter behind stone walls and fences. 
Fortunately we were enabled to enfilade many of their temporary shelters 
with a well-directed fire from our batteries, and this, added to our musketry, 
was so effective that first one regiment, then another, nnd finally the entire 
Federal line, gave way before the determined onset of onr troops. 

\ Critteuden testified before the Buell Commission that his leiidiiig division "was in line of battle 
between 10 and 11." This line was formed ou the Lebanon pike about three miles from the battle- 
field.— Editors. 


FK< I 


At one time Cleburne and Jolmson seemed checked for a moment, as they 
assailed a very strong position, the fire from which cut down our men and 
severely wounded General Clebui-ne. But encouraged by the steady advance 
on both right and left, these troops recovered from the shock, and with 
increased speed the entire line overran the enemy, capturing three batteries 
and a number of prisoners. Among the dead and wounded Federals lay one 
who, the prisoners told us, was General James S. Jackson, the commander of 
one of McCook's divisions. General Liddell, who had been placed in reserve, 
followed the movement, and when the contest became warmest was sent to 
reenforee Cheatham, where he did valiant service. 

During this sanguinary struggle, our line had advanced nearly a mile. 
Prisoners, guns, colors, and the field of battle were ours ; not a step which 
had been gained was yielded. The enemy, though strongly reenforced, 
was still broken and disordered. He held his ground mainly because 
our troops were too exhausted for further elfort. At one point just at 
dusk we captured a disorganized body, including a number of brigade and 
division staff-officers. Soon darkness came on and we rested on the field 
thus bravely won. 

Our entire force engaged, infantry, cavalry and artillery, was but 16,000 
men. Our loss was 510 killed, 2635 wounded, and 251 missing. Generals 
S. A. M. Wood and Cleburne were disabled, and a large proportion of higher 
officers were killed or wounded. Three of General Wood's staff were among 
the killed. 

General Buell lost 916 killed, 2943 wounded, and 489 captured by the 
Confederates. General Jackson, commanding a division, and General Terrill 
and Colonel Webster, commanding brigades, were among the Federal killed, 
and Colonel Lytle was among the wounded. 

At every point of battle the Confederates had been victorious. We had 
engaged three corps of the Federal army; i^ one of these, McCook's, to use 
Buell's language, was " very much crippled," one division, again to use his 
language, " having in fact almost entirely disappeared as a body." 

After darkness had closed a battle, it was a custom to send messengers or 
notes to the nearest generals, detailing results, telling of this or that one who 
had fallen, and asking information from other portions of the field. Resting 
quietly on the ground, the army expected, and would gladly have welcomed, 
a I'enewal of the fight on the next day, but the accumulation of Buell's forces 
was such as not to justify further conflict in that locality. Kirby Smith was 
near Lawrenceburg with his own troops and Withers's division, and after full 
consultation it was determined to march to Harrodsburg, where it was hoped 
the entire Confederate force in Kentucky might bo concentrated. I was 
directed with the cavalry to prevent an advance on the road leading to 
Danville. At midnight the troops withdrew to Perry ville, and at sunrise 
continued the march. It was long after this when the Federal pickets began 
to reconnoiter, and it was fully 10 o'clock when, standing on the edge of the 
town, I saw the advance of the skirmish line of Buell's army. Bragg prepared 

■5^ Only a small part of Crittendeu's corps was in actiou ; see p. 31.— Editors. 


for battle on the Harrodsbiirg road, only eight miles from Perryvillo, and 
awaited Buell's advance. 

Two days elapsed, and the Federal army evinced no disposition to attack. 
A division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry fought me back to near 
Danville, and at the same time Buell formed with his right within four 
miles of that place, making a feint in Bragg's immediate front on the road 
leading from Perryville to Harrodsburg. Buell, no doubt, hoped to cut him 
off from the crossing of the Dick River near Camp Dick Robinson. 

I sent Greneral Bragg information of Buell's dispositions, whereupon he 
issued orders to his army and wrote me as follows: 

''Harrodsburg, Ky., October 10th, 1862. Colonel Wheeler. Dear Colonel: I 
opened yom- dispatch to General Polk regarding the enemy's movements. The information 
you furnish is very important. It is just what I needed and I thank you for it. This infor- 
mation leaves no doubt as to the proper course for me to pursue. Hold the enemy firmly till 
to-morrow. Yours, etc., Braxton Bragg." 

Bragg had now determined to retreat to Knoxville by the way of Cumber- 
land Gap. It was evident that Buell's large army would enable him to select 
his own time and position for battle unless Bragg chose to attack. Bragg 
already had 1500 sick and over 3000 wounded. A severe battle would 
certainly have increased the wounded to 4000 or 5000 more. The care of 
such a number of wounded would have embarrassed, possibly controlled, 
our movements. 

Hardee states that he had but 10,000 men before the battle of Perryville, 
and Bragg said that the three divisions which fought that battle had but 
14,500. If that was correct they had now but 11,000. 

It was too hazardous to guard our depot of supplies and contend with the 
Federal forces within easy march. Our wagon trains were immense, and our 
artillery large in proportion to other arms. 

The enemy pushed up close to Danville on the night of the 10th, but we 
easily held him in check until all our army had crossed Dick River. On the 
11th we contended against a force of infantry, which finally pressed us so 
warmly that we were compelled to retire east of Danville. Here the enemy 
was again diiven back, and we held our position near the town. 

Before day on the 13th I received the following appointment and instruc- 
tions in a special order from Greneral Bragg, dated Bryantsville : 

*' Colonel Wheeler is hereby appointed chief of cavalry, and is authorized to give orders 
in the name of the commanding general. He is charged under Major-General Smith with 
covering the rear of the army and holding the enemy in check. All cavahy will report to him 
and receive his orders." 

Compliance with the above of course involved considerable fighting, but by 
using the cavalry to the best advantage, and adopting available expedients, 
the movement of our infantry and trains in retreat was unmolested. These 
engagements were constant, and were often warmly and bitterly contested. 

The large trains of captured stores made the progress of our infantry very 
slow, and the corps commanders sent frequent admonitions to me urging the 



importance of persistent resistance to Buell's advance. In crossing Big Hill, 
and at other points, the trains hardly averaged five miles a day, and General 
Kirby Smith at one time regarded it as impossible for the cavahy to save 
them. In his letter to Bragg, on the 14th, he says : " I have no hope of saving 
the whole of my train " ; and in his letter on the 15th he says : " I have little 
hope of saving any of the trains, and fear much of the artillery wiU Ije 
lost." But fortunately nothing was lost. Our cavalry at times dismounted 
and fought behind stone fences and hastily erected rail breastworks, and when 
opportunity offered charged the advan- 
cing enemy. Each expedient was adopted 
several times each day, and when practi- 
cable the road was obstructed by felling 
timber. These devices were continually 
resorted to until the 22d, when the enemy 
ceased the pursuit, and early in Novem- 
ber the cavalry force, which covered the 
retreat from Kentucky, reached middle 
Tennessee and was close to the enemy, 
less than ten miles south of Nashville. 

The campaign was over. Buell was 
deprived of his command for not having 
defeated Bragg, who, in turn, was cen- 
sured by the Southern people for his 
failure to destroy the Federal army com- 
manded by Buell. 


This campaign was made at a time 


when the opposing Grovernments hoped 

for more from their generals and armies than could reasonably be accom- 
plished. The people of the South were misinformed regarding the resoui'ces 
at the disposal of Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith, and oiu' fii'st successes 
aroused expectations and hopes that the Kentucky movement would result 
in the defeat, or at least the discomfiture, of Buell's army, the possible inva- 
sion of the North, and certainly the recovery of Confederate power in the cen- 
tral and eastern portions of Kentucky and Tennessee. They were sorely 
disappointed when they heard of General Bragg's "svithdrawal through Cum- 
berland Gap, and could not easily be convinced of the necessity of such a 
movement immediately following the battle of Perryville, which they 
regarded as a decisive victory. The censure which fell upon Bragg was 
therefore severe and almost universal. It somewhat abated after the prompt 
advance of the army to Murfreesboro' ; but to this day there are many who 
contend that Bragg should have defeated Buell and maintained himseh' in the 
rich and productive plains of Kentucky. On the other hand the Federal 
Government was, if possible, more severe in denunciation of General Buell, 
and held that, fcir from allowing General Bragg to cross the Tennessee River 
and the mountains into middle Tennessee, Buell should have anticipated these 
movements, occupied Chattanooga, and, as some even contended, inarched 


his army toward Atlanta. The Government was convinced that he could 
easily have met and halted Bragg as he debouched from the mountains before 
entering middle Tennessee. It was emphatic in its assertion that ordinary 
celerity on the part of General Buell would have saved Munford\dlle and its 
garrison of 4'200 men ; that proper concentration would have destroyed the 
Confederate forces at Perryville, and that the plainest principles of strategy 
presented the opportunity of throwing forward a column to cut off Bragg's 
retreat via Camp Dick Robinson, or that at least after the commencement of 
the conflict at Perryville he should have pressed close to his antagonist and 
forced Bragg to continuous battle, contending, as they did, that superior num- 
bers and proximity to his base gave the Federal commander advantages 
that, if properly improved, would have resulted in the destruction of the 
Confederate army. 

Buell's strategy and tactics were the subject of Congressional investigation 
and inquiry by a military commission. With regard to the adverse criticisms 
on Bragg's campaign it must be admitted that there were opportunities, had 
they been improved, to cripple, if not to defeat, the Federal army. 

The failure to " concentrate and attack " tells the story of the campaign. 
The first opportunity was on September 18th, when we caught Buell south of 
Munfordville. Bragg could not have attacked at Altamont, because it will be 
remembered that on August 30th, at the first appearance of our cavalry, the 
Federal force retreated from that place down the mountain. Neither could 
he have overtaken Buell's troops at McMinnville, because, fully three days 
before Bragg could have reached that place, Buell had ordered all his army 
to Murfreesboro'. 

Those who contend that Bragg should have followed Buell to Nashville do 
not consider that he would have found him in a good position, strengthened 
by fortifications, and defended by 9 divisions of infantry and 1 of cavalry; 
his available force for duty then being 66,595. 

After the surrender of the Federal fort at Munfordville, it became painfully 
apparent that a single mind should control the Confederate troops in Ken- 
tucky, and concentrate our entire force and attack the divided enemy ; but a 
condition existed which has been repeated in military operations for four 
thousand years, and always with disastrous results. The troops in Kentucky 
had two commanders. The troops of two different departments were expected 
to cooperate. 

Both Kirby Smith and Bragg were brave and skillful generals. The 
devotion of each to the cause in which they were enlisted was absolute, and 
their only amlntion was to contribute to its success. In their characters the 
pettiness of personal rivalry could find no place, and either would willingly 
have relinquished to the other the honor of being the victor, if the victory 
could only have been won. 

It will be remembered how promptly, in the preceding June, General Bragg 
had weakened his own army and strengthened Smith's by sending McCown's 
division from Tupelo to Chattanooga, and again in August by sending the 
brigades of Cleburne and Preston Smith from Chattanooga to Knoxville; 


PEARTRFE, OM II I M 1 I I > ^ I M - < 'I 1 \1 I 
ROUSSLVt > lO-UloN, 1 1 KUWll I 1 1 

SPKrsG >r \n vru\ ^ \ ii 1 1 w iik ii in i 


and again, when Smith was 
pressed at Frankfort, that 
Bragg reenf orced him prompt- 
ly with one of his best divi- 
sions. That Kirby Smith 
would, at any time, have been 
as ready and prompt to give 
Bragg any part or all of his 
army there can be no doubt, 
but when the decisive moment 
came, the two independent 
armies were more than one 
hundi-ed miles apart, and neither commander could be informed of the other's 
necessities. Bragg and Smith conferred together, but neither commanded the 
other. If all the troops had belonged to one army, Bragg would have ordered, 
and not conferred or requested. 

To aggravate the difficulties inherent in the system of independent 
commands and divided responsibility, Brigadier-Greneral Marshall, who had 
commanded in West Virginia, appeared upon the field of active opemtions 
with 2150 men. He was an able and distinguished man and determined 
in his devotion to the Confederac^y. He wished to do his full duty, but he 
appeared to feel that he could render more efficient service with a separate 
command than if trammeled by subordination to a superior commander-; 
and his aversion to having any intervening power between himself and the 
President was apparent. 

While G-eneral Smith was anxious to cooperate, he nevertheless, in reply 
to Bragg's request for cooperation, wrote indicating very forcibly that he 
thought other plans were more important ; and, in fact, the only cooperative 
action during the campaign was Bragg's compliance aWHi Smitli's request to 


transfer to him two brigades on August 5th, and to transfer Withers's division 
to him on October 7th. 

In reply to the question as to what one supreme commander could have 
done, I confidently assert he could have concentrated and attacked and 
beaten Buell on September 18th south of Munfordville. He could then have 
turned and marched to Louisville and taken that city. If it should be argued 
that this plan involved unnecessary marching on the part of Kirby Smith, 
who was then at Lexington, a supreme commander could have adopted the 
one which was contemplated by Bragg early in the campaign. \ 

After the surrender of Munfordville he could by September 21st have 
reached Louisville with all the force in Kentucky, taken the city, and then 
risked its being held by a small garrison, while making another concentra- 
tion and attack upon Buell. 

As an evidence of how easily we could have taken Louisville, it must be 
observed that on September 22d Buell sent Major-General Nelson orders 
containing these words : 

" If you have only the force you speak of it would not, I should say, be advisable for you to 
attempt a defense of Louisville unless you are strongly intrenched ; under no circumstances 
should you make a fight with his whole or main force. The alternative would be to cross the 
river or march on this side to the mouth of Salt River and bridge it so as to form a junction 
with me. . . . " 

Nelson seemed to concur with Buell, and it was not until that officer was 
but a day's march from Louisville that Nelson telegraphed the fact to General 
Wright, saying, " Louisville is now safe ; ' Grod and Liberty.' " 

In further corroboration of this, " Harper's History," p. 311, says : 

" Just before the Federal army entered Louisville, on the 25th of September, the panic there 
had reached its height. In twenty -foui* hours more Nelson would have abandoned the city." 

But sui^pose neither plan had been adopted, the next chance for a supreme 
commander of the Kentucky forces was to "concentrate and attack" Buell's 
flank while his army was strung out en route to Louisville. Elizabethtown 
would have been a good place, and had it been done with vigor about 
September 23d it certainly would have resulted in victory. But at this time 
General Smith's forces were all moving to Mount Sterling, 130 miles to the 
east of that place (Elizabethtown), and General Smith was asking, not order- 
ing. General Marshall to cooperate with him. The next field upon which a 
supreme commander had an opportunity to concentrate and attack was 
at Perryville. Three hundred cavalry could have played with Generals 
Sill and Diimont around Frankfort, and every other soldier, except a few 

\ On the 1st of August General Bragg wrote the fairest prospect of cutting off General Buell." 

from Chattanooga to Eichmond : "As some ten On the 12 th Bragg wrote to Smith, at Knoxvillo, 

days or two weeks must elapse before my means as follows: "On Friday I shall probably com- 

of transportation will reach here to sucli extent as mence crossing the river [Tennessee], by which I 

to enable mo to take the field with ray main force, shall draw their attention from you. ... I shall not 

it has been determined that General Smitli shall desire to hold you longer in check than will enable 

move at once against General [G. W.] Morgan in me to get in motion to support you, for it would be 

front of Cumberland Gap. Shoidd he be success- too great a risk to allow Buell, by rapid railroad 

ful, and our well-grounded hopes fulfilled, our en- movements, to get in your front. In the meantime 

tire force will be thrown into middle Tennessee with I hope you will bring Morgan to terms."— Editors. 



scouts, could then have struck Clilbert's corps as day dawned on the 8th 
of October. 

Since, in the final result, we neither defeated Buell nor took Louis^dlle, it 
is now evident that it was unfortunate Bragg did not foresee the end imme- 
diately after his victory at Munfordville, He could certainly have crippled 
Buell to some extent as he attempted his hazardous flank movement en route 
to Louisville, and then, by a rapid march, he could have reached and 
captm-ed Nashville and relurned and established himself at Bowling Green. 

I have pointed out these 
lost opportunities as an 
additional proof of the 
adage, as old as war itself, 
"that one bad general is 
better than two good ones." 
The very fact that both the 
generals are good intensi- 
fies the evil; each, full of 
confidence in himself and 
determined to attain what 
he has in view, is unwilling 
to jdeld to any one ; but if 
both are weak the natural 
indisposition of such men 
to exertion, their anxiety to 
avoid responsibility, and 
their desire in a great crisis 
to lean on some one, will 
frequently bring about the 
junction of two independ- 
ent armies without any 
deliberately planned concert of action between the commanders. Both 
Bragg and Kirby Smith were men who had, to an eminent degree, those 
qualities that make good generals, and, once together with their armit\'< upon 
the same field, victory would have been certain. Both fully appreciated the 
fact that, when an adversary is not intrenched, a determined attack is the 
beginning of victory. By this means Smith had been \dctorious at Manassas 
and at Richmond, Ky., and by ^dgorous attack Albert Sidney Johnston and 
Bragg had won at every point of battle at Sliiloh, on the Cth of April. Later, 
the Confederate points of attack were Bragg's scene of \nctory the first day at 
Murfreesboro', and the boldness of his onset gave Bragg his great triumph 
at Chickamauga. Nothing was therefore wanting in Kentucky but absolute 
authority in one responsible commander. Cooperation of the most cordial 
character is a poor substitute. The word cooperation should be stricken from 
military phraseology. 

Li writing to the Government on August 1st, aftei- he had met (Jeneral 
Smith, General Bragg says : " We have arranged measures for mutual sup- 


The cemetery is situated on a knoU a few rods south-east of the hill on 
which General J. S. Jackson was killed. After the battle Squire Henry 
P. Bottom oflered the friends of the Confederates any plot of sroimd 
they might choose on his farm for a burial spot. They chose this knoll 
because their dead lay thickest near its eastern slope. In the autumn 
of 1886 a fragment of a lime-stone wall was visible above the weeds. At 
that time Squire Botton> said that 435 Confederates were buried hero, 
of whom about 100 were identified. Only one headstone was to be found, 
and that lioic tlie name of Samuel H. Ransom, of the 1st Tenn., and 
was placed there by his wife. Several offlcers were buried with the 
unidentiticd dead.— EDITORS. 





According to a note on the lithograph, a detach- 
ment of Morfraii'8 cavalry, and of infantry, approached 
Cage's Ford at daybreak of November 21, 18G2, hoiiiiig 
to surprise the 31st Ohio regiment, which had been en- 
camped on the south side of the Cumberland. Finding 
that the Union troops had changed their camp to the 

north side, the Confederates threw shells from two 12- 
pouuder howitzers until tlieir cannoneers were driven 
from the pieces b.\- the musketry tire of the Ohioaus, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Lister, three of -whom were 
wounded. The Confederates made no serious attempt 
to cross, and soon withdrew.— Editors. 

port and effective cooperation." On August 8th Bragg writes to Smith: " I 
find myself in your department ; without explanation this might seem an 
unjustifiable intrusion." While it is no doubt true that General Smith was 
at all times willing to yield to the authority of General Bragg, yet the fact 
that Smith was the commander of an independent department, receiving 
orders from and reporting directly to the President, made him prhnarily 
responsible to the Executive, and this limited the authority of General Bragg. 
Nevertheless the Kentucky campaign was attended with great results to the 
Confederacy. Two months of marches and battle by the armies of Bragg and 
Smith had cost the Federals a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners of 2(v')o0. 
We had captured 35 cannon, 16,000 stand of arms, millions of rounds of 
ammunition, 1700 mules, 300 wagons loaded with military stores, and 'JOOO 
horses. We had recovered Cumberland Gap and redeemed middle Ten- 
nessee and north Alabama. Yet expectations had been excited that were 
not realized, and hopes had been cherished that were disappointed; and 
therefore this campaign of repeated triumi»hs, without a single reverse, 
has never received — save from the thougliirul, intelligent, and inii)artial 
minority — any proper recognition. 



"T'TT^HILE Bragg was concentrating at Chatta- 

VV nooga, in August, 1862, preparatory to his 
march iuto Kentucky, Colonel John H. Morgan, 
with his cavalry command, numbering some nine 
hundred effectives, was actively engaged in middle 
Tennessee, operating chiefly against the Federal 
garrisons in the vicinity of Nashville, and the 
detachments employed immediately north and to 
the east of that city. All of these were successively 
captured or dispersed, and on the 21st of August 
Morgan defeated and completely routed a select 
body of cavalry, twelve hundred strong, sent under 
command of General R. W. Johnson to drive him 
out of Tennessee. Of this force 164 were killed 
and wounded, and a much larger number, includ- 
ing Johnson and his staff, were made prisoners. 

Morgan had been notified of the intended inva- 
sion of Kentucky, and part of his duty was the 
destruction of the railroad track and bridges 
between Nashville and Bowling Green, for the 
purpose of retarding Buell's movements when the 
latter should begin his retreat to Louisville. 

On the 28 th of August Bragg crossed the Ten- 
nessee River at Chattanooga, and pushed north- 
ward. General Kirby Smith had previously entered 
Kentucky, and had ordered Morgan to report to 
him at Lexington, in the blue-grass region. Mor- 
gan marched from Hartsville, Tenn., on the 29th 
of August, and on the 4th of September reached 
Lexington, already occupied by General Smith. 
His command consisted of the 2d Kentucky Cav- 
alry C. S. A., about 700 strong, and Gano's squad- 
ron, of 2 companies of Texan cavalry, about 150 
strong. It was vex'y largely recruited, however, 
during the occupation of Kentucky. A small 
detachment of the 2d Kentucky, leaving Lexing- 
ton on the same day, made a rapid march of some 
90 miles, and captured the garrison, 150 strong, 
of the stockade fort erected for the protection of 
the railroad bridge over Salt River, 17 miles 
south of Louisville. The bridge was burned in 
pursuance of the programme to destroy rail com- 
munication between Bowling Green and Louis- 
ville. By order of General Smith, the command 
was then divided for separate service. I was 
ordered to proceed with 600 men of the 2d Ken- 
tucky to the vicinity of Covington, whence 
General Heth, who had threatened Cincinnati, 
was then retiring. Colonel Morgan was ordered, 
with the remainder of the regiment, Gano's squad- 
ron, and all the cavalry recruits then organized, to 
march to, the assistance of General Marshall in the 
mountains of eastern Kentucky, The Federal 
general, George \V. Morgan, had evacuated Cum- 
berland Gap, and followed by Stevenson, who had 
been instructed to observe and pursue liim if he 
moved, was making his way to the Ohio. It was 
intended that Marshall and Morgan should inter- 
cept and arrest his niarcli until Stevenson could 
overtake him and attack him in rear. 

The detachment under my command became 

immediately very actively engaged with the enemy, 
who, in considerable numbers, had crossed the 
river and advanced to Walton, twenty-five miles 
south of Covington. For several days, skirmishing 
went on constantly, and I was steadily driven 
back, until I became convinced that it was an 
advance in force. Discovering, however, by care- 
ful reconnoissance that the entire Federal strength 
consisted of only 7000 or 8000 infantry, about 
1000 cavalry, and 8 pieces of artillery, and that 
troops were being transported in large numbers 
by the river from Cincinnati, I became satisfied 
that the movement was intended to cover and 
divert attention from the real concentration at 
Louisville, and was not meant as a serious move- 
ment on Lexington, and I so reported to General 
Smith. Reports fi'om my scouts and from citizens, 
to the effect that these troops were quite raw and 
inexperienced, and that, on account of the omission 
to scout or reconnoiter, the encampment at Wal- 
ton, where the enemy had halted, could be easily 
approached, induced me to attack the camp. By 
a quick dash upon it, just after daybreak, I secured 
90 or 100 prisoners, with very little loss on my 
part ; but found that no effort by a force numer- 
ically so inferior could compel the enemy to retire. 
It was important, however, that his column 
should be forced to fall back and not remain as a 
menace to Lexington, whence it was distant only 
two or three days' march. I learned that a regiment 
was orgaTiized for the Federal army out of some 
"home guai"d " companies at Augusta, a small town 
on the Ohio, about forty miles above Co\angton. I 
was also informed that at that season of year, when 
the river was at a very low stage of water, it was 
f ordable immediately below this place. Leaving the 
greater part of my command in front of the enemy 
at Walton to observe and follow him if he retreated, 
I marched rapidly with 250 men to Augusta, be- 
lieving that the recruits there could be captured 
or dispersed with ease, and without loss on my 
part, and that I could cross the river into Ohio, 
enter the suburbs of Cincinnati, and induce such 
consternation that the troops at Walton would be 
recalled. On the 27th of September I attacked, 
meeting, however, with fierce resistance. Two 
small river steamers were there, bulwarked with 
bales of hay, and each carrying a 12-pounder how- 
itzer. On these boats were, about one hundred in- 
fantry. The " Home Guards," 400 or 500 strong, 
were ensconced in the houses of the little town. I 
planted two small howitzers attached to my com- 
mand on a hill overlooking the village, and within 
a half-mile range of the river. After the exchange 
of a few shots on each side, the boats, with the 
troops upon them, steamed off in disgraceful panic. 
I thought then that the affair was over, but when 
I entered the town I found nearly every house a 
fortress, and was met with severe volleys which did 
much damage. Before I could overcome the resist- 
ance of the inmates, I was forced to burn some of 





the houses, storm many others, and even double- 
sliot the small tield-pieces aud fire them point-blauk 
from the street into some whose defenders were 
unusually stubborn. The hand-to-hand fighting in 
this little skirmish was the fiercest lever saw. In 
many instances when the firing from the windows 
was stopped by the volleys poured into them from 
the streets, the inmates still refused to surrender, 
and the details of my men who broke down tlie doors 
and entered were compelled to kill all they found 
inside. Captain S. D. Morgan killed seven men 
with his own hand, and was himself killed before 
the house he entered was taken. In some houses I 
saw blood dripping down the stairways. 

My loss was 21 men killed aud IS wounded. A 
very much larger number of the " Home Guards " 
was killed, and I carried off between 300 and 400 
prisoners. The combat lasted not more than fif- 
teen minutes after I entered the town; but my 
loss, the number of prisoners, and especially the 
fact that I had nearly exhausted my ammunition, 
decided me not to cross the Ohio and carry out the 
movement on Cincinnati I had contemplated. I 
knew, also, that 500 or 600 Federal troops at Mays- 
ville, not far distant, would be ordered immediately 
to Augusta, and that my return by that point would 
be intercepted. On the next morning I was at- 
tacked at Brookvill e by these troops, under Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel H. B. Wilson, nine miles from Augusta ; 
but the affair was trifling, the loss on either side 
slight, and I carried off my prisoners. Four or five 
days afterward I was ordered to return to Lex- 

Col. John H. Morgan had been sent to eastern 
Kentucky, as I have said, to intercept the retreat 
of the Federal general, George W. Morgan. He did 
not find Marshall in the vicinity where he was in- 
structed to seek him, nor, indeed, at all. Learning 
that the Federal column was moving from Man- 
chester via Booneville to Mount Sterling, doubtless 
to reach the Ohio at Maysville, Colonel Morgan ex- 
pected to strike the enemy between Booneville and 
Mount Sterling. But General Morgan concentrated 
at Irvine on the 21st, and moved toward Proctor. 
The Confederate cavalry then moved as rapidly 
as the mountainous country permitted, and receiv- 
ing further information tliat the enemy had turned 
to the right and was at Carapton, in Wolfe County, 
succeeded in getting directly iu his front near 
Hazel Green. From the 2r)th of September until 
the 1st of October every effort was made to arrest 
or delay the Federal retreat. The roads were bar- 
ricaded, the column was attacked in front and 
flank, and the skirmishing was contiimous. Dur- 
ing that time the enemy progressed only thirty 
miles ; nevertheless, John Morgan received no aid 
as promised him, Jior did Stevenson overtake the 
Federal commander and force liim to battle. At 
noon, October the 1st, Colonel Morgan received 
orders to withdraw from the enemy's front, and 
rejoin General Smith " at Lexington, or wherever 
he might be." He reached Lexington on the 4th 
of October. I reported to him there the next day. 
The town was about to be evacuated, and Gen- 
eral Smith's entire army, Stevenson having arrived, 
was marching to effect a junction with Bragg. Wo 

left Lexington on the Gth, and until the 10th were 
employed in preventing the debouchment of Sill's 
and Dumont's divisions (Federal) from the rough 
country west of Frankfort, where they wer(; demon- 
strating to induce Bragg to believe that Buell's at- 
tack would be delivered from that direction when 
the latter had in reality marched to Perryville. 

After General Bragg had moved from Munford- 
ville to Bardstown, the entire Confederate strategic 
line, including the disposition of the forces under 
General Smith, may be described as extending 
from Bardstown on the left flank, via Lexington, to 
Mount Sterling on the extreme i-ight. It was one 
admirably adapted for defense. However threat- 
ened, the troops could be marched to the point 
menaced by excellent interior roads, and favorable 
ground for battle was available wherever attack 
was probable. The base at Bryantsville was 
secure, and was an exceedingly strong natural posi- 
tion. The aggregate strength of the Confederate 
armies was little, if any, less than Gl ,000 men. 

On October 1st Buell moved out of Louisville 
with 58,000 effective men, of whom 22,000 were 
raw troops. 

Under the impression that Buell was about to 
throw his entire army upon Smith at Frankfort, 
Bragg, on the 2d, ordered Polk to march with the 
Army of the Mississippi from Bardstown via Bloom- 
field toward Frankfort in order that he might strike 
the enemy in rear, while Kirby Smith should assail 
him in front. Until the 7th he remained appar- 
ently under the impression that Buell was advan- 
cing to attack Smith. But on the evening of the 7th, 
Gilbert, in command of Buell's center, came in 
contact with Hardee near Perryville, and compelled 
him to prepare for action. Hardee called for reen- 
forcements, and Cheatham's division was sent him, 
while the remainder of Polk's corps continued its 
march toward Versailles with the view of joining 
the forces under General Smith. 

It thus happened that General Bragg, completely 
misled by the mere demonstration upon Frankfort, 
kept more than two-thirds of the entire force under 
his control idly manoeuvring in a quarter where 
nothing could possibly be accomplished, and per- 
mitted less than 20,000 men to become engaged 
upon afield where more than 45,000 of the enemy 
could have been hm-led upon them. Buell's whole 
army (with the exception of the di%isions of Sill 
and Dumont — together 10,0(tOor 12,000 strong) 
was concentrated at Perryville on the 8th, and but 
for the unaccountable circumstance that McCook 
had been fighting several hours before Buell was 
informed that a T)attle was in progress, the Con- 
federate line would have been overwhelmed by an 
attack in force. If such had been the result at 
Perryville on the Sth, and Buell liad then gotten 
between the scattered remnants of the troojis 
that opposed liiju tlun-e, as he would almost 
surely liave done, he would have been master of 
the situation, and nothing but disaster could liave 
befallen the Confederates. For on the 0th Sill 
and Dumont were marching to rejoin tlie main 
body, and in another day Bu(dl coidd have had his 
entire 58,000 — minus the loss sustained in the 
battle — well in hand. 



After Perryville, Morgan was ordered to rejoin 
tlie army, when everytliing was concentrated at 
Harrodsburg, as if for a battle which General 
Bragg couhl have won but never meant to fight. 
When the army, leaving Harrodsburg, without 
battle, began its retreat to Tennessee, Morgan, 
assisted by Col. Henry Ashby with a small brigade 
of cavalry, was employed in covering its rear. 
This rear-guard was engaged very arduously, and 
almost constantly, in contact with Buell's advance 
regiments until the I7th. At that date Morgan 
received permission to retrace his march, capture 
Lexington, which was, of course, in the hands of 
the enemy, and then move southward, directly 
across Buell's rear, doing the latter all possible 
damage. Marching rapidly for twenty-four hours, 
he reached Lexington at dawn of the following 
morning, and immediately attacked the 4th Ohio 
Cavalry, which was encamped at Ashland — once the 
residence of Henry Clay — about two miles from 
the city. The enemy was defeated after a short 
combat, and nearly six hundred were made prison- 
ers. The loss in killed and wounded on either side 
was slight. Resuming his march at noon that 
day, Morgan encamped on the following night at 
Shryoek's ferry on the Kentucky River. At mid- 
night he was attacked by Dumont, and fearing 
that be would be surrounded and entrapped in the 
rugged hills of that region, he marched with all 
speed for Lawrenceburg, four miles distant, reach- 
ing and passing through that little town just as a 
heavy Federal column, sent to intercept him there, 
was entering it upon the Frankfort turnpike. Pass- 
ing around Bardstown on the next day, we encamped 
between that place and Elizabethtown. We were 
now directly in Buell's rear, and during the next 
twenty-four hoiu's capturedmauy laggards, and sev- 
eral wagon trains — one quite lai-ge and richly laden. 

From the 20th to the 25th of October Morgan 
continued to march in a south-western direction, 
reaching Hopkinsville on the 25th. Here he had 
entirely passed beyond the zone of Federal garri- 
sons in middle Kentucky, but still had arduous work 
before him in Tennessee and in front of Nashville, 
whither Bucll, having turned aside from pursuit 
of Bragg through the mountains of south-eastern 
Kentucky, was now directing his course. After a 
short sojourn at Hopkinsville for much-needed rest. 
Colonel Morgan moved directly to Gallatin, Ten- 
nessee, with a view of completing the dostruetion 
of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in that 
vicinity, and to that extent impeding the transpor- 
tation of troops and supplies to Nashville. While 
engaged in this work lie received orders from Gen- 
eral John C.Breckinridge, who was stationed with 
a small infantry force at Murfreesboro', to coiip- 
erate with Forrest in a movement intended to effect 
the destruction of the rolling-stock of the Louis- 
ville and Nashville Railroad (Jompany collected at 
Edgefield, on tlio bank of the Cumberland River, 
opposite Nashville. It was planned that Forrest 
should make such a demonstration south of Nash- 

ville that the attention of the garrison would be 
attracted, while Morgan should dash into Edgefield 
and burn the cars, several hundred in number. 

Leaving Gallatin on the night of November the 
4th, Morgan entered Edgefield at daybreak the 
next morning, and immediately attacked the IGth 
Illinois and part of another regiment stationed 
there. After a sharp fight he drove this force back 
and obtained possession of the cars it was intended 
he should destroy. We heard Forrest's artillery 
at the same moment on the other side of the river. 
But Nashville was so strongly fortified on that 
side, and perhaps, also, the inadequacy of the small 
force under Forrest to make any serious attempt 
upon the place was so apparent, that although he 
advanced resolutely upon the works, the movement 
failed: a large portion of the garrison was dis- 
patched to reenforce the detachment we had at- 
tacked; and before the work of demolition was 
fairly commenced, a column of infantry streamed 
at the double-quick over the pontoon-bridge, and 
reenforced the troops with which we were already 
engaged. The fight grew too hot to be maintained 
so near to yet stronger hostile forces, and under the 
heavy batteries which commanded the ground on 
which we stood. Morgan accoi-dingly withdrew, 
followed a short distance by the enemy. Our loss 
in killed and wounded was not so heavy as the en- 
emy's, and we carried off a few prisoners. Only a 
small number of the railroad ears were burned, and 
the expedition was a failure. Rosecrans's army •j^ 
was now close at hand, marching upon three or four 
roads leading into Nashville, and we were immedi- 
ately in it s path. Crittenden's corps was in advance, 
the major part of it marching on the Louisville and 
Nashville turnpike. Morgan sent strong detach- 
ments to harass these troops, and, if possible, 
delay their march. The leading division was am- 
buscaded near Tyree Springs, and a volley deliv- 
ered at seventy-five yards' range inflicted some 
loss. Similar attacks were kept up all day on the 
8th, but of course the efforts of so small a body 
against more than twenty thousand men were 
merely annoying. Early on the morning of the 
9th Wood's and Van Clove's divisions moved into 
and on either flank of Gallatin, nearly surrounding 
our people, who incautiously resisted the advance 
of the central column too long, thus necessitating 
brisk movement as well as sharp fighting to effect 
an escape. That afternoon Morgan crossed the 
Cumberland and encamped in a safe position be- 
tween Lebanon and Mui-freesboro'. Morgan's loss 
diiring the entire campaign, in killed and wounded, 
was not more than one hundred. He had inflicted 
a much greater loss on the enemy, and had capt- 
ured nearly twelve hundred prisoners. He had 
entered Kentucky with less than 900 effectives ; 
his command when he returned to Tennessee was 
nearly 2000 strong. It was admirably mounted, ai;(l 
well armed, and the recruits were fully the equals of 
the original "Morgan IMen," in spirit, intelligence, 
and capacity to endure. 

1^ Ocncral Buell was succocdort in the conuDand of OrdovR of October 21th the Department of the Cum- 
the trnoi)H of the Army of the Ohio by G('n(>ral W. S. berlanrt was croatod, :m<l tlio troops witliin it were 
RoBocrauB ou the 30th day of October. Under General designated the Fourtceutli Army Corps.— Editors. 


October 8th, 18G2. 

The composition, lo.ssea, and strength of each army as licri! .stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the OfiScial 
Records. K stands for killed ; w for wounded ; in \v for mortally wounded ; m for captured or missing ; c for captured. 


ARMY OF THE OHIO.— Maj.-Gen. Don Carlos Bucll; Maj.-Gen: George H. Thomas, second in command. 

Escort: Anderson (Pa.) Troop, Lieut. Thomas S. Maple; 
4th U. 8. Cav. (6 GO'S), Lieut.-Col. James Oakes. E.s- 
cort loss : m, 1. Unattached : 7th Pa. Cav. {i co's), Maj. 
John E. Wyukoop. Loss : w, 4; m, 3 = 7. 

FIRST ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Alexander McD. 

THIRD DIVISION, Brig -Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau. StaflT 
loss : m, 1. 

Ninth Brigade, Col. Leonard A. Harri.s: 38th Ind., Col. 
Benjamin F. Scribner; 2d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John Kell; 
33d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Oscar F. Moore (w and c), Maj. Fred- 
erick J. Look ; 94th Ohio, Col. Joseph W. Frizell ; 10th 
Wis., Col. Alfred R. Chapin; 5th Ind. Battery, Capt. 
Peter Simonson. Brigade loss : k, 121 ; w, 419 ; m, 51 = 591. 
Seventeenth Brigade, Col. William H. Lytle (w and c), 
CoL Curran Pope (m w) : 42d Ind., Col. James G. Jones ; 
88th Ind., Col. George Humphrey; 15th Ky., Col. Curran 
Pope ; 3d Ohio, Col. John Beatty ; 10th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. 
Joseph W. Burke; Ist Mich. Battery, Capt. Cyrus O. 
Loomis. Brigade loss: k, 193; w, 606; m, 23=822. 
Twenty-eighlh Brigade, Col. John C. Starkweather: 24th 
111., Capt. August Mauflf; 79th Pa., Col. Henry A. Ham- 
bright; 1st Wis., Lieut.-Col. George B. Bingham; 21st 
Wis., Col. Benjamin J. Sweet; 4th Ind. Battery, Capt. 
Asahel K. Bush ; Ist Ky. Battery, Capt. David C. Stone. 
Brigade loss: k, 170; w, 477; m, 109 = 756. Unattached : 
2d Ky. Cav. (6 co's). Col. Buckner Board ; A, C, and H, Ist 
Mich., Eng'rs and Mech's, Maj. Enos Hopkins. Unat- 
tached loss : w, 18 ; m, 4 = 22. 

TENTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gcn. James 8. Jackson (k). Staff 
loss: k, 1, 

Thirty-third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William R. Terrill (k). 
Col. Albert S. Hall : 80th 111., Col. Thomas G. Allen ; 123d 
ni., Col. James Monroe; Detachments 7th and 32d Ky. 
and 3d Tenn., Col. Theophilus T. Garrard; 105th Ohio, 
Col. Albert S. Hall; Parsous's (improvised) Battery, 
Lieut. Charles C. Parsons. Brigade loss : k, 100 ; w, 336 ; 
m, 91 = 527. Thirty-fourth Brigade, Col. George Webster 
(k) : 80th Ind., Lieut.-CoL Lewis Brooks ; 50th Ohio, Col. 
Jonah R. Taylor, Lieut.-Col. Silas A. Strickland; 98th 
Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Christian L. Poorman; 121st Ohio, Col. 
WiUiam P. Reid; 19th Ind. Battery, Capt. Samuel J. 
Harris. Brigade loss : k, 87 ; w, 346 ; m, 146 = 579. 

SECOND ARMY CORPS, ) Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crit- 
FOURTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William S. Smith. 

Tenth Brigade, Col. William Grose : 84th 111., Col. Louis 
H. Waters; 36th Ind., Lieut.-Col. O. H. P. Carey; 23d 
Ky., Lieut.-Col. J. P. Jackson; 6th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. 
Nicholas L. Anderson ; 24th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frederick 
C. Jones; H, 4th U. 8. Arfy. Lieut. Samuel Canby ; M, 
4th U. S. Art'y, Capt. John Mendenhall. Nineteenth 
Brigade, Col. William B. Hazen : 110th 111., Col. Thomas 
8. Casey; 9th Ind., Col. William H. Blake; 6th Ky., Col. 
Walter C. Whitaker; 27th Ky., Col. C. D. Peunobaker; 
4l8t Ohio. Lieut.-Col. George 8. Mygatt; F, 1st Ohio 
Art'y, Capt. Daniel T. Cockerill. Twenty-second Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft: 31st Ind., Lieut.-Col. John 
Osborn; Ist Ky., Lieut.-Col. David A. Enyart; 2d Ky., 
Col. Thomas D. Sedgwick ; 20th Ky., Lieut.-C(d. Charles 
8. Hanson; 90th Ohio, Col. Isaac N. Ross; B, 1st Ohio 
Art'y, Capt. William E. Standart. Cavalry: 2d Ky. 
(4 co's), Lieut.-Col. Thomas B. Cochran. 
FIFTH DIVISION, Brig.-(ien. Horatio P. Van Clove. 

Eleventh Brigade, Col. Sanmcl Beatty : 79th Ind., Col. 

Frederick Knefler ; 9th Ky., Lieut.-Col. George H. Cram ; 
13th Ky., Lieut.-Col. J. B. Carlile; 19th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. 
E. W. HolUnsworth ; 59th Ohio, Col. James P. Fyffe. 
Fourteenth Brigade, Col. Pierce B. Hawkins : 44th Ind., 
Col. Hugh B. Reed; 86th Ind., Col. Orville 8. Hamilton ; 
11th Ky, Lieut.-Col. S. P. Love; 2Gth Ky., Col. Cicero 
Maxwell; 13th Ohio, Col. Joseph G. Hawkins. Tventij- 
third Brigade, Col. Stanley Matthews: 35th Ind., Col. 
Bernard F. Mullen ; 8th Ky., Col. Sidney M. Barnes; 2l8t 
Ky., Col. S. Woodson Price; 5l8t Ohio, Lieut.-Col. 
Richard W. McClain ; 99th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John E. 
Cummins. Artillery: 7th Ind., Capt. George R. Swallow ; 
B, Pa., Lieut. Alanson J. Stevens; 3d Wis., Capt. Lucius 
H. Druiy. 
SIXTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood. 

Fifteenth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Milo 8. HascaU: 100th 
111., Col. Frederick A. Bartleson; 17th Ind., Lieut.-Col. 
George W. Gorman ; 58th Ind., Col. George P. Buell ; 3d 
Ky., Lieut.-Col. William T. Scott; 26th Ohio, Msy. Chris, 
M. Degenlield ; 8th Ind. Battery, Lieut. George Estep. 
Ticentietli Brigade, Col. Charles G. Harker: 51st Ind., 
Col. Abel D. Streight ; 73d Ind., Col. Gilbert Hathaway ; 
13th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Worden ; 64th Ohio, 
Col. John Fergu,son; 65th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William II. 
Young ; 6th Ohio Battery, Capt. Cullen Bradley. Twenty- 
first Brigade, Col. George D. Wagner: 15th Ind., Lieut.- 
Col. Gustavus A. Wood ; 40th Ind., Col. John W. Blake ; 
57th Ind., Col. Cyinis C. Hiues ; 24th Ky., Col. Louis B. 
Grigsby ; 97th Ohio, Col. John Q. Lane ; 10th Ind. Bat- 
tery, Capt. Jerome B. Cox. Brigade loss (40th Ind.) : 
w, 2. Unattached : B, E, I, and K, Ist Mich., Eng's and 
Mech's, Col. William P. Innes; let Ohio Cav. (detach- 
ment), Miy. James Laughlin. 

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Charles C. Gilbert. 
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Geii. Albin Schoepf. 

First Brigade, Col. Moses B. Walker: 82d Ind., Col. 
Morton C. Hunter; 12th Ky., Col. William A. Iloskins; 
17th Ohio, Col. John M. Council ; 3l8t Ohio. Lieut.-Col. 
Frederick W. Li.'^ter; 38th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William A. 
Choate. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Speed S. Fry: 10th 
Ind., Col. William C. Kise; 74th Ind., Col. Charles W. 
Chapman ; 4th Ky., Col. John T. Croxton ; 10th Ky., Lieut.- 
Col. Wilham H. Hays; 14th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. (ieorge P. 
Este. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 7 = 11. Third Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. James B. Steedman : 87th Ind., Col. Kline ii. 
Shryock; 2d Minn., Col. James George : iHli Ohio, Lieut.- 
Col. Charles .Joseph ; 35th Ohio, Col. Ferdinand Van Der- 
veer ; 18tli U. 8., Miij. Frederick Townsend. Brigade w, 6; m, 8 = 14. Artillery: 4tli Mich., Capt. Josiah 
W. Church ; C, let Ohio, Capt. Daniel K. Southwick ; I, 
4th U. 8., Lieut. Frank G. Smith. Artillery loss: w, 1. 
Cavalry: 1st Ohio idetachment), Col. Minor Milliken. 
NINTH DIVISION. Bri^'.-(i«n. Robert B. Mitchell. 

Thirtieth J{riga<lr.Vo\. Michael Gooding: 59th 111.. Mnj. 
Joshua C. Winters; 74th 111., Lieut.-Col. James B. Kerr; 
75th 111., Lieut.-Col. .Tohn E. Bennett: 22d Ind.. Lieut.- 
Col. Scpiire I. Keith (k) ; .^th Wis. Battery, Capt. Oscar F. 
Pinnev. Brigade loss : k. 121 ; w. 314 ; m. 61 = 499. Thir- 
ty-first Brir/ade. Col. Wllliani P. Carlin : 21.<t 111.. Col. 
John W. 8. Alexander; 38th 111.. Ma.j. Daniel II. (Jilm.r: 
lOlst Ohio. C<d. Leander Stem: l.^tli Wis.. Col. Hans C. 
Heg; 2d Minn. Battery. Capt. Willi;im \. Hot<hkiss. 
Brigade loss : w. 10. Thirly-seroml lirigadc. Col. Williani 
W. Caldwell : 25th 111.. Lieut.-Col. James S. McClelland; 
35th 111., Lieut.-Col. William P. Chandler; Slst Iml., 

i Of the operations „f this corps Buell .says, in his ..lllcial report : " The corps «f Oenoral «;ritt'<nden closed in. and 
Wagner's brigade, of WooTs division, became engaged and di.l good service on the right of Mltehell s dlvl-sion. but knowing 
nothing of tlie severity of tlie light on the extreme left the rest of the corps did not get into acUou." - t,DlT0W8. 




Lieut. -Col. Jotin Timlierlake ; 8tli Kan. (battalion), 
liieiit.-Col. John A. Martin; 8th Wis. Battery, Capt. 
Stephen J. Carpenter. Cavalry: B, 3f>tb 111., Capt. Sam- 
uel B. Sherer. 
ELEVENTH DIVISION, Brif,'.-Gon. Philip H. Sheridan. 

Thirty-fifth Brigade, Lieut.-Col. Bernard Laiboldt : 44th 
111., Capt. Wallace W. Barrett ; 73d 111., Col. James F. 
Jaquess ; 2d Mo., Capt. Walter Hoppe (k) ; 15th Mo., 
Maj. John Weber. Brigade loss: k, 22; w,J02; m, 1 = 
12.5. Thirty-sixth Brigade, Col. Daniel McCook : 85th 111., 
Col. Robert 8. Moore- 86th 111., Col. David D. Irons; 
I25th 111., Col. Oscar F. Harmon ; 52d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. 
D. D. T. Cowen. Brigade loss : k, 7 ; w, 63 ; m, 9 = 79. 
Thirty-seventh Brigade, Col. Nicholas Greusel : 36th lU., 
Capt. Silas Miller; 88th 111., Col. Francis T. Sherman; 
21st Mich., Col. Ambrose A. Stevens; 24th Wis., Col. 
Charles n. Larrabee. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 124; m, 
4 = 143. Artillery : I, 2d 111., Capt. Charles M. Barnett; 
G, 1st Mo., Capt. Henry Hescock. Artillery loss : w, 3. 

cavalry: Third Brigade, Capt. Ebenezer Gay: 9tli 
Ky. (detachment), Lieut.-Col. John Boyle; 2d Mich., 
Lieut.-Col. Archibald P. Campbell ; 9th Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas C. James. Cavalry loss : k, 4 ; w, 13 = 17. 

% In March, 1888, General D. C. Buell wrote to the editors : 
" Adopting this estimate and adding Sill's Division, say 7000, 
which moved on the Frankfort road and did not join until 
after tlio battle (i. e., on the 11th), will make tlie entire 
aruiv 01,000 before the battle and 57,000 after. The corps 

Total Union loss : killed, 845 ; wounded, 2851 ; captured 
or missing, 515 = 4211. 

The most definite information afforded by the " Official 
Records" relative to the strength of the Union forces is 
contained in tlie testimony given before the Buell Com- 
mission by Major J. M. Wright, assistant adjutant-gen- 
eral at Buell's headquarters. On page 660, Vol. XVT., 
Part I., ho says : " After the battle I do not think there 
were more than fifty thousand of the army which ap- 
peared in front of Perryvllle." Adding to this number 
the 4000 casualties sustained in the battle, would make 
the entire army at and about Perry viUe 54,000 strong. 3> 
Perhaps not over one-half of these were actually en- 
gaged. General McCook, commanding the First Corps 
(which bore the brunt of the fight), says that " Rous- 
seau had present on the field 7000; Jackson, 5500; the 
brigade of Gooding [from Mitchell's division of Gilbert's 
corps] amounting to about 1.500." The strength of Crit- 
tenden's (Second) and Gilbert's (Third) Corps is not any- 
where otHcially stated. Crittenden did not reach the 
field of action until the conflict was practically ended, 
and only parts of Wagner's and Hazen's brigades of 
Ms corps became slightly engaged. 

were of about equal strength. Gilbert told me recently 
that he estimated his corps at about 18,000 before the 
battle. About one-thirrt of the whole were raw troops. 
Jackson's division was composed almost entirely of raw 
regiments." — EDITOUS. 

General Braxton Bragg. 

ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI : Major-General Leonl- 
das Polk. Right WiNG,Maj.-Gen. Benjamin F.Cheatham. 
cuKATHAM's DIVISION, Brig.-Geu. Daniel S. Donelson. 

First Brigade, Col. John H. Savage : 8th Tenn., Col. 
W. L. Moore; 15th Tenn., Col. R. C. Tyler; 16th 
Tenn., Lieut.-Col. D. M. Donnell ; 38th Tenn., Col. John 
C. Carter; 5l8t Tenn., Col. John Chester; Tenn. Bat- 
tery, Capt. W. W. Carnes. Brigade loss: k, 68; w, 272; 
m, 7 = 347. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. P. Stewart: 
4th Tenn., Col. O. F. Strahl; 5th Tenn., Col. C. D. Ven- 
able; 24th Tenn., Lieiit.-Col. H. L. W. Brattou; 31st 
Tenn., Col. E. E. Tansil; 33d Tenn., Col. W. P. Jones; 
Miss. Battery, Capt. T. J. Stanford. Brigade loss : k, 
62; w, 340; m, 26 = 428. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
George Maney: 4l8t Ga., Col. Charles A. McDaniel (w), 
Maj. John Knight; IstTenn., Col. H. R. Field; 6th Tenn., 
Col. George C. Porter; 9th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. John W. 
Buf(ud (w). Major George W. Kelsoe; 2;thTenn., Lieut.- 
Col. W. Friei'son (w), Ma^jor A. C. Allen; Miss. Battery, 
Lieut. William B. Turner. Brigade loss : k, 136 ; w, 517 ; 
m, 34 = 687. 

CAVALRY BRIGADE, Col. Jolm A. Wharton : 1st Ky. 

(3co's), ; j. 4thTeun., ; 8th Tex., . Brigade 

loss (not separately reported). 

Left Wing, Maj. -Gen. William J. Hardee. 
SECOND division, Brig.-Gen. J. Patton Anderson. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Brown (w), Col. 
William Miller: Ist Fla., Col. William Miller; 3d 

Fla., ; Miss., ; Palmer's Battery, 

Brigade loss (not separately reported). Second Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. Daniel W. Adams : 13th La., Col. R. L. 
Gibson; 16th La.. Col. D. C. Gober; 20th La., Col. Aug. 
Reichard, Lieut.-Col. Leon von Zinken; 25th La., Col. S. 
W. Fisk; 14th Battalion La. Sharp-sliooters, Ma^ior J. E. 
Austin; 5th Co. Washington (La.) Art'y, Capt. C. H. 
Sloconib. Brigade loss: k, 6; w, 78; m, 68=1.52. Third 

Brigade, Col. Samu<'l Powell: 4.5th Ala., ; 1st 

Ark., ; 24th Miss., Col. William F. Dowd; 29th 

4- The dasli indicates the name nf the commanding otfl- 
cer lias not been found in the " Ofticial Uecorda."— Editors. 
bin March, 1888, General Buell wrote to the editors : 
"This probably did not include tlie cavalry. It is scarcely 
credible that the three divisions of infantry contained only 

Tenn., ; Mo. Battery, Capt. Overton W. Barret. 

Brigade loss (not separately reported). Fourth Bri- 
gade, Col. Thomas M. Jones: 27th Mis.'?., ; 30th 

Miss., ; 37th Miss., ; Ala. Battery (Lums- 

den's). Brigade loss (not separately reported). 
THIRD division, Maj. -Gen. Simon B. Buckner. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. St. JolinR. Liddell : 2d Ark., 

; 5th Ark., Col. L. Featherston ; 6th Ark., ; 7th 

Ark., Col. D. A. Gillespie ; 8th Ark., Col. John H. Kelly ; 
Miss. Battery (Swett's). Brigade loss : k, w, and m, 71. 
Second BHgade, Brig.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne (w) : 13th Ark., 

; 15th Ark., ; 2d Tenn., ; Ark. Battery 

(Calvert's). Brigade loss (not separately reported). 
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson : 5th 
Confederate, Col. J. A. Smith; 17th Tenn., Col. A. 8. 
Marks; 23d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R. H. Keeble; 25th Tenn., 
Col. John M. Hughs; 37th Tenn., Col. Moses White; 
44th Tenn., Col. John S. Fulton ; Miss. Battery (Jefl'er- 
son Art'y), Capt. Put. Darden. Brigade loss : k, 30 ; w, 
165; m, 9 = 204. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. A. INI. 
Wood (w) : 16th Ala., r 33d Ala., ; 3d Con- 
federate, ; 45th Miss., ; I5th Battalion Miss. 

Sharp-shooters, ; Ala. Battery, Capt. Henry C. 

Semplo. Brigade loss (not separately reported). 

CAVALRY BRIGADE, Col. Joseph Wheeler: 1st Ala., 
Col. William W. Allen ; 3d Ala., Col. James Hagau ; 6th 
Confederate, Lieut.-Col. James A. Pell ; 2d Ga. (battal- 
ion), Maj. C. A. Whalcy; 3d Ga., Col. Martin J. Craw- 
ford ; Ist Ky. (6 co's), Maj. J. W. Caldwell. Brigade loss 
(not separately reported). 

Total Confederate loss: killed, 510; wounded, 2635; 
missing, 251 = 3396. 

General Bragg reiiorts (" Official Records," Vol. XVI., 
Pt. I., p. 1092) that "our forces . . . consisted of 
three divisions of infantry (about 14,500) .and two small 
brigades of cavalry (about 1500)." General Polk reports 
(p. 1110) : " The whole of our force, including all arms, 
did not exceed 15,000." ^ 

" However, the imjiortant question is as to the force that 
Bragg had in the field in Kentucky, for that was the force 
tlijit was to be expected in a great battle. That question 
is not fully di'tcrmined by oflicial reports, but a careful 
study of the i)ublisli('d records seems to place it at not leas 
than 08,000 men."— EDITQKS. 

-%. ^^'■ 




THE invasion of Kentucky in the summer of 1862 by the Confederate forces 
under General Bragg was one of the most prominent incidents of the war; 
and both the officer who conducted it and the one who repelled it were the 
objects of much popular displeasure on their respective sides. On the one 
side there was severe condemnation of the withdrawal, and on the other 
unmeasm*ed dissatisfaction that the invaders had not been captured in a body. 
Of course, there were in both cases numerous specifications to the general mat- 
ter of complaint. With reference to the result, it i^ust follow that the critics 
were wi^ong on one side or the other. It may even be that in the main, what- 
ever may have been the incidental blunders, they were wi'ong on both sides : 
that is, that an invasion for a permanent occupation which lacked the support 
of the population, and was opposed by an army able and ready to contest the 
object, was wisely abandoned without further resistance ; and that the con- 
testant, in the presence of a skillful and not inferior adversary, wisely took 
his measures to make the result reasonably certain. The rashness of revo- 
lutionary ends might reject the former, but no rule of loyalty to the public 
welfare would condemn the latter. 

In gi\dng here a brief review of the subject — which properly includes the 
project for my advance into east Tennessee in the early summer — I shaU 
undertake no more than a simple outline of the essential facts, and an expo- 
sition of the circumstances which controlled events. 

The period immediately following the evacuation of Coi-inth, and lasting 
through the summer, found the Western armies in a less satisfactory state 
than at the first glance would. be supposed. The early delusion of a ninety- 
days' campaign had not so completely passed away as not to give rise to dis- 
appointment in the ranks and among the people, at finding no signs in the 



South of reconciliation or submission, after the signal successes which the 
Union cause had achieved ; and it could hartUy fail to happen that the dis- 
appointment would for a while act injuriously upon the temper and efficiency 
of unseasoned troops. It resulted, in fact, that the desire to get back to 
friends, or to find relief for a time from the hardships and restraints of service, 
caused large numbers to get away from the front on every possible pretext 

on leave granted with or without proper authority, upon authority exercised 

too loosely, and even without any authority ; and when once away their return 
was very difficult. Appeals were of little avail, and the recourse of sending 
officers to recall the absentees was attended with poor results. 

But al)sence from the colors was not the worst form of the evil. Duty of 
every sort was performed with a sluggishness which greatly retarded every 
sort of work, of which there was much that had to be done, and the service 
of escorts and road guards was executed in very many cases with a fatal 
laxity. An idea grew up that a soldier on parole was virtually released from 
all restraint ; and there was good reason to believe that large numbers of 
stragglers were quite willing to find themselves for a moment in the hands 
of the enemy, and that even the vigilance and resoluteness of escorts and 
guards were materially affected by the idea that captivity meant liberty and 
relaxation. J 

Even in the routine of camp life, the weariness and impatience manifested 
themselves in some manner, actively or passively, in a protest against the 
interior demands and the exterior restraints of discipline. The thousands of 
letters which poured from the camps into the soldiers' homes and the puljlic 
press were mediums for these manifestations, which put upon the general in 

)To this rule there were of coui-se honorable 
exceptions. The followng orders concerning 
absentees and paroles were published in view of 
these evils, which were seriously impairing the 
strength and efficiency of the army : 

" Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, 
•' In Camp, near Florence, Ala., June 24th, 1862. 
"fiKNERAL Orders, No. 26: There are 14,000 officers 
anil HDldifTs absent from their duty with the various 
(liviHioiis of this army, /. c, the live tlivisious south 
of tlic TcniK'Sscc Uivcr. Some of them have gimc otF 
without any aiitliority ; others with the permission of 
oHicers not autliorized to fjraiit it. In general, sickness 
is given as the cause of iil>Neiiee. hut in very mauj' cases 
that cause has notoriously ceased to exist, and men 
remain away, drawing the same pay as their comrades 
wlio are faithfully performing their duty. To correct 
this abuse it is ordered 

"(4th.) .\11 absejit oflieers and soldiers who do not.join 
their coinj>aiiicH and regiments or are not satisfactorily 
aeeoiinteil for as above l)y the 10th of July next, will be 
reiiorled on their muster-roll as deserters, dating from 
the tini<' that they may have been absent without 
aiitliority. I$y act of f'ongress every deserter forfeits 
all claim on the (Joveriimcnt for i)ay and allowances, 
besides being liable to arrest ;ind trial by court-martial. 
Any iierson who ai)pr(heiiils and returns a deserter to 
the commanding oflflcer of a military post is entitled to 
a reward of f.i. liy command of MA.ioR-ft enehal Ktteli,. 
James B. Fry, Aseistant Adjutant-General, Chief-of- 

" Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, 
"In Camp, Huntsville, Ala., August 8th, 1862. 

"General Orders, No. 41: The system of paroles 
practiced in this army has run into an intolerable abuse. 
Hereafter no otficer or soldier belonging to the forces in 
this district will give his paroU' not to take up arms, for 
the purpose of leaving the enemy's lines without the 
sanction of the general commanding this army, except 
when, by reason of wounds or disease, he could not bo 
removed without endangering his life. 

"Any parole given in violation of this order will not 
be recognized, and the jurson giving it will be required 
to perform military duty and take the risks prescribed 
by the laws of war. 

" Any ollicer or soldier of this command, being in the 
hands of the enemy and desiring to be released on parole 
for the purpose of lea\ ing the enemy's lines, will make 
application to the general coiiinianding tills army, in- 
closing in duplicate the parole which he proposes to 
give, and await its ap)iroval. 

"The sanction of tli<' ollicer commanding the forces by 
which he is held, being necessary to eflfect the arrange- 
ment, should l)c forwarded with the application. No such 
application will be appioved when the capture has re- 
sulted from neglect or misbehavior on the part of the 
prisoner or of the command to which he belonged. 

" The evidence of a lawful parole will be the parole 
itself, l)eariiig the ai>i>roval of the commanding general. 

" The same rule will be observed by this army in parol- 
ing iirisoiicis taken frinii the eneiny. If fliey cannot bo 
held until (he siinction of such ofliceras the general com- 
manding' tlie enemy's forces may designate; for that pnr- 
Iiose is obtained, they will be released. By commajid of 





command the burthen of every compkiint, and the responsibility of every 
miscarriage. If a command started upon a march, every soldier would be 
anxious to know how his haversack was to be replenished, but it never 
occurred to him that there was a question as to how the depots were to be 

The Government, also, seemed to di*op suddenly into a similar state of 
disappointment, discontent, and inaction. It had not apparently been 
imagined that the depletion which would unavoidably go on rapidly in the 
ranks must be replaced, and when at length the work of repair was taken up 
it was done by creating new regi- 
ments instead of replenishing the 
old ones. A vast waste of time, and 
material, and efficiency was caused 
by this plan of throwing large 
numbers of raw troops suddenly 
into service in distinct bodies. 
Moreover, party politics, which at 
first, under a spontaneous burst of 
patriotism, had put aside all party 
distinctions, began now to resume 
its old organization. That, of 
course, meant old ambitions and 
opposing policies with reference 
to means, however united men 
might be in motive upon the 
one great object of preserving 
the Union. No doubt all of these 
causes worked to the same end. 
At all events it resulted that dur- 
ing the summer of 1862, after the 
withdrawal of the Confederates 
from Corinth, the armies were 
weaker numerically than they 
had been or ever were afterward, and that the tone of the troops, though 
always loyal, was in some respects seriously defective. 

It was exactly the reverse on the other side. To the South the result of 
the battle of Shiloli was the disappointment of a great hope almost consum- 
mated, rather than a discouragement. The first depressing effect of the 
retreat from Corinth was more than compensated for by the splendid successes 
which were considered to have been gained in Virginia. Their Government 
acted vigorously. Their armies were speedily recruited, and never again 
entered the field in as great relative strength and as high spirit as in tliat 
summer. The army at Tupelo, no longer thrc^atened, an«l under a new com- 
mander of established reputation for nerve and ability, paused for a moment 
to discover an opening for attack or a call for defense, and the disposition 
of the now unoccupied force under General Halleck soon pointed the wa\-. 





As soon as the expulsion of the Confederates from the line of the Mem- 
phis and Charleston Railroad was consummated by the definitive retreat of 
the Corinth army, the large Federal force that had been called together for 
the operations on that line was redistriliuted for ulterior objects. About 
65,000 men were retained under General Halleck's immediate command to 
occupy the line from the Tennessee Eiver to Memphis; the Army of the 
Ohio was restored to its original departmental territory, to advance into east 
Tennessee, perhaps even to penetrate Georgia; and the remainder of the force 
was sent to strengthen General Curtis in Arkansas. Thus the Army of the 
Ohio was the only army in the West that was assigned to an aggressive 

The occupation of east Tennessee had from the first been a favorite meas- 
ure with the President, apparently more from political than from military 
considerations. It had at one time been enjoined upon my predecessors in 
specific orders, and was m-ged upon my attention by General McClellan in 
the instructions with which I came to Kentucky. Some abortive steps had 
been taken in that direction by General Sherman before my arrival, but vari- 
ous causes, which need not here be enumerated, compelled its postponement 
then and afterward, — especially the inexpediency of the attempt upon military 
grounds under the circumstances, and finally the drift of events, which car- 
ried the bulk of the army to Shiloh and Corinth. A general view of the thea- 
ter of war, and a consideration of the geography of east Tennessee, will show 
the importance of the lodgment that was now to be undertaken, and indicate 
the opposition it was sure to encounter, unless seconded by operations of a 
decisive character in other quarters. 

East Tennessee is an elevated valley of great salubrity and considerable 
agricultural capacity, practically inclosed, though with some natural open- 
ings, by a mountainous and rugged belt of country in which rise the sources 
of the Tennessee River. The surplus of food products during the war was not 
large, but was not without value to the South at first, when so much of the 
country was absorbed in the growth of cotton. The railroad passing east and 
west through the valley afforded the most direct and convenient communica- 
tion between Richmond and the Mississippi, while abreast of it, from Chatta- 
nooga, a branching railroad penetrated the Atlantic and Gulf States to the 
coast, affording a valuable system of internal communication for supply 
or defense, and an equally effective line for external invasion. On the 
northern side, the valley had a strong defensive line in the difficult, though 
not impracticable mountains, which, farther to the north, assume an expanse 
and ruggedness that present what might bo considered practically a secm-e 
barrier between Kentucky and Virginia. East Tennessee might therefore be 
regarded as a doorway to the rear of Richmond, and a commanding rendez- 
vous which looked down with a menacing adaptability upon tlie Gulf and 
Atlantic States. In the latter light, more than as a means of defense, its 
preservation was of vital moment to the Confederacy. The occupation of it 
by the Federal force would be like the last stage in a regular siege, when the 
glacis is crowned and batteries are established for breaching the walls and 



delivering the final assault. But the fact that it was the home of all that 
was loyal to the Union in the States in rebellion, seemed to blind the Grovern- 
ment to the considerations which insured that it would be defended with all 
the energy of self-preservation. The powerful force and desperate battles 
that were finally found necessary to secure the object, afforded a vindication, 
to which nothing need be added, against the fatuity which demanded that 
the Army of the Ohio, without supplies and with severed communications, 
should accomplish it in the summer of 1862 with a movable force of 31,000 
men against more than 60,000 that barred the way. [See maps, pp. 3 and 6.] 

I was following the movements of the enemy retreating from Corinth, 
when, on the 9th of June, I received notice from General Halleck that my 
army was to resume its separate action, and advance into east Tennessee. 
My divisions started in the new direction the next day, and on the 11th I 
received my instructions verbally from G-eneral Halleck. I was to move 
as diligently as possible to the object specified, but I was to repair the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad as I proceeded, guard it, and draw my 
supplies from it. The inexpediency of these conditions, as I had pointed out, 
was realized before the rejDairs were completed. The road, running along the 
enemy's front, was peculiarly exposed to attack — was in fact attacked while 
we were working on it and afterward; it was not supplied with rolling 
stock, and we derived no benefit from it, though the repairs detained us 
until the last of June. Foreseeing these embarrassments, I had given orders 
for the repair of the roads south from Nashville, and for the accumulation 
of supplies at that point. I desired also the option of making the advance 
through McMinnville and Kingston, which I imagined might be found to 
present decided advantages. It would avoid the heavy work on the railroads 
to the Tennessee River, the bridging of the river, and the extremely difficult 
ground that must at first be overcome by wagon transportation after crossing. 
It would establish a junction promptly with the force under Gr. W. Morgan 
operating against Cumberland Gap, and give actual possession of east Ten- 
nessee, which the mere occupation of Chattanooga would not. Halleck at first 
assented to my proposition, but a day or two afterward \vithdrew his consent, 
and enjoined that the movement should be made directly upon Chattanooga. 

We crossed the Tennessee by extemporized ferries — three di\'isions at 
Florence, arriving at Athens on the Nashville and Decatur Railroad on the 28th 
of June, and one division l)etween the 1st and 6th o| July, by a very inefficient 
ferry prepared by General Mitchel at Decatur. !«« 4 6 S 4 3 9 

General Thomas with his division was still detained on the Corinth road 
under General Halleck's orders, and did not join at Huntsville until the last 
of July ; so that the available effective force for an advance when I reached 
Huntsville on the 29th of June was between 24,000 and 25,000 men. The 
16,000 already in middle Tennessee and north Alabama would still be retiuired 
to guard Nashville and keep open the connnunications. But there was much 
to be done before an advance could be possible. We found ourselves already 
at the very limit of our means of transportation. Nothing had been accom- 
plished in the way of repairing the raih-oads, and it required every wagon to 


haul supplies euougli for the daily consumption. Much of the time there- 
after the troops were on half rations. We could gather some forage from the 
country, but not enough for the animals. 

Before my arrival G-eneral Mitchel had urgently reported demonstrations of 
the enemy from the direction of Chattanooga. To the Secretary of War he 
said, June 21st : " I am with difficulty maintaining my position in front of 
Chattanooga. I will endeavor to hold my position until reenforcements 
arrive." His nearest position was in fact at Battle Creek, twenty miles below 
Chattanooga, with the Tennessee River and a mountain range intervening. 
To me he telegraphed, June 21st : " I think everything depends on celerity of 
movement. If we should be driven from Stevenson (the junction of the Nash- 
ville and Chattanooga and the Memphis and Charleston railroads), or even 
from the position we now occupy (at Battle Creek, nine miles above Bridge- 
port), I should deem it a great misfortune." Partly therefore to oppose this 
supposed danger, and especially to place a strong working force on the Nash- 
ville and Chattanooga Railroad, McCook's and Crittenden's divisions were sent 
to Stevenson and Battle Creek. Nelson's and Wood's divisions were for the 
present kept on the Nashville and Decatur road ; and the repairs by means of 
the troops and by experienced hired hands were urged energetically. At the 
same time mills were put to work to get out lumber, and the building of boats 
for a bridge was commenced. We had no pontoon train, and the Tennessee 
was a formidable river, requiring a bridge 1400 yards long. 

The depredations of the small bands that had harassed Mitchel before my 
arrival were continued afterward, and soon demonstrated the necessity of 
defensive works for bridges and other vulnerable points. An inclosed earth- 
work of considerable strength, large enough for a regiment, was constructed 
at Stevenson for the protection of the depot to be established there for the 
advance; and a specific plan and instructions for small block-houses, or, 
more properly speaking, picket-houses, at the less important points were 
prescribed. An officer was specially assigned to the direction of these works, 
and the supervision of the guards. Iron-clad dummy cars were provided for 
such purj^oses and for express service. Much of the road-repairing and 
other engineering work was done and supervised by a splendid regiment of 
mcichanics and engineers from Michigan, under Colonel William P. Innes. 

These, from among the thousand other details, are mentioned, because they 
were infinitely important to our existence, and absolutely necessary for the 
first step in advance. Clearly the means of transportation, which were barely 
sufficient to provider us with a precarious subsistence where we were, would 
l)e insufficient to carry us at least thirty miles farther away, across a l)road 
river and a mountainous country, into the presence of the enemy. The records 
show that lab(n'ious and unceasing efforts were used to bring about the neces- 
sary conditions for a forward movement, and that every officer employed 
in command or in staff positions was stimulated to the utmost by advice and 
instructions for the object before us. We had been engaged in this earnest 
manner just nine days from the time of my arrival at Huntsville [June 29th], 
when I received a dispatch from Ilalleck,' saying that my progress was not 


satisfactory to the President. I was so astonished at the message that I made 
no reply until three days afterward, when I was called on for explanations. \ 
The road from Nashville to Stevenson was completed on the 12th of July, 
and a train was started the next morning with supplies for the depot at 
Stevenson. My attention had been attracted to the importance of McMinn- 
ville as an outpost. It was at the foot of the mountain on the direct wagon 
road between Nashville and Chattanooga, and was the terminus of a branch 
railroad, twenty miles east of the Nashville and Chattanooga Kailroad. I had 
just organized a new brigade at Murfreesboro' to occupy McMinnville. On 
the morning of the 13th Forrest, \\dth a large body of cavalry, surprised the 
brigade, killed and wounded some and captured the rest, damaged the railroad 
seriously, and produced alarm in Nashville, where the force was not large. \ 

4. "Official Records," Vol. XVI., Part II., pp. 
104, 122. 

^ The following orders were published with ref- 
erence to this and similar affairs. It is proper to 
add that a Court of Inquiry, instituted by General 
Rosecrans, at the request of General T. T. Crit- 
tenden, the commander of the brigade, after his 
exchange, acquitted the commander of blame, on 
the ground that he had only arrived the day before 
the attack, and had shown commendable energy 
in his new position. Colonel Duffield had also just 
arrived. He appeared to have behaved well in the 
attack, and was severely wounded: 

" Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, 
"In Camp, Huntsville, Ala., July 21st, 1862. 

" General Orders, No. 32 : Ou the 13th instant the 
force at Murfreesborough, under command of Brigadier- 
General T. T. Crittenden, late colonel of the 6th Indiana 
Regiment, and consisting of 6 companies of the 9tb 
Michigan, 9 companies of the 3d Minnesota, 2 sections of 
Hewett's (Kentucky) battery, 4 companies of the 4th 
Kentucky Cavalry, and 3 companies of the 7th Penn- 
sylvania Cavalry, Wiis captured at that place bj' a force 
of the enemy's cavalry variously cstiniatcd at from 
1800 to 3.'50). It appears from tlic ixst infoi-niation that 
can be obtained, that Bi'ijjadicr-CJcucral Crittenden and 
Colonel Duffleld of the '.tth Michigan, with the six com- 
panies of that rciiinii lit and all of the cavalry, were 
surprised and oapt nnd early in the morning in the 
houses and streets of the town, or in their camp near 
by, with but slii,'^ht rcHistaiiec^ and witliout any timely 
warning of tlie presences of tlie enemy. The rest of the 
force, consisting of tlie 3d Minnesota and the artillery 
under Col. Lester, left its camp and took aiiollier posi- 
tion, M'liieli it maintained with but few casualties 
tlie feeble attacks of the eiuMuy until about 3 o'clock, 
when it was surrendered and marched into captivity. 

"Take it in all its features, few more disgraceful 
examples of neglect of duty and lack of good conduct 
can be found in tlie history of wars. It fully merits the 
extreme penalty whicli the law provides for such mis- 
conduct. The force was more than sufflcient to reoel 
the attack effectually. The mortification which the 
army will f(-el at the result is poorly compens.ated bv the 
exertion made by Kome — perhaps inany — of thi> otlicers 
to retrieve the disgrace of the surprise. The action lit 
to be adopted with reference to those who arc bliiniable. 
especially the officers highest in conunaiid, 'cannot be 
determined without fiirthei' investigation. 

"In contrast to this slianicfiil affair, the general com- 
manding takes ph'asnre in making honorable mention 
of the conduct of a detachment of twenty-two men of 
Companies I and II. loth Wisconsin Reginieiit. nnder the 
command of Scrg<'ants W. Nelson and A. II. Makinson. 

The detachment was on duty guarding a bridge east 
of HuntsviUe, when it was attacked on April 28th by a 
force of some 200 or 300 cavalry, wlii<-li it fought for two 
hours and repulsed in the most signal manner. Such is 
the conduct that duty and honor demand of every sol- 
dier ; and this example is worthy of imitation by higher 
officers and larger conmiands. By command of Ma.jor- 
General Buell. James B. Fry, Col. and Chief-of-Btaff. 

" Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, 
"In Camp, Huntsville, Ala., August 1st. 1862. 

" General Orders, No. 37 : The nnijor-general com- 
manding has to announce other instances of disgrace- 
ful neglect and contrast them with another of gallantry : 

"The guard at Courtland Bridge, consisting of com- 
panies A and H, 10th Kentucky, under the command 
of Captain Davidson, and a part of Captain Egglcston's 
company, 1st Ohio Cavalry, was completely surprised 
and captirrcd with but trifling loss on the morning of 
the 25th ultimo, by a force of irregular cavalry. On the 
same day the companies of Captains Boyl and Goben, 
10th Indiana, which wen- ordered to protect two bridges 
on the same road, respectively six and twelve miles 
east of Courtland, deemed it Aviser to bring in an 
empty train which came up than to defend their posts, 
threatened with an attack from the same irregular cav- 
alry ; and so put themselves on the train and arrived 
safely at Decatur, a few miles distant, without the loss 
or injury of a man. On the same day, and on the same 
road, eight miles from Decatur, a guard, consisting of 
twenty-four men of Ccmipauy E, 31st Ohio, under the 
command of Lieutenant Harman, were suddenly at- 
tacked by a greatly superior force of the same cav- 
alry. The.v defended themselves gallantly, however, 
and repulsed the enemy, killing several of the nunilur. 
Lieut, llarinan ami eleven of his men were wounded, 
himself in two places, and two of his men were killed. 

"The general submits these examples to tlie reflection 
of the troops. He reminds t hem that neglect and bn<l con- 
duct on the part of guards brings dishonor upon them and 
may even jeopardize the safety of an army. If these ap- 
peals to their personal and professional pride should fail 
of their oltject. he warns them that the extreme penalty 
of the law niust intervene to punish the guilty and save 
the army from the jeopardy in which they place it. The 
duty of guarding the coumiunicatious of the army is 
among the most important with which an officer and his 
troops can b(> intrusted. Vigilance, det«'rmination. and 
the ju-eparation of suitable defenses in the way of in- 
trcnchnients or stockades will i>revent such attacks, or 
enable a small force to repel a greatly siiiverior one. Had 
the order for bridge-guards to fortify their posts been 
promptly executed and iU'Oi)er vii.'ilance been observed, 
the attacks referred to, if made at all. would hav.' had 
very different results. This order and (tcnend Orders, 
No." 32, will be read at the head of ev(>ry company and 
detachment. By command of M v.toR-ciKNERAL ItCEl.L. 
James B. Fry, Colonel and Chicf-of-Stafl'." 


This was the first appearance of any large body of the enemy in our rear 
south of the Cumberland, though Morgan was at the same time engaged in a 
formidable raid in Kentucky. Nelson was immediately ordered to occupy 
Murfreesboro' and McMinnville with his division, himself and one brigade 
going by railroad. He had just reached Murfreesboro' with a portion of his 
troops when Forrest, on the 18th, appeared again on the railroad between 
him and Nashville, captured guards, and destroyed two more bridges. Work 
was immediately commenced to repair the damage. It was completed on the 
28th of July, and the shipment of supplies for the depot at Stevenson was 

As soon as my designs upon east Tennessee were known, the Confederate 
authorities took prompt measures to counteract them. The sudden appear- 
ance of large bodies of cavalry under Morgan and Forrest on my communi- 
cations in Tennessee and Kentucky early in July, and the increased activity 
of small parties, were a part of these measures. It was at first in contempla- 
tion to move the Tupelo army upon my rear in middle Tennessee, but the 
wiser plan was adopted of concentrating in my front. One division of that 
army, and reenforcements from other quarters, reached Chattanooga in June. 
General Bragg arrived on the 30th of July, and by that time the transfer of 
his force from Tupelo was about completed. The nucleus of a force under 
Van Dorn and Price was left in Mississippi to neutralize the large Federal 
force on the Memphis and Charleston road, an object which was accomplished 
at first by inaction alone, and at last by bold though unsuccessful attacks 
with inferior numbers. 

The foreshadowing of an aggressive campaign from east Tennessee soon 
began to be seen. By report, and actually, as the record now shows, the 
objective was at first middle Tennessee and Nashville. Rumor, as usual, 
placed the force that was ready for the work at very large numbers — 80,000 
or 100,000 men. I realized that the enemy in front of us was assuming formi- 
dable proportions, but I did not doubt that his strength was over-estimated, 
nor that, if necessary, my own force would be increased, and therefore my 
efforts for the accumulation of supplies for an advance were not relaxed. 

On the 7th of August I informed Oeneral Halleck of the condition which 
the campaign was assuming, and told him that my force should be increased. 
I estimated the force opposed to me at sixty thousand men. The records now 
show that it was greater. He answered on the 8th that Oeneral Grant would 
turn over two divisions to my command " if I absolutely required them," but 
cautioned me not to ask for them if I could avoid it with safety. By the 12th 
the accumulating evidence showed that the call could not be dispensed with, 
and I requested General Grant to forward the divisions without delay. One 
of them joined on the 1st of September; the other did not arrive until the 
12th, after the movement northward to follow Bragg had commenced. The 
strength of the two divisions was about 5000 men each. 

Our communications south of the Cumberland had been made secure by 
the distribution of the troops, but to the north the depredations were prose- 
cuted with increased vigor. Our cavalry was totally insufficient to cope with 



these incursions, which it must be said, also, were seldom resisted by the 
infantry guards with vigilance and resohition. On the 10th of August, Mor- 
gan again appeared on the railroad north of Nashville, captured the guard of 
about 150 men at Grallatin, effectually disabled the tunnel north of that place, 
and destroyed several bridges toward Nashville. Our communication with 
Louisville, on which we were dependent for supplies, was thus, for the pres- 
ent, effectually severed. Work was immediately commenced to repaii- the 
damage, but the constantly recurring presence of the enemy's cavalry inter- 
fered so effectually as to require a large increase of force from the front or 
the rear for the defense. I had already strengthened the guards at Bowling 
Grreen and Munfordville. To continue to draw from the front was not yet 
to be thought of. On the 16tli, therefore, I gave General Nelson a couple of 
field-batteries and some experienced cavalry and infantry officers, and sent 
him to Kentucky to organize such troops as could be got together there to 
reestablish our communications and operate against Morgan's incursions. 

On the 18th a guard of a regiment belonging to Orant's command was capt- 
ured without a show of resistance at Clarksv^lle, i^ where a considerable quan- 
tity of supplies had been deposited for transshipment in consequence of the 
suspension of navigation by low water in the Cumberland. Upon hearing of 
Morgan's appearance again on the Cumberland north of Nashville, General R. 
W. Johnson, a spirited cavalry officer, under whose command I had asseml)led 
all the cavalry that was available, moved promptly in pursuit, and with his 
inferior force attacked Morgan vigorously near Hartsville. Johnson was 
defeated with a loss of 80 killed and wounded and 75 prisoners, himself among 
the latter. The rest escaped and made their way as stragglers or in small 
bodies to Nashville. 

These details, harassing and disappointing to the actors at the time, are now 
no less wearisome and uninteresting to the careless reader ; but the considera- 
tion of them is essential to a correct appreciation of the campaign. It is a 
story familiar to history of the crippling of an invading army by a successful 
war upon its too long and inadequately protected communications, with an 
enemy in its front. The line in this case was a single railroad, 350 miles long, 
through a population either hostile to the invader, or at least in a consider- 
able degree friendly to his opponent. Under the circumstances that were 
to ensue, it is not perhaps to be accounted a misfortune that the contemplated 
advance was checked at the start. A Union army of 81,000 men at Chatta- 
nooga in July, 1862, without supplies, with its communications broken for 
400 miles, and the Government on the Potomac appealing for 25,000 men 
which could not be spared from Corinth, might well have been in a worse 
condition than the stronger army in November, 1863, which was reduced to 
horse and mule meat for its ration, with its communications complete to 
within 30 miles, and with an unoccupied army from Vicksburg and consider 
able reenforcements from the Potomac hastening to its succor. 

i^Fov an explanation of the sun-ender see Vol. after the surronder tlio colonel iind nil the liiio-otli- 

XVI., Part I., pp. 8G2-8G9, "Official Records." cers present were cashiered ])y order of the I'resi- 

Colonel Rodney Mason, 71st Oliio regiment, the dent, but tliis action was subse«itieii(ly revoked, and 

commander, had less than 200 effective men. Soon they were honorably discliarged.— D. (,'. B. 


The roi)orts of the superior force assembled in east Tennessee were con- 
finutMl as tlie time passed, and there could be no doubt that our position in 
middle Tennessee was about to be assailed. Already there were rumors of 
crossing at Chattanooga, Harrison's Landing, and Kingston. These starting- 
points indicated no certain plan of attack. The enemy might descend the 
Sequatchie and Cumberland valleys and enter at north Alabama, in which 
case he would have a railroad for his supplies ; or he might cross the mount- 
ains by direct roads toward middle Tennessee. In either case, Stevenson, 
on the south side of a declining spur of the Cumberland Mountains reaching 
to Huntsville, was unsuitable for om- depot, and Decherd, on the north side, 
was adopted instead. 

On the 19th of August I received information from Gleneral McCook, who 
was at Battle Creek with his own and Crittenden's divisions, that the enemy 
was crossing in force at Chattanooga. My plans were already matured and 
McCook had his orders for such a case, only waiting the signal to act, which 
was given on the 20th. He was to march with his division to the point at 
which the Anderson or Thm*man road between Chattanooga and McMinnville 
crossed the Sequatchie valley, watching and opposing the enemy on that road, 
and gradually fall back toward McMinnville until he joined the remainder 
of the army. Crittenden was to follow him, and act similarly and in con- 
junction with him on the Higginbottom road, which crossed the valley a little 
lower down, and united with the Thurman road further north. They had 
pre\iously been provided with rockets and a signal code for communicating 
with each other and with the rest of the army. The same day I went to Battle 
Creek and then to Decherd to superintend the further concentration, for 
which general instructions had already been given. Altamont, in advance 
of McMinnville, was designated as the point of junction, though that could 
have been modified, if desirable, after an examination of the locality. General 
McCook proceeded up the valley some distance until he received information 
on which he relied, that the enemy had already entered the valley in force, 
or would enter it before he could be intercepted. He therefore returned to 
Crittenden at the Higginbottom road, which he deemed to be impracticable 
for his artillery and train, and both divisions returned to Battle Creek, where, 
after hearing from them, I sent them fm^ther orders. The information was 
positive that the enemy was advancing on the Thurman road, where in fact 
his cavalry was encountered ; and under the orders for the concentration 
Thomas went to Altamont from McMinnville with one division, but returned 
to McMinnville. McCook arrived there a little later and remained until the 
final concentration at Murfreesl)oro' under the orders of the 30th. A brigade 
under Colonel W. H. Lytic, of Rousseau's division, was still retained at Hunts- 
ville, and two regiments under Colonel L. A. Harris were at Battle Creek. The 
failure of McCook's movement up the Sequatchie was unfortunate. It gave 
a false impression of the enemy's progress, and of the route he was to pursue. 
But for the erroneous information under which it was abandoned, it ought 
to have led to important results. There would have been no advantage, 
however, in retiring on the Higginbottom road without meeting the enemy. 


We were now reduced to ten days' provisions. Our railroad communica- 
tion north of Nashville had been broken for twenty days, and no effort was 
being made at Louisville to reopen it. My orders to General Nelson had 
been of no avail. In fact, on his arrival there he found Kentucky organized 
into a separate department not under my command ; and his report of my 
instructions and his representations of the necessity of opening the road to 
Nashville were answered with orders from Washington to first open com- 
munication with Cumberland Gap, where General G. W. Morgan was not in 
danger, and had abundant supplies for the present. The result of those 
orders, unnecessary for the relief of Morgan, and insufficient for stopping 
Kirby Smith, was the defeat of Nelson at Richmond on the 30th. Ten days 
had elapsed since the enemy's advance was positively reported, and there was 
no more evidence of his approach than at first. He was, of course, to be 
expected, any day, but he might not come in two weeks. 

Under the circumstances it was plainly necessary to concentrate nearer 
Nashville, where we could get to work on the railroad, and at the same time 
be ready for the enemy when he should come. Orders were accordingly 
given on the 30th of August for concentrating at Murfreesboro' on the 5th 
of September. Thomas, at McMinnville, was to march on the 2d, and other 
commands according to their position. To the last Thomas had no defi- 
nite information of the approach of the enemy. It turned out that Bragg 
crossed at Chattanooga on the 28th of August, entered Sparta on the 3d of 
September, and made his way to Glasgow, where he arrived on the 14th, 
ha^dng crossed the Cumberland at Carthage and Gainsboro'. Something 
of these movements, though not of the entii-e force, was learned on the 6th, 
and that Bowling Green was threatened. Two divisions were, therefore, 
moved across the river at Nashville on the 7th, — one to go to the protection 
of Bowhng Green, where there was a small garrison with some stores, and 
the other to Gallatin, to gain information of the movements of the enemy in 
the valley. 

At the same time preparation was made to act with the remaining force as 
circumstances might require. Two and a half divisions, including Paine's 
division from Grant, which had not yet arrived, and a large nunil)er of con- 
valescents, were designated to hold Nash\alle, under the eoniniand of General 
Thomas. It was ascertained on the lOtli that the bulk of Bragg's army had 
marched north from the Cumberland, and my movable divisions were accord- 
ingly put in motion to follow. They were concentrated at Bowling Gi-een on 
the evening of the 15th. I there learned that the garrison at Munfonhille 
had been attacked, but the result was not certainly known, Bragg was 
reported at Glasgow, and on the KJth I marched to givi^ battle to him at that 
place; but during the day it was asc(>rtaiiied that he had marched the day 
before for Miiiit'ordville, the garrison of which, it was also ascertained, had 
re]ielled the first attack, and my divisions were directed upon that point. Tlu» 
next day, at Prewett's Knob, thirteen miles from :Munfordville, I learned tliat 
the garrison had that morning surrendered to Bragg's entiic army, and that 
night Colonel Wilder reported to mo with his command as j.risoners of war, 

VOL. Ill 4. 



The enemy was now concentrated in front of us, and had taken up a posi= 
tion of unusual strength upon and beliind a rather low crest on the south side 
of Green River. My information of the aggregate force assembled in east 
Tennessee was sufficiently accurate, but at fii'st there was no means of know- 
ing what portion of it was with Bragg, and what portion had followed Kirby 
Smith. The proximity of the last three days had given a better knowledge 
of Bragg's strength. Colonel Wilder, who was competent, and had had some 
opportunity for observation, estimated it at from 35,000 to 40,000 men, and 
nobody estimated it at any less. I supposed it to be from 30,000 to 40,000. I 

had with me 35,000 effective men, but 
on being satisfied at Bowling Green 
that no considerable force remained to 
threaten Nashville, I called up Thom- 
as's division, and now determined, on 
its arrival, to attack Bragg's position if 
he should remain. Thomas arrived on 
the 20th. There was some skirmishing 
between the lines that evening, but 
the enemy withdrew during the night. 
His rear-guard was driven out of Mun- 
f ordville the next day, and was pressed 
by oui' advanced guard until he turned 
off the main road toward Bardstown.->V 
There was no reason to hesitate at 
this point as to the course which I 
should pursue. I did not know where 
Kii'by Smith was, but the junction be- 
tween himself and Bragg was to be 
considered as practically established. 
United for battle they would outnumber me very greatly. Louisville also, in the 
presence of this combined force, might be in danger. Besides, our provisions 
were nearly exhausted ; some of the troops were without rations after arriv- 
ing at West Point, twenty-five miles from Louisville. I therefore pushed for- 
ward to Louisville, the leading division arriving there on the 25th, and the 
last on the 29th. The cavalry was kept as an outpost at Elizabethtown to 
guard the flank of the passing columns and watch any possible movements 
of the enemy toward Bowling Green. The large empty wagon train which 
the exhaustion of our supplies at Nashville had rendered useless and insup- 
portable, had })een pushed through from Bowling Green by the way of Browns- 
ville, Litchfield, and West Point, under a cavalry escort. 

The army was now to encounter grave danger from the influence of Oliver 
P. Morton, Governor of Indiana. He had from the ])eginning tried to retain 
a r/uasl authority over Lidiana troops after they had been mustered into the 

•^ 111 his official report General Bragg states that he ' ' offered battle " at Mimf ordville. No doubt he 
was willing to fight on his own terms at more than one point. But the general who offers battle is he 
who stays to give or receive it. — D. C. B. 



service of the United States and had joined my army. His interference was 
injurious to discipline 5 but he persisted in order to preserve his influence with 
the troops, the people, and the Government. The seeds of mischief, always 
present in his extra-official conduct toward the Indiana troops, were now being 
sown with a vigorous but crafty hand, in the counsels at Washington and 
among the executives of other States, to impair my authority and effect my 
removal from command. General Nelson, an officer of remarkable merit, was 
in command of the center corps of my army. He was assaulted and killed by 
General Davis, accompanied by Governor Morton, the very day before the 
army was to march against the invaders. Nelson, though often rough in 
command, was always solicitous about the well-being of his troops, and was 
held in high esteem for his conspicuous services, gallantry in battle, and 
great energy ; and his death caused much indignation among the troojDS that 
knew him best. Davis, an Indianian, was unknown in my arm}^ except in his 
own division, which had just joined while he was absent ; but Morton's rela- 
tion to the affair brought to bear in Davis's behalf a State feeling inspired by 
Morton and strengthened by his habitual intervention in favor of Indiana 
troops against the rigidity of my control. The restraining influence of dis- 
cipline was all that prevented an outbreak between the friends of Nelson and 
Davis, which might have added the most serious consequences to the criminal 

Nothing but the law of violence could, under any circumstances, justify the 
manner of the killing for the alleged provocation, and no mere merit of ordi- 
nary soldiership could ever atone for the sacrilege against discipline under 
the circumstances which existed. The dignity of a State was abused by the 
attitude of its governor in the affair, and the authority of the general gov- 
ernment was even more degraded by its condonement of the act — a con- 
donement made virtually, if not actually, at his dictation.i!^ 

Davis was immediateh^ placed in arrest, and the case reported to General 
Halleck, with the request that a court might be ordered from Washington 
for its trial, as the operations then in progress made it impracticable for me 
to spare the officers for the purpose at the moment. Instead of that, Davis 

i^ Briefly stated, the particulars of the occurrence nounced him for appearing as an abettor of the in- 

are as follows : Nelson was in command at Louis- suit forced upon him, and retired toward his room 

villc, and was laboring to put the city in a state of in the adjoining hall. Davis received a pistol from 

defense against the expected attack. A few days be- the hand of his other attendant, not Morton, and 

fore my arrival lie rebuked Davis, no doubt harshly, followed Nelson to the hall. Nelson, apparently 

for what he considered a neglectful or inefficient dis- changing his purpose, returned before reaching his 

charge of duty, and ordered him to report to General room, and as he nearly reached the end of the liall 

Wright at Cincinnati. Upon my arrival Davis was where DaWs was, the latter tired, inflicting a wound 

ordered by Wright to report to me for duty with his in the breast, of which Nelson died in about half an 

division. Instead of proceeding directly to Louis- hour, after receiving the ministrations of the church 

ville, he went by Indianapolis and was joined by and forgiving his slayer. It has recently been 

Morton. With liim and with another friend Davis made known for the lirst tinu^ in a publislied stati-- 

approached Nelson in tlio vestibule of the Gait House ment of the affair by General James B. Fry, who 

at Louisville at breakfast-time, in the presence of at the moment ])laced Davis in arrest, and as a 

a considerable number of persons. The reception ])ersonal friend listened to his statement, that 

which Davis's demand for satisfaction received was upon accosting Nelson. Davis tilliiied into Ins face 

no doubt such as he had expected. Wliat the l)y- a i)aper-wad that he Inid b(HMi crumpling between 

standers witTiessed and what was reported at the liis fingers. It was then tluit Nelson struck liim. I 

time was a slap from the back of Nelson's liand in was not aware of this circumstance until the ap- 

Davis's face. Nelson then turned to Morton. <le- pearance of the statenu'nt referred to.— D. C. B. 


was released, ostensibly that the case might be turned over to the civil 
authority; and thus the military authority of the Government was abased 
over the grave of a high officer, whose slaughter by another officer under 
such circumstances, and as a purely military offense, it had not the character 
to bring to trial. J 

In the midst of the excitement caused by the killing of Nelson, and the 
active preparation that was going on for an advance against the enemy the 
next day, an order was received from Washington relieving me from the (».om- 
mand, and appointing Greneral Thomas to succeed me. In a little while 
General Thomas came to my room and stated his intention to decline the 
command. I answered that I could not consent to his doing so on any gi'ound 
that was personal to me, and that if his determination was fixed I must be 
allowed to see the message he proposed to send. He then prepared the fol- 
lowing dispatch to General Halleck : 

" Colonel McKibbin handed me your dispatch placing me in command of the Department of 
the Tennessee. General Buell's preparations have been completed to march against the enemy, 
and I therefore respectfully ask that he may be retained in command. My position is very 
embarrassing, not being as well informed as I should be as the commander of this army, and 
on the assumption of such a responsibility." 

I could make no personal objection to his reasons, but I encouraged him to 
accept the duty assigned to him, saying that nothing remained to be done but 
to put the army in motion, and that I would cheerfully explain my plans to 
him and give him all the information I possessed. He persisted, however, 
and the message went off. I did not then know of the steps that were being 
taken for my retention by both of the senators and two representatives 
from Kentucky. 5^ 

Halleck replied to Thomas that the order had not been made by him or 
by his advice, and he had no power to revoke it, but that he would sus- 
pend it until the question could be submitted to the Government, and that 
Colonel McKibbin had been twice telegraphed to withhold the order. The 
order was accordingly suspended. I at once resumed the reins of command, 
which, indeed, had scarcely been laid aside, and proceeded with the prepara- 
tions to advance. 

On my arrival at Louisville I had found a considerable number of newly 
made regiments or fragments of regiments, which the crisis had hurried into 

\ The following order announced General Nel- of public duty; but no man was more prompt to recog- 

son's death to the army : "i^^ ^""^ foster merit in bis inferiors, and in bis own 

conduct be set an example of tbat vigilance, indus- 

" HEADQUAKTEKS, ARMY OF THK Oiiio, Loi'isviLLE, t^'^' •'^"*^ Piowpt attention to duty whicb be exacted 

September 29tb, 18(;2. General Orders, No. 47a. Tbe fiomotbers. In battle bis example was equally marked, 

seiicnil conniianding announces witb inexpressible re- ^n more tban one field -at Sbilob, Ricbmond, and 

Kr.-t tl.e.leutber Msuor-General William Nelson, wbicb Ivy Mountain -be was conspicuous for bis gallant 

occurred in tbis city at 8 : 30 o'clock tbis morniiiK- bearing. 

"Tbe deceased was bred a sailor, and was an officer of "T'lf funeral of the deceased wiU take place at 3 

tbe navy wbile bolding a commission in tbe militan' ^- '"• t'>-m<.rrow, at Calvary Cbureb, Third street. By 

service. ITisfory will honor him as one of tlie first to f""'""""^ of Major-General Buell. James B. Fey, 

()n,'iiiii/,c. l)y bis iiKlividiml exertion, a military force in Colonel and Cbief-of-8taflF." 

K.iitu.'ky. his naf iv HI ate. to rescue be- from tbe vor- + Dispatch from Senators Crittenden and Davis, 

'"^n::::^2^"^:^^::s:!^ts,::z^::"::^;.,r ,. ™.iBep.-™.«tive.M»,wa„dD„„iap,to,he 

sive views, and great eiu-rgy and foicr of cbaraitei-. By l'i-(^sident (" Official Records," Vol. XVI., Part II., 
bis nature be was intolerant of disobedience, or neglect p. 557). 



the State from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. After desi^-nating a portion as a 
guard for Louisville, mostly organized into a division under General Dumont, 
the remainder of the new regiments were assigned to places in the old divisions ; 
the baggage, hospital, and supply trains were reorganized ; the equipment of 
the soldier was repaired ; each man was provided with individual cooking- 
utensils, so as almost to dispense 
with baggage-wagons; and on 
the arrival of the last division, on 
the 29th, the army was ready to 
march on the next day. One day 
was lost by the instructions from 
Washington, Ijut orders were 
given for marching on the 1st of 
October. The army was divided 
into three corps : the First under 
Genera] McCook, the Second un 
der General T. L. Crittenden, and 
the Third under General Gilbert. 
This corps was to have been com- 
manded by General Nelson. Gen- 
eral Thomas was announced as 
second in command in the army. 
It is now proper to take a survey 
of the military situation which 
was before me. 

My instructions of the 18th 
of March placed General G. W. Morgan in command of the Seventh division 
of the army, to operate in the Cumberland Gap road from Kentucky to east 
Tennessee, and required him to take the Gap if practicable, and if not, to 
hold the enemy in check on that route. The division was at first only 
partially formed, and some time elapsed before it was in a condition to 
advance. The Gap was naturally strong, and was occupied by a consider- 
able force. Morgan turned the position on the 17th of June by marching 
through Big Creek and Rogers's Gaps. The Confederates thereupon evacu- 
ated the place without waiting for an attack, and Morgan took possession 
on the 18th. It was at once strongly intrenched under the supervision of 
an officer of engineers, but its importance in a general campaign was not in 
proportion to the force to which its maintenance gave occupation. It was 
chiefly as an encouragement to the loyal element in east Tennessee that the 
possession of it was desirable. The campaign inaugurated by the Confed- 
ei-ates in east Tennessee emi)loyed the troops of two military dei>artments, 
and lal)ored under the inconvenience of cooperation l)etween the two inde- 
])endent commanders, instead of subordination to a single authority. It was 
executed with a harmony and zeal unusual under such circumstaiKM's, but 
perhaps lacked the consistency which either of the two leaders wt)uld have 
been amply capable of imi)arting to it. 




The original plan was for a combined movement 
into middle Tennessee for the recovery of Nash- 
ville. The invasion of Kentucky was at first prob- 
ably not thought of at all, or at least only as a 
later possibility. But as Bragg could not be ready 
to cross the river from Chattanooga for about two 
weeks after his arrival, it was arranged that in the 
meantime Kirby Smith with his troops should at- 
tack and capture Morgan at Cumberland Gap. The 
strength of Morgan's fortified position, however, 
with 8000 good troops to defend it, was upon con- 
sideration deemed to preclude the attempt. The 
alternative was to invest him on the soutii side 
with 1)000 men under Stevenson, while Smith with 
lL',000 sliould seize and hold his communications 
on the north ; by which means, not being strong 
enough to break his way out on either side, Mor- 
gan, upon the exhaustion of his sup])lie8, would be 
compelled to surrender. This i)laii l)eiug adopted, 
Smith commenced his movement through Kogers's 
and Big Creek Gaps on the 14th of August, and 
reached Morgan's rear at Barbourville on the 18th. 
He now perceived that it would be impossible 
for him to gather supplies for his command from 
that poor and exhausted region, and later his em- 
barrassment was increased by Morgan's occupa- 
tion of Eogers's and Big Creek Gaps. Nothing 
therefore remained for him but to withdraw or 
advance boldly into the rich portion of Kentucky. 
Bragg was not at first in favor of the latter course, 
until he should be prepared to follow up the pre- 
cipitate movement which it was not doubted I 
would make from middle Tennessee for the pro- 
tection of Kentucky. However, his concurrence 
was readily yielded, for the proposition was allur- 
ing. The idea of invasion, which had now taken 
firm root, was coupled with the chimera of an up- 
rising of the people and a transfer of the State to 
the Confederacy. I never had the slightest appre- 
hension of such a result. Boys might join John 
Morgan's roving cavaliers, and some mature men 
might commit themselves with less romance to the 
cause of the Confederacy, and these phenomena 
would of course be multiplied by the backing of an 
army. But when Kentucky so far overcame her 
sympathy as to assume an attitude of neutrality, 
she listened to a call of reason and interest, not 
unmingled with genuine love of the Union, that 
was not to stop at half-measures ; and as soon as 
it became apparent that neutrality was impractica- 
ble, it was the deliberate choice of the mass of the 
people — not any pressiire of coercion — that ar- 
rayed her irrevocably on the side of the Union. 
To that choice she was thoroughly loyal, and no 
finer example of political and popular generosity 
can anywhere be foimd than that wherein, at the 
close of the conflict, she restored to all the rights 
of citizenship and the ties of fraternity her oxp:i- 
triated sons who for four years had inad<' war 
upon her. 

Smith advanced from Barljourville with 12,000 
men on the 2r)th of August, encountered at Kogers- 
ville and Richmond the 5000 or 0000 raw troops 
assembled there, scattered them like chaff, mak- 
ing prisoners and capturing arms, proceeded to 
Lexington, where he established his head<iuarters 

.on the 2d of September, occupied Frankfort and 
Cynthiana, and finally threw his pickets almost to 
the gates of Cincinnati and Louisville. 

These events produced widespread effects. They 
were the signal tor the movement of Humphrey 
Marshall with 3000 men into Kentucky through 
Pound Gap, and it would seem stimulated Bragg's 
advance from Chattanooga. They changed the 
concentration of my army from Murfreesboro' to 
Nashville, and would perhaps have caused the trans- 
fer of half of it into Kentucky, which seemed to be 
jjowerless, but for the sudden appearance of Bragg 
in the Valley of the Cumberland endangering Nash- 
ville. In Kentucky and other bordering States, 
they produced an excitement which was intense in 
some places, amounting almost to consternation. 
Business at Cincinnati was for a few days entirely 
suspended for the purpose of defense ; intreneh- 
ments were vigorously prosecuted at Covington 
and Louisville by the labor of the citizens and the 
troops, and raw regiments in the process of forma- 
tion were hurried into Cincinnati and Louisville 
from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The Government 
of Kentucky sought refuge at Louisville, where on 
my arrival Nelson reported a force of 30,000 raw 

General Morgan at Cumberland Gap was promptly 
aware of Kirby Smith's movement, and informed 
me of it on the IGth of August. He had thirty 
days' provisions, and was instructed the same day 
to hold his position. The exhaustion of his sup- 
plies and the improbability of their being replen- 
ished in time made it necessary for him at last to 
withdraw, which he did on the night of the 17th 
of September'. He was pm"sued by Stevenson and 
harassed by John Morgan's cavalry, but made his 
way successfully through Manchester, Boonesville, 
West Liberty, and Grayson to the Ohio River at 
Greenup, where he arrived about the 2d of Octo- 
ber. Stevenson with his division joined Kirby 
Smit-h near Frankfort about the time of my arrival 
at Louisville, and was present in the operations 
around Perryville. 

On his ai'rival in central Kentucky, Smith issued 
his proclamation inviting the people to join the 
cause of their deliverance, and Bragg did the same 
in pathetic terms at Glasgow. These appeals, like 
many of the orders promulgated to arouse the ani- 
mosity and stimulate the valor of the Southern 
troops, would give a sad impression of the condi- 
tion of the inhabitants, especially the innocent and 
helpless, and of the brutality of the oppressor ; 
but they were not confirmed by the feebleness of 
the response. There was a sweet sympathy, so the 
Confederates thought, but that was all. The arms 
in abundance, which Kentuckians were advised to 
grasp, remained in the store-houses. Kentuckians 
suffered just as Ohioans would have suffered with 
armies in their midst, and they had as a body no 
more thought of changing their colors. During the 
whole occupation enough perhaps for a brigade 
joined tlie invaders. 

The arrival of Bragg at Bardstown gave the 
Confederates ^^rtual possession of the whole of 
Kentucky east of the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad, excepting within the limits of Covington 



and Louisville, and Smith called his troops to- 
gether near Frankfort to assist in the proposed 
attack upon Louisville. That project was post- 
poned after tny arrival ; but Polk, Bragg having 
gone to Frankfort and Lexington, was ordered 
to occupy Shepherdsville, Taylorsville, and other 
near points around Louisville. Steps were being 
taken to that end when, on the 2d of October, the 
enemy's pickets announced to the leaders at Frank- 
fort and Bardstown the advance of my army in 
force on four roads, threatening the whole of their 
front, which covered a distance of sixty miles. 

The plan of my movement was to force the ene- 
my's left back and compel him to concentrate as 
far as possible from any convenient line of retreat, 
while at the same time making a strongdemonstra- 
tion against his right, so as to mislead him as to 
the real point of attack, and prevent him from 
moving upon my left flank and rear. With that 
object General Sill, commanding a division in Mc- 
Cook's corps, was ordered to move boldly toward 
Frankfort through Shelbyville, followed tempora- 
rily by the division of raw troops under Dumont 
which hadljeen organized as a guard for Louisville. 
McCook with his two remaining divisions moved 
upon Taylorsville, where he halted the second night 
in a position which pointed to either flank. The 
other two corps moved respectively through Shep- 
herdsville and Mt. Washington, to converge upon 
Bardstown, and halted the second night at Salt 
River. The enemy's pickets were encountered on 
all of the roads within a few miles of the city, in- 
creasing in strength as the movement progressed, 
and opposing a sharp opposition at Bardstown and 
Shelbyville. Polk withdrew his army from Bards- 
town on the night of the 3d, going through Spring- 
field, and Sill, against a considerable resistance, 
pushed back the force in front of him toward 
Frankfort. These measures brouglit to a hurried 
completion the inauguration of Provisional Gov- 
ernor Hawes at Frankfort on the 4th, under the 
supervision of General Bragg. Polk, on his part, 
was pressed so closely t lint Hardee, who was bring- 
ing up his rear, ((niiiMlled to make a stand at 
PeiTyville and call for assistance. Assuming that 
Smith was the object of my attack, and that my 
right and rear would thereby bo exposed to Polk 
at Bardstown, Bragg ordered Polk on the 2d to 
attack in that manner, while Smith should attack 
my left, and that view of my design was persisted 
in ; so tliat only one of the two divisions which 
were being pressed forward to reenforce Smith 
was returned to assist Hardee at Perryville on the 
uiglit of the 7th. 

The strength of the opposition to Sill and the 
continued presence of Kirby Smith about Frankfort 
pointed to a concentration in that dii-ection, at least 
nortli of PeiTyville ; but on the (Ith the information 
was that Smith was moving upon Danville. Mc- 
Cook, who had been halted momentarily at Bloom- 
field until the question should be developed, was 
therefore directed on Harrodsburg, and Sill was 
ordered to join him by forced marclies. During tlie 
night the information in regaril to Smith was con- 
tradicted, and the expectation of a concentration 

i " Olllcial Kecords," Ve 

at or north of Perryville was confirmed. MeCook 
was therefore promptly turned upon Perryville, 
and Sill was ordered to follow him. Under a stub- 
born resistance fi"om Polk, during the 7th, the 
center corps halted in the evening about three 
and a half miles from Perryville without water, of 
which it had had but little since morning, and the 
corps was put in order of battle. It appeared 
now that the enemy was vii'tually concentrated in 
our front. Orders were therefore dispatched to 
McCook, who was supposed to be about seven 
miles back, on the left, and to Thomas, who had 
been ordered to halt the right corps (Crittenden's) 
for the night at Haysville, about four miles in rear, 
on the road from Lebanon to Perryville. They 
were to march precisely at 3 o'clock in the morn- 
ing, prepared in every respect for battle, and on 
arriving at certain designated jioints were to be 
formed in order of battle on the left and right, 
respectively, of the center corps. They were then 
to be made as comfortable as possible, but not to 
leave ranks. A reconnoissance was to be made to 
ascertain the position of the enemy, and as soon 
as that was done Thomas and McCook were to 
report at headquarters for further orders. | I 
expected that these objects would be accomplished 
by 7 o'clock in the morning. 

During the night it was ascertained that there 
were some pools of water in the bed of Doctor's 
Fork, which crossed the road in front of us, and 
of which the enemy's rear-guard held possession. 
Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding a brigade in 
Sheridan's division, was selected to attack the 
enemy and get possession of the water, which he 
did in a handsome manner at day dawn. Very 
soon the enemy attempted to recover the lost posi- 
tion, but Sheridan's and Mitchell's divisions were 
moved to the front and defeated the design. From 
that time a desultory cannonading was kept up 
between the two lines until it merged into the bat- 
tle, which suddenly burst forth fiercely at 2 o'clock. 
The arrival of McCook's corps is dated from half- 
past 10 o'clock, but for the bulk of the corps it 
was later. He reported to me at about half-past 
12, and I hastened his return to his command; 
for though the time had passed when I had some- 
what apprehended an attack, while the center 
corps was alone, yet the occasion was critical, 
and he had not reconnoitered his front. Thomas 
had not reported, and no final instructions for 
attack could be given. When McCook readied 
his corps, it had materially changed its ground and 
was not in position. Artillery guns were exchang- 
ing distant shots, but evidently no one on our side 
was expecting an attack. It came at about 2 
o'clock, while a line was moving forward to take 
possession of the water which could be discerned 
in the bed of Clniplin river, behind wliich the 
enemy were formed for the assault. 

It turned out tliat Polk witli three divisions, with 
cavalry on both fljinks, had determined \o figlit a 
"defensive-olTensive" battle; but as the morning 
wore away without the attack, which was awaited, 
Bragg came ujion the ground and onlered an as- 
sault. If was delivered mainly upon McCook, but 
1. XVI., I'Mit H., 1). 580. 



also fell heavily upon Sheridan, who repelled it 
handsomely on his side. MeCook fought bravely, 
and by (rilberfs order was reenforced with Good- 
ing's brigade from Mitchell's division ; but he was 
steadily driven back for a mile, until the enemy's 
pursuing line came within the enfilading fire of 
Sheridan's artillery, which was delivered with great 
effect across the intervening valley of Doctor's 
Fork. At 4 o'clock Captain Fisher of McCook's 
staff arrived and reported to me that the left corps 
had been sustaining a severe conflict for a consid- 
erable time, and was being driven back. I was 
astonished. Not a sound of musketry had been 
heard, and my staff-oflB.cers had been at the front 
until dinner-time, I had noticed a sudden increase 
of eaiinonadiiig at 2 o'clock, and General Gilbert, 
who had come in from his lines and was getting 
his dinner with mo, immediately proceeded to his 
command ; but as the firing as suddenly subsided, 
and no report came to me, I had ceased to think 
of the occurrence. 

Keenforcements were immediately ordered to 
McCook from Schoepf's division, which was in re- 
serve, and a staff-officer was dispatched to Thomas 
with orders to move the right corps forward vigor- 
ously and attack the enemy's left. Thomas could 
not be found until about 6 o'clock, and owing to 
the lateness of the hour the advance was not made ; 
but McCook was relieved by the succor sent to him 
and the battle ceased about night-fall. Fm'ther 
orders were sent to Thomas at 6.30 P. M. : 

October 8th, 1862, 6.30 p. m. General Thomas, Sec- 
ond in Comiiiaiid : The First Corps (McCook's) on our 
left has been very hciivily engaged. The left and center 
of this cori)8 gained ground, but the right of it yielded a 
little. Press your lines forward as far as possible to- 
night, and get into position to make a vigorous attack 
in tlie niorning at daylight. Tf you have got your troops 
into a position whicli yon dconi advantageous it will not 
be advisable to make acliant;c for tlicpuriioseof coiuply- 
. ing witli tlif gcnci-al's iiistiiutioiiK for yon sent by Cap- 
tain Mack. It may lie as well to halt tlic division ordered 
to the center and let it wait wliere it is for further orders. 
The general desires to see you in ])erson as soon to-night 
as yoni- duties will permit you to come, over. Respect- 
fully, Jamks U. Fry, Colonel and Cliief-of-Staff. 

McCook liad 12,500 men in the battle, and lost 
in killed and womided about 3000 — nearly one- 
quarter ; Gilbert lost in killed and woimded nearly 
900, all of which belonged to Sheridan's division 
and one of Mitchell's brigades; and about iSOinall 
were taken prisoners ; total loss, 4348. The force 

i " IlAYSViLLE, October 7th, 1862, 6 p. m.— Major-Gen- 
ERAL BnELL: About two and a half miles west of this 
place I can get a camp on the Rolling Fork, where th(>re 
ifl said to bo an abundance of M'ater. As there is no 
water here, 1 propose to camp there. It will only throw 
us about one and a half miles farther from Perry ville. 
It was reported to me on 7iiy arrival that the rebels had 
200,000 pounds of pork at Lelianon. At flrst I ordered a 
regiment to go there and seize it. I afterward learned 
that it belonged to a (•nm))any of pork-packers, who 
profess to be Union men. I tlierefare concluded not 
to send or seize it, as we can get it at any lime by send- 
ing for it. Maxey's lirigade is also rei)orle(l as leaving 
Lebanon to-day for Danville, via liiadfordsville and 
rinstonville, with a train loaded with flour and pork 
from Lebanon. Shall I send and intercept him now, or 
laiiture him hereafter? Very respectfully, Geo. H. 

actually engaged on the Union side numbered 
about 22,000, though more came into position for 
battle near the close. All of the force had a good 
number of new regiments. One of McCook's di- 
visions was composed entirely of new regiments, 
with one exception. Its division commander, 
Jackson, and its two brigade commanders, Terrill 
and Webster, were killed. The enemy claim to 
have fought the battle, according to Bragg's re- 
port, with 16,000 men. His loss is reported at 
3396, of which 251 were prisoners. He captm-ed 
some artillery that he did not carry off, though he 
exchanged some of his pieces for better ones. 

Not long before the commencement of this 
partial but fierce contest, a staff-officer arrived 
from General Thomas and reported two divisions 
of the right corps up — the last had not yet ar- 
rived. The enemy was in front, and Thomas 
thought it not advisable to leave to report in 
person. The want of definite information from 
both flanks, the failure of a meeting of the 
two commanders at my headquarters for explana- 
tions and final orders, and the lateness of the hour 
for effecting these preliminaries for the great bat- 
tle which was to be fought, precluded the idea of 
bringing it on that evening. That conclusion had, 
indeed, been rendered probably unavoidable at 
the time of McCook's arrival at my headquarters, 
by two dispatches which had been received from 
Thomas dui-ing the morning : One dated the 7th, 
6 o'clock p. M., at Haysville, ^ saying that finding 
no water at that point he would march the right 
corps to the Rolling Fork for a camp ; and the 
other, dated on the EoUiug Fork, October 8th, 3 
o'clock, A. M.,\ reporting that my order to march 
at 3 o'clock had just been received, that the corps 
reached that place at 11 o'clock at night, and was 
then camping, the trains being not all yet up, and 
that he would be in front of Perryville as soon as 
possible. The staff-officer was, therefore, started 
back a few minutes before 2 o'clock with some 
minor instructions to General Thomas, and a desire 
that he should report in person after night-fall. 

Thomas, McCook, and Gilbert met at my head- 
quarters after dai-k, and after conversation upon 
the events of the day, orders were given for battle 
the following morning. Crittenden's corps on the 
right was to move forward at 6 o'clock and engage 
the enemy, and the center was to do likewise as 
soon as they were abreast. MeCook was to close 


Fork, Ky., October 8th, 1862, 3 a. m.— General Buell: 
Your letter of instruction came to hand at the time 
indicated for the Second Corps to nuirch. Have given 
the necessary orders to General Crittenden, and will 
take position before Perryville as 8007i as possible. The 
roads over which we marched yesterday were exceed- 
ingly rough and tortuous, and, with one exception, 
witlioMt water. Reached this {)liice at 11 o'clock last 
Jiighf,l)nt all the trains are not up yet. I found, as night 
approached, that the troops must have water, which 
could not be obtained short of Rolling Fork, some two 
miles out of our way, to which place the command was 
ordered, and \V(i are now camping. As soon as I decided 
to make Rolling Fork, I dispatch(>d messengers to your 
headiiuarters, who nnist have reached you l)efore this. 
Respectfully, etc., Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, U. 
8. Volunteers." 



ill and remain in reserve. In fact, only one of his 
divisions (Rousseau's) was in a condition to fight 
as a distinct body. At that hour not a man in the 
army who had any knowledge beyond the limit of 
his own vision doubted that the whole Confeder- 
ate army was in our front, and that the battle was 
to be renewed in the morning. 

The right corps did not commence the move- 
ment until 9 o'clock, owing, as was afterward 
explained, to Thomas's message to Crittenden by 
signal, from my camp, only specifying that he 
should be ready to advance at 6 o'clock; so that 
the orders to advance had to be repeated when 
it was discovered that the movement had not 
commenced. It was then ascertained that the 
enemy had withdrawn, and that only three of his 
divisions had been present. The battle had en- 
abled him to perfect his junction with Kirby Smith 
at Harrodsbui-g, as originally intended, and I did 
not hesitate to await the arrival of Sill's division 
before precipitating the anticipated battle. In 
the meantime, the army was put in position for 
any emergency, andreconnoissances were actively 
employed to gain information of the movements 
of the enemy. 

We had repelled the enemy's fierce attack when 
it was supposed his whole force was in front of 
us. My official report stated succinctly the causes 
which prevented us from winning a more fruitful 
success, namely, the difficulties which prevented 
the troops from getting on the ground simultane- 
ously, and the fact that I was not apprised early 
enough of the condition of affairs on my left 
("Official Records," Vol. XVI., Part I., p. 1031). 
When the orders in anticipation of battle were 
given on the evening of the 7th, McCook's exact posi- 
tion was .not known. He was supposed to be about 
seven miles in rear. The orders did not reach 
him until 2 : 30 o'clock, and he marched at 5. It 
■was 10:30 when the head of his column arrived. 
The road was hilly and rough, and the march was 
understood to be made in the vicinity of the en- 
emy. It was therefore properly conducted with 
prudence, and was of course slow. The right 
corps had been ordered to halt for the night at 
Haysville, not more tlian four miles to the rear. 
But on arriving at that point, finding no water, 
General Thomas, who was conducting tlie corps, 
determined to go to the Rolling Fork to encamp. 
He was told the distance was two and one-lialf 
miles off to the right, but he did not arrive until 1 1 
o'clock, after five liours of night marching. The 
courier diil not find him until .3 o'clock in the 
morning, at which hour he was camping, his trains 
being not all yet up. It is evident from his dis- 
patches that he did not rea.lize the gi-avity of tlie 
occasion. It wfis impossible, under the circum- 
stances, that marches should be regulated witli 
reference to water. The center corps marched 
witli no assurance of finding it, halted on the even- 
ing of the 7th without it, and only obtained it th(> 
next morning by wresting it from the haiuls of the 
enemy. Had tli(> right corps been found at Hiiys- 
villt>, it sliould have been in ])ositi(ui for battle 
by 7 o'clock, and, whatever else iray have liii]>- 
pened, wo^ild have been in such coniuH-lioii with 

headquarters by signals, as the otlier corps were, 
that the orders of 4 o'clock for it to attack would 
have been delivered immediately, and would have 
given fully two hours of daylight for action. 

On the other hand, had the battle on the left 
been reported at 2 o'clock, when it commenced, 
the succor which was ordered from the reserve at 
4 would have come in the form of reenforcements 
two hours earlier ; and the orders which were sent 
at the same time to the right corps would have had 
at least that much more time for execution. I 
make no prediction of all of the consequences 
that might have flowed from these conditions. It 
would have depended much upon the action of the 
riglit corps. They ought to have been of a very 
decisive character. For the rest, the reports show 
that the left corps was not fully prepared for the 
heavy blowthat fell upon it, but the reverse which 
it sustained was largely due to the ^aw^^ess of the 
troops. Fully one-half of the two diNisions was 
made up of new regiments. 

While the battle was in progress at PerrjTille, 
Kirby Smith, still thinking that my movement was 
upon his front, had prepared for a battle at or near 
Lawrenceburg. His cavalry attacked Sill at that 
point on that day, and the next day on the march, 
but Sill extricated himself skillfully, and contin- 
ued his march, joining his corps at Perryville on 
the 1 1th. Smith now discovered his mistake, and 
dispatched Bragg on the 51th that he would join 
him immediately at Harrodsburg, which he accom- 
plished partly on the 9th and fully on the 10th. 
On the latter day a strong reconnoissance found 
him in line of battle about four miles south of Har- 
rodsburg. He withdi-ew entirely on the 11th, fol- 
lowed by my cavalry toward Camp Dick Robinson, 
where Bragg's whole force now took position, shel- 
tered in front and on his right flank by the perpen- 
dicular cliffs of Dick's River and the Kentucky. I 
was moving on the 12th and 13th to turn his jiosi- 
tion and attack him on the left, when I learned that 
he was withdrawing. General Bragg states in his 
report that he was ready and desirous for battle at 
this point and previously after Perr\-A-ille, and I 
have no doubt that was true, if he could have had 
his own terms. His order for withdrawal was an- 
nounced on the 1 3th. 

The piu-suit was taken up that night, under the 
supervision of Thomas, Avith Crittenden's corjis. fol- 
lowed by the other corps. The details afford no 
interesting or important fact, exce])t that tlie re- 
treating army was pressed into difficulties wliich 
involved it in great hardship and teni]>(U-ary dis- 
organization. The juirsuif was ciuitinued in that 
manner as far as London, and then, about the 
20th, my several colunins were turned by the most 
direct routes toward the gmund in Tennessee and 
Alabama from which they had started six weeks 
before, and where it was foreseen tlie iiieiny would 
soon again be «>ncountered. The rejtnir of the 
railroa<l had been pushed forward witli energy, 
and the army was arriving at Glasgow and Howl- 
ing (Jreen on its route, when on the 3(Uii of Octo- 
ber I turned over th(> commiind to General Rose- 
(•r.ins, in nbedieiice to onlers from Washington. It 
woidd lie useh'ss to review tlu- oflicio-personr.l jiart 



of the correspondence wliich immediately preceded 
that event between the Washington authorities 
and myself, or even the official part of it, relating 
chiefly to the plan of a movement into east Ten- 
nessee, to which my successor in a measure fell 
heir. Toward him, I may add, the transfer brought 
no heart-burning on my part, and the prayer ex- 
pressed in my parting order was sincere, that the 
army might, under his command, be the means of 
speedily restoring the Union to its integrity. 

In spite of my connection — I can scarcely speak 
of it as a personal interest — with the subject, I ven- 
ture to make some observations that appear to me 
proper with reference to the campaign which I 
have outlined. It extended over a greater territory 
and involved greater hazard on the side of the 
Union than any other campaign of the war. In the 
early part, and up to the time of ray arrival in 
Louisville, it was more neglected by the Govern- 
ment than any other. It was distinguished also 
from all others, except a part of Pope's operations 
in Virginia, in the relative strength of the con- 
tending forces. 

The important results, favorable and adverse, 
were that the object for which I had started out, 
the occupation of east Tennessee, was not even in 
a condition to be attempted ; and that on the other 
hand, a formidable political and strategical scheme 
which aimed at the conquest and absorption of 
Kentucky, was defeated with substantial disaster 
to the invader, and at the close the Federal arms 
returned with increased strength to the possessions 
from which they had been withdrawn to counter- 
act the invasion. It has been said that territory 
was given up which was not recovered for a year ; 
but that is not substantially true, except with ref- 
erence to Cumberland Gap, and as to that, it is to 
be remarked that it had been held at a greater cost 
than it was worth, and that afterward it was no 
obstacle when the advance into east Tennessee 
was made with an adequate force. When the 
army on the way back changed commanders at 
Bowling Green, there was no new obstacle to its 
resumption of every position it had held in middle 
Tennessee and Alabama. The enemy, with broken 
fortune and relatively impaired strength, was 
only on the south side of the Tennessee from 
which he had started two months before. I do 
not comment upon what was afterward done, or 
raise the question whether it was desirable to 
resume the position which had been occupied 
as a point of departure ; but if it was not desir- 
able to resume it, certainly for stronger reasons it 
was not a position which it was advisable for me 
to hold. 

If the campaign, with no more advantageous re- 
sults, had been marked by one general and destruc- 
tive, but not disastrous battle, it would no doubt 
have been received with more popular favor, and 
perhaps even have been more easy of professional 
praise. I shall not insist on that point, but T shall 
particularly make no apology for not ha\ing fought 
battles where the issue was reasonably doubtfid, 
and wliere they in fact proved not to have been 
necessary for the success of my cause. Besides, 
in an open field, with capable commanders, it takes 

two parties to inaugurate a battle — one to begin 
the attack, and another to stand to receive it. 

It was much talked of after the event, that Ken- 
tucky was known to be the immediate object for 
which Bragg moved from Chattanooga ; that it 
was proposed to me to concentrate at Sparta to 
oppose him ; and that that mountainous and com- 
paratively barren region could have been relied 
upon to support my army, with exhausted maga- 
zines and in the presence of the enemy; but the 
facts were as erroneous as the theories were 
fallacious. There was never at the time an intelli- 
gent judgment or an accepted rumor that Bragg's 
first object, if he had any, was any other than the 
recovery of middle Tennessee and Nashville ; and 
if, under the circumstances, a proposition had been 
made to me to concentrate the army at Sparta, I 
should have rejected it. 

Various speculations and confident declarations 
have been indulged in by critics on both sides, 
as to the results that would have flowed from cer- 
tain drfferent action on the part of the two 
commanders. Such opinions with reference to 
extended operations are seldom of any value. 
They generally have no knowledge of the circum- 
stances which would have prevented the prescribed 
action, and take no account of the modifying 
influence which it would have had on the conduct 
of the opposing commander. It is, therefore, idle 
to assert, as many have done, that Kirby Smith 
could and should have marched into Lou:s\'ille 
after the battle of Richmond, or what would have 
been the substantial fruit of that proceeding if it 
had been accomplished ; or that Bragg and Smith 
united would have overwhelmed me at Munford- 
ville. The disappointment of calculations pending 
the events, affords no stronger marks of fallibility 
than do assumptions afterward. Of the former 
this campaign, like all campaigns, presents many 
examples. Thus, the military problem, as it ap- 
peared to my mind, was to be solved by a com- 
bined descent of the Confederates upon the iufeinor 
Union force in middle Tennessee. But instead of 
that, an army, embarrassed in its situation, to be 
sure, but intact and powerful, was left in the rear, 
and a distant invasion which had no well-founded 
prospect of success was undertaken. The bold- 
ness and formidable character of this alternative 
appeared to give assurance that it would not be 
abandoned without at least one vigorous blow in 
attack or defense ; but when prudential measures 
were taken on the opposing side with reference to 
such a contingency, the invader, with a prudence, 
not to be expected from the audacity of his ad- 
vance, withdrew from the contest. On the other 
side, to General Bragg's mind, as early as the 24th 
of August, the army opposed to him was demoral- 
ized and in full flight, with doubtful prospect of 
stopping short of the Ohio ; later it was racing to 
get the lead of liim at Munfordville ; and at that 
point, astonished to find himself not attacked at 
sight, he imagined that his opponent must be in 
retreat by some secret route to the Ohio River. 
But all of these impi-essions wei-e delusive. When 
to his mind the opposing army was in retreat, 
it was awaiting his approach from behind the 



Tennessee River and the mountains. When he 
imagined it trying to get ahead of him, it was 
moving especially to keep him in front and away 
from Nashville, deeming the retention of that point 
of more consequence than his transient intrusion 
upon Kentucky; always pursuing him, always 
aiming to get nearer to him, always willing to 
avail itself of advantages, and confident in the 
end of triumphing over him. 

A philosophical study of our civil conflict must 
recognize that influences of some sort operated 
fundamentally for the side of the Confederacy in 
every prominent event of the war, and nowhere 
with less effect than in the Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky campaign. They are involved in the fact that 
it required enormous sacrifices from 24,000,000 of 
people to defeat the political scheme of 8,000,000 ; 
2,000,000 of soldiers to subdue 800,000 soldiers: 
and, descending to details, a naval fleet and 15,- 
000 troops to advance against a weak fort, manned 
by less than 100 men, at Fort Henry ; 35,000 with 
naval cooperation to overcome 12,000 at Donel- 
son ; 60,000 to secure a victory over 40,000 at 
Pittsburg Landing; 120,000 to enforce the retreat 
of 65,000 intrenched, after a mouth of fighting 
and manoeuvring, at Corinth; 100,000 repelled by 
80,000 in the first Peninsular campaign against 
Richmond; 70,000, with a powerful naval force 
to inspire the campaign, which lasted nine months, 
against 40,000 at Vicksburg; 90,000 to barely 
withstand the assault of 70,000 at Gettysburg;^ 
115,000 sustaining a frightful repulse from 
60,000 at Fredericksburg . 100,000 attacked and 
defeated by 50,000 at Chancellorsville ; 85,000 
held in check two days by 40,000 at Antietam ; 
43,000 retaining the field uncertainly against 
88,000 at Stone River ; 70,000 defeated at Chiek- 
amauga, and beleaguered by 70,000 at Chatta- 
nooga ; 80,000 merely to break the investing line 
of 45,000 at Chattanooga ; 100,000 to press back 
50,000, increased at last to 70,000, from Chatta- 
nooga to Atlanta, a distance of 120 miles, and 
then let go — an operation which is commemorated 
at festive reunions by the standing toast of "one 
hundred days under fire"; 50,000 to defeat the 
investing line of 30,000 at Nashville ; and finally 
120,000 to overcome 60,000 with exhaustion 
after a struggle of a year in Virginia. The rule 
which this summary establishes will not determine 
al)solutely the relative merit of the different 
achievements, but is not to be ignored in a judg- 
ment upon particular events. 

Individually, the Northern soldier was in no sense 
the inferior of the Soutliern. What, then, is the 
explanation of this rule which is so nearly invari- 
able as to show that superior numbers were gener- 
ally essential to Union victories, and the success of 
Union operations ? Much was due to the character 
of the contest. Revolution is calculat(>d to in- 
spire bold and desperate action, and Wiirs of s(>nti- 
inent, of the nature of whicli this partook more in 
the South thaTi in the Nortli. are always marked 
by unusual energy. In tlic North there was much 

7!V(i'Micral Fnniris .\. Wiilk.T, in his "IIin(or.v of tlu 
tlic roHi)onsil)ility of renewing tlic attack an ordcrotl by 
advance is I'lioucou.s.— Editohs. 

animosity, but it was more collective, and operated 
more in shaping public policy than upon the 
temper of the armies. The style of the orders and 
I)roelamations issued by many of the Southern 
generals shows how much they relied on the jjas- 
sionate enthusiasm of their soldiers, and how they 
tried to stimulate it. They recognized that the 
odds must generally be against them, and that 
they must find some means of overcoming the 
effect of the fact upon the spirits of their troops, 
and themselves set an example of audacity. 

Of eom-se the necessity of invasion against a 
hostile population placed the Federal cause at a 
tlisadvantage which had to be overcome by 
greater numbers. The sinapler mode of life to 
which the bulk of the Southern troops were accus- 
tomed made them more contented with meager 
supplies ; the lack of resources of eveiy sort pre- 
cluded the luxurious outfit to wliich the Nortliern 
troops were accustomed ; and thus the inqiedi- 
menta of military operations were more restricted 
without impairing their efficiency than in the 
Northern armies. It took some time to eradicate 
this inequality. Another sectional distinction pro- 
duced a marked effect in the beginning of the war. 
The habits of the Southern people facilitated the 
formation of cavalry corps which were com- 
paratively efficient even without instruction ; and 
accordingly we see Stuart, and John Morgan, 
and Forrest riding with impunity around the Union 
armies, and destrojdng or harassing their com- 
munications. Late in the war that agency was 
reversed. The South was exhausted of horses, 
while the Northern cavalry increased in numbers 
and efficiency, and acquired the audacity which 
had characterized the Southern. 

But still another influence must be found in the 
personal differences between the two sections, — 
differences due chiefly to the more rural condition 
of the South and the institution of slavery. In all 
popular movements the Southern leader was then, 
and is now in a less degi-ee, followed with an im- 
plicit confidence which did not mean humility by 
any means, but produced subordination. Tliis 
difference is illustrated by two historical incidents. 
At Cold Harbor, the Northern troops, who had 
proven their indomitable qualities by losses nearly 
equal to the whole force of their ojiponent, when 
ordered to another sacrifice, even under such a sol- 
dier as Hancock, answered the demand as one 
man, with a silent and stolid inertia : ■^ at Gettys- 
burg, Pickett, when waiting for the signal wliich 
Longstreet dreaded to repeat, for the hopeless but 
immortal charge against Cemetery Hill, saluted 
and said, as he turned to his ready column: "I 
shall move forward, sir!" 

Nor must we give slight importance to the infiu- 
ence of the Southern women, who in agony of 
heart girded the sword upoii their loved ones and 
bade them go. It was to be expected that these 
various inlhiences would give a confidence to lead- 
ershi]) that would tend to bold adventure, and leave 
its mark upon the contest. 

St'coiid Army CorpH." Hnys. i>. filfi. that Hancock doclhied 
Moadc ; and fliat the statciucut that the troops refused to 





AS the Army of the Ohio, moving from Bardstown, approached Perry ville 
^t\- on the 7th of October, 1862, McCook's corps formed the left, Critten- 
den's the right, and mine — which was moving on the direct road by the way 
of Springfield, and was ahead of the others — the center. [See maps, pp. 
6 and 24.] In my column, R. B. Mitchell's division had the lead; Schoepf 
followed, and Sheridan brought up the rear. Our advance was vigorously 
resisted by Wheeler's cavalry, forming the rear-guard of Hardee's corps, which 
was retiring before us. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when the head of 
the column was nearing the line of Doctor's Creek, a tributary of the Chaplin 
River, or more properly the Chaplin Fork of Salt River, the enemy, in force, 
was observed lining the crest of the ridge on the farther bank, obviously 
with the intention of disputing the possession of a few pools of water that 
remained in the water-course, Avhich was otherwise nearly dry. An excessive 
drought had prevailed for months in this part of Kentucky. At sight of the 
enemy, orders were given to form Mitchell's division in order of battle across 
the Springfield road and along some high ground on the right. When Schoepf 
cani(; up his di\dsion was massed in reserve in Mitchell's rear, on the left of the 
road, and Sheridan, arriving after Wheeler had been dislodged and was being 
pressed back toward Porryville, was posted in front and to the right of Mit- 
chell. Before daybreak on the 8th, a position was gained that covered the 
pools in Doctor's Creek, and these formed our only water-supply for the next 
two days, or as long as the enemy held the Chaplin River. 

^Condensed from General Gilbert's articles iu the "Soutliern Bivouac," and revised bv him.— Editors. 



During the night Greneral Buell ordered McCook's and Crittenden's corps 
to march at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 8th, and to form in order of 
battle on the center corps — my own. The movements of these columns 
were delayed, and General Buell, apprehensive of an attack while the center 
corps was isolated, directed me to select a strong position, and my troops 
were soon moving out of their camps and taking positions for the main attack, 
which it was supposed would come on about 10 o'clock. As that horn* drew 
near, I observed, in visiting General Sheridan's ground, that a part of it was 
vacant, and that one of his brigades was in march on the road to PeiTyville, 
and the remainder were preparing to follow. On inquiry it was discovered 
that this movement was in consequence of some misunderstanding of orders. 
General Sheridan was directed to recall the brigade, resume his position, 
and limit himself to its defense until a general advance to attack in force 
should be ordered. To this' order was added the explanation that General 
Buell was particularly solicitous that nothing be done to bring on a general 
engagement until after the junction of the flank corps. 

General Sheridan lost no time in reestablishing his division on the ground 
to which he had been originally assigned. He had barely accomplished it 
when he was attacked in force and a fight ensued, in which the loss was 
severe on both sides. In the meantime the head of General McCook's 
corps, coming over the Mackville pike, appeared on the high ground marked 





SEAU'S LINE, 'taken in 188"). 

by Russell's house, due north of Sheridan's posi- 
tion about one mile. This was about 10: !>() .\. m. 
Marking out his line of battle. General McCook 
ordered General R<^usseau to form it. Looniis's 
battery was established on a commanding piece 
of gi-ound near Russell's house, and to the l«'ft 
of it. General Rousseau had been ]>rovi()iisly 
ordered to send a line of skinnishers to tlif left 




and front to examine some wood on that quarter, and Captain Wiekliffe, 
with his company of cavahy, was sent to reconnoiter the ground to the left 
of this line of skirmishers. At this time there was some light skirmishing 
going on with Sheridan's division, . at the head of the center corps, which was 
still in column, as previously described ; but this soon ceased, and General 
McCook was satisfied that the enemy he found engaging my corps when 
he arrived had retired from the field. 

McCook's corps, as previously related, had been ordered to march at 3 a. m., 
but it was 2 : 30 A. M. before the order reached Greneral McCook, and his 
march began at 5 a. m. M(;Cook had with him then two divisions, Rousseau's 
and Jac^kson's. Rousseau's division took the lead on the march, but when it 
arrived at Perry ville only two of the brigades were present — the remaining 
one, Starkweather's, having been thrown to the rear by the interposition of 
Jackson's division, which cut it off at Mackville. Without waiting for the 
arrival of this brigade. General McCook, after giving his assistant adjutant- 
general particular instructions to post Jackson's two brigades on a command- 
ing ]riece of ground immediately to the right of the Mackville and Perryville 
road, and to hold them in column so that they could be moved in any direc- 
tion as occasion required, turned over the command to General Rousseau, 
and galloped off to report to General Buell at headquarters. Buell was in 
my camp, on the Springfield pike about two and a half miles distant from 
McCook's position on the Mackville pike. At half -past 12 the Confederates 
advanced, and in a few moments the skirmishers and artillery were engaged. 
The attack fell upon Sheridan's division at the head of my corps and upon 




Loomis'8 battery occupied the highest part of the 
rid^e above H. P. Bottom's house, at about the center 
of KouHseau's liue (see map, p. 24). Lytlc's l)riga(l(' ox- 
teiuled from the battery across the old Mackvillc iiikf to 
the "burnt baru." Lytlc's brigade was awsailcd fioni 
the direction of Bottom's house, and from the right 

flank. The attack upon the position lield by Loomis's 
battery was made chiefly from the ridge in the middle 
distance of the i)icture on page 54. The Confederates 
gained the north-oast side of that ridge by following 
down the dry bed of Doctor's Creek under tlie shelter of 
its west bank.— Editors. 

the head of McCook's corps, now advancing from its first position at Kussell's 
house down the slope toward Chaplin Eiver. 

When General McCook returned to his troops after having reported at 
headquarters, he found that General Rousseau had advanced the right of the 
hue about eight hundred or a thousand yards, and was occupying a com- 
manding ridge which was to the left of the Mackville and Perry^illc inke. 
The enemy was firing on this line from three batteries, and Loomis's and 
Simonson's batteries were replying. As there was no Confederate infantry in 
sight McCook ordered the firing to cease, so as to economize ammunition, and 
then prepared to make a reconnoissance toward Chaplin River for water, as he 
had just been ordered to do by General Buell. Riding off to the left, General 
McCook found a commanding ridge about six hundretl yards from tlie stream 
and overlooking it. Sending for Generals Jackson and Terrill, he showt'd 
them the water, marked his line of l)attle, and placed a l)attery on it with 
strong supports. General Teri'ill was then ordered to advance a body of 
skirmishers down the slope to the water as soon as tlic line nvjis formed. 
Not being apprehensive of an attack, General McCook then went back to his 
rigiit. It was now nearly 2 o'clock. At this time the liiu> of the left corps 
stood with its right on the Mackville and Perryville ])ike near t]i(> rr.>ssing of 
Doctor's Creek and its left near (liai)lin Riv(M-, its direetioii being abont y\\\o 
north and south. It Avas formed of two l)rigades of Ixousseaii's division 



i V 


The fariii-house stands near Doctor's Creek, under the ridge occupied by Rousseau; and the view 
is from the old MackvlUe pike. [See map, p. 24.] 

(Lytle's and Harris's) and Terrill's brigade of Jackson's division, Webster's 
brigade of Jackson's division had not yet come into position, and Stark- 
weather's brigade of Rousseau's division had not yet reached the field. 

Just previously to this the enemy, in pursuance of his plan of attack, had 
begun to engage Sheridan's division, the head of the center corps. Mitchell's 
division was at that tim(3 closing up to take position within supporting dis- 
tance of Sheridan. Caldwell's and Carlin's brigades of this division were to 
the right and roar, under cover, and Gooding's brigade was north of Doctor's 
Creek, near the stream. In this position the latter covered Sheridan's left, 
and watched the interval between the two corps so long as the left corps 
remained in its place in line of battle, and before it advanced to the front. 
As Mitchell came into his position on the second line, the enemy appeared on 
his right in force and engaged Carlin's brigade, but were repulsed. It was 
now nearing lialf-past 2, and tlie enemy's entire line, from his left, where the 
attack began on SlK^-idan, to his right, where it fell in heaviest force on 
Rousseau, was in full progress, carrjdng everything before it. When Sheri- 
dan's assailants reached his main line he gave them a reception, cool, effect- 
ive, and disastrous, and when their repulse was complete a brigade from the 
second line (Carlin's), which had been called up to assist in the defense, pur- 
sued the enemy to Perryville, thus turning his left and establishing itself on 
his rear, (xeneral Sheridan's action was according to the sound principles 
of tlie profession, and, as lie was am]ily and promptly supported, tlie opera- 
tions on this ])arl of the Held, in wliicli he liad Ihc lead, were fully successful. 


and his conduct here foreshadowed the exceptionally successful career that 
lay before him. 

General McCook was assailed by greatly superior numbers. His brigades, 
which Greneral Rousseau had put in motion to the front in his absence, were 
surprised on the march by Greneral Bragg's attack, and were taken in the act 
of forming, and on ground favorable to the attacking party. Rousseau's right 
brigade, the extreme right of the left corps, was attacked with great severity 
and pertinacity. Terrill's brigade on the left, and Starkweather's, which had 
now arrived, were in turn heavily assailed. Being composed of entirely raw 
troops, Terrill's brigade in a few moments gave way in confusion, losing Par- 
sons's battery of eight Napoleon guns. Greneral Jackson, who was with this 
brigade, was killed at the first fire. Genei'al Terrill did all in his power to 
steady his men, but in vain. An hour and a half later, while still striving to 
rally his broken troops, he was mortally wounded. 5t Starkweather's brigade 
and Stone's and Bush's batteries were on the extreme left and rear of Terrill's 
brigade, and checked the attack. 

General McCook, perceiving that he was assailed by at least three times his 
number, sent an aide-de-camp, Lieutenant L. M. Hosea, to General Sheridan, 
requesting him to look to the right of his line and see that it was not turned. 
Just at this time Sheridan had his attention fully occupied with his own 
right, where two opposing batteries were in position, and troops were mass- 
ing behind them to attack him front and tlank. About half an hour later 
McCook sent Captain H. N. Fisher, of his staff, to General Schoepf, com- 
manding the reserve of my corps, with an urgent request for reenforcement, 
reporting that his reserves were all exhausted and his corps upon the point 
of being compromised. General Schoepf was at the time on the march to 
the front with two of his brigades (Walker's and Steedman's), and although 
desirous of rtmdering assistance, he declined to take the responsibility of 
changing his line of march. He referred the officer to me, but I was at the 
time at General Buell's headquarters, wdiere I had been since noon. 

Owing to the conformation of the gi'ound and to the limited use of artillery 
on both sides, no sound of the battle had been heard at General Buell's head- 
quarters until the attack reached General Sheridan's position, which was 
about half-past 3 o'clock. Then the cannon firing became so continuous and 
was so well sustained and so different from the irregular shots, at wiile 
intervals, which had characterized the "shelling of the woods" earlier in 
the day, that it was readily recognized as a battle. It was near 4 o'clock 
when there came up the valley of Doctor's Creek the sound of rapid artil- 
lery firing. It was too heavy and too well sustained to come from merely 
"shelling the woods." Listening attentively for a nioincnt, (Jcncral Bn.'U 
said to me, "That is something more than shelling the woods; it sounds 
like a fight." I at once mounted and set off" at a rapid jtace down the 

^Colonel Cliiiili's D.-iil.y. of th.' llM IikHmm:! "'i> .■n-.i-rmml. ..pinion was thai mm would 

reRinu'iit, says : '"•v 

i;lil.ii.'.l if tli<\ .onsidi if.l the tlo.-tiiiu' of 

l.iol.Ml.illtirs and liow sli.i,'lil tin- .hanc." was of any 
"ItiH <uri<His tliat tlu> night lu'fort' tin- battU' |of parti, iilar prrwon^; kill. -d. Tlifory failod. an it has 
Perryvillc] (i.n.iMls Jackson and Torrill and Colonel oft.ii d.>n.' lioforo; all tlnoo wiTC killod in tlie noxt 
WcbHtcr weiv discussiuK Ibc cliancfs of being bit in day's tlgbt." EDITORS. 




•■ SI-' 



Gciicr.'il .Toliii ('. Starkwpathor, in his official report, 
savH tliat flic bri.i^adc, coiisiHtiiig at the time of the 24th 
Illinois. iHt and Slst WisconHiii, and 79th Pennsylvania, 
'• arrived on the held of battle at about 1 : 30 P. M., havliiR 
iiiarclicd twelve miles — about three miles thereof being 
tluKiitrli tiilds, woods, etc. Finding the troops already 
engaged well on the right, center, and left, and thinMng 
the extreme left position most accessible, and, from 

appearances, one that should be held at all hazards, 1 
placed my command at once in iiosition facing the en- 
emy's right." General McCook, in his report on the part 
taken by Starkweather's brigade, saj's that the 21st 
Wisconsin was stationed "in a corn-field, lying down, 
awaiting the approach of the enemy, and when he ap- 
proached with his overwhelming force this new regi- 
ment poured into his raiLks a most withering tire." 

road in the direction of the firing. Within a mile I met Captain Fisher com- 
ing at full speed and bearing General McCook's message. Instead of sending 
Captain Fisher back to General McCook with my answer to his appeal for 
help, I advised him to continue on and bear to General Buell the astound- 
ing news, and at once sent orders to Schoepf to go to the interval between 
the two corps, — on the left of Sheridan, — and to Mitchell to close toward 
Sheridan's right and support him. Directing \xij course toward the left, I 
found Gooding's brigade of Mitchell's division still standing to the left of 
Doctor's Creek, and at once put it in motion to the right to join the main 
body of the division and be nearer Sheridan, who had just reported that he 
was hard pressed in front and that the enemy was driving our left wing. 
General Schoepf was now on the ground with his leading brigade (Walker's). 
This he was ordered to deploy, to replace Gooding. In the midst of these 
movements, another staff -officer. Captain AV. T. Hol)litzell, came from the left 
coi-ps for lielp, with the information that the troops, though fighting stub- 
boi-nly, were falling back everywhere, and that if assistance was not speedily 
afforded they must soon be driven from the field. 

Up to this moment the fighting with Sheridan had been gi'owing in inten- 
sity, and judging fi-om the sound that it must soon cuhninate, I detained 
C'aptaiii no])litzell to await the issue. It was soon perceived that the firing 
was diminisliiug, and as there were no signs of defeat on our side, I turned 



to Walker's brigade to send it over to the left wing, Avlien I discovered it had 
not yet deployed, and, moreover, did not seem to be sufficiently familiar 
with the tactics to make the simplest movements with promptness and in- 
telligence. Accordingly I sent my adjutant-general, Captain J. E. Stacy, 
to recall Gooding and order him to proceed under the guidance of Captain 
Hoblitzell to report to Greneral McCook. Gooding took with him Pinney's 
Wisconsin battery. Within twenty minutes after receiving the order, Good- 
ing made himself felt on the flank of the Confederates, who had thus far 
been steadily diiving Rousseau's troops back toward the Russell House. 
Within a few minutes after this brigade had started, Sheridan, ha^'ing re- 
pulsed his assailants, turned his guns and opened fire across the valley of 
Doctor's Creek on Rousseau's assailants, who, in their advance, had come to 
present their flank within easy range, and from his commanding position 
he delivered a fire so effective as to force back the enemy in this part of the 
field, to the great relief of the right of General McCook's line. Just after 
Sheridan's artillery opened, General Steedman came up with his brigade of 
Schoepf 's division and kept on his course down Doctor's Creek. The enemy 
had now been So far driven from McCook's front that they were beyond the 
reach of Steedman's infantry ; but, passing under the fire of Sheridan's guns, 
Steedman halted and opened to the left with Smith's battery of his brigade. 

Viewed from the Confederate stand-point, the battle of Perry\dlle appears 
to have consisted of an attempt to turn the left flank of the Union line, in 
which, for the distance of a thousand or twelve hundred yards, the assailants 
drove all before them. At this junctm'e, after a fierce fight, the attack came 
to a stand, having expended its force, and the left of the Confederate Hue 
was now itself di'iven and turned, and its line of retreat threatened. This 
last the Confederates supposed had been effected by a fresh corps arriving 
on the field from the direction of Lebanon. In abandoning the battle-ground 
the Confederates, although obliged to leave their wounded behind, moved 
without any sense of humiliation, for they had made a good fight, and 
appeared only to be withdrawing from the presence of a greatly superior force. 

From the Union side, the battle takes this appearance : The center corj^s, 
arriving on the ground alone on the afternoon of the 7tli, met with consider- 
able opposition in establishing itself in position. This opposition continued 
with only a Inief interval till about 11 o'clock on the 8th, when the Hank 
corps began to arrive on the line abreast of the center. After the lapse of about 
an hour four brigades from the left wing started to the front in cpiest of wat(»r. 
Tliis movement coincided with the advance of the Confederates in full foicc to 
turn the left of the Union army. Those brigades were accordingly met and 
overpowered and driven back to their places in line, and some of them l)eyond 
it. But they made a most obstinate resistance. In the center ('ori»s the 
detachments thrown out to watch the ap])roaches to the i)osition held by 
the leading division were driven in, and that division was attacked in strong 
force and with great determination. liut the assailants were r(»]>nlsed and 
driven from the field, and then thecenter cor}>s conti'ibuted al)out one-third of 
its effective force to the relief of the left winir and saved it from destruction. 



rpnE situation at Louisville in the latter part of 
-J- September, 18G2, was not unlike that at Wash- 
ington after the first battle of Bull Run. The be- 
lief was entertained by many that Bragg would 
capture the city, and not a few had removed their 
money and valuables across the Ohio River, not 
over-assured that Bragg might not follow them to 
the lakes. Nelson had sworn that he would hold 
the city so long as a house remained standing or 
a soldier was alive, and he had issued an order 
tiiat all the women, childi'en, and non-combatants 
should leave the place and seek safety in Indiana. 
Tie liiul only raw troops and convalescent veterans, 
ami few citizens believed that he could hold out 
against an attack. His tragic death occurred a 
few days later. 3> 

Buell's arrival changed the situation of affairs. 
The uncertain defensive suddenly gave way to an 
aggi'cssive attitude, and speculation turned from 
whether Bragg would capture Louisville to whether 
Buell would capture Bragg. 

The country through which Buell's army marched 
is almost destitute of water, but at Perry ville a 
stream ilowed between the contending armies, and 
access to that water was equally important to both 
armies. Buell accompanied the center corps (Gil- 
bert's), and the advance reached this stream on the 
evening of October 7th. From that time until the 
stream was crossed there was constant fighting for 
access to it, and the only restriction on this fighting 
was that it should not bring on an engagement until 
the time for the general attack should arrive. An 
incident will illustrate the scarcity of water. I ob- 
tained a cantoenful, and about dark on October 
7tli, after giving myself a good brushing and a 
couple of dry rubs without feeling much cleaner, 
mycai'eless announcement that I was about to take 
a tin-dipper bath brought General Buell out of his 
tent with a rather mandatory suggestion that I 
pour the water back into my canteen and save it 
for an emergency. The emergency did not come to 

i Condensed from a paper in " The Southern Bivouac." 


^The facts hi relation to the killing of Geucral Will- 
iam Nelson by General Jefferson C. Davis are recounted 
by General James B. Fry in his pamplilet, " Killed by a 
Brother Soldier," from which the followins ac(!Ount is 
coiidcTiscd : Davis, wlio had been on sick leave in 
Indiana, hearing that goneral offlcers were nrcdcd about 
f'iiiiiiinati and Louisville to assist in rciiclliufr the 
invawion of Kirby Smith and Bragg, vohiutccrcd liis 
8crvi('i-s, and was sent by General H. G. Wriglit at Cin- 
cinnati to report to Nelson at Louisville. Tlie latter 
assigned to Davis tlu^ work of arming the citizens of 
l^ouisville. A day or two afterward Davis called at 
Nelson's headipiarters in tlie Gait House. N(>l8on in- 
quired, " Well, Davis, how are you getting along with 
your ooniniand f " Davis re)ilied, " I don't know," and 
gave similar answeiHlo t woor three questions as to the 
number of regiments and companies he liad organized. 
Nelson, who was angered by his seeming inditt'erenee, 
rose and said, " But you should know. I am disa))- 
pointed in you. General Davis ; I selected you for this 
duty because you were an olliccr of the regular army. 

me, but on the morning of October 9th that water 
helped to relieve the suffering of some wounded 
men who lay between the two armies. 

At Buell's headquarters, on the Sth, preparations 
were going on for the intended attack, and the in- 
formation was eagerly waited for that Crittenden 
had reached his position on the right. Fighting 
for water went on in our front, and it was under- 
stood that it extended all along the line, but no 
battle was expected that day. McCook was at 
Buell's headquarters in the morning, and received, 
I believe, some oral instructions regarding the 
contemplated attack. It was understood that care 
would be taken not to bring on a general engage- 
ment, and no importance was attached to the 
sounds that reached us of artillery-firing at the 
front of the center. Of course the young officers 
of the staff, of whom I was one, were not taken 
into conference by General Buell, but we all knew 
that the subject of attention that morning was 
the whereabouts of Crittenden's corps, and the 
placing it in position on the right for the general 
engagement that was to be brought on as soon as 
the army was in line. We all saw McCook going 
serenely away like a general carrying his orders 
with him. 

In the afternoon we moved out for a position 
nearer Crittenden, as I inferred from the direc- 
tion taken. A message came from the line on 
the left center to General Buell, and in a few mo- 
ments Colonel James B. Fry, our chief of staff, 
called me up, and sent me with an order to Gen- 
eral Gilbert, commanding the center corps, to 
send at once two brigades to reenforce General 
McCook, commanding the left corps. Thus I came 
to be a witness to some of the curious features of 

I did not know what was going on at the left, 
and Colonel Fry did not inform me. He told me 
what to say to General Gilbert, and to go fast, and 
taking one of the general's orderlies with me, I 

but I Und I made a mistake." Davis replied, deliber- 
ately, "General Nelson, I am a regular soldier, and I 
demand the treatment due to mo as a general officer." 
Dr. Irwin, Nelson's medical director, was called in by 
Davis to be a witness to the altei-cation. In his presence 
Nelson rejieated the rei)riniau(l, and ordered Davis to 
report to (ieneial Wright at Cineiiniati. Davis replied, 
"You have no authority to oi'<ler mo." Nelson turned 
to his ad,jntaiit geneial and said, " Captain, if General 
Da\is does not leave the city bj' 9 o'clock to-night, give 
instructions to the provost-marshal to see that he is put 
across the Ohio." Davis was highly incensed by the 
manner and bearing of Nelson. He withdrew, and that 
night reported to Wright in Cincinnati. When Buell 
reached Louisville on September 25th, Wright ordered 
Davis to return and report to Buell. IIo arrived at the 
Gait House on the mrirning of September 2!>th. Nelson, 
after breakfast, was standing in the hotel office, and was 
leaning against the counter when he was approached 
by Davis in company with (Jovernor Oliver P. Mor- 
ton, of Indiana. Davis accosted Nelson Avith the re- 
mark that Nelson had insulted him at the last meetmg 
and that he must have satisfaction. Nelson told him 



started on my errand. I found General Gilbert at 
the front, and us he had no staff-officer at hand at 
the moment, lie asked me to go to General Schoepf, 
one of his division commanders, with the order. 
Schoepf promptly detached two brigades, and he 
told me I had better go on ahead and find out 
where they were to go. There was no sound to 
direct me, and as I tried to take an air line I 
passed outside the Union lines and was over- 
taken by a cavalry officer, who gave me the pleas- 
ing information that I was riding toward the en- 
emy's pickets. Now up to this time I had heard no 
sound of battle ; I had heard no artillery in front 
of me, and no heavy infantry-firing. I rode back, 
and passed behind the cavalry regiment which was 
deployed in the woods, and started in the direction 
indicated to me by the officer who called me back. 
At some distance I overtook an ambulance train, 
urged to its best speed, and then I knew that some- 
thing serious was on hand. This was the first inti- 
mation I had that one of the fiercest struggles of 
the war was at that moment raging almost within 
my sight. 

Directed by the officers in charge of the ambu- 
lances I made another detour, and pushing on at 
greater speed I suddenly turned into a road, and 
there before me, within a few hundred yards, the 
battle of Perryville burst into view, and the roar 
of the artillery and the continuous rattle of the 
musketry first broke upon my ear. It was the finest 
spectacle I ever saw. It was wholly unexpected, 
and it fixed me with astonishment. It was like 
tearing away a curtain from the front of a great 
picture, or the sudden bursting of a thunder-cloud 
when the sky in front seems serene and clear. I 
had seen an unlooked-for storm at sea, with hardly 
a moment's notice, hurl itself out of the clouds and 
lash the ocean into a foam of wild rage. But here 
there was not the warning of an instant. At one 
bound my horse carried me from stillness into the 
uproar of battle. One turn from a lonely bridle- 
path through the woods brought me face to face 
with the bloody stiniggle of thousands of men. 

Waiting for news to carryback, I saw and heard 
some of the unhappy occurrences of Penyville. I 
saw young Forman, with the remnant of his com- 
pany of the intli Kentucky regiment, withdrawn 
to make way for the reenforcements, and as they 
silently passed me they seemed to stagger and 
reel like men who had been beating against a great 
storm. Forraan had the colors in his hand, and he 
and several of his little gioup of men had their 
hands upon their chests and their lips apart as 
though they had difficulty in breathing. They filed 
into a field, and without thought of shot or shell 
they lay down on the ground apparently in a state 
of exhaustion. I joined a mounted gi-oup about a 
young officer, and heard Rumsey Wing, one of 
Jackson's volunteer aides, telling of that general's 
death and the scattering of the raw division he 
commanded. I remembered how I had gone up to 
Shiloh with Terrill's battery in a small steamer, 
and how, as the first streak of daylight came, Ter- 
rill, sitting on the deck near me, had recited a line 
about the beauty of the dawn, and had wondered 
how the day woidd close upon us all. I asked about 
Terrill, who now commandeil a brigade, and was 
told that he had been carried to the rear to die. 
I thought of the accomplished, good, and brave 
Parsons, — whom I had seen knocked down seven 
times in a fight with a bigger man at West Point, 
without ever a thought of (juitting so long as he 
could get up, and who lived to take orders in 
the church, and die at Memphis of the yellow 
fever, ministering to the last to the spiritual 
wants of his parishioners, — and I asked about 
Parsons's battery. His raw infantry support had 
broken, and stunned by the disaster that he thought 
had overtaken the whole army, he stood by his 
guns until every horse and every man had gone, 
and the enemy was almost touching him, and had 
been dragged away at last by one of his men who 
had come back to the rescue. His battery was a 
wreck and no one knew then where he was. And 
so the news came in of men I knew and men with 
friends about me. 

to go away. Davis pressed his demand and Nelson 

Bald, " Go away, you puppy. I don't want anything 

to do with you." Davis, who had picked up a blank visit- 
ing card and had squeezed it into a ball as he was talk- 
liiK, responded to the liisultiug words by flipplnfi the 
card into Nelson's fiioe. Nelson then 8lai)ped l)avin in 
the face and siiid to Governor Morton, " Did you eouie 
here, sir, to see me insulted 1 " " No," replied Morton, 
whereupon Nelson walked toward his room on the office 
floor. After the ulap Davis asked for a pistol, and a 
friend borrowed one and lian(h'(l it to Davis, who started 
toward NelHon's room and met liim in the corridor 
ne;ir tlie foot of the Hlaircase. apparently on his way to 
Hnell'H apartment npstairn. When a yiird apart Davis 
tired. Nelson walked npstairs and fell in the hall m-ar 
linell's door. To the proin-ietor of tin' liolel Nelson 
said, "Send for a <-lerLcynniii ; I wisli to t)e I 
have l)oen basely murdered." General T. L. Crittenden, 
who wasattln^ in-eakfiist tahle. hnrrie<l to the corridor, 
and, takiiifr N«'lson's hand, said, " Nelson, ar." yon seri- 
ously hurt?" Nelson replied. "Tom, I am nmrdered." 
WluMi Rnrseon Uobert Mni-rav arrived Nelson waslvins,' 
.Ml tin' floor of a m^ar wlnMe h.' ha.l fallen, insensi- 
ble. Tliesnnill pistol-ball entered Just over tlu> li.aM. 

In less than an hour Nelson was dead. General Fry was 
in the grand hall of the hotel at the time of the en- 
counter. On hearing the sound of the pistol he made 
his way through the crowd that had surrounded Davis 
and arrested him in the nann' of General Ruell. Fry 
took Davis's arm. and tlu'y went to Davis's room on an 
upi)er floor. Wlien the door was closed Davis said he 
wanted to relate the facts while they were fresh in his 
mind, and anu)ug other details mentioned the flipping 
of the paper into Nelsmi's face. (JeJieral Gilberi was 
appointed to succeed Nelson, and fwo «h(ys afferwanl 
the army nnirehed for rerryville. Ruidl could not then 
si)are oftleers for a eourt-nnirtial. ami suggested to 
IIalle<k that a trial by eomndssion appointeii from 
Wasliington should take place immediately As no 
eliarires were preferred against Davis within the luriod 
tlxed by military rules, he was released by onler of 
General Wright." 

On October 27th, 1S62, (Jcnernl Davis was tndieted 
by a grand Jury for inanshiughler. and was admittetl 
to bail in tliV sum of live thousand dollars. The ejise 
was continued from tiux' to time until May IWh, IsiVI, 
when "it was stricken from the do<ket. with h-«ve to 
reinstate."— Kditoks. 



ON the 11th of April, 1862, with the Seventh Division of the Army of the 
Ohio under my command, I arrived at Cumberland Ford with orders 
from General Buell to take Cumberland Gap, fourteen miles to the south- 
ward, and occupy east Tennessee, if possible; if not, then to prevent the 
Confederates from advancing from that direction. [See map, p. 6.] This 
movement and Mitchel's advance into northern Alabama formed detached 
parts of the general plan of operations arranged between General Buell and 
General Halleck. 

The division under my command consisted of four brigades, commanded 
by Brigadier-Generals Samuel P. Carter and James G. Spears, Colonel John 
F. De Com-cy, 16th Ohio regiment, and Colonel John Coburn, 33d Indiana 
regiment. (Coburn's brigade was afterward commanded by Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Absalom Baird.) During the preceding wintei'. Carter had occupied a 
position near the ford and threatening the Gap. 

The condition of Carter's brigade was deplorable. The winter's storms, 
converting the narrow roads into torrents, had practically cut him off from 
his base of supplies, and, in spite of all he could do, his troops were half- 
famished and were suffering from scurvy. Of the 900 men of the 49th 
Indiana regiment, only 200 were fit for duty. 

Reconnoissances at once satisfied me that the fastness could not be taken 
by a direct attack, nor without immense loss. I determined to try to force 
the enemy to abandon his stronghold by strategy. 

The position of the Confederate commander in east Tennessee, Major- 
General E. Kirby Smith, was a difficult one. A large majority of the people 
of east Tennessee were devoted to the Union, and the war there had become 
a vendetta. The Union men regarded the Confederates as criminals, and 
were in turn denounced by the Confederates as insurgents. Kirby Smith 
recommended the arrest and incarceration in Southern prisons of leading 
citizens, not in arms, as a means of converting the majority to the South- 
ern cause. J 

For a distance of eighteen miles north of Big Creek Gap, a pass south- 
west of Cumberland Gap, the Confederates had heavily blockaded the narrow 
and al)ru])t defiles along that route. The work of clearing the blockades 
was tlioroughly done. But while Spears was thus engaged Kirby Smith 
advanced with a large force of infantry through a bridle-path called Wood- 
son's Gap, to cut him ott'. Th(^ attempt might well have succeeded but for the 

i On our side acts not less vigorous were resorted was that th<>y liad arrested T. A. R. Nelson, while 

to. A few days after our occupation of Cumberland on his way to take his seat in the United States 

Gap, June ISth, General Spears, witliout authority, Congress, and had sent him to Eiclmiond. Their 

sent out in the night, captnred and wanted to hang lives were saved by my interposition, and they were 

a number of Confederate citizens, wliose offense sent as prisoners to Indianapolis.— G. W, M. 




heroic act of Mrs. Edwards, a noble womai], whose heart was wholly in the 
Union cause, although she had a son in each of the opposing armies. Well 
mounted, she passed the mountains by another path, and, by incredible 
efforts, reached my headquarters in time to enable me to send couriers at full 
speed with orders for Spears to fall back toward Barboursville, until his 
scouts should report that Smith had recrossed the mountains. 

In order to succeed in the task committed to me it was necessary to compel 
Kirby Smith, who was at this time concentrating his whole army in my im- 
mediate front, to divide his forces. 
To this end I urged General Buell 
to direct General 0. M. Mitchel to 
threaten Chattanooga, and thus 
draw the main force of the Confed- 
erates in that direction. 

About four miles south of Cum- 
berland Ford is a narrow defile 
formed by an abrupt mountain on 
one side, and the Cumberland Elver 
on the other, through which passes 
the State Road to Cumberland Gap, 
and on the edge of the defile was an 
abandoned cabin, known as "The 
Moss House," situated at the junc- 
tion of the State Road and a path- 
way leading to Lambdin's on the 
main road to Big Creek Gap. On 
the morning of May 22d I sent 
forward the brigade of De Courcy, 
with a battery, with orders to oc- 
cupy the defile, and, as a stratagem intended to puzzle Smith, to construct a 
fort at the junction of the pathway and road. 

I threw forward a strong party of pioneers to widen the path leading to 
Lambdin's, so as to enable my artillery and train to move forward. The 
mountain was steep and rugged, and skill and toil were necessar>- to the 
accomplishment of the work. Twenty-two guns, 2 of them SO-poundcr and 
2 20-pounder Parrott's, had to be dragged over the Pine and Cumberland 
mountains, at times by means of block and tackle, at others by putting 
in as many horses as could be used, and again by men — 200 at a single 
piece — hauling with drag-rojuxs. The pathway leading from tlie ]\I(>ss House 
had been made the width of a wagon, but two teams could not pass eacb 
other there. 

On the 6tli and 7tli of June J^ncll caHscd divcrsi 
advance of part of Mitchel's command to the v'ww ( 
and Smith, with two brigades, hastened to its i-esene 
Courcy had gone forward; Baird oecujtied the delilc 
and Carter was assiijrned to liold tlie delile till th<' la 


lis to be made l»y aii 
•1 )l)0site Chattanot)ga, 
. The brigade ,.f De 

■ at the Moss IloUM-, 

t moment, and then 


bring up the rear of the cohimn. On the 9th of June Greneral Buell tele- 
gi-aphecl me from Booneville, Mississippi : 

" The force now iu Tennessee is so small that no offensive operation against east Tennessee 
can be attempted, and you must therefore depend mainly on your own resources." 

And on the 10th: 

" Considering your force and that opposed to you, it will probably not be safe for you to 
undertake any offensive operations. Other operations will soon have an influence on your 
designs, and it is better for you to i-un no risk at present." 

It was, however, next to impossible to change my plans at this moment, 
and move back on a road such as described. We therefore continued to toil 
forward over the almost impassable mountains. 

Thinking that the series of feints against Chattanooga that were being- 
made at my request indicated an advance in force, Kirby Smith now con- 
centrated for defense at that point, after evacuating Cumberland Grap and 
removing the stores. This was just what I wanted. On the evening of the 
17th of June, General Carter L. Stevenson of the Confederate forces sent 
Colonel J. E. Eains to cover the evacuation of Cumberland Gap,^ which had 
been commenced on the afternoon of that day ; Rains withdrew in the night 
and marched toward Morristown. Unaware of that fact, at 1 o'clock on the 
morning of June 18th we advanced in two parallel columns, of two brigades 
each, to attack the enemy ; but while the troops were at breakfast I learned 
from a Union man who had come along the valley road that Rains had with- 
drawn and that the gap was being evacuated. The advance was at once 
sounded, the Seventh Division pressed forward, and four hours after the 
evacuation by the Confederates the flag of the Union floated from the loftiest 
pinnacle of the Cumberland Range. The enemy had carried away his 
field-guns, but had left seven of his heavy cannon in position, dismantling 
the rest. 

At the request of Carter, his brigade was sent forward in pursuit of the 
enemj^ as far as Tazewell, but the enemy had fallen back south-eastward to 
the Clinch Mountains. Cumberland Gaj) was om-s without the loss of a 
single Hfe. Secretary Stanton telegraphed the thanks of the President, and 
General Buell published a general order iu honor of this achievement of the 
Seventh Division. 

Lieutenant (now Colonel) William P. Craighill, of the Corps of Engineers, 
a soldier of distinguished merit and ability, was sent by Secretary Stanton 
to strengthen the fortifications at the Gap, and he soon rendered them 
impregnable against attack. 

My hope and ambition now was to advance against Knoxville and arouse 
the Uidon men of east Tennessee to arms. I urgently asked for two additional 
brigades of infantry, a battery, and two regiments of cavalry, and, thus reen- 
forced, pledged myself to sweep east Tennessee of the Confederates. My guns 
were increased from 22 to 28, and a battery of east Tennessee artillery was 
organized, commanded by Lieutenant Daniel Webster, of Forster's 1st Wis- 

3> The Confederate forces covering the mountain and river passes north of Knox-sdlle at this time 
were under General C. L. Stevenson, First Division, Department of East Tennessee.— Editors. 






consin battery. Four thousand stand of arms, destined for east Tennessee, but 
left at Nicholasville and Crab Orchard during the winter on account of the 
impassable state of the roads, were now sent forward to Cumberland Gap 
with a largo supply of ammunition, and magazines and an arsenal were got 
ready for them. A vast store-house, capable of containing supplies for 
20,000 men for G months, was also built by Cai)tain AV. F. Patterson. The 
nerves and muscles of every man were stretched to the utmost tension, and 
the Gap became a vast workshop. Captain S. B. Brown, assistant quarter- 
master and acting commissary of subsistence, a man of fine intelligence 
and great energy, put on the road in small trains over four hundred wagons, 
and by this means the various munitions of war were dragged from the blue- 
grass region through the wilderness to Cumberland Gap. 

Colonel De Courcy and Captain Joseiili Edgar (afterward killed in action 
under De Courcy at Tazewell) were detailed as instructors of tactics for the 
of&cers of the new regiments of east Tennessee troops, who wcic brave, 
ambitious men and anxious to learn. Forage was collected with tlilliculty 
by armed partitas. 

About the middle of August Stevenson went into position in my immediate 
front. On the morning of the 17th T receiviMl iiitelligtMice, ]>robabl(» in its 
character, that Stevenson woiiM a1tem])t to carry the (lap that night. At 


2:. 'JO A. M. oil the 18tli reveille was sounded, and the lines were manned, but 
the enemy did not attack. It was evident that he intended a siege. 

On the 16th Kirby Smith crossed the mountains south of us, into Ken- 
tucky, occupied Cumberland Ford, and sent a demand for the surrender of 
the Gap, to which I replied : " If you want this fortress, come and take HP 

Smith's position was critical. He had no base of supplies ; the valley in 
which his troops were concentrated was soon exhausted; the longer he 
delayed pushing toward the blue-grass region, the greater would be the 
force he would have to meet on reaching there. Having completely cut me 
oif from my base, he therefore pushed forward toward Lexington, leaving 
Stevenson still in front of me. 

The Confederates were invading Kentucky in three Columns: Bragg on 
the left. Smith in the center, Humphrey Marshall on the right, while John 
H. Morgan hovered like an eagle on the wing, ready to pounce upon any 
weak point. They now regarded the capture or destruction of my division as 
certain. Our situation was indeed critical. We had been three months in 
this isolated position. Our only reasonable hope of succor had been destroyed 
by the defeat and dispersion of Nelson's force at Richmond on the 30th of 
August. [See p. 4.] We were destitute of forage. The horses of the 9th 
Ohio Battery literally starved to death, and then- skeletons were dragged 
outside the lines. Our supplies of food were rapidly becoming exhausted. 
De Courcy had been sent to Manchester, sixty miles distant, in the hope of 
obtaining supplies, but there was scarcely sufficient for his own brigade. 
Enveloped on every side by the enemy, absolutely cut off from my base of sup- 
plies, and with starvation staring us in the face, I assembled a council of war, 
and, stating the situation in a few words, asked for the opinions of the mem- 
bers. Spears, Carter, and Baird (De Courcy being absent) gave it as their 
opinion, in which I concurred, that retreat was inevitable. In fact, I had 
already marked out in red chalk on the map of Kentucky my line of retreat, 
just as it was afterward carried out. Holding out the idea that we were 
seeking to obtain supplies by way of the barren wilderness through which I 
purposed to reach the Ohio, I had previously caused Lieutenant-Colonel George 
W. Gallup, of the 14th Kentucky, a soldier of rare merit, to send me at inter- 
vals men of his command familiar with the country through which each day's 
march would have to be made. The information given me by those brave 
mountaineers w^as discouraging. The want of water, the rugged character of 
tlie defiles, the almost absolute want of supplies, were stated by every one, 
but the opinion was expressed that a few wagons, laden with half a ton each, 
might get tiirough. My topogi-aphical engineer. Captain Sidney S. Lyon, a 
man of fine intelligence and skill, had been the geologist of Kentucky, and 
was familiar with every foot of the State. Pointing out to him the region 
I had marked across the map T said, " Can I take my di\asion by that route 
to the Ohio River ?" "Yes, possibly, by abandoning tiie artillery and wagons." 
However, there was practi(^ally no choice. To retreat on Lexington would 
have ])laced my division, with its reduced numbers, between Stevenson in 
our imincdiate rear, Smith in our front, Bragg on our left, and Humphrey 



^ ll 






A, Battery No. 1 ; B, Battery No. 2 ; C, Fort Moripllan ; D, Battery No. 3 ; E, Fort Halleck ; 1, 1st Teiiuessee Regt. ; 

2, 2d Tennessee ; 5, 49th Indiana ; 6, l-ttli Kentucky; 8, Headquarters Provost Guard; 9, 3d Kentucky ; 

10, 33d Indiana; 11, General Baird's lit ;ul(iiiarters; 12, (ieneral Carter's Headquarters ; 

13, House used as General Morgan's Headquarters. 

Marshall on our right, with the passes of the Wild Cat or of the Big Hill to 
overcome. I therefore determined to retreat by the red-chalk line, and at all 
hazards to take my artillery and wagons with me. | 

Stevenson, who knew as well as I did that I must attempt a retreat, was 
vigilant and energetic. From a knob on the east flank of Baptist Gap, with 
the aid of a good telescope, he could see all that was going on in Cumberland 
Gap. His line was nearly a semicircle, the opposite points of .the diameter 
resting on the mountain's base to the right and left of the Gap. His policy 
was to starve us out. 

During the night of the 16th of September, a long train of wagons was sent 
toward Manchester under the convoy of Colonel Coburn's 3od Indiana, two 
companies of Garrard's 3d Kentucky regiment, and the 9th Ohio Battery. 
This entire night and the following day, every preparation was made for the 
retreat. Mines had beiMi constructed to blow uj^ the magazines and arsenal 
and fire the vast store-houses constructed and under construction. Every- 
thing moved with the precision of a well-constructed and well-oiled jnece of 
machinery, until late in the afternoon of the 17th, when a ri'port came from 
our signal station on the crest of the mountain that a flag of truce from the 
enemy was approaching. This was in reality a party of observation. I tlien^- 
fore sent Lieutenant-Colonel Galluji, with a small escort and a few .^lirewd 
olficers, to meet the enemy's flag outside oni- jticket liin's. The oflicers in 

4.Tho retreat was made across Kentucky by the way of .Mancliesler, H i.ville, ami West Lilterty 

to Greenup on the Ohio Kiver. [See map, p. tJ.] — Ki>it(M;s. 


either side were laughing and joking together, when suddenly a glare of 
fii-e shone from the valley at the foot of the Gap and a volume of smoke 
curled over Poor Valley Ridge. One of the Confederates exclaimed, " Why, 
Colonel, what does that mean ? It looks like an evacuation." With admirable 
coolness and address Gallup replied, " Not much. Morgan has cut away the 
timber obstracting the range of his guns, and they are now burning the brush 
on the mountain-side." This off-hand explanation was apparently satisfac- 
tory, but the fact was that some reckless person had fired a quartermaster's 
building, — a criminal blunder that might have cost us dear. 

On the night of the 17th, Gallup, with a body of picked men, was left to 
guard the three roads leading from the camps of Stevenson, and to fire the 
vast quartermaster buildings, as well as the enormous store-house, nearly 
completed, on the crest of the mountain, and near the gap. The arsenal, 
containing four thousand stand of small-arms, and a large amount of shells 
and grenades, had been mined, and trains had been laid to the magazines. 

At 8 o'clock that night my command wheeled into column with the cool- 
ness and precision of troops on review ; and without hurry, without confu- 
sion, with no loud commands, but with resolute confidence, the little army, 
surrounded by peril on every side, set out on its march of more than two 
hundred miles through the wilderness. Toward morning Gallup fired the 
vast buildings and the trains leading to the mines. The shock of the explosion 
was felt fourteen miles away ; the fiaming buildings lighted up the sky as 
though the Gap and mountain crests were a volcano on fire, and from time to 
time till after dawn we heard the explosion of mines, shells, or grenades. At 
Manchester we halted for a day and a' half, to concentrate the command, and 
to organize for the march before us. A day or two before a soldier had 
murdered a comrade in cold blood, under circumstances of great aggravation. 
I had ordered a court to try him. The sentence, of course, was death, and 
at the very moment of the execution the fii^ing of our troops could be heard 
repelling the dash of Stevenson's cavalry on the wagon train of Spears. 

1 fully expected to be met by the enemy in force at Proctor, where the deep 
and abrupt banks would have rendered the passage of the Kentucky River 
perilous and difficult if disputed. We accordingly moved by two nearly parallel 
roads, and the two columns reached Proctor almost simultaneously. I at once 
threw a brigade, with a battery, across the river, and gave the command half a 
day's rest. The previous day and night the ever -vigilant John H. Morgan, 
with his dai-ing followers, had been at Proctor, had burned the steam flouring- 
mill and its valuable contents, and had then withdrawn to Irvine, thirteen 
miles away. 

In order to deceive the enemy as to my intended line of march, I directed 
Captain George M, Adams, Commissary of Subsistence, to send an officer 
toward Mount Sterling with written authority to purchase supplies. He set 
out, wearing his uniform, and attended only by two or three soldiers, know- 
ing with certainty that he would be taken prisoner, and his papers seized. 
He was, of course, captured, since the Confederates were concentrating at 
Mount Sterling, believing my objective point to be Maysville. 


Two roads run from Proctor to Hazel Green : the Ridge road, then destitute 
of water, and the North Fork road, which had water, but which the torrents 
of the previous rainy season had greatly damaged and in parts destroyed. 
De Courcy and Spears marched by the former, while Baird and Carter, with 
the wagon train, took the latter. It was largely through the energy of Baird 
that the wagon train was saved. After a day's halt at Hazel Green to rest and 
refresh the half-famished men and animals, the march was resumed toward 
West Liberty, supposed to be occupied by Humj^hrey Marshall. However, 
he was not there. During this march, John H. Morgan attacked the rear of 
De Courcy's brigade and scattered a lot of cattle intended for the use of the 
retreating column. Morgan then passed around us and commenced blockad- 
ing the defiles between West Liberty and Grayson and destroying everything 
that could feed man or beast. He did his work gallantly and well. Frequent 
sku'mishes took place, and it several times happened that while the one Mor- 
gan was clearing out the obstructions at the entrance to a defile, the other 
Morgan was blocking the exit from the same defile with enormous rocks and 
felled trees. In the work of clearing away these obstructions, one thousand 
men, wielding axes, saws, picks, spades, and block and tackle, under the gen- 
eral direction of Captain William F. Patterson, commanding his company of 
engineer-mechanics, and of Captain Sidney S. Lyon, labored with skill and 
courage. In one instance they were forced to cut a new road through the 
forest for a distance of four miles in order to turn a blockade of one mile. At 
Grayson, however, on the 1st of October, John Morgan abandoned the con- 
test, to seek a new field for the exercise of his superior partisan skill and 
high courage; and on the 3d we reached the Ohio River at Greenup [see 
map, p. 6], without the loss of a gun or a wagon, and with the loss of but 
eighty men. Not only that, but, as General Bragg states in his report, we had 
detained General Kirby Smith, and thus prevented the junction of the Con- 
federate armies in Kentucky, long enough to save Louisville. 


Union Forces.— seventh ditision, army of the iiartiiioiit of East Tenneesec, was In position confront- 

Oiiio. Brif;.-(!(Mi. GioiKt' W. Mmjjan. ini; Morj^an at ("uniborlaud (inp. The strtMisjtli of tliis 

Twi-uln-foiirtlt llrii/iii/c, Hv\'^.-(ir]\. Samuel P. Carter: division was stated by (teiieral Kirby Sniitli on the •J4th 
49th Intl., Lieut. -Col. James Keif,'\viii; 3d Ky., Col. of th<' month to be HOMO eltVetives. •• well oiiicanized and 
T. T. Garrard; 1st Tenn., Col. Kobort K. Byrd; mobilized, and in j^ood eondition for active serviee." 
2d Tonn., Col. James P. T. Carter. Twentij-Sifth The organization on the ;ul of July was as foUows : 
Brujade, Hrif?.-(ien. James (}. Spears: 3d Tenn., ."JcroHf/ /{/•/(/«(/<■. ("ol. Jaines K. Kains : 4th Tenn., Col. 
Col. LeonidasC. Ilouk ; 4th Tenn., Col. Robert .lohnson ; J. A. MeMnrry; llth Tenn.. C<d. J. K. Hains; 42d (Ja.. 
5tli Tenn., C(d. James T. Shelley ; 0th Tenn., Col. Joseph Col. K. .T. Henderson ; 3d (Ja. J?attalion, Lient.-Col. M. 
A. Cooper. Twfuli/sijfli nrii/tide. Col. John V. De A. Stovall; 2!nh N. C. Col. H. H. Vanee; (Ja. Kattery. 
Conrey: 2'2d Ky., Col. Daniel W. Lindsey; Ohio, Capt. J. C Yeiser. T/iinf liriuade, UrifT.-Gen. S. M. 
Lient.-Col. <ieor^a■ W. Hailey; ud Ohio. Col. Lionel A. liarton : :iOth Ala., Col. C. M. Shelley; 31st Ala., Col. I). 
8heldoii. Tirciiti/sfi'riitli Urii/nilf, Hrijr.-Cien. .Vbsalom \i. Hundley; 40th (ia.. Col. .\. Johnson; S2d (ia.. Col. 
Baird; 33d Ind., Col. John ("obnrn; 14th Ky.. Col. John \V. Boyd; i)th (ia. Battalion, .Ma.|. J. T. Sndth; Va. But- 
C. Cochran; IDtli Ky., Col. William J. .1/7//- tery, (apt. Josei)h W. .\nderson. Fourl/i llrii/nttr, ro\. 
icn/, Capt. J. leob T. Foster; 7th Mich . Capt. Charles H. A. \v. 201 h Ala., C<d. L W. (iarrott ; 3<5th (Ja.. 
Lanphere:'.ithOhio, Lieut. Leonar<l I*. Marrows; 1st Wis., Col. J. .V.Cl.nn; :!'.)! h t;a.. Col. J. T. MeConnell ; 4;td(;H.. 
Lieut. John D. Anders<ni ; Sie^'e Battery, Lieut. Daniel Col. S. Harris; imili N. C., Col. D. Coleman; :)d M.l. Hat- 
Webster, ('(inilrti: Ky. Battalion, Li<iit. Col. KeulMii tery. ("apt. 11. B. Latrobe. Fifth llri,/<i<lr. Col. T. H. 
Muuday. A'//. Eiu/iiirns. Ca|)t. William F. Patterson. Taylor: 2;iit Ala., Col. F. K. Beek ; 4f.tli Ala., Col. M. L. 

CONFEDICRATE FoitCKs. — enupositioii is not Woods; :!<l Tenn.. Col. J. C. Vaughn; 31st Tenn.. CoL 

stated in the" Offleial Records." During; tin- nu>idh of W. M. Bradfonl; .VJtIi Tenn., Col. J. B. Cooko; Tenu. 

July Brig.-Geu. Carter L. Bteveusou, First Division, De- (Khett) Ball.ry. Capt W. IL Burroughs. 





N the early fall of 1862, a distance of not more than 
tlnrty miles lay between the Army of the Potomac and 
the Army of Northern Virginia. A state of uncertainty 
had existed for several weeks succeeding the battle of 
Sharpsburg, but the movements that resulted in the 
battle of Fredericksburg began to take shape when on 
the 5th of November the order was issued removing 
General McClellan from command of the Federal forces. 
The order assigning General Burnside to command 
was received at General Lee's headquarters, then at Cul- 
peper Court House, about twenty-four hours after it 
reached Warrenton, though not through official courtesy. General Lee, on 
receiving the news, said he regi-etted to part with McClellan, "for," he added, 
" we always understood each other so well. I fear they may continue to make 
these changes till they find some one whom I don't understand." 

The Federal army was encamped around Warrenton, Virginia, and was soon 
divided into three grand divisions, whose commanders were Generals Sumner, 
Hooker, and Franklin. 

Lee's army was on the opposite side of the Eappahannock Eiver, divided 
into two corps, the First commanded by myself and the Second commanded 
by General T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson. At that time the Confederate army 
extended from Culpeper Court House (where the First Corps was stationed) 
on its right across the Blue Ridge down the Valley of Virginia to Winchester. 
Tliere Jackson was encamped with the Second Corps, except one division 
which was stationed at Chester Gap on the Blue Ridge Mountains. 

About the 18tli or 19th of November, we received information through our 
scouts that Sumner, with his grand division of more than thirty thousand 
men, was moving toward Fredericksburg. Evidently he intended to surprise 
us and cross the Rappahannock before we could offer resistance. On 'receipt 
of the infonnation, two of my divisions were ordered down to meet him. We 
made a forced march and arrived on the hills around Fredericksburg about 
3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st. Sumner had already arrived, and his 
army was encamped on Stafford Heights, overlooking the town from the 
Federal side. Before I reached Froderickslnirg, General Patrick, provost- 
marshal-general, crossed the river under a flag of truce and put the people 
in a state of great excitement by delivei-ing the following letter : 

"Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, November 21st, 1862. 
" To the Mayor and Common Council of Fredericksburg. Gentlemen : Under cover 
of the houses of your city, shots have been fired upon the troops of my command. Your mills 
and manufactories are furuishinj? provisions and the material for clothing for armed bodies in 
rebellion against the Government of the United States. Youi- railroads and other means of 
transportation are removing supplies to the depots of such troops. This condition of things 


must terminate, and by direction of General Burnside I accordingly demand the sui'render of 
your city into my hands, as the representative of the Government of the United States, at 
or before 5 o'clock this afternoon. Faihng in an affirmative reply to this demand by the 
hour indicated, .sixteen hours will be permitted to elapse for the removal from the city of 
women and children, the sick and wounded and aged, etc., which period ha^'iug expii-ed I 
shall proceed to shell the town. Upon obtaining possession of the city eveiy necessaiy means 
will be taken to preserve order and secure the protective operation of the laws and policy of 
the United States Government. I am, veiy respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"E. V. Sumner, 
" Brevet Major- General, U. S. Army, Commanding Right Grand Division." 

While the people were in a state of excitemeut over the receii:)t of this 
demand for the surrender of their town, my troops appeared upon the heights 
opposite those occupied by the Federals. The alarmed non-combatants heard 
of my arrival and immediately sent to me the demand of the Federal general. 
I stated to the town authorities that I did not care to occupy the place for 
militarv pui-poses and that there was no reason why it should be shelled by 
the Federal army. We were there to protect ourselves against the advance 
of the enemy, and could not allow the town to be occupied by the Fed- 
erals. The mayor sent to General Sumner a satisfactory statement of the 
situation and was notified that the threatened shelling would not take place, 
since the Confederates did not purpose to make the town a base of mihtary 

Before my troops reached the little city, and before the people of Freder- 
icksburg knew that any part of the Confederate army was near, there was 
great excitement over the demand for surrender. No people were in the place 
except aged and infirm men, and women and childi-en. That they should 
become alarmed when the surrender of the town was demanded by the Fed- 
erals was quite natural, and a number proceeded with great haste to board a 
train then ready to leave. As the train drew out, Sumner's batteries on Staf- 
ford Heights opened fire on it, adding to the general terror, but fortunately 
doing no serious damage. The spectacle was nothing, however, to what we 
witnessed a short time after. About the 26tli or 27th it became e\ddent 
that Fredericksburg would be the scene of a battle, and we ad^'ised the 
people who were still in the town to prepare to leave, as they would soon 
be in danger if they remained. The evacuation of the place by the dis- 
tressed women and helpless men was a painful sight. Many were almost 
destitute and had nowhere to go, but, yielding to the cruel necessities of 
war, they collected their portable effects and turned their backs on the 
town. Many were forced to seek shelter in the woods and brave the icy 
November nights to escape tht» approaching assault from the Fedei'al army. 

Very soon after I reached Fredei-icksburg the remainder of my corps arrived 
from Culpeper Court House, and as soon as it was known that all the Army 
of the Potomac was in motion for the prosjxvtive scene of battle Jackson 
was drawn down from the Blue Ridge. In a v»M-y .-^liorl liiiic tlic Army of 
Northern Virginia was face to face with the Army «»t' the I'oloniac 

Wlien Jackson arrived he objected to the positi(Mi, n..t that he 1"care<l the 
result of the l.attUs hut because lie tiiought (liat bcliiiid the North Anna was 



a point from which tlie most fruitful results would follow. He held that we 
would win a victory at Fredericksburg, but it would be a fruitless one to us, 
whereas at North Anna, when we drove the Federals back, we could give 
pursuit to advantage, w^liich we could not do at Fredericksburg. General 
Lee did not entertain the proposition, however, and we continued our prep- 
arations to meet the enemy at the latter place, i^ 

At a point just above the town, a range of hills begins, extending from the 
river edge out a short distance and bearing around the valley somewhat in 

the form of a crescent. On the opposite 
side are the noted Stafford Heights, then 
occupied by the Federals. At the foot of 
these hills flows the Rappahannock River. 
On the Confederate side nestled Fredericks- 
burg, and around it stretched the fertile 
bottoms from which fine crops had been 
gathered and upon which the Federal troops 
were to mass and give battle to the Confed- 
erates. On the Confederate side nearest 
the river was Taylor's Hill, and south of it 
the now famous Marye's Hill ; next. Tele- 
graph Hill, the highest of the elevations on 
the Confederate side (later known as Lee's 
Hill, because during the battle General Lee 
w^as there most of the time), where I had 
my headquarters in the field; next was a 
declination through which Deep Run Creek 
passed on its way to the Rappahannock 
River ; and next was the gentle elevation at 
Hamilton's Crossing, not dignified with a 
name, upon which Stonewall Jackson massed thii'ty thousand men. It was 
upon these hills that the Confederates made their preparations to receive 
Burnside whenever he might choose to cross the Rappahannock. The 
Confederates were stationed as follows : On Taylor's Hill next the river and 
forming my left, R. H. Anderson's division ; on Marye's Hill, Ransom's and 
McLaws's divisions; on Telegraph Hill, Pickett's di\dsion ; to the right 
and about Deep Run Creek, Hood's division, the latter stretching across 
Deep Run Bottom. 


■5^ That General Lee was not quite satisfied with 
the place of battle is shown by a dispatch to the 
Riclimond authorities on the second day after the 
battle, when it was uncertain what Burnside's 
next move would be. In that dispatch he says: 
"Sliould the enemy cross at Port Royal in force, 
before I can fi;et tliis army in position to meet him, 
I tliink it more advantageous to retire to the 
Annas and give battle, than on the banks of the 
Rappahannock. My desip:n was to have done so 
in the first instance. My purpose was changed 
not from any advantage in tiiis position, but from 

an unwillingness to open more of our country to 
depredation than possible, and also with a view of 
collecting such forage and provisions as could be 
obtained in the Rai^pahannoek Valley. With the 
numerous array opposed to me, and the bridges 
and transportation at its command, the crossing of 
the Rappahannock, where it is narrow and wind- 
ing as in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, can be 
made at almost any point without molestation. It 
will, therefore, be more advantageous to us to draw 
him farther away from his base of operations." 



On the hill occupied by Jackson's (iorps were the divisions of A. P. Hill, 
Early, and Taliaferro, that of D. H. Hill being in reserve on the extreme 
right. To the Washington Artillery, on Marye's Hill, was assigned the 
service of advising the army at the earliest possible moment of the Federal 
advance. General Barksdale, with his Mississippi brigade, was on picket 
duty in front of Fredericksburg on the night of the advance. 

The liills occupied by the (Confederate foi'ces, although over-crowned by the 
heights of Stafford, were so distant as to be outside the range of effective fire 
by the Federal guns, and, with the lower receding grounds between them, 
formed a defensive series that may be likened to natural bastions. Taylor's 
Hill, on our left, was unassailable ; Marye's Hill was more advanced toward 
the town, was of a gradual ascent and of less height than the others, and we 
considered it the point most assailable, and guarded it accordingl}'. The 
events that followed proved the correctness of our opinion on that point. 
Lee's Hill, near our center, with its rugged sides retired from Marye's and 
rising higher than its companions, was comparatively safe. 

This was the situation of the 65,000 Confederates massed around Fred- 
ericksburg, and they had twenty-odd days in which to prepare for the 
approaching battle. 

The Federals on Stafford Heights carefully matured their plans of advance 
and attack. Grenei'al Hunt, chief of artillery, skillfully posted 147 guns to cover 
the bottoms upon which the infantry was to form for the attack, and at the 
same time play upon the Confederate batteries as circumstances would allow. 
Franklin and Hooker had joined Sumner, and Stafford Heights held the 
Federal army, 116,000 strong, watching the plain where the bloody conflict 
was soon to be. In the meantime the Federals had been seen along the banks 
of the river, looking for the most available points for crossing. President 
Lincoln had been do^m with General Halleck, and it had been suggested hy 
the latter to cross at Hoop-pole Ferry, about 28 oi- 30 miles below Freder- 
icksburg. We discovered the movement, however, and prepared to meet 
it, and Burnside abandoned the idea and turned his attention to Fredericks- 
burg, under the impression that many of our troops were down at Hoop-pole, 
too far away to return in time for this battle. \ 

The soldiers of both armies were in good fighting condition, and there was 
every indication that we would have a desperate battle. We were confident 
that Burnside could not dislodge us, and patiently awaited the attack. 

On the morning of the 11th of December, 1862, an hour or so before day- 
light, the slumbering Confederates were awakened by a solitary canncm 
thundering on the heights of Marye's Hill. Again it boomed, and instantly 
the aroused Confederates recognized the signal oi the Washington Artillery 
and knew that the Federal ti-oops were preparing to crc^ssthe Ka])pahannock 
to give us the expected battle. The Federals came down to tlio rivrr's edge 
and l)egan the constructicm of their bridges, when Barksdale opened lire with 
such ett'ect that they were fcnved to retire. Again and again they made an 

4 It is more than probablo that Biinisidc a.-i-.-i-lcil tlu> proposition to movo by Hoop-polo Ft-rry for the 
purpose of drawing some of our troops from thi' [loints ht- had roally soloctod for his crossing.— J. L. 

NoTK.— Tlio hiittcrics wliicli liiid position on the oiitslfirtsot' the town in rear of Sumner's attack were AVaternian's 

Kusserow's, Kirby's, Hazard's, Frank's, Arnold's, Phillips's, and Dickenson's. In placing the Union artillery, we 

liave followed au official map made under direction of General Henry J. Hunt, cliief of artillery.— Editoks. 



effort to cross, but each time they were met and repulsed by the well- 
directed bullets of the Mississippiaus. This contest lasted until 1 o'clock, 
when the Federals, with angry desperation, turned their whole available force 
of artillery on the Httle city, and sent down from the heights a perfect storm 
of shot and shell, crushing the houses with a cyclone of fiery metal. From our 
position on the heights we saw the batteries hurling an avalanche upon 
the town whose only off'ense was that near its edge in a snug retreat 
nestled three thousand Confederate hornets that were stinging the Army 
of the Potomac into a frenzy. It was terrific, the pandemonium which that 
little squad of Confederates had provoked. The town caught fire in sev- 
eral places, shells crashed and burst, and solid shot rained like hail. In the 
midst of the successive crashes could be heard the shouts and yells of those 
engaged in the struggle, while the smoke rose from the burning city and the 
flames leaped about, making a scene which can never be effaced from the 
memory of those who saw it. But, in the midst of all this fury, the little bri- 
gade of Mississippiaus clung to their work. At last, when I had everything in 
readiness, I sent a peremptory order to Barksdale to withdraw, which he did, 
fighting as he retired before the Federals, who had hj that time succeeded in 
landing a number of their troops. The Federals then constructed their pon- 
toons without molestation, and during the night and the following day the 
grand division of Sumner passed over into Fredericksbui'g. 

About a mile and a half below the town, where the Deep Run emj^ties into 
the Rappahannock, General Franklin had been allowed without serious oppo- 
sition to throw two pontoon-bridges on the 11th, and his grand division 
passed over and massed on the level bottoms opposite Hamilton's Crossing, 
thus placing himself in front of Stonewall Jackson's corps. The 11th and 12th 
were thus spent by the Federals in crossing the river and preparing for battle. 

Opposite Fredericksburg, the formation along the river-bank was such that 
the Federals were concealed in their approaches, and, availing themselves 
of this advantage, they succeeded in crossing and concealing the grand 
division of Sumner and, later, a part of Hooker's grand di^dsion in the city 
of Fredericksburg, and so disposing of Franklin in the open plain below as 
to give out the impression that the great force was with the latter and about 
to oppose Jackson. 

Before daylight on the morning of the eventful 13tli I rode to the right of 
my line held by Hood's division. General Hood was at his post in plain 
hearing of the Federals south of Deep Run, who were marching their trooj^s 
into i)osition for the attack. The morning was cold and misty, and every- 
thing was obscured from view, but so distinctly did the mist bear to us the 
sounds of the moving Federals that Hood thought the advance was against 
him. He was relieved, however, when I assured him that the enemy, to 
reach him, would have to put himself in a pocket and be subjected to attack 
from Jackson on one side, Pickett and McLaws on the other, and Hood's own 
men in front. The position of Franklin's men on the V2th, with the configu- 
ration of th(^ ground, had left no doubt in my mind as to Franklin's inten- 
tions. I explained all this to Hood, assuiiug him that the attack would be 




on Jackson. At the same time I 
ordered Hood, in case Jackson's 
line should be broken, to wheel 
around to his right and stiike 
in on the attacking bodies, tell- 
ing him that Pickett, with his 
division, would be ordered to join 
in the flank movement. These 
orders were given to both divis- 
ion generals, and at the same 
time they were advised that I 
would be attacked near my left 
center, and that I must be at 
that point to meet my part of 
the battle. They were also ad- 
vised that my position was so 
well defended I could have no 
other need of their troops. I then 
returned to Lee's Hill, reaching 
there soon after sunrise. 

Thus we stood at the eve of 
the great battle. Along the Stafford Heights 147 guns were turned upon us, 
and on the level plain below, in the town, and hidden on the opposite bank 
ready to cross, were assembled nearly 100,000 men, eager to begin the com- 
bat. Secure on our hills, we grimly awaited the onslaught. The valley, the 
mountain-tops, everything was enveloped in the thickest fog, and the j^rep- 
arations for the fight were made as if under cover of night. The mist brought 
to us the sounds of the preparation for battle, but we were blind to the move- 
ments of the Federals. Suddenly, at 10 o'clock, as if the elements were 
taking a hand in the ch*ama about to be enacted, the warmth of the sun 
brushed the mist away and revealed the mighty panorama in the valley below. 
Franklin's 40,000 men, reeiiforced by two divisions of Hooker's grand 
division, were in front of Jackson's 30,000. The flags of the Federals fluttered 
gayly, the polished arms shone brightly in the sunlight, and the beautifid 
uniforms of the buoyant troops gave to the scene the air of a holiday occasion 
rather than the spectacle of a great army about to be thrown into the 
tumult of battle. From my place on Lee's Hill I could see almost every 
soldier Franklin had, and a splendid array it was. But off in the distance 
was Jackson's ragged infantry, and beyond was Stuart's battered cavalry, 
with their soiled hats and yellow butternut suits, a striking contrast to the 
handsomely equipped troops of the Federals. 

About the city, here and there, a few soldiers could be seen, but there was 
no indication of the heavy masses that were concealed by the houses. Those 
of Franklin's men who were in front of Jackson stretched well up toward Lee's 
Hill, and were almost within reach of our best guns, and at the other end 
they stretched out to the east until they came well under the fire of Stuart's 




In the background is seen the continuation of Hanover 
street, which on the left ascends the hill to the Marye 
Mansion. The little sciuaic field lies hi the fork made by 
the former road and flic T(lci;ra|ih road (sec map, p. 
74). Nearly all that remained in lS8t of the famous stone- 
wall is seen in the right of the picture. The horses are 
in the road, which is a continuation of the street south 
of Hanover street, and on which is the brick house men- 
tioned ill (icmial Coucirs article. Tla^ house in which 
(ieneralCnhl) died would lie tlie iii'xf ol.ject in the right 
of t lie piel lire it t lie toret;roiiiid were extended. And be- 
yond that house, following the Telegraph road south, 
there was, at the time of the battle, a long stretch of 
stone-wall (see map, p. 74), little if any of which was to 
be scM'ii in 188i, the stone having been used for the gate- 
llous(^ of till- National Cemetery. 

In his ollieial report (ieneral Kershaw, who succeeded 
(icneral Cobb, thus describes llni situation durlTig the 
battle in that part of tin- road seen in the picture: "The 
roail is about 'i'> I'eet wide, and is faced by a stone-w.all 
about 4 feet high on thi^ city side. The road having 
been cut out of the sid<> of the hill, in iiiaiiy places this 
last wall is not visible above the surface of the ground. 
The ground falls off rapidly to almost a level surface. 
Which extends aboiil 150 yards, then, with another 
abrupt fallof a lew feet, to another plain which extends 
some '.iOO yardw, and then falls oil' abruptly into a wide 
ravine, which extends along flic whole front of the city 
and discharges into Hazel Knn. I found, on my arrival, 
that ('obb'H tirii;ade. Colonel McMillan coninianding, oc- 
cuiiied our entire front, and my trooiis conid only get 
into position by doiililiiig on them. This was accord- 
ingly doni!, and the formation ahing most of the lino 
during the engagement wae cousequoutly four deep. As 

III.I.. FliOM A I'lIoToCltAl'H TAKEN IN 1884. 

an evidence of the coolness of the command, I may men- 
tion here that, notwithstanding that their tiro was the 
most rapid and continuous I h.ave ever witnessed, not a 
man was injured by the fire of his comrades. . . . lu 
the meantime line after line of the enemy dephiycd in 
the ravine, and advanced to the attack at intervals of 
not more than lifteeu minutes until about 4 : 30 o'clock, 
when there was a lull of about a half hour, during which 
a mass of artillery was placed in position in front of the 
town and opened upon our position. At this time I 
brought up Colonel De .<?aussure"s regiment. Our batter- 
ies on the hill were silent, haviiiir exhausted their am- 
munition, and till' Washimrton .Art illery were relieved 
by a part of Colonel Alexander's battalion. Undercover 
of this artillery lire, the most formidable column of at- 
tack was formed, which, about 5 o'clock, emerged from 
the ravine and, no longer impt'ded by our artillery, 
impetuously assailed our whole front. From this time 
until after 6 o'clock the attack was continnous, and the 
Are on both sides terrirtc. Some few, chiefly ollicers, got 
within 30 yards of our lines, luit in every instance their 
columns were shattered by the time they got within \oo 
paces. The tiring gradually subsided, and by 7 o'clock 
our pickets were established within thirty yards of those 
of the enemy. 

" Our chief after getting Into position In the road 
was from the tire of sharp-shooters, who occupieil some 
buildings on my left flank in the curly part of the en- 
gagement, and were only silenced by Captain (W.) Wal 
lace, of the 2d Regiment, directing the continuous Are of 
one company upon the bidltlings. (buieral Cobb, I learn, 
was killed by a shot from that quarter. The regimciits 
on the hill sutTered most, as they were less perfectly 
covered."— Editors. 



horse artillery under Major John Pelham, a brave and gallant officer, almost 
a boy in years. As the mist rose, the Confederates saw the movement against 
theu' right near Hamilton's Crossing. Major Pelham opened fire upon Frank- 
lin's command and gave him lively work, which was kept up until Jackson 
ordered Pelham to retire, Franklin then advanced rapidly to the hill where 
Jackson's troops had been stationed, feeling the woods with shot as he 
progressed. Silently Jackson awaited the approach of the Federals until 
they were within good range, and then he opened a terrific fire which threw 
the Federals into some confusion. The enemy again massed and advanced, 
pressing through a gap between Archer and Lane. This broke Jackson's line 
and threatened very serious trouble. The Federals who had wedged them- 
selves in through that gap came upon Gregg's brigade, and' then the severe 
encounter ensued in which the latter general was mortall}^ wounded. Archer 
and Lane very soon received reenforcements and, rallying, joined in the 
counter-attack and recovered their lost ground. The concentration of Talia- 
ferro's and Early's divisions against this attack was too much for it, and the 
counter-attack drove the Federals back to the railroad and beyond the reach 
of our guns on the left. Some of our troops following up this repulse got 

too far out, and were in turn much 
, ^■. discomfited when left to the enemy's 

superior numbers, and were obliged to 
retire in poor condition. A Federal 
brigade advancing under cover of 
Deep Run was discovered at this time 
and attacked by regiments of Pender's 
and Law's brigades, the former of 
A. P. Hill's and the latter of Hood's 
division ; and, Jackson's second line 
advancing, the Federals were forced to 
retire. This series of demonstrations 
and attacks, the partial success and 
final discomfiture of the Federals, con- 
stitute the hostile movements between 
the Confederate right and the Federal 

I have described, in the opening of 
this article, the situation of the Con- 
federate left. In front of Marye's Hill is 
a plateau, and immediately at the base 
of the hill there is a sunken road known as the Tt^egraph road. On the side 
of the road next to the town was a stone-wall, slioulder-high, against which 
the eartli was banked, forming an almost uiia])proacliable defense. It was 
impossible for the troops occupying it to expose more than a small portion 
of tlieir bodies. Behind this stone-wall I had placed about twenty-five hun- 
dred men, being all of General T. P. R. Cobb's brigade, and a portion of the 
brigade of General Kershaw, both of McLaws's division. It must now be 

^()U8^: uv the stone-wall, iv WFiirii general 



understood that the Federals, to reach what appeared to be my weakest 
point, would have to pass dii-ectly over this wall held by Cobb's infantry. 

An idea of how well Marye's Hill was protected may be obtained from the 
following incident : General E. P. Alexander, my engineer and superintend- 
ent of artillery, had been placing the guns, and in going over the field with 
liim before the battle, I noticed an idle cannon. I suggested that he i)lace it 
so as to aid in covering the plain in front of Marye's Hill. He answercnl : 
" General, we cover that ground now so well that we will comb it as with 
a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open 
on it." 

A little before noon I sent orders to all my batteries to open fire through 
the streets or at any points where the troops were seen about the city, as a 
diversion in favor of Jackson. This fire began at once to develop the work 
in hand for myself. The Federal troops swarmed out of the city like bees out of 
a hive, coming in double-quick march and filling the edge of the field in front 
of Cobb. This was just where we had expected attack, and I was prepared 
to meet it. As the troops massed before us, they were much annoyed by the 
fire of our batteries. The field was literally packed with Federals from the 
vast number of troops that had been massed in the town. From the moment 
of their appearance began the most fearful carnage. With our artillery from 
the front, right, and left tearing through their ranks, the Federals pressed 
forward with almost invincible determination, maintaining their steady step 
and closing up their broken ranks. Thus resolutely they marched upon 
the stone fence behind which quietly waited the Confederate brigade of 
General Cobb. As they came within reach of this brigade, a storm of lead 
was poured into their advancing ranks and they were swept from the field 
like chaff before the wind. A cloud of smoke shut out the scene for a 
moment, and, rising, revealed the shattered fragments I'ecoiling from their 
gallant but hopeless charge. The artillery still i)lowed through their retreat- 
ing ranks and searched the places of concealment into which the troops had 
])lunged. A vast number went pell-mell into an old railroad cut to escape 
fh-e from the right and front. A battery on Lee's Hill saw this and turned 
its fire into the entire length of the cut, and the shells began to pour down 
ui)on the Federals with the most frightful destruction. They found their 
position of refuge more uncomfortable than the field of the assault. 

Thus the right grand division of the Army of. the Potomac found itself 
repulsed and shattered on its first attempt to drive us from Marye's Hill. 
Hardly was this attack off' the field before we saw the determined Federals 
again filing out of Fredericks! )urg and prepaiing for another charge. The 
Confederate's under (Jobb reserved their fire and cpiietly awaited tlie a})proat'h 
of the enemy. The Federals came nearer than before, l)nt were forced to 
retire before the well-directed guns of Cobb's brigade and the fire of the 
artillery on the heights. By that time the field in front of CV^bb was thickly 
strewn with the dead and dying Federals, but again they formed with des- 
perate courage and renewed the attack and again were driven off. At each 
attack the slaughter was so great that by the time the lliird attack was 


repulsed, the ground was so thickly strewn with dead that the bodies seri- 
ously impeded the approach of the Federals. General Lee, who was with me 
on Lee's Hill, became uneasy when he saw the attacks so promptly renewed 
and pushed forward with such persistence, and feared the Federals might 
break through our line. After the third charge he said to me : " General, 
they are massing very heavily and will l)reak your line, I am afraid." " Gen- 
eral," I replied, " if you put every man now on the other side of the Potomac 
on that field to approach me over the 
same line, and give me plenty of am- 
munition, I will kill them all before 
they reach my line. Look to your 
right ; you are in some danger there, 
but not on my line." 

I think the fourth time the Fed- 
erals charged, a gallant fellow came 
within one hundred feet of Cobb's 
position before he fell. Close behind 
him came some few scattering ones, 
but they were either killed or they 
fled from certain death. J^ This charge 
was the only effort that looked like 
actual danger to Cobb, and after 
it was repulsed I felt no apprehen- 
sion, assuring myself that there were 
enough of the dead Federals on the 
field to give me half the battle. The 
anxiety shown by General Lee, how- 
ever, induced me to bring up two or 
three brigades, to be on hand, and 
General Kershaw, with the remainder 
of his brigade, was ordered down to the stone-wall, rather, however, to carry 
ammunition than as a reenforcement for Cobb. Kershaw dashed down the 
declivity and arrived just in time to succeed Cobb, who, at this juncture, fell 
from a wound in the thigh and died in a few ndnutes from loss of blood. 
[See also p. 94.] 

A fifth time the Federals formed and charged and were repulsed. A sixth 
time they charged and were driven back, when night came to end the dread- 
ful carnage, and the Federals withdrew, leaving the battle-field literally heaped 
with the l)odies of their dead. Before the well-directed fir.' of CoblVs brigade, 
the Federals had fallen like the steady dri])i)ing of rain finm tlic eaves of a 
house. Oui- musketry alone killed and wounded at least .")()()(); au<l thes»». 

" ""^""r^^ 


Before the war, General Cobb was a lawyer. He was 

born in (Jeorfria in 1820. In 1851 he imblishe<l a 

"Difjeet of the Laws of Georgia." 

^ In his oilieial report (iencral Ijat'ayctd' Mc- 
Laws says: ''Tlio body of one man, Ix-lieved to 
bo an oflieor, was fonnd within about tliirty 
yards of the stone-wall, and otlier sing^lo bodies 
were scattered at increased distances until tlie 
main mass of the dead lav tliieklv strewn over tlie 

,1,'roMnd at sonielhiiif,' over one iiiindred yards o(T. 
and extendin^j to tlie ravine, eoinmeneinf? at the 
point where our men would allow the enemy's 
column to apin-oaeh before oixMiiuj; fire, nntl be- 
yoiul which no organized body of men was able to 
jiass."— Editors. 


with the slaughter by the artillery, left over 7000 killed and wounded before 
the foot of Marye's Hill. The dead were piled sometimes three deep, and when 
morning broke, the spectacle that we saw upon the battle-field was one of the 
most distressing I ever witnessed. The charges had been desperate and 
bloody, but utterly hopeless. I thought, as I saw the Federals come again and 
again to their death, that they deserved success if courage and daring could 
entitle soldiers to victory. 

During the night . a Federal strayed beyond his lines and was taken up 
by some of my troops. On searching him, we found on his person a memo- 
randum of Oeneral Burnside's arrangements, and an order for the renewal of 
the battle the next day. This information was sent to General Lee, and 
immediately orders were given for a line of rifle-pits on the top of Marye's 
Hill for Ransom, who had l)een held somewhat in reserve, and for other guns 
to be placed on Taylor's Hill. 

We were on our lines before daylight, anxious to receive Greneral Burnside 
again. As the gray of the morning came without the battle, we became more 
anxious ; yet, as the Federal forces retained position during the 14th and 15th, 
we were not without hope. There was some little skirmishing, but it did not 
amount to anything. But when the full light of the next morning revealed 
an abandoned field, General Lee tui-ned to me, referring in his mind to the dis- 
patch I had captured and which he had just re-read, and said : " General, I 
am losing confidence in your friend General Burnside." We then put it down 
as a ruse de guerre. Afterward, however, we learned that the order had been 
made in good faith but had been changed in consequence of the demoralized 
condition of the grand divisions in front of Marye's Hill. During the night 
of the 15th the Federal troops withdrew, and on the 16th our lines were 
reestablished along the river, i^ 

I have heard that, referring to the attack at Marye's Hill while it was in 
progress, General Hooker said: "There has been enough blood shed to satisfy 
any reasonable man, and it is time to quit." I think myself it was fortunate 
for Burnside that he had no greater success, for the meeting with such 
discomfiture gave him an opportunity to get back safe. If he had made any 
progress, his loss would i)rol)ably have been greater. 

8uch was the battle of Fredericksburg as I saw it. It has been asked why 
we did not follow up the victory. The answer is plain. It goes without say- 
ing that the battle of the First Corps, concluded after nightfall, could not have 
been changed into offensive operations. Our line was about three miles long, 
extending tln-ough woodland over hill and dal(\ An attempt at concentration 
to throw the troops against the walls of the city at that hour of the night 
would have been little better than madnc^ss. The Confederate field was 

•j^ General Lee explained officially, as follows, not fk'cnicd expedient to lose the advantages of our posi- 

why he expected the attack woidd be resumed : '••>" ""•• exi)oso tlie troops to the Are of his inaccessible 

Imttcrics licyond t lie river ))v advaneinir a.irninst him; 

"The attack on the 13th hnd been so easily repulsed, l)ut we wen' ncc<"ss;iril v itriioraiit of the extent to which 

and by so Nuiall a part of our army, that it was not sup- he had suflTered, and onlv l.eeanie aware of it when, on 

ixmod the eneiny would liuiit his efforts to :in att(Mnpt the morning of the lOth. it was discovered that he had 

whieli in view of the of his preimrations :ind availed himself of the darkness of nitflit. and the prcv- 

the <;\teiit of hiH toree, seemed to be eomi.iii-af ively in- alenco of a violent storm of wind iind rain, to recross 

^'f.'ll !'.""!■ the river. The town was immediately reoccupied and 

liem-vm-, therefore, that he would attack ns. it our position on the river-bank resumed." EDITORS. 




armiigod for defensive battle. Its abrupt termination could not have l)e('n 
anticipated, nor could any skill have marshaled our trooi)s for olfensive oper- 
ations in time to meet the emergency. My line was long and over broken 
country, — so much so that the troops could not be promptly handled in offen- 
sive operations. Jackson's corps was in mass, and coidd he have anticipated 
the result of my battle, he would have been justified in pressing Franklin to the 
river when the; battle of the latter was lost. Otherwise, pursuit would have 
IxH'u as unwise as the attack he had just driven off. The Federal batteries 
on Stafford Heights were effectively posted to jn'otect their troops against our 
adv^ance, and Franklin would have been in good defensive position against 
attack on the next day. It is well known that after driving off attacking 
forces, if immediate pursuit can bo made so that the victors can go aU)ng with 
tlie retreating forces pell-mell, it is well enough to do so; but the attack 
should be innnediate. To follow a success by counter-attack against the 
enemy in position is problematical. In the case of the armies at Fredericks- 
l)urg it would have been, to say the least, very hazardous to give counter- 
attack, the Federal position being about as strong as oui-s from wliicli we had 
(h'iven them back. Attempts to break uj* .-in ;inn\- by foIl<«\\ ing on iis line of 
retreat are hazardous and rnr(>ly successful, while movements against the 
Hanks and rear increase the demoralization :ni<l otb r better oi)portunities 
for great results. The condition of a retreating army may b(> illustrated by 




^**WBaf«^ 1^ ^•^'(^m^ 

a little incident witnessed thirty years ago on the western plains of Texas. 
A soldier of my regiment essayed to capture a rattlesnake. Being pursued, 
the reptile took refuge in a prairie-dog's hole, turning his head as he entered 
it, to defend the sally-port. The soldier, coming up in time, seized the tail as 
it was in the act of passing under cover, and at the same instant the serpent 
seized the index finger of the soldier's hand. The result was the soldier lost 
the use of his finger. The wise serpent made a successful retreat. The rear 
of a retreating army is always its best guarded point. 

During the attack upon Greneral Jackson, and immediately after his line 
was broken, General Pickett rode up to General Hood and suggested that 

the moment was at hand for 
% the movement anticipated 

by my orders, and requested 
that it be executed. Hood 
did not agree, so the oppor- 
tunity was allowed to pass. 
Had Hood sprung to the oc- 
casion we would have envel- 
oped Franklin's command, 
and might possibly have 
marched it into the Con- 
federate camp. Hood com- 
manded splendid troops, 
quite fresh and eager for 
occasion to give renewed as- 
sui-ances of their mettle. 

It has been reported that 
the troops attacking Marye's 
Hill were intoxicated, having 
been plied with whisky to nerve them to the desperate attack. That can 
hardly be true. I know nothing of the facts, but no sensible commander 
will allow his troops strong drink upon going into battle. After a battle is 
over, the soldier's gill is usually allowed if it is at hand. No troops could 
have displayed greater courage and resolution than was shown by those 
brought against Marye's Hill. But they miscalculated the wonderful strength 
of the line behind the stone fence. The position held by Cobb surpassed 
courage and resolution, and was occupied by those who knew well how to 
hold a comfortable defense. 

After the retreat. General Lee went to Richmond to suggest other opera- 
tions, but was assured that the war was virtually over, and that we need not 
harass our troops l)y marches and other hardships. Gold had advanced in 
Now York to two hundred, and wo were assured by those at the Confederate 
capital that in thirty or forty days we would be recognized and peace pro- 
claimed. General Loo did not share in this belief. 

I have been asked if Bnrnside could have been victorious at Fredericks- 
burg. Such a thing was hardly possible. Perhaps no general could have 



The southern slope of Willi«'.s Hill is seen in the background. 


accomplished more than Bura.side did, and it was possible for him to have 
suffered greater loss. The battle of Frederickslnirg was a great and unprofit- 
able sacrifice of human life made, through the pressure from the rear, upon 
a general who should have known better and who doubtless acted against 
his judgment. [See p. 99.] If I had been in General Burnside's place, I 
would have asked the President to allow me to resign rather than execute 
his order to force the passage of the river and march the army against 
Lee in his stronghold. 

Viewing the battle after the lapse of more than twenty years, I may say, 
however, that Burnside's move might have been made stronger by throwing 
two of his grand divisions across at the mouth of Deep Eun, where Franklin 
crossed with his grand division and six brigades of Hooker's. Had he thus 
placed Hooker and Sumner, his sturdiest fighters, and made resolute assault 
with them in his attack on our right, he would in all probability have given 
us trouble. The partial success he had at that point might have been pushed 
vigorously })y such a force and might have thrown our right entirely from 
position, in which event the result would have depended on the skillful hand- 
ling of the forces. Franklin's grand division could have made sufficient 
sacrifice at Marye's Hill and come as near success as did Sumner's and 
two-thirds of Hooker's combined. I think, however, that the success would 
have been on our side, and it might have been followed by greater disaster 
on the side of the Federals; still they would have had the chance of success 
in their favor, while in the battle as it was fought it can hardly be claimed 
that there was even a chance. 

Burnside made a mistake from the first. He should have gone from War- 
renton to Chester Gap. He might then have held Jackson and fought me, or 
have held mo and fought Jackson, thus taking us in detail. The doubt about 
the matter was whether or not he could have caught me in that trap l)efore 
we could concentrate. At any rate, that was the only move on the board that 
could have benefited him at the time he was assigned to the command of the 
Army of the Potomac. By interposing between the corps of Lee's army he 
would have secured strong ground and advantage of position. With skill 
equal to the occasion, he should liave had success. This was the move about 
which we felt serious apprehension, and we were occupying our minds with 
plans to meet it when the move toward Fredericksburg was rejtorted. Gen- 
eral McClelhin, in his report of August -ith, 1861), spi^aks of this move as that 
upon which he was studying when the order for Burnside's assignment to 
command reached him. 

When Burnside determined to move by Fredericksburg, he sliould lKi\t' 
moved rapidly and occujned the city at once, but this would only liave t<>i-ct'd 
us back to the plan })referred by General Jackson. 



ON the 25th of November, 1862, my division marched into Fredericksburg, 
and shortly after, by direction of General Longstreet, I occupied the city 
with one of my brigades and picketed the river with strong detachments from 
the dam at Falmouth to a quarter of a mile below Deep Run creek, the enemy's 
pickets being just across the river, within a stone's-throw of mine. Detach- 
ments were immediately set at work digging rifle-pits close to the edge of the 
bank, so close that our men, when in them, could command the river and 
the shores on each side. The cellars of the houses near the river were made 
available for the use of riflemen, and zigzags were constructed to enable the 
men to get in and out of the rifle-pits under cover. All this was done at 
night, and so secretly and quietly that I do not believe the enemy had any 
conception of the minute and careful preparations that had been made to 
defeat any attempt to cross the river in my front. No provision was made 
for the use of artillery, as the enemy had an enormous array of theii' bat- 
teries on the heights above the town, and could have demolished ours in 
five minutes. 

Two or three evenings previous to the Federal attemj^t to cross, I was with 
General Barksdale, and we were attracted by one or more of the enemy's bands 
playing at their end of the railroad bridge. A luimber of their officers and a 
crowd of their men were about the band cheering their national airs, the 
" Star Spangled Banner," " Hail Columbia," and others, once so dear to us all. 
It seemed as if they expected some response from us, but none was given 
until, finally, they struck up " Dixie," and then both sides cheered, with much 
laughter. Surmising that this serenade meant mischief, I closely inspected 
our bank of the river, and at night caused additional rifle-pits to be con- 
structed to guard more securely the approaches to the bridge. 

Early in the night of the 10th General Barksdale reported that his pickets 
had heard noises, as if the enemy were hauling pontoon-boats to the brink of 
the river ; a dense fog had prevented a clear view. About 2 a. m., of the 11th, 
General Barksdale notified me that the movements on the other side indi- 
cated that the enemy were preparing to lay down the pontoon-bridges. I told 
him to let the bridge building go on until the enemy were committed to it 
and the construction parties were within easy range. At 4:30 he reported 
that the bridge was being rapidly constructed and was nearly half done, 
and he was about to open fire. I then ordered the signal to be given by firing 
two gTins of J. P. W. Read's battery, posted on the highest j^oint along my 
front, on the edge of the hills alongside the main road running to the city. 

Previous notice had been sent to General Lee and to corps headquarters that 
tlu! bridge was being constructed. With the sound of the cannon was mingled 
the rattle of the rifles of the Mississippi men, who opened a concentrated fire 
from the rifle-pits and swept the bridge, now crowded with the construction 



parties. Nine distinct 
and desperate attempts 
were made to complete 
the bridge, but every 
one was attended with 
such heavy loss from 
our fire that the efforts 
were abandoned until 
about 10 A. M., when 
snddenly the tremen- 
dous array of the Fed- 
eral artillery opened 
fire from the heights 
above the city. 

It is impossible fitly 
to describe the effects 
of this iron hail hurled 
against the small band 
of defenders and into 
the devoted city. The 
roar of the cannon, th(^ 
])ursting shells, the fall- 
ing of walls and chim- 
neys, and the flying 
bricks and other ma- 
terial dislodged from 
the houses by the iron 
balls and shells, added 
to the fin^ of the infan- 
try from both sides and 
the smoke from the guns and from the burning houses, made a scene of 
indescrilmble confusion, enough to appall the stoutest hearts ! Under cover of 
this bond )ardment the Federals renewed their efforts to construct the bridge, 
but the little band of Mississippians in the rifle-pits under Lieutenant-Colonel 
John C. Fiser, 17th Mississippi, composed of his own regiment, 10 shai-p- 
shooters from the 13th Mississippi, and 3 companies from the 18th Mississippi 
(Ijieutenant-Colonel Luse), held their posts, and successfully rei^«'ll«Ml t^very 
attempt. The enemy had been committed to that point, l>y ha\iiig iis.'d 
half their })ontoons. 

About 4:30 p. iv[. the enemy began crossing in boats, and tlic conccnti 
fire from all arms, directed against Barksdale's men in the rille-pits, be* 
so severe that it was impossible for tliem to use their rilh's with etfect. ,1 

As the main purpose of a determined defense, wliidi was to gain tim 
the other troops to take position, had been accomiilislicd, Colonel Fiser 




i Colonel Fiser himself had V)eeii ki 
recovering consciousness, 

•1<(<1 down and stum 
.'Id to Ids post, and d 

;.f a fall! 
.-L. Ml 

ig wall, hut, 


directed to di'aw his command back from the river and join the brigade iu 
the city ; and just in time, for the enemy, no longer impeded by our fire, 
crossed the river rapidly in boats, and, forming on the flanks, rushed down to 
capture the men in the rifle-pits, taking them in the rear. Some of the men 
in the cellars, who did not get the order to retire, were thus captiu^ed, | 
but the main body of tliem rejoined the brigade on Princess- Anne street, 
where it had been assembled, and all attempts made by the enemy, now cross- 
ing in large numbers, to gain possession of the city were defeated. The firing 
ceased by 7 o'clock, and as the grand division of Franklin had effected a cross- 
ing below the mouth of Deep Run, and thus controlled ground which was 
higher than the city, and other ti'oops had crossed above the city, where, 
also, the ground was higher, so that our position would become untenable in 
the morning, I directed Greneral Barksdale to retire to a strong position I had 
noticed along a sunken road cut through the foot of Marye's Hill and running 
perpendicular to the fine of the enemy's advance. 

We read in the accounts given by Federal officers of rank that although 
General Franklin's command had constructed a bridge or two across the 
Rappahannock, below the mouth of Deep Run, and had crossed the greater 
portion of his division on the 11th, yet, because of the failure of General 
Sumner's grand division to force a crossing in front of Fredericksburg, all 
but one brigade of Franklin's grand division had been recrossed to the left 
bank to await the result of Sumner's efforts, and that Franklin's grand divis- 
ion was not again crossed to our side until the 12th. The Federal accounts 
show that this detennined defense offered by a small fraction of Barksdale's 
brigade not only prevented Sumner's crossing, but by this delay caused the 
whole of Franklin's Left Grand Division, except one brigade, to recross the 
Rappahannock, and thus gave General Lee twenty-four hours' time to prepare 
for the assault, with full notice of the points of attack. 

Early on the night of the 11th General Thomas R. R. Cobb was directed to 
relieve the brigade of General Barksdale, and accordingly three Georgia 
regiments and the Phillips Legion of Cobb's brigade took position in the 
sunken road at foot of Marye's Hill, on the lower side of which there was a 
stone- wall something over four feet high, most of which was protected by the 
earth thrown from the road, and was invisible from the front. Barksdale's 
brigade retired to their originally assigned position as my rear line of 
defense, in Bernard's woods, where they constructed abatis and rifle-pits 
during the 12th. 

Meanwhile tlui 18th Mississippi Regiment, of Barksdale's brigade, under 
Colonel Luse, which had been detached to defend the river-bank below the 
town on the night <^f the 10th, had offered such vigorous resistance from 
behind some old huts and thickets that the enemy had delayed the construc- 
tion of their pontoon-bridges there until after daylight on the 11th, and there- 
fore, instead of crossing the grand division by daylight of the 11th, did not 
cross until late on that day. The enemy on the 11th brought grape and 
canister against Colonel Luse, who was not fortified, not having rifle-pits 

jPorliaps tliirty or forty, not more.— L. McL. 



Ill the niiddlc-Krouiid is Keen the Routh end of tlie 
stoue-wall, aud it may be hccii tliat the trout Hue of 
defense foriued by the wall waw contiuiied still farther 
to the right by the eiiukeu Tclci,a'aph road. At the 
base of the hill, this side of the stone-wall, is seen an 
earth-work which was a part of the second line. A 

third line [see p. 83] wa.-: on tlu" brow of this hill, n..w 
the National Cenietery. Between the steeples on the 
outskirts of Fredericksburg is seeu the end of Han- 
over street, by which, and by the street in the right 
of the picture, the Union forces tiled out to form for the 
assault.— Editors. 

even, and liis regiment was witlulrawn to the river I'oad. The IGtli Georgia, 
Colonel Bryan, and tlie 15tli S(Kitli Carolina, Colonel De Sanssure, wliieh had 
been ordered to the assistance of Colonel Luse, retired with liis cokunn. Early 
on the 11th a battalion of the 8th Florida, under Captain Lang, numbering 
150 men, had been posted to the left of Colonel Fiser's command, above Fred- 
ericksburg, and while under Captain Lang did good service. But unfortu- 
nately the captain was badly wounded about 11 a. m, and the battalion was 
withdrawn. I think the defense of the river-crossing in front of Fredericks- 
burg was a notable and wondei'ful feat of arms, challenging conii)arison witli 
aiiytliing that liappened during the war. 

On tlie 12th close and heavy skirmishing was kept up between my advanced 
parties and the enemy, and whole divisions were employed in fortifying tlu^r 
l)Ositions and preparing for the coming assaults. The grounds in my front 
had been well studied by myself, in company with my brigade commanders 
and colonels of regiments, and all the details for the suj)ply of annnunition, 
]»rovisions, water, care for the wounded, and otlier necessary arrangements 
liad been attended to, so lliat we waited for the enemy willi perfect cahimess 
and with confidence in our ability to repel them. 

A heavy fog hung over the valley, concealing tlie town froni our \ iew, and 

until late in the day the banks below were not visible. As I was anxiously 

iiKpuring for some news from the i)ickets, since the point «•!" attack had not yet 

been developcMl, my aid(wle-cami), Cajttain 11. L. P. ]\iiig, \oInnteered to goto 

VOL. in. 7. 


the river and collect information by personal observation, and I consented to 
his going, but did not send him. He rode off, and in about two hours returned, 
reporting that he had ridden down Deep Run as far as he could go in safety 
on horseback, and, dismounting and concealing his horse, had gone on foot 
down the run to its mouth, and from there he had watched the enemy cross- 
ing the river on two bridges. One or two hundred yards below the mouth of 
the I'un large bodies of infantry, artillery, and some cavalry had crossed, 
while heavy forces on the opposite side were waiting their turn to cross. On 
his return he had gone into a two-story wooden dwelling on the banks of the 
river, and had taken a leisurely view of the whole surroundings, confirming 
his observations taken from the mouth of Deep Run. This was a daring 
reconnoissance, as, at the time, none of our troops were within a mile of him. 
Up to this time the enemy had not shown us any very large body of troops, 
either in Fredericksburg, on the opposite side, or below. 

On the 13th, during the early morning, a thick fog enveloped the town in 
my front and the valley of the river, but between 9 and 10 o'clock it lifted, 
and we could see on our right, below Deep Run, long lines of the enemy 
stretching down the river, and near it, but not in motion. Reconnoitering 
parties on horseback were examining the grounds in front of our army, coming 
within range without being fired on. After they retired a strong body of 
infantry advanced from a point on the river somewhat below my extreme 
right, as if to gain possession of the Bernard woods, but I had seven rifle- 
guns on the hill above those woods to meet this very contingency, and these 
opening on this advancing body, it fell back to the river before coming 
within reach of Barksdale. 

As the fog lifted higher an immense column of infantry could be seen 
halted on the other side of the river, along the road leading from the hills 
beyond to the pontoon-bridges in front of the town, and extending back for 
miles, as it looked to us, and still we could not see the end. In Jackson's front 
the enemy had advanced, and their forming lines were plainly visible, while in 
Longstreet's front we could see no body of troops on the Fredericksburg side 
of the river. The indications were that Jackson was to receive the first blow, 
and General Longstreet came to me and said he was going over to that flank. 
I called his attention to the immense column of troops opposite us, on the 
other side of the river, with its head at the pontoon-bridges, crossing to 
Fredericksburg in our immediate front, and told him that in my judgment 
the most desperate assault was to be made on his front, and it would Ije 
developed close to us, without our knowing that it was forming, nor would we 
know when it commenced to move against us; that the assault would be 
sudden and we should be ready to meet it, acd that there wei-e certainly as 
many of the enemy in that column threatening us as appeared in the lines 
opposite General Jackson. General Longsti'cet agreed with me, and remained. 

Not long after, the grand division of General Franklin, in plain view from 
where we stood, was seen advancing in two lines against Jackson's front, 
marching in most magnificent order. No perceptible check could I observe 
in the advance, and the first line in good order entered the woods and was 


lost to our view. But the immediate crash of musketry and the thunder of 
artillery told of a desperate conflict, and we waited anxiously for some sign of 
the result. Soon masses of the enemy were seen emerging from the woods in 
retreat, and the whole body of the enemy marched back in the direction they 
came from, in excellent order, and very deliberately. Now began the trial 
against Longstreet's lines; but our confidence in our ability to resist all 
assaults against us had been wonderfully increased by seeing the rei)ulse of 

My line of defense was a broken one, running from the left along the 
sunken road, near the foot of Marye's Hill, where General Cobb's brigade 
(less the 16th Georgia) was stationed. During the 12th the defenses of this 
line had been extended beyond the hill by an embankment thrown up to pro- 
tect the right from sharp-shooters, as also to resist assaults that might be 
made from that direction, and then the line was retired a hundred or more 
yards to the foot of the hills in the rear, along which was extended Kershaw's 
brigade of South Carolina troops, and General Barksdale's Mississipijians, 
from left to right, the brigade of General Semmes being held in reserve. The 
Washington Artillery, under Colonel Walton, were in position on the crest of 
Marye's Hill over the heads of Cobb's men [see p. 97], and two brigades 
under General Ransom were held here in reserve. The heights above Kershaw 
and Barksdale were crowned with 18 rifle-guns and 8 smooth-bores belonging 
to batteries, and a number of smooth-bores from the reserve artillery. The 
troops could not be well seen by the enemy, and the artillery on my rear 
line was mostly concealed, some covered with brush. The enemy, from theu* 
position, could not see the sunken road, near the foot of Marye's Hill, nor do I 
think they were aware, until it was made known to them by our fire, that 
there was an infantry force anywhere except on top of the hill, as Ransom's 
troops could be seen there, in reserve, and the men in the sunken road were 
visible at a short distance only. 

Soon after 11 a. m. the enemy approached the left of my line by the Tele- 
gi-aph road, and, deploying to my right, came forward and planted guidons 
or standards (whether to mark their advance or to aid in the alignment I do 
not know), and commenced firing ; but the fire from our artillery, and espe- 
cially the infantry fire from Cobb's brigade, so thinned their ranks that tlie 
line retreated without advancing, leaving their guidons phinted. Soon an- 
other force, heavier than tlie first, advanced, and were driven l)ack with great 
slaughter. They were met on retiring by reenforcements, and advanced 
again, but were again repulsed, with great loss. This continued until about 
1 V. M., when General Cobb reported to me that he was sliort of ;immu- 
nitioii. I sent his own very intelligent and brave conrici-, little -lolinny 
Clark, from Augusta, Georgia, to bring up his ordnance sui)])lies, and directed 
General Kei'shaw to reenforce General Cobb with two of his South Carolina 
regiments, and I also sent the IGth Georgia, which had been detached, to 
report to General Cobb. A few minutes after these ord(M-s had been given I 
received a note from General Cobb, informing me that General R. H. Anders(Ui, 
whose division was posted on the left and rear of Cobb's, had just told him 


that if the attack was tui-ned on him he would retire his troops to the hills 
in their rear. As this would leave my troops in the sunken road with their 
left flank unprotected, and at the mercy of the enemy, should they come up 
on my left, I went over to Greneral Longstreet and represented to him that if 
this were done I would have to provide in some other way for the protection 
of the troops in the sunken road, or move them out, so soon as there was a 

lull in the attack, which would be vir- 
tually giving up the defense of Marye's 
Hill. General Longstreet at once or- 
dered General Pickett to reenforce 
Anderson, and directed Anderson to 
hold his position until forced back. I 
then went over and examined the 
ground where Anderson's force was on 
my left, and finding that the prepa- 
rations for defense made to resist an 
^^^ _ assault were incomplete and inconsid- 

♦ ^T- erable, I thought it best to take meas- 

^ ^ I w^ ^ ^ ures to protect my own flank with 

I* - _ ^^ my own troops, and therefore directed 

General Kershaw to take his brigade, 


FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. , ,-, ^ 1 /^ 1 1 i T 1 

strengthen General Cobb's line be- 
neath the hill, to hold the rest of his command on top of the hill, to the left 
of Cobb's line, to meet emergencies, and especiall}^ to hold in check, or aid 
in repelling, any force coming on Cobb's flank, until the force in the sunken 
road could be withdrawn by the right flank ^ the only chance it would have 
of retiring without very heavy loss. I then tore a leaf from my memoran- 
dum-book and wrote to General Cobb, " General : Hold your position, witli 
no fear of your flank, it will be protected," and handing it to Captain King, 
my aide-de-camp, told him to carry it to General Cobb, and to inform him 
that both ammunition and reenforcements were on the way.j General Ker- 
shaw at once moved his brigade as ordered, but while it was in motion a 
courier came from General Cobb and informed me that the general was des- 
perately wounded. General Kershaw was directed to go at once and take 
command of the force at the foot of Marye's Hill. 

Kershaw doubled his 2d and 8th regiments on Phillips's Legion and 24th 
Georgia, commanded by Colonel McMillan, who succeeded General Cobb in 
command of the brigade, leaving the 3d and 7th South Carolina on the hill, 
and holding the 15th, Colonel l)e Saussure, in reserve. His 3d Battalion was 
])osted on the right at Tlowison's mill to repulse any attack up Hazel Run, and 
the l()tli (Sreorgia was doubled on the right of Col)b's brigade in the road. The 
3d and 7th South Carolina suffered severely while getting into position, Colonel 
Nance, Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford, Major Maffett, Captains P. Todd and 

^ This was the last I saw of Captaiu King until we found this gallant officei-'s body, after 
the battle. — L. McL. 



John C. Summer being shot down. Summer was killed. The 2d and 8th 
arrived just in time to resist a heavy assault made on the left about 2:45 p. m., 
and all of these reenforcements were opportune. The enemy, then deploy- 
ing in a ravine about three hundred yards from the stone-wall, advanced with 
fresh lines of attack at short intervals, but were always di'iven back with 
great loss. This was kept up until about 4:30 p. m., when the assaults ceased 
for a time ; but the enemy, posting artillery on the left of the Telegraph road, 
opened on our position ; however, they did no damage worth particularizing. 

The batteries on Marye's Hill were at this time silent, having exhausted 
their ammunition, and were being relieved by gans from Colonel E. P. Alex- 
ander's battalion. Taking advantage of this lull in the conflict, the 15tli 
South Carolina was brought forward from the cemetery, where it had been 
in reserve, and was posted behind the stone-wall, supporting the 2d South 
Carolina regiment. 

The enemy in the meanwhile formed a strong column of lines of attack, 
and advancing under cover of their own artillery, and no longer impeded by 
ours, came forward along our whole front in the most determined manner ; 
but by this time, as just explained, I had lines four deep throughout the 
whole sunken road, and beyond the right flank. The front rank, firing, 
stepped back, and the next in rear took its place and, after firing, was 
replaced by the next, and so on in rotation. In this way the volley fi]-ing 
was made nearly continuous, and the file firing very destructive. The enemy 
were repulsed at all points. 

The last charge was made after sundown — in fact, it was already dark in 
the valley. A Federal officer who was in that assault told me that the first 
discharge at them was a volley, and the bullets went over their heads " in 
sheets," and that his command was ordered to lie down, and did lie down for a 
full half-hour and then retired, leaving a large number of killed and wounded. 
The firing ceased as darkness increased, and about 7 p. m. the pickets of the 
opposing forces were posted within a short distance of each other, my pickets 
reporting noises as of movements of large bodies of troops in the city. 

Thus ended the battle. The enemy remained in possession of the city until 
the night of the 15th, and then retired across the Rappahannock, resuming 
their former positions, and Kershaw's brigade of my di\'ision re-occupied 
the city. My loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 853 ; of which number 
67 were missing, 62 being from Barksdale's brigade, 100 of the 853 being 
killed. Over 200 of the number were killed or disabled in Kershaw's conunaiid 
while taking positions to defend my left flank. 

There was a ravine in my front, distant between 200 or 300 yards, where 
large masses of the enemy were constantly deployed, and they controlled the 
slope of Marye's Hill, so that it would have been a hazardous feat, even for 
a dog, to have attempted to run down it; and yet a Georgia boy named 
Crumley, an orderly of Genei-al Kershaw's, fliiding that the general had no 
use for his horse in the sunken rond, or thi?d<ing that it was no place for a 
fine animal, deliberately rode him up that slope without injury either to the 
horse or to himself, — and going back to his camp, returned with an inferior 



horse, rode down the slope unscathed, and joined his chief, who, until his 
return, was ignorant of Crumley's daring feat. 

General Cobb, who was wounded by a musket-ball in the calf of the leg, ^ 
died shortly after he was removed to the field-hospital in rear of the division. 
He and I were on intimate terms, and I had learned to esteem him warmly, 
as I beheve every one did who came to know his great intellect and his 
good heart. Like Stonewall Jackson, he was a reUgious enthusiast, and, 
being firmly convinced that the South was right, believed that God woiild 
give us visible sign that Providence was with us, and daily prayed for His 
interposition in our behalf. 

% The statement in the text is made on the authority of Surgeon Todd, of Cobb's brigade, who says 
he saw the wound, and I am assured that General Cobb received all possible attention, and that every- 
thing that skill could do was done to save his life. — L. McL. 



IN "The Century" magazine for August, 1886, 
General James Lougstveet published what he 
" saw of the battle of Fredericksburg, Va., Decem- 
ber 13th, 1862." [See p. 70.] 

The omissions in that article were so glaring, and 
did such injustice, that I wrote to him and re- 
quested him to correct what would produce false 
impressions. His answer was unsatisfactory, but 
promised that, " I [Longstreet] expect in the near 
future to make accounts of all battles and put them 
in shape, in a form not limited by words, but with 
full details, when there will be opportunity to 
elaborate upon all points of interest." 

General Lee, in his report of the battle of Fred- 
ericksburg, December 13th, 1862, writes as fol- 
lows : 

..." Longstreet's corps constituted our left, with 
Audersou's division resting upon the river, aud those 
of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood cxtciuling to the righr in 
the order named. RiuiHomV division supported the bat- 
teries on Marye's and Willis's hills, at the foot of wliich 
Cobb's l)rigad(- of McLaws's divisinu and tlif ittli North 
Carolinaof Kansoiu's brigade were stationed, protected 
by a stonewall. Tlie hnincdialc cure of litis )Ktint Wds 
commuted to General Ransom." 

The italics in this paper are all mine. The 
positions are stated by General Lee exactly as 
the troops were posted. Lee's report continues 
farther on : 

..." About 11 A. M., having massed hie [the en- 
emy's] troops under cover of the houses of Fredericks- 
burg, ho moved forward in strong cobimns to seize 
Marye's and Willis's liills. General Ransom advanced 
Cooke's brigade to the top of the hill, ami placed his 
own, with the exception of the 24th North Carolina, a 
short distance in rear." . . . "In the third as- 
sault," his report continues, "the brave and lamented 
Brigiulier-General Thomas R. R. Cobb fell at the head of 
his gallant troops, and almost at the same monn^nt 
Brigadier-General Cooke was borne from the tlcld 
severely wounded. Fearing that Cobb's brigade might 
exhaust its ammuiiithm, General Longstreet had di- 
rected General Kershaw to take two regiments to its 
support. Arriving after the fall of Cobb, ho assumed 

command, his troops taking position on the crest and at 
the foot of the hill, to jp/iich point General Ransom also 
advanced three other regiments." 

General Kershaw took command of Cobb's bri- 
gade, which I had had supplied with ammunition 
from my wagons, and I repeated the supply during 
the day. 
General Longstreet, in his official report, says : 
. . . " GeneralRansom on Marye's Hill was cJiarged 
u^ith the immediate care of the point attacJ^ed, with orders 
to send forward additional reenforcements if it should 
become necessary, and to use Featherston's brigade of 
Anderson's division if he should require it." And con- 
tinuing, "I directed Major-General Pickett to send me 
two of his brigades : one, Kemper's, teas sent to General 
Ransom to be placed in some secure position to be ready 
in case it should be wanted." And again, " I would also 
mention, as particularl.\ distinguished in the engage- 
ment of the 13th, Brii^adier-CJcnerals Ransom, Kershaw, 
and Cooke (severely wounded)." 

General McLaws was not upon the part of the 
field in the vicinity of Marye's and Willis's hills 
during the battle, but his aide, Captain King, was 
killed on the front slope of the hill near Marye's 

My own permanent command was a small divis- 
ion of two brigades of infantry, — my own, con- 
taining the 24th, 25th, 35th, and 49th; and 
Cooke's, the 15th, 27th, 46th, and 48th regi- 
ments, — all from North Carolina ; and attached to 
my brigade was Branch's battery, and to Cooke's 
brigade the battery of Cooper, 

At the time the fog began to lift from the iield, I 
was with Generals Lee and Longstreet on what has 
since been known as Lee's Hill. Starting to join 
my command as the Federals began to emerge 
from the town, General Longstreet said to me : 
" Remember, General, I place that salient in your 
keeping. Do what is needed ; and call on Ander- 
son if you want help." 

I brought up Cooke before the first assault to 
the crest of the hill, and before that assault 



ended Cooke took the 27th and the 4Gth and part 
of the 15th North Carolina into the sunken road 
in front. The iSth North Carolina fought on top 
of the hill all day. 

At the third assault I brought up the 25th North 
Carolina just in time to deliver a few deadly vol- 
leys, and then it " took position shoulder to shoul- 
der with Cobb's and Cooke's men in the road." 

During this third attack Genei-al Cobb was mor- 
tallj' hit, and almost at the same instant, and 
within two paces of him, General Cooke was se- 
verely wounded and borne from the field, Colonel 
E. D. Hall, 46th North Carolina, assuming com- 
mand of Cooke's brigade. 

At this juncture I sent my adjutant-general, 
Captain Thomas Rowland, to the sunken road to 
learn the condition of affairs. "His report was 
most gratifying, representing the troops in fine 
spirits and an abundance of ammimition. I had 
ordered Cobb's brigade supplied from my wagons." 

After this tliird attack I was bringing up the 
35th and 49th North Carolina of my brigade, when 
General Kershaw, by a new road leading from the 
mill below, came up on horseback with his staff at 
the head of one regiment, which he took in just at 
Marye's house. He was followed by a second regi- 
ment, which halted behind a brick-walled gi-ave- 
yard upon Willis's Hill. [See below.] 

About sundown Brigadier-General Kemper was 
brought up, and relieved the 24th North Carolina 
with two of his regiments and held the others in 
closer supporting distance. On the 20th of Decem- 
ber, 1862, he sent me a list of his casualties, with 
this note : 

"Headquarters, Kemper's Brigade, 
" Dpceiuber 20th, 1862. 

" General : I inclose heremth the statement of the 
losses of ray brigade on the 13th and 14th lust, while 
acting as part of your command. While a report of my 
losses has been called for by my permanent division 
commander, and rendered to him, it has occmn-ed to me 
that a similar one rendered to yourself would be proper 
and acceptable. Permit me to add, General, that our 

brief .service with you was deeply gratifying to myself 
and to my entire command. I have the honor to be, 
General, very respectfully, yom- obedient servant, 

" J. L. Kemper, Brigadier-General. 
" Brig.-Gen. Ransom, Commanding Division." 

As stated in my letter to General Longstreet 
dated August 14th, 1886, when I brought to his 
attention his extraordinary omissions, it gave me 
unfeigned pleasure to mention properly in my offi- 
cial i-eport the meritorious conduct of those who 
were a part of my permanent command and those 
others who that day fell under my direction by 
reason of my " immediate care of the point attacked." 
My official report exhibits no self-seeking nor par- 
tial discriminations. 

Upon a letter from me (of the 17th of Decem- 
ber, 1862) to General R. H. Chilton, assistant ad- 
jutant-general Army of Northern Virginia, wherein 
I protest against the ignoring of my command in 
some telegraijhic dispatches to the War Depart- 
ment at Richmond relative to the battle of the 1 3th, 
General Longstreet indorses these words: ''Gen- 
eral Ransom^s division teas engaged throughout the 
battle and was quite as distinguished as an;/ troops 
upon the field" ; and the same day, the 19th of De- 
cember, I received from both him and General 
Chilton notes expressing the regret felt by General 
Lee at the injustice of which I complained. Those 
original letters are now among the " Official Rec- 
ords " in Washington. 

I may be pardoned for remembering with pride 
that among the Confederate troops engaged on the 
whole battle-field of Fredericksburg, Va., Decem- 
ber 13th, 1862, none were more honorably dis- 
tinguished than the sons of North Carolina, and 
tiiose of them who, with brother soldiers from 
other States, held the lines at Marye's Hill against 
almost ten times their number of as brave and 
determined foes as ever did battle, can well trust 
their fame to history when written from truthful 
official records. | 

I Where credit Is not given for quotations, they are from my official report of the battlo.- 


GENERAL J. B. Kershaw writes to the editors 
as follows, December 6th, 1887: 

" General Ransom's letter, in ' The Century ' for De- 
cember, 1887, in regard to his services at Fredericks- 
burg, contains an error in relation to the operations of 
my brigade. In the morning of that day, my troops 
wt'ic sfatioiifd at the footof Lee's Hill. After the as- 
Riiiilts on (icMKTiil ('obl)'s position had connnenccd, I was 
ilircctcd to send two of my regiments to rcf'nforcc Cobb, 
and (li<l so. lictoi-c^ they had reached liini, tidinirs ar- 
rived of tlie fall of (ioneral Cobb, and I wasininiediately 
ordered to take t lie rest of my brigade to the position 
held by his forces, and assiini(> eonniiand of tlie troops 
of MeLaws's division there. I preceded my troops, and 
as soon as possil)h' arrived at the Stevens House at the 
foot of Marye's Hill. As my brigade arrived they were 
placed — two regiments, the 3d and the 7th South Caro- 

lina, at Marye's House on the hill, and the rest of them In 
the sunken road, with the left resting about the Stevens 
House. The last regiment that arrived was the L-jth 
South Carolina (Colonel De Saussure'si. He sheltered 
his command behind the cemetery on the hill until his 
prop<'r position was made known, when he moved delib- 
erately and in perfect order down the road to the Stevens 
House, and proceeded to the right of my line. Instead 
of having two regiments engaged at that point, as (ien- 
eral Hansom supposes, I had Hve regiments and a bat- 
talion (my entire brigade), eai-h of which suffered more 
or less severely. During these operations I received no 
orders or directions from any officer but my division 
commander, (General I recpiestod not to bo 
relieved tliat night, and remained in that position until 
the evacuation of Fredericksburg by the Union forces. 
These facts were officially reported iit the time, and were 
then too well known to be the subject of ndstake." 





ON the night of the 10th of December we, of the 
New Orleans Washington Artillery, sat up late 
in our camp on Marye's Heights, entertaining some 
visitors in an improvised theater, smoking our 
pipes, and talking of home. A final punch having 
been brewed and disposed of, everybody crept 
under the blankets and was soon in the land of 
Nod. ' In an hour or two we were aroused by the 
report of a heavy gun. I was up in an instant, for 
if there should be another it would be the signal 
that the enemy was preparing to cross the river. 
Mr. Florence, a civilian in the bivouac, bounced 
as if he had a concealed spring under his blanket, 
and cried out, " Wake up ! wake up ! what's that ? " 
The deep roar of the second gun was heard, and we 
knew wliat we had to do. It was 4 o'clock. Our 
orders were that upon the firing of these signal 
guus we should at once take our places in the 
redoubts prepared for us on Marye's Hill, and 
await developments. "Boots and saddles" was 
sounded, and the camp was instantly astir, and in 
the gray of the morning we were on the Plank road 
leading to the hill. The position reached, our nine 
guns were placed as follows: Two 12-pounder 
howitzers and two 12-pounder light Napoleon 
guns of the 4th Company, under Captain Eshle- 
man and Lieutenants Norcom and Battles, were 
put in the work on the extreme right of the line 
next to the Telegraph road ; two 12-poimder 
Napoleon guns of the 3d Company, under Cap- 
tain Miller and Lieutenant McElroy, in the center; 
two 3-inch rifle-gims of the 1st Company, under 
Captain Squires and Lieutenant Brown, on the left, 
next to a little brick-house and in fi-ont of the Wel- 
ford graveyard, and one 10-pounder PaiTott rifle, 
under Lieutenant Galbraith, of the 1st Company, 
next to the Plank road leading into Fredericksburg. 

The 2d Company, mider Captain Richardson, 
with four Napoleon guns, moved on across the 
Telegraph road to the right, and reported as 
ordered to General Pickett for service with his 
troops. Without delay the men made the re- 
doubts as snug as possible, and finding the epaide- 
ments not to their liking, went to work with 
pick and shovel throwing tlie dirt a little higher, 
and fashioning embrasures to fire thi'ough. The 
engineers objected, and said they were "ruining 
the works," but the cannoneers said, "We have 
to fight here, not you ; we will arrange them to 
suit ourselves." AtkI General Longstreet approv- 
ingly said, "If you save tlio finger of a man's 
liand, that does some good." A dense fog covered 
the country, and we could not discern what was 
going on in tlie town. 

Tlic morning of the 1 2th was also foggy, and it 
was not until 2 i>. m. tliat it cleared ofl", and tliiMi 
w(> could sec tlie Staff"ord Hoiglits, across the river, 
densely packed with troops. At 3 P. M. a lieavy 
column moved down toward one of the bridges 
near tlie gas-works, and we opeiiod upon it, mak- 
ing soni(> sph'iulid practice and apiiarcntly stirring 
tlicin u]) ])ro(ligi()usly, for thoy soon sougiit cooler 
localities. While our guns were tiring, the enemy's 

long range batteries on the Stafford Heights opened 
upon us, as much as to say, "What are you about 
over there ? " We paid no attention to theii- in- 
quiry, as our guns could not reach them. 

At dawn the next morning, December 13th, in 
the fresh and nipping air, I stepped upon the 
gallery overlooking the heights back of the little 
old-fashioned town of Fredericksburg. Heavy 
fog and mist hid the whole plain between the 
heights and the Rappahannock, but under cover 
of that fog and within easy cannon-shot lay Burn- 
side's army. Along the heights, to the right and 
left of where I was standing, extending a length 
of nearly five miles, lay Lee's army. The bugles 
and the drum corps of the respective armies were 
now sounding reveille, and the troops were pre- 
paring for their early meal. All knew we should 
have a battle to-day and a great one, for the en- 
emy had crossed the river in immense force, upon 
his pontoons during the night. On the Confeder- 
ate side all was ready, and the shock was awaited 
with stubborn resolution. Last night we had 
spread our blankets upon the bare floor in the par- 
lor of Marye's house, and now om- breakfast was 
being prepared in its fire-place, and we were im- 
patient to have it over. After hastily dispatching 
this light meal of bacon and corn-bread, the 
colonel, chief bugler, and I (tlie adjutant of the 
battalion) mounted our horses and rode out to in- 
spect our lines. Visiting first the position of the 
10-pounder Parrott rifle on the Plank road, we 
found Galbraith and his boj's wide-awake and ready 
for business. Across the Plank road, in an earth- 
work, was the battery of Donaldsonville Can- 
noneers, of Louisiana, all Creoles and gallant 
soldiers. Riding to the rear of Marye's house, we 
visited in turn the redoubts of Squires, Miller, and 
Eshleman, and found everything ready for instant 
action. The ammunition chests had been taken off 
the limbers and placed upon the ground behind the 
traverses close to the guns. The horses and lijiibers 
had been sent to the rear out of danger. We drew 
rein and spoke a few words to each in passing, and 
at the 3d Company's redoubt we were invited by 
Sergeant " Billy " Ellis to partake of some "caf6 
noir'' which his mess had prejiared in a horse 
bucket. Nothing loath, we drank :i tin-cupfnl, and 
found, not exactly "Mocha," or "Java," but the 
best of parched corn. However, it was liot, the 
morning was raw, and it did very well. 

At 12 o'clock the fog had cleared, and wliile we 
were sittingin Marye's yard smokiiigour]>ipes, after 
a lunch of luird crackers, a courier came to Colonel 
Walton, bearing a dispatch from General Long- 
street for General Cobb, but, for our information as 
well, to be read and tluMi given to liiin. It was as 
follows: " Should General ,\nderson, on'your left, 
be compelled to fall back to tlie second line of 
lieights, j'ou must conform to his nioven'eiits." 
Des<'en(ling the hill into tlie sunken road. I maile 
my way through the troojjs. to a little house where 
General Cobb had his headquarters, and handed 
him the dispatch. He rea.l it carefully, and said. 




"Well! if they wait for me to fall back, they will 
wait a long time." Hardly had he spoken, when 
a brisk skirmish fire was heard in front, toward 
the town, and looking over the stone-wall we saw 
our skirmishers falling back, firing as they came ; 
at the same time the head of a Federal column 
was seen emerging from one of the streets of the 
town. They came on at the double-quick, with 
loud cries of " Hi ! Hi ! Hi ! " which we could dis- 
tinctly hear. Their arms were carried at "right 
shoulder shift," and their colors were aslant the 
shoulders of the color-sergeants. They crossed the 
canal at the bridge, and getting behind the bank to 
the low ground to deploy, were almost concealed 
from our sight. It was 12:30 P. M., and it was 
evident that we were now going to have it hot and 

The enemy, having deployed, now showed him- 
self above the crest of the ridge and advanced in 
columns of brigades, and at once our guns began 
their deadly work with shell and solid shot. How 
beautifully tliey came on ! Their bright bayonets 
glistening in the sunlight made the line look like 
a huge sei-pent of blue and steel. The very force 
of their onset leveled the broad fences bounding 
the small fields and gardens that interspersed the 
plain. We could see our shells bursting in their 
ranks, making great gaps; but on they came, as 
though they would go straight through and over 
us. Now we gave them canister, and tliat staggered 

them. A few more paces onward and the 
Georgians in the road below us rose up, 
and, glancing an instant along their rifle 
barrels, let loose a storm of lead into the 
faces of the advance brigade. This was 
too much ; the column hesitated, and then, 
turning, took refuge behind the bank. 
But another line appeared from behind 
the crest and advanced gallantly, and 
again we opened om* guns upon them, 
and through the smoke we could discei'n 
the red breeches of the "Zouaves," and 
hammered away at them especially. But 
this advance, like the preceding one, al- 
though passing the point reached by the 
first column, and doing and daring all 
that brave men could do, recoiled under 
our canister and the bullets of the infan- 
try in the road, and fell back in great con- 
fusion. Spotting the fields in our front, 
we could detect little patches of blue — 
the dead and wounded of the Federal 
infantry who had fallen facing the very 
muzzles of our guns. Cooke's brigade 
of Ransom's division was now placed in 
the sunken road with Cobb's men. At 
2 P. M. other columns of the enemy left 
the crest and advanced to the attack; it 
appeared to us that there was no end of 
them. On they came in beautiful array^ 
and seemingly more 'determined to hold 
the plain than before ; but our fire was 
murderous, and no troops on earth could 
stand the feu d'cnfcr we were giving 
them. In the foremost line we distin- 
guished the green flag with the golden 
harp of old Ireland, and we knew it to be Meag- 
her's Irish brigade. The gunners of the two rifle- 
pieces, Corporals Payne and Hardie, were directed 
to turn their guns against this column ; but 
the gallant enemy pushed on beyond all former 
charges, and fought and left their dead within five 
and twenty paces of the sunken road. Our position 
on the hill was now a hot one, and three regiments 
of Ransom's brigade were ordered up to reenforce 
the infantry in the road. We watched them as 
they came marching in line of battle from the rear, 
where they had been lying in reserve. They 
passed through our works and rushed down the hill 
with loud yells, and then stood shoulder to shoulder 
with the Georgians. The 25th North Carolina 
regiment, crossing Miller's guns, halted upon the 
crest of the hill, dressed its line, and fired a deadly 
volley at the enemy at close range, and then at the 
command "Forward! " dashed down, the hill. It 
left dead men on Miller's redoubt, and he had to 
drag them away from the muzzles of his guns. At 
this time General Cobb fell mortally wounded, and 
General Cooke w^as borne from the field, also 
wounded. Among other missiles a 3-inch rifle-ball 
came crashing through the works and fell at our 
feet. Kursheedt picked it up and said, "Boys, 
let's send this back to them again"; and into the 
gun it went, and was sped back into the dense 
ranks of the enemy. 

General Kershaw now advanced from the rear 



with two regiments of his infantry, to reenforce 
the men in the sunken road, who were running 
short of ammunition, and to take command. 

The sharp-shooters having got range of our em- 
brasures, we began to suffer. Corporal Kuggles 
fell mortally wounded, and Pei-ry, who seized the 
rammer as it fell from Ruggles's hand, received a 
bullet in the arm. Eodd was holding "vent," and 
away went his " crazy bone." In quick succession 
Everett, liossiter, and Kursheedt were wounded. 
Falconer in passing in rear of the guns was struck 
behind the ear and fell dead. We were now so 
short-handed that cvciydiicwasin the work, officers 
and men putting tlicii- slmulilcrs to the wheels and 
running up the gnus after each recoil. The frozen 
ground had given way and was all slush and mud. 
We were compelled to call uj)on the infantry to help 
us at the guns. Eshleman crossed over fi'om the 
right to report his guns nearly out of ammunition ; 
the other officers reported the same. They were 
reduced to a few solid shot only. It was now 5 
o'clock, p. M., and there was a lull in the storm. 
The enemy did not seem inclined to renew his 
efforts, so our guns were withdrawn one by one, 
and the batteries of Woolfolk and Moody were 

The little whitewashed brick-house to the right of 
the redoubt we were in was so battered with bullets 
during the four hours and a half engagement that 
at the close it was transformed to a bright brick- 
dust red. An old cast-iron stove lay against tlie 

house, and as the bullets would strike it it would 
give forth the sound of "bing! bing!" with dif- 
ferent tones and variations. Dm-ing the hottest 
of the firing old Mr. Florence, our non-combatant 
friend, was peering around the end of the house 
(in which, by the way, our wounded took refuge), 
looking out to see if his son, who was at the gun, 
was all right. A cannon-ball struck the top of the 
work, scattering dirt all over us and profusely 
down our necks, and, striking tlie end of the house, 
carried away a cart-load of bricks, just where Mr. 
Florence had been looking an instant before. We 
thought surely he had met his fate, but in a mo- 
ment we were jjleased to see his gray head *'bob 
up serenely," determined to see * * what was the gage 
of the battle." 

After withdrawing from the liill the comnumd 
was placed in bivouac, and the men threw them- 
selves upon the ground to take a much-needed rest. 
We had been under the hottest fire men ever ex- 
perienced for four hours and a half, and our loss 
had been three killed and twenty-four wounded. 
Among them was Sergeant John Wood, our lead- 
ing spirit in camp theatricals, who was severely 
injured and never returned to duty. One gim was 
slightly disabled, and we had exhausted all of our 
canister, shell and case shot, and nearly every solid 
shot in our chests. At 5 : 80 another attack was 
made by the enemy, but it was easily repulsed, and 
the battle of Fredericksburg was over, and Burn- 
side was baffled and defeated. 





FREDERICKSBURG was the first great battle that 
I saw in its entire scope. Here the situation 
of the country — a champaign tract inclosed in 
hills — offered the opportunity of seeing the troops 
on both sides, and the movements down the entire 
lines. I witnessed the magnificent charges made 
on our left by Meagher's Irish Brigade, and was 
also a sorrowful witness of the death of our noble 
T. R. R. Cobb of Georgia, who fell mortally wounded 
at the foot of the stone-wall just at the door of Mrs. 
Martha Stevens. This woman, the Molly Pitcher 
of the war, attended the wounded and the dying 
fearless of consequences, and refused to leave her 
house, although, standing just between the advan- 
cing line of the enemy and the stone-wall, the posi- 
tion was one of danger. It is said that after using 
all tlio iii;itci-i;ils for bandages at her command, she 
tore tVoin her ]Mison most of her garments, even on 
that letter cold (hiy, in her anxiety to administer to 
necessities greater than her own. 

Mrs. Stevens still lives in her old home at the foot 
of Marye's Heights, honored by every Confederate 
soldier. Not long ago, hearing that she was very 
sick, I went out with a party of gentlemen friends 
who were visitors in Fredericksburg to inquire for 
her. Being told of our visit, she requested her son- 
in-law to ask me in. When jocularly asked by him 
if she was going to invite a gentleman into her 
sick-room, the old lady replied: "Yes, ask Major 
Mason in, — we were old soldiers together." 

After Burnside had witlidrawn liis forces across 
the Rappahannock, General Lee rode over to 
Marye's Heights, where I then was, and said to me: 
"Captain, those people [meaning the enemy] have 
sent over a flag of truce, asking permission to send 

a detachment to bury their dead. They have landed 
near yotu- house, ' The Sentry Box.' Have you any 
objection to taking this reply down ? " As he spoke, 
he handed me a sealed envelope directed to General 
Burnside. I accordingly rode into town and made 
my way down to the river-front of my residence, 
from which Burnside had only that morning re- 
moved his ijontoons. There I found a Federal 
lieutenant-colonel with two soldiers in a boat, 
holding a flag of triice. I handed him the dispatch 
and at the same time asked where Burnside was. 
He answered, "Just up the hill across the river, 
under an old persimmon-tree, awaiting the dis- 
patch." Telling him my name, I said: " Give my 
regards to General Burnside, and say to him that I 
thought he was too familiar with the surroundings 
of Fredericksburg to butt his brains out deliber- 
ately against our stone-walls." 

" Do you know General Burnside ? " inquired the 

"Oh, yes!" I replied, "he is an old acquaint- 
ance of mine." 

" Then will you wait till I deliver your message 
and return ? He may have something to say." 

" I will wait then," was my answer. 

In a very short time the flag of truce returned 
with a request from Burnside that I would come 
over in the boat to see him. I thoroughly appre- 
ciated the fact that I was running the risk of a 
court-martial from my own side in thus going into 
the enemy's lines without permission ; but being 
that rather privileged person, a staff-officer, from 
whom no pass was required and of whom no ques- 
tions were asked, I determined to accept this in- 
vitation and go over. 


After passing the river and walking leisurely up 
the hill, the idle Federal soldiers, seeing a Confed- . 
erate officer oJi their side and feeling curious 
ahout it, ran down in numbers toward the road. 
For the first time I was frightened by this result 
of my act, as I feared that our generals on the 
hills with their strong glasses, seeing the commo- 
tion, might inquire into it. As soon as I approached 
Burnside, who met me with the greatest cordiality, 
I expressed to him this fear. He at once sent out 
couriers to order the soldiers back to camji, and 
we then sat down on an old log, and being provided 
with crackers, cheese, sardines, and a bottle of 
■ brandy (all luxuries to a Confederate), we discussed 
this lunch as well as the situation. General Burn- 
side seemed terribly mortified and distressed at 
his failure, but said that he wanted me to tell his 
old army friends on the other side that he was not 
responsible for the attack on Fredericksburg in 
the manner in which it was made, as he was him- 
self under orders, and was not much more than a 
figure-head, or words to that effect. 

We talked pleasantly for au hour about old 
times, Burnside asking me many questions about 
former friends and comrades, now on our side of 
the fratricidal struggle. When I expressed my 
wish to return, he WTapped up a bottle of brandy 
to give me at parting, and sent me under escort to 
the river. Having recrossed, I mounted my horse 
and rode back to Marye's Heights, but, enjoyable 
as this escapade had been, I said nothing, of course, 
about it to my army friends till long afterward. 

That day I witnessed with pain the bui'ial of 
many thousands of Federal dead that had fallen 
at Fredericksburg. The night before, the ther- 
mometer must have fallen to zera, and the bodies 
of the slain had frozen to the ground. The ground 
was frozen nearly a foot deep, and it was necessary 
to use pick-axes. Trenches were dug on the battle- 
field and the dead collected and laid in line for 
burial. It was a sad sight to see these brave 
soldiers thrown into the trenches, without even a 
blanket or a word of prayer, and the heavy clods 
thrown upon them ; but the most sickening sight 
of all was when they threw the dead, some four or 
five hundred in number, into Wallace's empty ice- 
house, where they were found — a hecatomb of skel- 
etons — after the war. In 1865-66 some shrewd 

Yankee contractors obtained government sanction 
to disinter all the Federal dead on the battle-fields 
of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Wilder- 
ness, and Spotsylvania Court House. They were to 
be paid per capita. When I went out to see the 
skeletons taken from the ice-house, I fomid the con- 
tractor provided with unpainted boxes of common 
pine about six feet long and twelve inches wide ; 
but I soou saw that this scoundrel was dividing the 
remains so as to make as much by his contract as 
possible. I at once reported what I had seen to 
Colonel E. V. Sumner, Jr., then in command of the 
Sub-district of the Rappahannock. He was utterly 
shocked at this vandalism. I afterward heard that 
the contract was taken away from the fellow and 
given to more reliable parties. 

One morning about this time I was at breakfast, 
when the servant, terribly frightened, announced 
a sergeant and file of soldiers in my ijorch asking 
for me. The ladies immediately imagined that 
this squad had been sent to arrest me, as they had 
heard more than once that charges would be pre- 
ferred against me by the United States Govern- 
ment for extreme partisanship. Going to the door, 
I was told by the sergeant that Colonel Sumner 
had sent him to me to inquire as to the burial 
places of the Federal soldiers whom I had found 
dead iipon my lot and in my house after the battle 
of Fredericksburg. I told him that I had found 
one Federal soldier stretched on one of ray beds. 
In my parlor, lying on the floor, was another whose 
entire form left its imprint in blood on the floor, — 
as may be seen to this day. In my own cham- 
ber, sitting up in an old-fashioned easy-chair, I 
had found a Federal lieutenant-colonel. WTien I 
entered, I supposed him to be alive, as the back 
of his head was toward me. Much startled, I 
approached him, to find that he had been shot 
through the neck, and, probably, placed in that 
upright position that he might better breathe. He 
was quite dead. I had all these bodies, and five 
or six others found in my yard, buried in one grave 
on the wharf. They had been killed, no doubt, by 
Barksdale's Mississippi brigade, in tlieir retreat 
from my lot. I made my report at Sumner's head- 
quarters, after which I took the burial squad to 
the grave, and then returned home to quiet the 
apprehensions of my family. 





IN some former notes ^ I tried to trace with an 
impartial hand, and without intruding any prej- 
udice or opinion of my own, the course of the un- 
fortunate differences that had ai'isen between the 
Government and the commander of the Army of the 
Potomac. The acute stage was reached on the 
Peninsula ; Pope's campaign marked the first crisis. 
On the 1st of September McClelhm toiiiid liimself 
a general without an army. On the L'd the ( iovern- 
ment gave him what was left of two armies, and 
only asked him to defend the capital. On the 
nth the troops were in motion ; on the 7th, without 
another word, and thus, as appears probable, over- 
stepping the intentions of the Government, 3> he 
set out to meet Lee in Maryland; and, moving 
deliberately imder repeated cautions, ten days 
later he once more gi-appled fiercely with his 
antagonist, who stood waiting on the banks of 
the Antietam. Antietam strained the back of 
the Confederacy. 

^ " The Adruinistration in the Poniusular Campaign," 
Vol. II. of this work, p. 435 ; " Washinjfton under Banks," 
Vol. II. of this work, p. 541. 

% Ro(5 Vol. II., p. 542, and note. This is Btronf;l.y c.on- 
lirnicd hy Chase's diary, Scptenibera (Warden's" Life of 
C'liase,"!). .'->4i)) : "Tlie President repeated thai the whole 
Heoi)et)f the order was simply to direct Met 'lellan toput 
the troops iido the fortifications .and conunand them for 
the defense of Washini^fton." Septond)er 3d (Ibid., p. 460), 

the diary says : " . . . the President assin-ed 

lliin[Poi)e] . . . that McClellan's command was only 
temporary, and save him reason to expect tlnit another 
anuy of active operations would be orf,Muize(l at once 
which he fPopc] would lead." The same evening (Sep- 
tember 3d) the President gave General Halleck an order, 

Hardly had the echo of the guns died away than 
again the angry ink began to flow. To follow its 
track would here be as tedious and unnecessary as 
it must always be painful. The sullen stage of the 
disorder had been reached ; collapse was soon to fol- 
low. As one turns the pages of the history of the 
seven weeks after Antietam, or the scattered leaves 
that are some time to be gathered into history, it 
is impossible not to realize that we are reading of 
the last days of the first and best-loved commander 
of the Army of the Potomac ; that the last hour 
is not far off. 

Without going into the details, and without at- 
tempting to pass judgment, it must be said that no 
candid person, knowing anything of war and armies, 
can doubt that the Army of the Potomac, in the 
last days of September and early October, 18G2, 
needed nearly everything before beginning a fresh 
campaign of its own choice. For some things, such 
as shoes, the troops were really suffering. It is 

which never became known to General McClellan, "to 
organize an army for active operations . . . independ- 
ent of the forces ho may deem necessary for the de- 
fense of Washin.gton, when such active army shall 
take the field." (" Official Records," Vol. XIX., Part II., 
p. 169.) 

The published extracts from Chase's diary, though 
volunnnous in the earlier stages, are silent on the sub- 
ject of McClellan's final renmval. In Warden's "Life of 
Chase" (p. 506) we read: "Another chapter'^ ofi'ers a 
few words relating to our hero's responsibility for that 
fall," and the foot-note refei-s us to ""-Post Chapter 
LVII.," but not another word is said, and "Chapter 
LVI., Conclusion," ends the book. This is at least curi- 
ous, if not significant,— R. B. J. 




equally evident that the duty of providing these 
essential supplies rested with the administrative 
services in Washington ; that some of the supplies 
did not reach the troops for a long time, 4 and that 
certain subordinate chiefs were at least indulged in 
expending an amount of energy in combating the 
earnest representations that came poiu'ing in from 
the army on the field; that they, or some one, might 
well have been required to devote to the task of 
seeing that the supplies reached the troops who 
needed them, instead of resting content with per- 
functory declarations that the stores had "been 
sent." Nor can any commander of an anny be 
blamed for not liking this. The wonder is, that a 
railway journey of a few hours should have stood 
in the way of a complete understanding and swift 
remedy, on one side or the other. 

President Lincoln visited General MeClellan on 
the 1st of October, and went over the battle-fields 
of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and Antietam 
in his company. When the President left him on 
the 4th, General MeClellan appears to have been 
imder the impression that his military acts and 
plans were satisfactory. ^ What these plans were 
at this time, beyond the reorganizationandrefitting 
of his army, in the absence of direct evidence, one 
can but conjecture from a passage that occurs in 
a private letter dated October 2d, printed in " Mc- 
Clellan's Own Story" (p. 654). "His [the Presi- 
dent's] ostensible purpose is to see the troops and 
the battle-field ; I incline to think that the real 
purpose of his visit is to push on into a premature 
advance into Vii-ginia. . . . The real truth is 
that my army is not fit to advance." \ However, on 
the Gth, two days after Mr. Lincoln's departure, 
General Halleck telegraphed to General MeClellan : 

" The President directs that you croes the Potomac 
and give battle to the enemy or tlri\ e hira south. Your 
army must move now, while the roads are Rood. If you 
cross the river between the enemy and Washington and 
cover the latter by your operation, you can be reen- 
forced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the 
Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent 
to you. The President advises the interior line between 
Wiishingtou and the enemy, but does not order it. He is 
very desirous that your army move as soon as possible." 

General MeClellan at first selected the valley 
route, but the tardy delivery of supplies delayed 
his movement, and when he began crossing the 

4. In particular the statement of General Rufus lu- 
galls(" Official Records," Vol. XTX., Part I., p. 95) seems 
to lue concliiHivc, altliough tlio contrary view isstrouiily 
held by high aiitliority. K. B. I. 

^ " We spent some time on the battle-field and eon- 
versed fully on the state of affairs. He told me that ho 
was eutirely satisfied with me and with all that I had 
done; that ho would stand ))y me against 'all comers'; 
that he wished me to <'Outiuue my prejiaratioiis for a 
new eam|iiiign, not to stir an inch until fully ready, and 
when ready to do what \ tlionght l)est. He repealed that 
he was (entirely satisfied wifli me; that I should l)c let 
alone; that he would stand l>y me. 1 liaye no doubt he 
meant exactly what he said. He parted from me willi 
tile utmost cordiality. We never met again on tliis 
earfli." |" Mc( 'lellan's Own Story," pp. 027, f)2H.] 

"X President Lincoln's yiews as to tlie eomj>arative 
readiness to moye of t lie Federal and ConfedtM'ate armies 
may be found tersely e\]iressed in liis letter to (ieneral 
MeClellan, dated Oefolier i;!tli, mv2. printed on p. lOr.. 

^ Among otlier filings, Stuart crossed tlie I'otomac 

Potomac on the 2.'jth and advanced a few days 
later, the circumstances had somewhat changed. ■j;^ 
Then, leaving the Twelfth Corps to hold Harper's 
Ferry, he marched down the eastern side of the 
Blue Kidge, as the President had originally desired, 
picked up the Third and Eleventh corps and Bay- 
ard's division of cavalry on striking the railway 
opposite Thoroughfare Gap, and on the 5th of 
November made his headquarters at Kectortown, 
with all his arrangements in progress for concen- 
trating the army near Warrenton. 

This movement in eifect (although General Me- 
Clellan does not appear to have known it definitely 
until three days later) placed the Army of the 
Potomac, with a force double that of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, ) between the two halves of that 
army, farther separated by the Blue Kidge ; for Lee, 
with Longstreet's corps, had moved to Culpeper as 
soon as it was seen that MeClellan was advancing 
east of the Blue Eidge,^ and Jackson was still in 
the Shenandoah, distant several days' march. 

On that very day, November 5th, the President, 
with his own hand, wTote the following order: 44- 

"Executive Mansion, 
Washington, , 186 . 

" By direction of the President it is ordered that Major- 
General MeClellan be relieved from the command of the 
Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Bui nside 
take eonnuand of that army. Also that Major-(;enenil 
Hiniter take command of the corps in said army now 
commanded by General Buruside. 

"That Major-Geneial Fitz John Porter be relieved 
from the command of the corps he now commands in 
said array, and that Major-General Hooker take com- 
mand of said corps. 

" The general-in-chief is authorized, in [his] discretion, 
to issue an order substantially as tho above, forthwith 
or as soon as he may deem i)roper. 

"A. Lincoln. 

" November 5th, 1862." 

Forthwith the following orders were issued: 
"Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, November 5th, 1862. 
"Ma.jor-General McCi.ellan, Commanding, etc.— 
General : On receipt of the order of the President, seut 
herewith, you will immediately turn oyer your com- 
mand to MaJor-General Buruside, and repair to Trenton, 
N. .L, reporting, on your arrival at that place, by tele- 
graph, for further orders. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
"H. W. Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief." 

at Williamsport on the lOth of October, on his famous 
raid into Maryland and Pennsyhania, rode completely 
round the rear of the Army of the Potomac, and. eluding 
Phasonton's vigorous but iuellectual piu-suit, safely 
reerossed the river near the mouth of tlie Monocacy. 
One eflect of this raid on tlie mind of the President is 
indicated in an anecdote related in " Washington under 
Banks," VoL IL of this work. p. .'-.44.- R. B. I. 

) Tlie "Otlicial Kccoids" show that McCIellan's effe<-t- 
iye force was about 14.-..0<i;), Le.-'s about 72,(XHi. Long- 
street :ind .Tackson each had about :12,(KH».— R. B. I. 

;^ Lee's inders for Longstreet's moy<ntcnt are dated 
October 2Kth. The Army of the Potomac luulnot then 
tlnislied crossing the riy<M-.— R. B. I. 

Ult is yirfually certain that (i.iicral MeClellan ncyi-r 
saw this order, which, in the form as written l>y the 
President, was iieycr promulgated. G.neral Hunter 
was not placed in coniiiiand of Tiiirnsidc's corps. Hooker 
was ordered to iclicyc Porter by Special Orders from the 
War Deiiartnunt. AiUntant-GeHeral's Office, dated No- 
ycmber lOtli. l.Wi. 



This order was inclosed : 

" War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, 
Washington, November 5tli, 1862. 
"GENERAL Orders, No. 182: By direction of the 
President of tlie United States, it is ordered that Major- 
General McClellau be relieved from the command of the 
Army of the Potomac, and that Msyor-General Burnside 
take the command of that aiiuy. 

" By order of the Secretary of War : 


" Assistant Adjutant-General." 

If we except Halleck's report of October 28t]i, 
obviously called for and furnished as a record, 
and containing nothing new, no cause or reason 
was ever made public either officially or in any 
one of the many informal modes in which official 
action so often finds it convenient to let itself be 
known until the appearance in "The Century" 
majrazine for February, 1889, in which Messrs. 
Hay and Nicolay make it clear that the President 
had some time before made up his mind to remove 
MeClellan "if he should jiermit Lee to cross the 
Blue Ridge and place himself between Richmond 
and the Army of the Potomac." 

General C. P. Buckingham, the confidential assist- 
ant adjutant-general of the Secretary of War, bore 
these orders from Washington by a special train. 
He arrived atRectortown in a blinding snow-storm. 
First calling upon Burnside to deliver to him a 
counterpart of the order, late on the night of No- 
vember 7th these two officers proceeded together 
to General McClellan's tent. MeClellan says : ^ 

" I at once [when he heard of Buckingham's arrival] 
suspected that he brought the order relieving me from 
command, but kept my own counsel. Late at night I 
was sitting alone in my tent, writing to my wife. All 
the staff were asleep. Suddenly some one knocked 
upon the tent-pole, and upon my invitation to enter 
there appeared Burnside and Buckingham, both look- 
ing very solemn. I received them kindly and com- 
menced conversation upon general subjects in the most 
unconcerned manner possible. After a few moments 
Buckingham said to Burnside : ' Well, General, I think 

we had better tell General MeClellan the object of our 
visit.' I very pleasantly said that I should be glad to 
learn it. Whereupon Buckingham handed me the two 
orders of which he was the bearer. . . . 

"I saw that both — especially Buckingham — were 
watching me most intently while I opened and read the 
orders. I read the papers with a smile, immediately 
turned to Burnside, and said : ' Well, Burnside, I turn 
the command over to you.' " ^ 

The movements of troops that had already been 
begun were completed on the Sth and 9th, at Gen- 
eral Burnside's request; but there the execution 
of General McClellan's plans stopped. Burnside 
turned to the left and massed his army on the 
Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg; Lee 
conformed to this movement, called in Jackson, 
and concentrated on the opposite heights. The 
disaster of Fredericksburg followed. 

On the 10th MeClellan bade farewell to the 
Army of the Potomac. As he rode between the 
lines, formed almost of their own accord to do 
honor for the . last time to their beloved com- 
mander, grief and disappointment were on every 
face, and manly tears stood in many an eye that 
had learned to look on war without a tremor. 
In the simple, touching words of the gallant and 
accomplished Walker: "Every heart was filled 
with love and grief ; every voice was raised in 
shouts expressive of devotion and indignation ; 
and when the chief had passed out of sight, the 
romance of war was over for the Army of the 

Potomac." Jj' 

In all that these brave men did, in all that they 
suffered, and great were their deeds, unspeakable 
their sufferings, never, perhaps, were their devotion 
and loyalty more nobly proved than by their in- 
stant obedience to this order, unwisely wrung 
from the President as many of them believed it 
to have been, yet still for them, as American sol- 
diers, as American citizens, an implicit mandate. 
The men who coidd talk so glibly of "praetorian 
guards" knew little of the Army of the Potomac. 

i^ " McClellan's Own Story," pp. 652, 653. 

\ General Buckingham, in a letter printed in the 
" Cliicago Tribune," of September 4th, 1875 (quoted in the 
" History of the Civil War in America," by the Comte de 
Paris, Vol. II., p. 555), writes substantifilly to the same 
eflfect. He also states that General Burnside at first 
declined the command (as there is good reason for believ- 
ing he had done twice before, namely, in August, and 
again early in September). Ho adds: "General Me- 
Clellan has himself borne tcsfimony to the kind manner 
in which I communicated tlir urdcr, and I can bear 
testimony to his prompt and cheerful obedience to 
it."— R.B.I. 

^ "History of the Second Army Corps," by General 
Francis A. Walker, p. 137. 

From " McClcllini's Last Service to the P>cpublip," liy 
George Ticknor Cui'tis (N. Y. : D. Ai>ph1nn A- Co.), pp. 
81-83, we tnk(^ tlie following description of McClellan's 
farewell to the Army of the Potomac : 

"After he had readiort Warreiit.on, a day was spent in 
vi(^\vins tlio i)()sitioii of \\n\ tr()<)i)s and in cnnforeiices with 
(iciirtal I',uriisiili> icH)iC(tiii'r flit lire (ipcrations. In tlie 
course of tiKit ilay tlie order was ])ii))lislied, and 
Mc('lell:in issiiod a farewell address to the army. On the 
evening of Sunday, the 9th, there was an assembly of officers 
who came to take leave of liim. On the lOtli he visited some 
of the v.arioiia camps, and amid the iniiiassioned cries and 
demonstrations of the men lie tool; a last look of tlii> troops 
who had followed him with such luifalteriiiij; devotion. • His- 

tory,' lie said to the ofQcers who crowded around him — ' his- 
tory will do justice to the Army of the Potomac, even if the 
ju'esent generation does not. I feel as if I had been intimately 
connected \\ itli e:ieh and all of you. Nothing is more liinding 
than tlic fiiiiMlsliiii of companions in arms. Stay yon all in 
fntuie iiie.sei\c I he hish reputation of our army, and servo 
all as well ami f:iitlitiiriy as you have 8er\-ed me.' (Ju tlio 
11th, at Wariiiitiiii .) unction, he entered with liis staff a rail- 
road train that w ;is iilidiit to start toward Washington. Here 
there was stationed a detachment of 2000 troops. Tliey 
were drawn up in line, and a salute was fired. The men then 
broke their ranks, surrounded the car in wliich he was seated, 
uncoupled it from the train and ran it back, insisting wildl.v 
that he shcuild not leave them, and uttering the bitterest 
imprecations against those who had (le]irive<l them of their 
beloved comniamler. The scene has lieeii deseiilied to us liy 
an officei who was present as one of tearful excitement. The 
momeiil critical. One word, one look of encouragement, 
the liftiiii^dl :i liii-( r, would have been the signal forarevolt 
a.gainst law fiil aiitliority, the consequences of which no man 
can nn>asuTe. M<'Clell:in steiipeil upon the front ]»latform of 
the car, and there w;is instant sileiHc. His address was 
short. It ended in the memoralile woids, ' Stand liy General 
Burnside as ron have stood liy me, and all will lie well.' The 
soldiers were calmed. They rolled the caronward, recoupled 
itto the train, and with one lonp; and mnmnfiil huzza bade 
farewell to their late commander, whom many of them were 
destined never to behold again. General MeClellan reached 
Washington on the following dav, and without tarrying for 
an hour proceeded at once to Trenton, where he arrived at 
4 o'clock in the morning of the 12th. From that time he 
never again saw Lincoln, or Stanton, or Halleck." —EDITORS. 

V- - 





ON the evening of October 15th, 1862, a few days aftei' McClellan had phiced 
me in command of the Second Corps, then at Harper's Ferry, the com- 
manding general sent an order for Hancock to take his division the next 
morning on a reconnoissance toward Charlestown, about ten miles distant. 
The division started in good season, as directed. About 10 in the morning 
General McClellan reined up at my headquarters and asked me to go out 
with him to see what the troops were doing. Our people had met the enemy's 
outpost five miles from the Ferry, and while artillery shots were being 
exchanged, both of us dismounted, walked away by ourselves, and took seats 
on a ledge of rocks. After a little while McClellan sent to an aide for a map 
of Virginia. Spreading it before us, he pointed to the strategic features of the 
valley of the Shenandoah, and indicated the movements he intended to make, 
which would have the effect of compelling Lee to concentrate in the vicinity, 
I think, of Gordons ville or Charlottesville, where a great battle would ho 
fought. Continuing the conversation, he said, " But I may not have command 
of the army much longer. Lincoln is down on me," and, taking a paper from 
his pocket, he gave me my first intimation of the President'3 famous letter. ;J, 

J It is due to General Couch to state that, with 
limited time in which to prepare tliis paper, he 
dictated it to a stenoj^rapher in answer to ques- 
tions by the editors bearing cliiefiy on his personal 
recollections.— Editors. 

3^ Lincoln's letter is dated October 13th, 18r>2, 
and begins: " My Dear Sir,— You remember my* 
speaking to you of what I called your rtver-cautious- 
ness. Are you not over-cautious wlien you assunu^ 
that you cannot do what tho enemy is constantly 
VOL. III. 8. l( 

doing ? Sliould you not claim to be at least his equal 
in prowess, and act upon the claim f " Furtlier on 
tho President says: "Ciiange positions witli tlie 
enemy, and think you not he would break your 
communication with Richmond within the next 
twenty-four hours? You dread his going into 
Pennsylvania ; but if he does so in full force, he 
gives up his communication to you absolutely, 
and you have notiiiiig to do but to follow and ruin 
him. . . . Exclusive of the water-line, you aro 


He read it aloud very carefully, and when it was finished I told him I thought 
there was no ill-feeling in the tone of it. He thought there was, and 
quickly added, " Yes, Couch, I expect to be relieved from the Ai'my of the 
Potomac, and to have a command in the West ; and I am going to take three 
or four with me," calling off by their names four prominent officers. I 
queried if " so and so " would be taken along, naming one who was generally 
thought to be a great favorite with McClellan. His cm^t reply was, " No, I 
sha'n't have him." 

This brief conversation opened a new world for me. I had never before 
been to any extent his confidant, and I pondered whether on a change of the 
commanders of the Army of the Potomac the War Department would allow 
him to choose the generals whose names had been mentioned. I wondered 
what would be the future of himself and those who followed his fortunes in 
that untried field. These and a crowd of other kindred thoughts quite 
oppressed me for several days. But as the time wore on, and preparations 
for the invasion of Virginia were allowed to go on without let or hindrance 
from Washington, I naturally and gladly inferred that McClellan's fears of 
hostile working against him were groundless. However, the blow came, and 
soon enough. 

On the 8th of November, just at dark, I had dismounted, and, standing 
in the snow, was superintending the camp arrangements of my troops, 
when McClellan came up with his staff, accompanied by General Burn side. 
McClellan drew in his horse, and the first thing he said was : 

'' Couch, I am relieved from the command of the army, and Burnside is my 

I stepped up to him and took hold of his hand, and said, " General McClel- 
lan, I am sorry for it." Then, going around the head of his horse to Burnside, 
I said, " General Burnside, I congratulate you." 

Burnside heard what I said to General McClellan; he tui*ned away his head, 
and made a broad gesture as he exclaimed ; 

" Couch, don't say a word about it." 

His manner indicated that he did not wish to talk about the change ; that 
he thought it was not good policy to do so, nor the place to do it. He told me 
afterward that he did not like to take the command, but that he did so to 
keep it from going to somebody manifestly unfit for it. I assumed that he 
meant Hooker. Those of us who were well acquainted with Burnside knew 
that he was a brave, loyal man, but we did not think that he had the military 
ability to command the Army of the Potomac. 

McClellan took leave on the 10th. Fitz John Porter sent notes to the 
corps commanders, informing them that McClellan was going away, and 
suggesting that we ride about with him. Such a scene as that leave-taking 

now nearer Richmond than the enemy is, by the sen, McClurg & Company) Isaac N. Arnold makes 
route that you can and he 7nust take." And in President Lincoln say : " With all his failings as a 
conclusion: "It is all easy if our troops march as soldier, McClellan is a pleasant and scholarly gen- 
well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they tleman. He is an admirable engineer, but he 
cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order." seems to have a special talent for a stationary 
In his " Life of Abraham Lincoln " (Chicago : Jan- engine."— Editors. 



had never been known in our army. Men shed tears and there was great 
excitement among the troops. [See p. 104.] 

I think the soldiers had an idea that McClellan would take care of them, — 
would not put them in places where they would be unnecessarily cut up ; and 
if a general has the confidence of his men he is pretty strong. But officers 
and men were determined to serve Burnside loyally. 

A day or two afterward Burnside called the corps commanders together, 
mapped out a course that he intended to pursue ; and, among other things, he 
said that he intended to double the army corps, and he proposed to call the three 
new commands — or doubles — " grand divisions." Under this arrangement 
my corps, the Second, and Willcox's, the Ninth, which had been Burnside's, 
formed the Right Grand Division imder General Sumner. When Sum- 
ner and I arrived near Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, November 17th, 
we found the enemy in small force in readiness to oppose our crossing the 
Eappahannock. Everybody knew that Lee would rush right in ; we could see 
it. If the pontoons had been there, we might have crossed at once. [See p. 
121.] Yet we lay there nearly a month, while they were fortifying before our 
eyes ; besides, the weather was against us. Under date of December 7th, my 
diary contains this entry : " Very cold ; x^lenty of snow. Men suffering ; cold 
outdoors, ice indoors in my room." 

Sumner's headquarters were at the Lacy House, while the Second Corps lay 
back of the brow of the hill behind Falmouth. 

On the night of the 9th, two niglits before the crossing, Sumner called a 
council to discuss what we were to do, the corps, division, and bi-igade com- 
manders being present. The result was a plain, free talk all around, in whicli 
words were not minced, for the conversation soon drifted into a markeil dis- 
approbation of the manner in which Burnside contemplated meeting the 

Sumner seemed to feel badly that the officers did not agree to Burnside's 
mode of advance. That noble old hero was so faithful and loyal that lie wanted, 
even against impossibilities, to carry out evei-ything Burnside suggested. I 




should doubt if his judgment concurred. It was only chivalrous attachment 
to Burnside, or to any commander. But there were not two opinions among 
the subordinate officers as to the rashness of the undertaking. 

Somebody told Burnside of our views, and he was irritated. He asked us 
to meet him the next night at the Lacy House. He said he understood, in a 
general way, that we were opposed to his plans. He seemed to be rather 

severe on Hancock, — to my 
.'- surprise, for I did not think 

that officer had said as much 
as myself in opposition to 
the plan of attack. Burn- 
side stated that he had 
formed his plans, and all he 
wanted was the devotion of 
his men. Hancock made a 
reply in which he disclaimed 
any personal discourtesy, 
and said he knew there was 
a line of fortified heights on 
the opposite side, and that it 
would be pretty difficult for us to go over there and take them. I rose after 
him, knowing that I was the more guilty, and expressed a desire to serve 
Burnside, saying, among other things, that if I had ever done anything in 
any battle, in this one I intended to do twice as much, French came in 
while I was talking. He was rather late, and in his bluff way exclaimed: 
" Is this a Methodist camp-meeting ! " 

The heights on the morning of the 11th, before the bridges were thrown 
across, did not offer a very animated scene, because the troops were mostly hid- 
den. The bombardment for the purpose of dislodging the sharp-shooters who 
under cover of the houses were delaying the bridge-making, was terrific, while 
the smoke settled down and veiled the scene. After the bombardment had 
failed to dislodge the enemy, the 7tli Michigan and the 19th and the 20th 
Massachusetts of Howard's division sprang into the pontoons, and rowing 
themselves over drove away Barksdale's sharp-shooters. This gallant action 
enabled the engineers to complete the bridges. Howard's division was the 
first to cross by the upper bridge [see map, p. 74], his advance having a lively 
fight in the streets of Fredericksburg. Hawkins's brigade of Willcox's corps 
occupied the lower part of the town on the same evening, and the town was not 
secured without desperate fighting. I went over the next morning, Friday, 
the 12tli, with Hancock's and French's divisions. The remainder of Willcox's 
corps crossed and occupied the lower part of the town. . There was consider- 
al)le looting. I placed a provost-guard at the bridges, with orders that nobody 
should go back with plunder. An enormous pile of booty was collected there 
by evening. But there came a time when we were too busy to guard it, and 
I suppose it was finally carried off by another set of spoilers. The troops 
of the two corps bivouacked tliat night in the streets and were not per- 



mitted to make fires. Late on that day we had oi'ders to be read^y to cross 
Hazel Run, which meant that we were to join Frankhn. That was the only 
pi-oper move to make, since we had done just what the enemj^ wanted us to 
do, — lijid divided our army. The conditions were favorahle for a change of 
position unknown to the enemj^ since tlie night was (hirk and the next morn- 
ing was foggy. But it would have been very dilhcult to make the movenuMit. 
I was much wori'ied in regard to ])uilding tlie necessary bridges over Hazel 
Run and the dangers attending a fiauk movement at niglit in the preseiice ot" 
the enemy. But the order to march never came. The orders tliat were gi\ «mi 
by Burnside showed that he had no fixed plnn of battle. After getting in 
the face of the enemy, his intentions seemed to be continually changing. 

Early the next morning, Snturday, the llUh, I receive<l orders to make an 
assault in front. My instructions came fcom (Jenenil Sunnier, who did not 


cross the river during the fight, owing to a special understanding with which 
1 had nothing to do, and which related to his supposed rashness. At Fan- 
Oaks, Antietam, and on other battle-fields he had shown that he was a hard 
fighter. He was a grand soldier, full of honor and gallantry, and a man of 
great determination. 


As I have said, on that Saturday morning we were enveloped in a heavy 
fog. At 8:15, when we were still holding ourselves in readiness to move 
to the left, I received the following order : 

'* Headquarters, Right Grand Division, near Falmouth, Va., December 12tli, 1862. 
** Major-General Couch, Commanding Second Corps d'Armee. 

" General : The major-general commanding directs me to say to you that General Willcox has 
been ordered to extend to the left, so as to connect with Franklin's right. Yon will extend your 
right so far as to prevent the possibility of the enemy occupying the upper part of the town. 
You will then form a column of a division for the purpose of pushing in the direction of the 
Plank and Telegi-aph roads, for the purpose of seizing the heights in rear of the town. This 
column will advance in three lines, with such intervals as you may judge proper, this movement 
to be covered by a heavy line of skirmishers in front and on both flanks. You will hold another 
division in readiness to advance in support of this movement, to be formed in the same manner 
as the leading division. Particular care and precaution must be taken to prevent collision with 
our own troops in the fog. The movement will not commence until you receive orders. The 
watchword wUl be, ' Scott ! ' Very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 

"J. H. Taylor, Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant-General. 

" P. S. The major-general tliinks that, as Howard's division led into the town, it is propei 
that one of the others take the advance." 



French was at once directed to prepare his division in three brigade lines 
for the advance, and Hancock was to follow with his division in the same 
order. The distance between the brigade lines was to be about 200 yards. 

Toward 10 o'clock the fog began to lift ; French reported that he was ready, 
I signaled to Sumner, and about 11 o'clock the movement was ordered to begin. 
French threw out a strong body of skirmishers, and his brigades filed out of 
town as rapidly as possible by two parallel streets, the one on the right, which 


was Hanover street, running into the Telegraph road, and both leading direct 
to Marye's Hill, the stronghold of the enemy. On the outskirts of the town the 
troops encountered a ditch, or canal, so deep as to be almost impassable except at 
the street bridges, and, one of the latter being partly torn up, the troops had to 
cross single file on the stringers. Once across the canal, the attacking forces 
deployed under the bank bordering the plain over which they were to charge. 
This plain was obstructed here and there by houses and fences, notably at a 
fork of the Telegraph road, in the narrow angles of which was a cluster of 
houses and gardens ; and also on the parallel road just south of it, where stood 
a large square brick house. This cluster of houses and the brick house were 
the rallying-points for parts of our disordered lines of attack. The fork in 
the road and the ])rick house were less than 150 yards from the stone-wall, 
which covered also as much more of the plain to the left of the brick liouse. 
A little in advance of the brick house a slight rise in the ground alforded 
protection to men lying down, against the musketry behind the stone-wall, 
but not agahist the converging fire of the artillery on the heights. My head- 
quarters were in the field on the edge of the town, overlooking the plain.^ 

A few minutes after noon French's division charged in the order of Kim- 
ball's, Andrews's, and Palmer's brigades, a part of Kimball's men getting into 
the cluster of houses in the fork of the road. Hancock followed them in th.' 
order of Zook's, Meagher's, and Caldwell's brigades, the two former getting 


nearer to the stone-wall than any who had gone before, except a few of 
Kimball's men, and nearer than any brigade which followed them. 

Without a clear idea of the state of affairs at the front, since the smoke and 
light fog veiled everything, I sent word to French and Hancock to carry the 
enemy's works by storm. Then I climbed the steeple of the court-house, and 
from al)ove the haze and smoke got a clear view of the field. Howard, who 
was with me, says I exclaimed, " Oh, great God ! see how our men, our poor 
fellows, are falling ! " I remember that the whole plain was covered with men, 
prostrate and dropping, the live men running here and there, and in front 
closing upon each other, and the wounded coming back. The commands 
seemed to be mixed up. I had never befoi'e seen fighting like that, nothing 
approaching it in terrible uproar and destruction. There was no cheering on 
the part of the men, but a stubborn determination to obey orders and do 
their duty. I don't think there was much feeling of success. As they 
charged the artillery fire would break their formation and they would get 
mixed; then they would close up, go forward, receive the withering infantry 
fire, and those who were able would run to the houses and fight as best they 
could ; and then the next brigade coming up in succession would do its duty 
and melt like snow coming down on warm ground. 

I was in the steeple hardly ten seconds, for I saw at a glance how they 
were being cut down, and was convinced that we could not be successful in 
front, and that our only chance lay by the right. I immediately ordered 
Howard to work in on the right with the brigades of Owen and Hall, and 
attack the enemy behind the stone-wall in flank, which was done. Before he 
could begin this movement both Hancock and French had notified me that 
they must have support or they would not be responsible for the maintenance 
of their position. Sturgis, of Willcox's corps, who had been supporting my 
left, sent the brigades of Ferrei-o and Nagle to the fruitless charge. 

About 2 o'clock General Hooker, who was in command of the Center 
Grand Division (Stoneman's and Butterfield's corps), came upon the field. 
At an earlier hour Whipple's division of Stoneman's corps had crossed the 
river and relieved Howard on the right, so that the latter might join in the 
attack in the center, and Grifiiu's division of Butterfield's corps liatl come 
over to the support of Sturgis. Humphreys and Sykes, (^f the latter corps, 
came to my support. Toward 3 o'clock I received the following di8i>atch ; 

" Headquarters, Right Grand Division, Army op the Potojiac, Dec. 13th, 1862.— 2: -K) p.m. 
General Couch : Hooker has been ordered to put in^ verything. You must hold on until he eoiues 
in. By command of Brevet Major-General Sumner. W. (1. Jones, Lieut., Aide-de-camp, etc." 

Note to illustration.— The Artillery Reserve near the center of tlie ridge, and consisting of 27 

posted on the eastern bank of the river comprised guns ; the Left Division, vnider Captain 0. A. l>e 

four coiimiiinds, as follows : the Right Division, Russy, numbering 42 guns. When the order was 

un.lcr Licutciiant-Coloiicl William Hays, extend- given to fire upon the town, only the guns of the 

ing from Falmouth down to the raviue.'about 500 Right (Y'liter ami L«>ft Tenter could bi- bronglit to 

yards below Falmouth (see map, p. 74), and con- bear effectually. Hays's batteries delivered a few 

sisting of 40 rifled guns; the Right Center Division, shots. Tyler's gims opened tire, doing but little 

undor Colonel C. H. Tom))kins, consisted of MS execution. Colonel Tomiikinsrej^orte.! that his bat- 

gans ; the Left Center Division, under Colonel R. terios oi)em".l at 1 L' : :{0 l\ M. under orders to burn 

O. Tyler, occupying the erest of the ri.lgo from the the town, and ceased tiring at 2 : 30 p. M., at which 

middle bridge southward to the wooded ravine time several buildings were burning. — Editors. 





-w€s.f ;'•^,■.: " ' 





-s^- Hooker was the ranking general, and as I 

^^^ understood that he was to take command of the 

whole fighting line, the putting in of his fresh men 

beside mine might make a success. His very coming 

\ was to me, therefore, like the breaking out of the sun in a storm. I rode 

\ back to meet him, told him what had been done, and said, " I can't 

carry that hill by a front assault ; the only chance we have is to try to get 

in on the right." Hookcu* replied, " I will talk with Hancock." He talked with 

Hancock, and after a few minutes said, "Well, Couch, things are in such 

a state I must go over and tell Burnside it is no use trying to carry this line 

here," — or words to that effect, — and then he went off. His going away 

left me again in command. Burnside was nearly two miles distant. It 

was not much after 2 o'clock when he went away, and it was about 4 

when he returned. This was after Humphreys had made his charge and the 

figliting for the day was substantially finished. We were holding our lines. 

Hooker left word that Humphreys, whose division was ready to advance, 


should take his cue from me. Butterfield also gave Humphreys orders to 
that effect. After a lull in the battle General Caldwell, a brigade commander 
under Hancock, sent word to the latter that the enemy were retreating 
from Marye's house. It was probably only a shifting of the enemy's troops 
for the relief of the front line. But, assuming that the report was true, 
I said, " General Humphreys, Hancock reports the enemy is falling back ; 
now is the time for you to go in ! " He was ready, and his troops around 
him were ready. The order had evidently been expected, and after an 
interval of more than twenty-five years I well recollect the grim deter- 
mination which settled on the face of that gallant hero when he received 
the words, " Now is the time for you to go in ! " Spurring to his work he 
led his two brigades, who charged over precisely the same ground, Init 
who did not get quite so near, to the stone-wall as some of French's and 
Hancock's men.| 

The musketry fire was very heavy, and the artillery fire was simply terrible. 
I sent word several times to our artillery on the right of Falmouth that they 
were firing into us, and were tearing our own men to pieces. I thought they 
had made a mistake in the range. But I learned later that the fire came 
from the guns of the enemy on their extreme left. 

Soon after 4 o'clock, or about sunset, while Humphreys was at work, Getty's 
division of Willcox's corps was ordered to the charge on our left by the unfin- 
ished railroad. I could see them being dreadfully cut up, although they 
had not advanced as far as our men. I determined to send a battery upon 
the plain to shell the line that was doing them so much harm ; so I ordered 
an aide to tell Colonel Morgan to send a battery across the canal and plant it 
near the brick house. Morgan came to me and said: "General, a battery 
can't live there." I replied, " Then it must die there ! " 

Hazard took his battery out in gallant style and opened tire on the enemy's 
lines to the left of the Marye House. Men never fought more gallantly, and he 
lost a great many men and horses. When Hooker came he ordered Frank's 
])attery to join Hazard. But this last effort did not last long. In the midst 
of it I rode to the brick house, accompanied by Colonel Francis A. Walker, 
Lieutenant Crushing, and my orderly. Long. The smoke lay so thick that we 
could not see the enemy, and I think they could not see us, but we were aware 

I Lieutonant-('olonel Carswell McClellan, As- tUuiiif; the war. His Thinl Bii«a«le rciuaiiioti iiiaHsed 

sistant Adjutant-General, serving on General i^'^> Kiydericksburg during the. night of Deeeiuber I3th- 
Humphreys's staff at Fredericksburg, writes to tlio 

editors to correct a statement nia<le in Walker's Noticing, also, the denials of General Walker and 

"History of the Second Army Corps" [p. 181], as otliers that General Humphreys's men approached 

well as by other writers, implying that the charge "nearer to tlu> wall than any other troops liad 

of Humphreys's division was supported by Sykes. reached," Colonel McClellan cites the fact that 

Colonel McClellan says: General Humphreys, who made this statement, 

..„,.,...,,, , ., r. I I was an eve-witiu'ss of the scene from his position 

»yKVH», (Uvinum hail vol crossof t/ie I{ni>/>nlniiiii(>rh- . .'<.,•,... , •, »i ,i. >i..,„.i«i,u 

when (icn,-ral IIui>.,.l.rc.v8'H t1r«t assault was and "' ffoi't "f '"« <l>vision. while on the other hand the 

the head of his coluiiiu reached tlie bridge crossing officers of the burial-parties sent out a week later 

the null-race on the Telegranli road, only after the (whose evidence has been relied on to support the 

last charge made by (ieiieral Ilnmi.l.n-ys had been opi>osite view) could hardiv have identifie.l the nn-n 
rei)ulw.>d. (Jeiieral Mykes's First ami .second Hrigades .' ,.,- . i" i . „ .. > ...i,. ..ii •!.« 

„ncnn,n( relieved the troops upon the advanced ol the d.lTerent com.nands, because nenrl.N all tho 

line on the Telegrai>h road. aii<l exp.Mieiu-ed on." of bodies had in the meantime been stripped of their 

tUo most trying tours of duty exacted fnuu troops clothing.— Editoks, 




of the fact that some- 
body in our front was 
doing a great dt^al of 
shooting. I found the 
brick house packed with 
men ; and behind it the 
dead and the living 
were as thick as they 
could be crowded to- 
gether. The dead were 
rolled out for shelter, 
and tlie dead horses were used for breastworks. I know I tried to shelter 
myself behind the brick house, but found I could not, on account of the 
men already there. The plain thereabouts was dotted with our fallen. 
I started to cross to the fork of the road where our men, under Colonel John 
E. Brooke, were holding the cluster of houses. 

When it became dark the wounded were being lirought oif the plain, and 
Hooker was talking about relieving my men in front by putting in Sykes's 
division, and I said, " No ! No men shall take the place of the Second Corps 
unless General Sumner gives the orders. It has fought and gained that 
gi'ound and it shall hold it." Later the order came for Sykes to relieve the 
Second Corps, which was done about 11 o'clock. 

That night was bitter cold and a fearful one for the front line hugging the 
hollows in the ground, and for the wounded who could not be reached. It 
was a night of dreadful suff(>ring. Many died of wounds and exposure, and 
as fast as men died they stiffened in the wintry air, and on the front line 
were rolled forward for protection to the living. Frozen men were placed for 
dumb sentries, 



My corps again bivouacked in the town, and they were not allowed fires 
lest they should draw the fire of the enemy's artillery. 

At 2 o'clock in the morning Burnside came to my headquarters near the 
center of the town. I was lying down at the time. He asked me to tell him 
about the battle, and we talked for about an hour. I told him everything 
that had occurred. " And now," I said, " Greneral Burnside, you must know 
that everything that could be done by troops was done by the Second Coi^ps." 
He said, " Couch, I know that ; I am perfectly satisfied that you did your 
best." He gave no intimation of his plans for the next day. He was cheerful 
in his tone and did not seem greatly oppressed, Ijut it was plain that he felt 
he had led us to a great disaster, and one knowing him so long and well as 
myself could see that he :\vished his body was also lying in front of Marye's 
Heights. I never felt so badly for a man in my life. 

The next day, Sunday, the 14th, our men began digging trenches along the 
edge of the town. We were on the alert, for there was some fear of an 
assault. Of course 
there is no need of 
denying that after 
the battle the men 
became strained. 
The pressure of a 
fight carries you 
through, but after 
it is all over and 
you have been 
whipped you do 

not feel very pugnacious. The men, knowing that they had been unsuc- 
cessful, were in a nervous state, and officers suffered also from the reaction, 
the worst of it being that the mass of the army had lost confidence in its 

About midday of the 14tli Burnside called a council of war, in which it was 
decided to fall back, but to hold Fredericksburg. No attack was made by 
us that day, though Burnside had said that lie sliould renew the assault on 
Marye's Hill, with his old Ninth Corps, and that he would place himself at 
its head. General Getty of that corps, a very gallant officer, touched me as 
I passed him and said : " I understand that Burnside has given out that he 
intends to lead seventeen regiments to the attack." He urged lue strongly 
to dissuade him if possiV)le, as it would be a perfect slaughter of men. 


At the council Hooker 


1 himself as against the movement ot 

retrtuit, saying, "We nmst figlit tliose people. We are over there and we 
must fight them." But, as I remember, he did not advocah' llir i>lan of 
holding Fredericksburg if we were not to renew the light. 1 urged that the 
army was not in a condition, after oui- repulse, to renew tlie assault, but tliat 
we ought to hold Frcdericksbui-g at all hazards. I ha<l an argunuMit with 
(Jeneral Burnside upon that poijit, telling him that T was willing to have him 
throw all the responsibility upon me; that if wc held ihf town W(> should 



The portico of the Marye mansion is faintly marked senton the fourth day after the battle with a large detail 

among the trees of the hill in the middle-background, to bury the dead. In his official report he says : " Those 

The road on the right is the end of Hanover street and bodies nearest the enemy's works were recognized as 

the beginning of the Telegiaph road, by which most of belonging to Kimball's brigade of French's division and 

the attacking troops crossed the canal, or ditch, and, to the diflferent regiments of Hancock's division." In 

filing to the left, formed line under the low bank. In the two days occupied by the burial he says he "found 

the middle-ground, to the left of the road, is seen the and buried 913 of our soldiers, and brought to this side 

square brick house mentioned by General Couch. Part of the river the bodies of five officers, making a total of 

of the troops crossed the canal by a street on the left 918. Nearly all the dead were stripped entirely naked 

parallel with Hanover street, and a few waded. Most by the enemy." A woman who lived in one of the houses 

of the dead lay a short distance beyond the brick near the stone-wall has related that " the morning after 

house. the battle the field was blue ; but the morning after the 

Colonel John R. Brooke, of Hancock's division, was Federals withdrew the field was white."— Editors. 

have a little something to show for the sacrifice of the day before ; that the 
peophi would feel we had not failed utterly. It was agreed that Fredericks- 
burg should be held-. Then Burnside dismissed us and sent Hooker and 
myself to Fredericksburg to arrange for the defense. We held a council at 
the corner of Hanover street. 

It was decided that Hooker's troops should hold the town. The question 
was how many men would he leave for that purpose, opinions varying from 
ten to eighteen thousand. My limit was ten thousand men. General Tyler 
turned to me and said: "Make it higher, General." We compromised on 
twelve thousand. We remained in the town on the 15th, and that evening 
my corps and the Ninth Corps recrossed the river. Next morning we found 
that Fredericksburg had been evacuated. When Willcox and I left, we 
thought, of course, it would be held. The talk was that during the night 
Hook<;r prevailed upon Burnside to evacuate the town. 

Our wing of the army thought the failure of the campaign was due in part 
to the fact that we were put in where we ought not to have been. We were 
asked to achieve an impossibility. We had something to do that was not 
possible for us to do. 

After the battle Burnside tried to regain the confidence of the army, and 
there is no doubt that Sumner did a good deal to help him. Bm-nside con- 
ceived the plan of crossing the Rappahannock a few miles above Fredericks- 
burg, where the enemy were unprepared to receive us. The result was the 
"mud march" of January 20th -21st. It was Burnside's effort to redeem 
himself. To start off in the mud as we did with the army in its discouraged 



state was perfect folly. There did not seem to be anything in the move to 
recommend itself. If the weather had happened to tnrn cold, possibly he 
might have surprised Lee and gotten across the river, above Fredericks- 
bui'g, but it was a hazardous move, with the army out of confidence with 
its commander and the enemy elated with brilliant success. The general 
demoralization that had come upon us made two or three months of rest a 
necessity. ^ 

When Hooker, on January 25tli, was placed in command of the army, many 
of us were very much surprised ; I think the superior officers did not regard 
him competent for the task. He had fine qualities as an officer, but not th.e 
weight of character to take charge of that army. Nevertheless, under his 
administration the army assumed wonderful vigor. I have never known men 
to change from a condition of the lowest depression to that of a healthy fight- 
ing state in so short a time. President Lincoln with his wife came down to 
spend a few days with General Hooker, and to see the different officers and 
talk with them. To further that, General Hooker gave a tiinner party at 

^ In the coiu'se of a eorrespondeuee, relating to 
tbeir sevei'al controversies with General Burnside, 
Franklin wrote to Halleck, under date of June 1st, 
18G3 : "I was of your opinion with regard to the 
honesty and integrity of purpose of General Burn- 
side, until after his relief from the command of the 
Array of the Potomac. I lost all coniidenee in his 
ability at the first Fredericksburg battle. There 
was not a man in my command who did not believe 
that everything he would undertake would fail, 

and General Hooker iufcrmed me that that was 
the general feeling in hip command. General Sum- 
ner's feelings were noi so decided, but they were 
nearly so. You can imagine that the beds of the 
grand division oonmanders were not of roses, and 
I came to thr conclusion that Burnside was fast 
losing his nilid. So I looked upon the rain which 
stopped iis second attempt to cross the river [the 
' mud 'Jiarch '] as almost a providential interfer- 
ence in our behalf." — Editors. 

STUCiv IN Til 




r lAf.MoiTII l»tl;lN(j PRESIDENT 

which all the corps commanders were present, and also Mrs. Lincoln. Mr. 
Lincoln would talk to the officers ou^ the subject that was uppermost in our 
minds — how we were to get the bettei-of the enemy on the opposite hills. 
Before he went away he sent for Hooke.^* and for me, I being second in 
command, and almost his last injunction "vv-as : " Grentlemen, in your next 
battle 2^i(t in all your menP Yet that is exactly- what we did not do at Chan- 

We had a grand review of the army in honor of tlae President. The Second 
Corps paraded with Howard's Eleventh Corps, I thibk, for after I had saluted 
at the head of my' corps I rode to the side of the Presvdent, who was on horse- 
back, and while near him Genei-al Schurz approached t\i the head of his di- 
vision. I said: "Mr. Lincoln, that is General Schurz," in'onouncing it Shios, 
after the American fashion. Mr. Lincoln turned to me aLid said : " Not SJnos, 
General Couch, but Shoort^y But he did it very pleasanitly, and I was just 
a little surprised that our Western President should hay(\^, the advantage of 
me. It was a beautiful day, and the review was a stirrihig sight. Mr. Lin- 
coln, sitting there with his hat off, head bent, and seemingly meditating, sud- 
denly turned to me and said : " General Couch, what do; you suppose will 
become of all these men when the war is over?" And it s, truck me as very 
pleasant that somebody had an idea that the war would soi^netime end. 



ON the morning of the 1 Ith of December, 1862, 
about two hours before daylight, the regi- 
mental coinmandei's of Colonel Norman J. Hall's 
Third Brigade, of Howard's Second Division, Sec- 
ond Army Corps, were assembled at brigade head- 
quarters to receive preliminary orders for the 
approaching battle. Our brigade commander in- 
formed us that our regiment was to be the first to 
cross the upper pontoon-bridge, which was to 
be laid by the engineer corps by daylight, and 
that we vrere to hold and occupy the right of the 
town until the whole army should have crossed, 
when the Right Grand Division, comprising the 
Second and Ninth (,'orps, would charge the heights, 
supported by artillery in front and on the right 
flank. On 'our arrival at the river at daylight wo 
found but a very small section of the bridge laid, 
in consequence of the commanding position which 
the enemy hold on the right bank of the river, 
secreted as they were behind fences made musket- 
proof by piling cord-wood and other materials 
against them. After a fruitless attempt of eight 
hours' duration to lay the bridge where the enemy 
had alisoluti' control of the river front, the idea 
was abandoned, and notice was sent down to us at 
the river that the enemy would be shelled from the 
heights, with orders to take to the pontoon-boats and 
cross and dislodge the enemy in order to enable the 
engineer corps to complete the bridge. The instant 
the artillery ceased firing, the 7th Michigan and 
19th Massachusetts took to the boats and poled 
across the river under a heavy musketry fire from 
the enemy. The 7th Michigan was the first to make 
a landing, and marched up Farquhar street in a 
direct line from the bridge. They immediately be- 
came severely engaged, and the first two companies 
of the 19th Massachusetts that had crossed went 

forward and joined them. A few minutes later the 
remainder of the 19th crossed, formed in line on 
the bank of the river, left resting on Farquhar 
street, and advanced, deploying as skirmishers in 
order to drive back the enemy from the western 
part of the city. We were met with such resist- 
ance by Barksdale's brigade, very aptly styled by 
General Longstreet "Confederate hornets," that 
it was nearly dusk before we gained the north side 
of Caroline street. It was now apparent that our 
thin line could not make any farther advance 
against the formidable barricades the enemy 
had erected on the south side of the street, con- 
sisting of barrels and boxes, filled with earth and 
stones, placed between the houses, so as to form 
a continuous line of defense, and the left of our 
line was forced to fall back down Farquhar street, 
fully one-half the distance from Caroline street. 
On reporting our position to a staff-orticer our bri- 
gade commander ordered the L'Otli Massachusetts 
to clear the streets. They marched up Farquhar 
street in company or division front, and on reach- 
ing Caroline street wheeled to the right ; but before 
the full regiment had entered tlie street the enemy, 
from their snug retreats, pom-ed sudi a deadly fire 
on tliem as to force them to retire with great loss. 
Tliis action of the 20th enabled our left to re- 
gain our position on Caroline street, wliich was 
maintained until Barksdale withdrew his com- 
mand to the heights, about an hour after dark. 
At about 11 o'clock General Howard crossed over 
to learn our position. Informing him tliat the 
enemy had retired in our front, I asked him if we 
should move forward. After making some inquiries 
concerning our right, he thouglit notliing would be 
gained by doing so. We remained in this i)Osition 
until about noon of the 13th. 




FROM certain remarks made by various writers 
[see pp. 107 and 120] on the battle of Fred- 
ericksburg, it inight be inferred that there was 
some foundation for the general impression that 
had the pontoons arrived in time, the crossing 
could have been made before t)ie enemy concen- 
trated, and the disastrous defeat whicli followed 
might thus have been avoided. 

The fact is that the engineers (inth and r>0(h 
New York), with two full trains and material for 
two pontoon-bridges, ciich 420 feet in length, ar- 
rived opposite Fredericksburg and l)ivoua('ked in 
rear of the Lacy house on the afternoon of Nov(>m- 
ber 27tli, and could have thrown two bri<lges 
across the stream witliout opposition that night 
liad they been allowed to do so. There was no 
force of the enemy in tiu> city, and General Jjong- 
Htrei't, with (he advance of (lie Confederate arinv. 

had by a forced raarcli occupied a ^lortion of the 
heights in rear of the city on the 21st. 

I distinctly remember that (ieneral Sumner rode 
up to our position soon after our arrival on the 27tii 
and asked Major Ira Spauliling, of the r.otli New 
York, and myself if we could throw a bri<lge across 
the river that night, to which we rejdied that wo 
could throw two bridges across in three lionrs if lie 
would give us the order to do so. After a little 
hesitation, he replied tliat he would like to give us 
tlie order, as there was certaiidy nothing to opjuisc 
its execution, but tJnit lie did tiot care to assume 
the res]>onsil)iIity, fearing that it jiiight contlict 
witli (Jeiieral Burns! le's plans. He also remarked 
that he could have forded the stream with a part of 
liis command at Falmouth several days before had 
lie been allowed to do so ; he then rode away. We 
were ordered back into camp, and the "golden 



opportunity " passed — a blunder for which we were 
in no way responsible, but for which we were des- 
tined to suffer. 

We did not receive the order to leave Berlin, six 
miles below Harper's Ferry, until late on the 
seventh day after it was issued. ) We took up two 
bridj,'es, each 1100 feet long, loaded and moved 
tlicni by canal and land transportation to Wash- 
ington, where we received 500 unbroken mules. 
We then fitted up two trains, moved through the 
mud to Occoquau, where we divided the trains, part 
going by water and part by land to Aquia Creek, 
where we again reloaded the entire equipment, 
and arrived at the Lacy house but six days behind 
Longstreet's advance, which had made a forced 
march from the vicinity of Culpeper to reach the 
heights in rear of Fredericksburg. These being the 
facts, it can hardly be said, with justice, that the 
engineers were slow in their movements. 

The idea of crossing immediately in front of the 
town seemed to have passed, temporarily at least, 
from General Burnside's mind, and "demonstra- 
tions " on an extensive scale were made to the right 
and left. 

Twice I crossed the river below the town and 

J The " Official Records" show that this order, issued 
by Captain J. C. Duane, Chief-Engineer of the Army of 
the Potomac at Rectortown, on the 6th of November, did 

examined the country for some distance inland, it 
being rather difficult to find ground suitable for the 
passage of artillery on both sides of the stream at 
.all stages of the tide. The second time I crossed 
at " Skinker's Neck," and made a thorough exam- 
ination of the country for several miles around, 
pacing off the distances, and furnished General 
Burnside, in person, with my sketches. These ex- 
peditions were, of course, made in the night. 

" Skinker's Neck" seemed to me to be the proper 
place for a crossing. At the time of my visit it was 
not occupied by the enemy, except by a cavalry 
patrol, which I easily avoided. 

Six or eight miles above, where I made my first 
crossing, it was somewhat difficult to make my 
way through the picket lines. General Burnside 
appeared to be gi-eatly pleased and relieved when 
I reported favorably on the "Skinker's Neck" 
crossing. He gave me to understand that we 
should throw our bridges there, and we made our 
arrangements accordingly. 

What was my s^^rprise when, a few days after, 
the orders came that mine was to be one of two 
bridges that were to be thrown across directly in 
front of the city, near the Lacy house. 

not reach Major Spauldiug, at Berlin, until the afternoon 
of November 12th. General Halleck's report exonerates 
the engineers from all blame.— Editors. 



ON Saturday, December 13th, our brigade 4- had 
been held in reserve, but late in the day we 
were hurried to the battle only to see a field full of 
flying men and the sun low in the west shining red 
through columns of smoke, — six deserted field- 
pieces on a slight rise of ground in front of us, 
and :i cliceriiig column of troops in regular march 
disa PI leaving on our left. But the day was then over 
and the l)attlc lost, and our line felt hardly bullets 
enough to draw blood before darkness put an end 
to the uproar of all hostile sounds, save desultory 
shell-firing. For an hour or two afterward shells 
from Marye's Heights traced bright lines across 
the black sky with their burning fuses. Then, by 
command, we sank down in our lines, to get what 
sleep the soggy ground and the danger might allow 
us. Experience had taught us that when the 
silent line of fire from the shells had flashed across 
the sky and disappeared behind us the scream and 
explosion tliat followed were harmless, but still it 
required some effort to overcome the discomfort of 
the damp ground, and the flash and report of burst- 
ing shells, ajid to di-op quietly asleep at an order. 
We finally slept, but wo were roused before mid- 
night, and formed into line with whispered com- 
mands, and then filed to the right, and, reaching the 

S Condensed from the " Overland Monthly," 1869, Vol. 
TIL. p. 432, !)>' pcnniHsion of Fisher Ames. General 
Ji)hn W. Ames. U. 8. Surveyor-General of California, 
died iu Han Rafael, iu that State, in 1878. 

highway, marched away from the town. There 
were many dead horses at exposed points of our 
turning and many more dead men. Here stood a 
low brick house, with an open door in its gable end, 
from which shone a light, and into which we peered 
when passing. Inside sat a woman, gaunt and 
hard-featured, with crazy hair and a Meg Merrilies 
face, still sitting by a smoking candle, though it was 
nearly two hours past midnight. But what woman 
could sleep, though never so masculine and tough 
of fiber, alone in a house between two hostile 
armies, — two corpses lying across her door-steps, 
and within, almost at her feet, four more ! So, 
with wild eyes and face lighted by her smoky can- 
dle, she stared across the dead barrier into the 
darkness outside with the look of one who heard 
and saw not, and to whom all sounds were a terror. 
We formed in two lines, — the right of each rest- 
ing near and in front of this small brick house, 
and the left extending into the field at right angles 
with the highway. Here we again bivouacked, 
finding room for our beds with no little difficulty, 
because of tlie sliattered forms of those who were 
here taking their last long sleep. We rose early. 
The heavy fog was penetrating and chilly, and the 
damp turf was no warm mattress to tempt us to 

iThe 2d Brigade of regulars (Sykes's division. Fifth 
Army Corps), comm.inded by Major George L. Andrews, 
17tli U. 8. Infantry. General Ames was then a captain 
iu the 11th U. 8. Infantry.— Editohs. 



a morning nap. So we shook off sloth from our 
moistened bodies willingly, and rolling up the gray 
blankets set about breakfast. The bivouac break- 
fast is a nearer approach to its civilized congener 
than the bivouac bed. Coffee can be made hot 
and good in blackened tins ; pork can be properly 
frizzled only on a stick over an open fire ; hard- 
tack is a better, sweeter morsel than the average 
American housewife has yet achieved with her 
saleratus, sour-milk, "empt'ins," and what-not; 
and a pipe ! — who can estimate what that little 
implement has done for mankind ? Certainly none 
better than those who have sought its solace after 
the bivouac breakfast that succeeds a bivouac bed, 
in December. 

We now began to take note, through the misty 
veil, of the wreck of men and horses cumbering the 
ground about us, and a slight lifting of the gray 
fog showed us the story of yesterday's repeated 
assaults and repeated failures. When our pipes 
were exhausted we got up to inspect and criti- 
cise the situation. Just here was the wreck of 
a fence, which seemed to have been the high- 
tide mark of our advance-wave of battle. The 
fence was a barrier which, slight as it was, had 
turned back the already wavering and mutilated 
lines of assault. Almost an army lay about us and 
scattered back over the plain toward the town. 
Not only coi-pses, but many of the badly wounded, 
liardly distinguishable from the dead, were here 
too. To die, groveling on the ground or fallen 
in the mire, is dreadful indeed. The pallid faces, 
and the clammy hands clenching their muskets, 
looked ghastly by the fog-light. The new, bright, 
blue overcoats only made the sight the ghastlier. 

About eighty yards in front the plowed field 
was bounded by a stone-wall, and behind the wall 
were men in gray uniforms moving carelessly 
about. This picture is one of my most distinct 
memories of the war — the men in gray behind this 
wall, talking, laughing, cooking, cleaning mus- 
kets, clicking locks, — there they were! — Lee's 
soldiers! — the Army of Northern Virginia! We 
were so absurdly near this host of yesterday's vic- 
tors that we seemed wholly in their hands and a 
part of their great mass ; cut off and remote from 
the Federal army^ and almost within the lines of 
the enemy — prisoners, of course. That was the 
immediate impression, as we stupidly gazed in the 
first moment of the awkward discovery. 

But the sharp whistle of a bullet sounded in our 
oars, and a rebel's face peered through the puff of 
smoke, as he removed the rifle from liis sliouider; 
Hicn rapidly half-a-dozon more bullets whistled 
by us, and the warning sent us all to earth. The 
order to lie down is theoretically infrequent, but 
practically it is often given in modern warfare. 
Napoleon's maxim tliat ''an army travels on its 
belly" was metaphorical, but long-range and ro- 
p(Miting rifles have gone far to make it true in a 
literal sense. Our double linos of battle sought 
the shelter of the ground as soon as blood was 
drawn. This had the effect of hiding us from 

the enemy, or partially so, for the fusillade slack- 

It was irksome to keep one position, even at 
full length, but the watch over us was very 
vigilant ; hardly a movement was made at any 
part of our line that did not draw fire from the 
wall. Necessity compelled us, however, to keep 
up something of a lookout upon the enemy at any 
risk. A cautious inspection showed great care- 
lessness in their lines, the men still strolling and 
lounging — a group at cards, even, evidently ignor- 
ant or careless of our proximity. 

What to do about it was to us a topic second 
only in interest to the probable action of the 
enemy. Could we long lie thus without waking 
up the big guns, whose black muzzles looked down 
at us from the hill-tops on our right ? And if not, 
what then ? From these guns there would be no 
possible shelter. Retreat alone was more danger- 
ous than to remain as we were, or even to advance. 
The field behind us stretched away toward the 
town, level and exposed — the focus of an arc of 
battery-crowned hills, with no inequality of ground 
to protect us from a convergence of fire that would 
be singularly effective. 

The situation had already forced upon us a policy 
of masterly inactivity, which alone seemed to meet 
our immediate difficulties. So we drifted into a com- 
mon understanding that no doubt an abler coun- 
cil of war would have approved. Shots might rouse 
the enemy from his carelessness or ignorance; 
certainly a volley from our line would not go unan- 
swered, and the odds were gi-eat. Let them stick 
to their cards and forget us if they would ! But 
we arrived at this policy only as the least of 
many evils. 

The enemy riddled every moving thing in sight : 
horses tied to the wheels of a broken gun-carriage 
behind us; pigs that incautiously came grunting 
fi'om across the road ; even chickens were brought 
down with an accuracy of aim that told of a fatally 
short range, and of a better practice than it would 
have been wise for our numbers to face. They 
applauded their own success with a hilarity we 
could hardly share in, as their chicken-shooting 
was across our backs, lea\ing us no extra room for 
turning. But this was mere wantonness of slaugh- 
ter, not indulged in when the higher game in blue 
uniform was in sight. The men who ha«l left our 
raTiks for water, or from any cause, before we were 
pinned to the earth, came back at great peril. In- 
deed, I believe not one of them reached our line 
again unhurt. Some were killed outright; otliers 
were mortally wounded, and died within a few 
steps of us; and several who tried to drag them- 
selves away flat upon their faces were put out of 
their misery. This, too, sliowed us plainly what 
we might expect, and fixed our Itounds to such 
segments of the field as were hidd.-n from the 
enemy. This was not alik<^ throughout tht> liiu^. 
At one point the exposure was absolute, and still- 
ness as absolute was the only safety. A slight 
barrier was afterward formed at this point by a 

i The fore- lirrc consistod of Rucliannn'H and Anrlrews's bHundort of n^tnilurs. of Pykew'H division, and 
Stockton's brigade of volunteerH, of (irinin's division, Fiftli .\rmy Corps.— Editors. 



disposal of the dead bodies in front, so that the 
dead actually sheltered the living. 

After two or three hours of this experience we 
became somewhat accustomed to the situation, — 
for man becomes accustomed to almost anything 
that savors of routine, — and learned with consid- 
erable exactness the limit inside which we might 
move with safety, and the limit also of endurable 
constraint. It was somewhat curious to see how 
strong the tobacco hunger was with many, — jier- 
haps with most. Men would jump to their feet 
and run the length of a regiment to borrow to- 
bacco, and in so doing run the gauntlet of a hun- 
di-ed shots. This was so rarely accomplished in 
entire safety that it won the applause' of our line 
and hearty congratulations to any one fortunate 
enough to save his life and sweeten it with the 
savory morsel. 

All this would have been ludicrous but for the 
actual suffering inflicted upon so many. Men were 
mortally hit, and there was no chance to bind up 
their wounds ; they were almost as far beyond our 
help as if they had been miles away. A little was 
accomplished for their relief by passing canteens 
from hand to hand, keeping them close to the 
ground out of sight, and some of the wounded 
were where a little manipulation could be done in 
safety. It was sad to hear the cries fade away to 
low moans, and then to silence, without a chance 
to help. The laugh over a successful chase for 
tobacco would die away only to change into a mur- 
mur of indignation at the next cruel slaughter. 
A young officer, boyish and riiddy, fresh from a 
visit home, with brighter sword and shoulder- 
straps than most of us, raised his head to look at 
the enemy, and a bullet at once pierced his brain. 
Without a word or groan his head sank again, his 
rosy cheek grew livid, and his blood crimsoned his 
folded hands. Next a leg or arm was shattered 
as it became exposed in shifting from the weari- 
someness of our position. Presently a system of 
reporting the casualties became established ; the 
names of the injured were passed from mouth to 

mouth; — "Captain M , 17th, just killed"; 

"Private , Co. C, 11th , knocked over." 

Those who were fortunate enough to have paper 
and pencil, and elbow-room enough to get them 
from pocket-depths, kept a list of the names of the 
killed and wounded; the occupation this gave 
proved a blessing, for tlie hours were very long 
and weary. 

I suppose ennni is hardly the word where nerves 
are on the rack, and daiigc^r pinions one to a single 
spot of earth, yet something like finiin came over 
us. By chance I found a fragment of newspaper 
which proved a charm that for a time banished the 
irksome present with its ghastly field of dead men 
and its ceaseless dangei-. Through this ragged 
patch of advertisements I sailed away from Fred- 
ericksburg with the good bark Ncptiote, which 
had liad quick dispatch a moTith before, — for the 
paper was of ancient date, — and was well on her 
way to summer seas, when I obeyed the printed 
injunction and api)lied on })oard for passage. And 
oh, pleasant summer meadows of the peaceful 
North ! who would have suspected you to lurk in 

extracts of sarsaparilla and ointment for eruptive 
skins ? But I found you there, and forgot the sun- 
shine and the chill earth, the grim war, the rifle's 
crack and the bullet's whistle, — forgot even the 
dead hand that had stretched itself toward me all 
the morning with its clutch of grass. 

I was called back to the dull wet earth and the 
crouching line at Fredericksburg by a request from 
Sergeant Eead, who " guessed he could hit that 
cuss with a spy-glass," — pointing, as he spoke, 
to the batteries that threatened our right flank. 
Then I saw that there was commotion at that part 
of the Confederate works, and an officer on the 
parapet, with a glass, was taking note of us. Had 
they discovered us at last, after letting us lie here 
till high noon, and were we now to receive the 
plunging fire we had looked for all the morning? 
Desirable in itself as it might be to have "that 
cuss with a spy-glass" removed, it seemed wiser 
to repress Read's ambition. The shooting of an 
officer would dispel any doubts they might have 
of our presence, and we needed the benefit of all 
their doubts. Happily, they seemed to think us 
not worth their powder and iron. 

Were we really destined to see the friendly 
shades of night come on and bring us release from 
our imprisonment ? For the first time we began 
to feel it probable when the groups left the guns 
without a shot. I grew easy enough in mind to 
find that sleep was possible, and I was glad to wel- 
come it as a surer refuge from the snrroundings 
than the scrap of newspaper. It was a little dis- 
couraging to see a sleeping officer near me wakened 
by a bullet, but as his only misfortune, besides a 
disturbed nap, seemed to be a torn cap and 
scratched face, he soon wooed back the startled 
goddess. I had enjoyed sleep for its quiet and 
rest, but never before for mere oblivion. 

When I returned to consciousness I found the 
situation unchanged, except that the list of casu- 
alties had been swelled by the constant rifle prac- 
tice, which was still as pitiless and as continuous 
as before. It was almost startling to see, on look- 
ing at the brick house, the MegMerrilies of the night 
before standing at her threshold. With the same 
lost look of helpless horror that her face had worn 
by candle-light, she gazed up and down our pros- 
trate lines, and the disenchantment of day and 
sunshine failed to make her situation seem in any 
way prosaic and commonplace. The desolate part 
she had to play suited well her gaunt and witch- 
like features. Shading her eyes with her hand at 
last, as if to banish a vision and call her senses 
back to earth, she searched our lines once more ; 
then, with a hopeless shake of the head, she moved 
slowly back into the dismal little tomb she was 
forced to occupy. In which army was her husband 
serving? Did she search our lines and the dead 
ranks for any friend of hers ? Was maternal anx- 
iety added to the physical terrors of her forced 
isolation ? 

Slowly the sun declined. He had been our friend 
all day, shining through the December air with an 
autujnn glow that almost warmed tlie chill earth ; 
but at his last half-hour he seemed to hang mo- 
tionless in the western sky. His going down would 


set us free ; free from the fire that was galling and 
decimating us ; free from the fear of guns on the 
right, and advance from the front; free from 
numbness, and constraint, and irksomeness, and 
free from the cold, wet earth. Also it would bring 
us messengers from the town to call us back from 
the exposed position and the field of dead bodies. 
But he lingered and stood upon the order of his 
going, until it seemed as if a Joshua of the Confed- 
erates had caused him to stand still. 

When at last the great disc stood, large and red, 
upon the horizon, every face was turned toward it, 
forgetting constraint, thirst, tobacco, and rebel 
fire, in the eagerness to see the end of a day that 
had brought us a new experience of a soldier's life, 
and had combined the dangers of a battle-field and 
the discomfort of a winter's bivouac with many 
new horrors of its own. 

At last the lingering sun went down. December 
twilights are short ; the Federal line sprang to its 
feet with almost a shout of relief. The reoel fire 
grew brisker as they saw such a swarm of blue- 
coats rising from the ground, but it was too late 
to see the fore-sights on the rifles, and shots un- 
aimed were not so terrible as the hated ground. 
So we contemptuously emptied our rifles at them, 
and before the smoke rolled away the coming dark- 
ness had blotted out the wall and the hostile line. 

With our line rose also a few men from the 
ghastly pile of yesterday's dead, who hobbled up 
on muskets used as crutches. These poor fellows 
had bound up their own wounds, and the coffee we 
had given them had cheered them into life and hope. 
Their cheerfulness grew into hilarity and merri- 
ment as they found themselves clear, at last, from 
the dead, and facing toward home, with a hope not 
by any means so impossible of realization as it had 
seemed not long before. Poor fellows! their joy 
was more touching than their sufferings, — which, 
indeed, they seemed to have forgotten. 

In our own brigade we found we had lost nearly 
150, \ out of a present-for-duty strength of about 
1000 men. This would have been a fair average 
loss in any ordinary battle, but we had suffered it 
as we lay on the ground inactive, without the ex- 
citement and dash of battle and without the chance 
to reply : a strain upon nerves and physical endur- 
ance which we afterward remembered as severer 
than many more fatal fields. In the midst of our 
buzz of relief and mutual congi-atulation, the ex- 
pected summons came for us to fall back to the 
town. Once more w<' formed an upright line of 
battle, then faced by the rear rank and inarclied 

in retreat, with muffled canteens and many halts 
and facings about toward a possible pursuit. 
Reaching a slight bank, we descended to the 
meadow through which the Fredericksburg race- 
way was dug, and here we changed to a flank 
march and filed into the highway. The highway 
soon became a street, and we were once more in 

We marched past the court-house, — past 
churches, schools, bank-buildings, private houses, 
— all lighted for hospital purposes, and all in use, 
though a part of the wounded had been transferred 
across the river. Even the door-yards bad their 
litter-beds, and were well filled with wounded men, 
and the dead were laid in rows for burial. The 
hospital lights and camp-fires in the streets, and 
the smoldering ruins of burned buildings, with 
the mixture of the lawless rioting of the demor- 
alized stragglers, and the suffering and deatli in 
the hospitals, gave the sacked and gutted town 
the look of pandemonium. 

In our new freedom we wandered about for the 
first half of the night, loath to lie on the earth 
again after om- day's experience. At last we 
spread our blankets on a sidewalk and slept in 
the lurid firelight with a sense of safety not war- 
ranted by our position. The next morning we 
made our toilets in wanton plenty. Water from a 
pump! and we bathed in the falling splash. Our 
"contraband" brought us a box of soap and an 
uncut, unhemmed bolt of toweling from the de- 
spised plunder of a store. The same source gave 
us a table-cloth for our breakfast. This we spread 
upon the sidewalk and furnished with variously 
assorted crockery from an ownerless pantry. Cab- 
bage fresh from a kitchen garden, with vinegar 
from the deserted kitchen, added a welcome and 
unusual luxury to the meal. And at the end we 
rolled dishes and debris together into the paved 
gutter by a comprehensive pull at the table-cloth. 
Then we smoked the emblem of peace, tilted back 
against the buildings in borrowed chairs, and were 
very comfortable and happy. This was the holiday 
of war, — vastly better than yesterday! But we 
were hardly safer here, tliough more comfortal>le. 
Lee might open bis guns at any moment. The 
drum-beat made us tip down our chairs and fall 
into line. We had roll-call and something like a 
dress parade without music, then stacked arms 
along the curb-stono and mounted sentinels over 
them. A bright, beautifid day and tlie freedom 
of an uninhabited and plundered city were be- 
fore us. 

\Tlic'M)lli(i;il Kec()ra8"(Vol. .XXL, Tt. I., p. liiCi 
total. HO.- 

:ivc \\u- lo, 

IN \i. kilUil, 114 wounded, 14 missing ; 



ny-rovEMBER 2 2d, 1862, the whole Union army 
iN had reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericks- 
burg, and General Lee, who had proved upon more 
than one oecasiou his watchfulness and enterprise, 
took means to insure the arrival, about the same 
time, of the Army of Northern Virginia on the 
heights in the immediate rear of Fredericksburg. 

Without the slightest delay the enemy's line of 
defense was marked out, nor did their labors cease 
until their defensive lines were made formidable 
and complete by the mounting of a large number 
of guns. In the meantime the Army of the Potomac 
had di'awn its abundant supply of daily rations, sub- 
jected itself to some drilling and several reviews, 
while its commander had been carrying on an ani- 
mated correspondence with the powers at Wash- 
ington, chiefly in relation to pontoons which had 
been promised but had failed to reach Falmouth 
until long after the arrival of both armies at the 
points they then occupied. [See p. 121.] Some 
time during the first week in December the much- 
looked-for pontoou train appeared, and then came 
the oft-repeated camp rumor of a "movement over 
the river," which in a few days assumed a more 
definite form, the actual plan of attack becoming 
the topic of many a camp-fire. It was freely stated 
that the whole army was to cross the river about 
such a time, and that the chief attack was to be 
made by General Sumner's Right Grand Division 
upon the enemy's center immediately back of Fred- 
ericksbui'g, where the hills were steepest and the 
fortifications strongest. 

There were a few ofiieers in the Army of the 
Potomac who had watched the gradual growth 
of the enemy's lines, and knew something of the 
natural formations in that direction,— a suc- 
cession of steep hills which, in themselves, were 
almost as potent for defensive purposes as the 
average artificial fortifications. I, for one, had 
been over that groimd several times the August 
before while engaged in ascertaining the best 
line for a grand guard for the protection of the 
roads leading from the back country into Fred- 
ericksburg. The three or four officers who were 
possessed of this knowledge expressed themselves 
very strongly in opposition to the plan of attack 
as foreshadowed by the gossips of the camp, and 
the news of these adverse ()])iiiions having come to 
General Buriiside, lie sent acireularto Tlie general 
officers of the Right (iraii<l Division and colonels 
commanding brigades to meet him at the Phillips 
house on the evening of December 9th. At the 
time iii>i)<)inted the large room of that mansion was 
fiUeil with general officers, with here and there a 
colonel and a few grand division stafl'-officers. Gen- 
eral Burnside made a speech in which he partly 
disclosed and explained his plan for the coming 
battle. If was received without any ]>articular crit- 
icism or <M,tniiieiit, but ({eiieral French, who was 
very enthusiast i<-, said th<' battle would be won in 
forty-eight liours, and called for three cheers for 
the commander, which were given. 

The meeting ended. Colonel J. H. Taylor, assist- 

ant adjutant-general of the Right Grand Division, 
and myself were standing together in the hall of the 
house, when General Burnside came along and said 
to me, "What do you think of it?" I answered, 
"K you make the attack as contemplated it will 
be the greatest slaughter of the war ; there isn't 
infantry enough in our whole army to carry those 
heights if they are well defended." He then 
turned to Colonel Taylor and said, "Colonel, 
what do you say about it f " The response came 
quickly and was sufficiently definite, "I quite 
agree with Colonel Hawkins. The carrying out of 
your plan will be murder, not warfare." The com- 
manding general was very much surprised and 
irritated at these answers, and made a remark 
about my readiness to throw cold water upon his 
" plans " ; he repeated the assertion of French about 
victory within forty-eight hours, and passed on. 

The meeting dispersed, the officers who had 
composed it going to their respective commands 
and giving their final orders for the movement of 
the following day. Besides attending to the de- 
tails of moving my command on the morrow, I 
f oimd time to write three letters — one to my 
mother, another to my wife, and a third to Charles 
P. Kirkland, of the city of New York. In each of 
these defeat was distinctly and without qualifica- 
tion predicted. The fii'st letter in the order men- 
tioned has been preserved, and from it the follow- 
ing quotations are given : 

" Camp, near Falmouth, Va., December 10th, 1862. 

" Dear Mother — . . . . To-monow, if our present 
plans are carried out, the great battle of the war will 
commence. ... I have little hoiie of the plans succeed- 
ing. I do not think them good,— there will he a great 
loss of life and nothing accomplished. I am sure we are 
to fight against all chances of success. There is a rumor 
and a hope that Banks may have landed on the James 
River ; If so, a large part of the enemy's force will lie di- 
verted from this point, hut if they have a force au.v- 
where near our own in munber we are pretty certain to 
get whipped." 

The letter to Judge Kirkland was much stronger 
and more explicit, and evoked an answer from 
which one paragraph is quoted : 

" New York, December 18th, 1862. 

" How wonderfully prophetic is your letter, written on 
the lOth of December. It foretells exactly the awful 
disaster and reverse that our cause has met with. How 
is it iiossihie, if you tlnis knew all this, tliat those liiir- 
imj control were' iuiiorant of it J Tliis wliole transaction 
sfcins iiowahnost incrcdilde. To think of the tliousaiids 

of splendid, brave, i>atriotic fellows ab.solut.'ly butch- 
ered without the least bcnelicial result : on the contrary, 
with a result disgraceful and disheartening to us, but I 
fervently trust a result from which we can recover."' 

This matter of the letters is here referred to, 
not in a spirit of pride, but simply to show a want 
of knowledge, judgment, and foresight on the 
part of those high in command. 

We now pass over the bombardment of Decem- 
ber 11th, the many disastrous attempts to lay the 
pontoons in front of Fredericksburg, and come to 3 
o'clock of that day, when volunteers were called for 
to cross the river in open boats for the purpose of 



dislodging the enemy from the opposite bank. For 
this service the 7th Michigan, 19th and 20th Mas- 
|i sachusetts of General Howard's division, and the 

I 89th New York of my brigade answered the call. 

' The first three regiments crossed under fire where 

the first bridge was afterward laid, and the fourth 
under sharper fire where the second was completed. 
By 9 o'clock that night the division of General 
Howard and my brigade had obtained possession 
of the town, the former taking the right of the line 
and the latter the left. The whole of the 12th of 
December into the night was occupied in cross- 
ing the army, and on the morning of the 1 3th the 
battle began and continued at intervals until dark- 
ness set in. During a considerable portion of that 
day, while the attacks upon the enemy's center, 
known as " Marye's Heights," were being made, 
General George W. Getty, my division commander, 
and myself were on the roof of the Slaughterhouse, 
a high residence at the lower end of the city, 
named after its owner. From this prominent posi- 
tion our repeated repulses and the terrible de- 
struction of the Union troops had been witnessed. 
At about half-past 3 o'clock the order came for 
General Getty's Third Division of the Ninth Corps 
to make an attack upon that part of the enemy's 
line to the left of where the principal attacks had 
been made. The order was obeyed, but not until 
I had tried to induce General Getty to protest 
against its obedience and the further useless waste 
of life. The attack of our division closed a battle 
which was one of the most disastrous defeats to the 
Union forces during the war. The sadness which 
prevailed throughout the whole army on that 
night can neither be described nor imagined. The 
surgeons were the happiest of all, for they were so 
busy that they had no time to think of our terrible 

About 9 o'clock that evening I found myself near 
a building situated upon the main street of the 
town, where several of the generals of the Right 
Grand Division had assembled for the purpose of 
discussing the attack to be made the next morn- 
ing. Wlien I entered the room these oflicers were 
looking at a map upon a table, showing the posi- 
tion of the enemy. There were present Generals 
Willcox, Humphreys, Getty, Butterfield, Meade, 
and three or four others. They were seriously 
discussing the proposed renewal of the attack the 
next day as though it had been decided upon. I 
listened until I was thoroughly irritated because 
of the ignorance displayed in regard to our sit- 
uation, and then uttered a solemn, earnest, and 
emphatic protest against even the consideration of 
another attack. With a pencil I made a i-ougli 
drawing of the first line then occupied by tlie en- 
emy, and also showed a second position a little 
to the rear, to whicli they could fall back and 
make a strong stand in the event of their being 
driven out of their first line. It did not take long 
to convince these officers that a second attack 
would probably end more disastrously than the 
first, aTul they united in a request that I should 
go at once to try to persuade Burnside that the 
attack ought not to be renewed. 

It was a cheerless ride in the wet and cold, and 
through the deep mud of an army-traveled road 
that dark night, for I was already weary from 
much care, watching, and loss of sleep, and besides 
I was fully aware of the unpleasant fact that an 
officer of very inferior rank was bent upon an 
ungrateful errand to a general commanding one of 
the largest armies of modern times. But a solemn 
sense of duty, and a humane desire to save further 
useless slaughter, convinced me that any sacrifice 
of self ought to be made in tlie interest of the 
men who were fighting oui- battles. 

I arrived at the Phillips house about 1 1 o'clock 
to learn that I had probably passed General Burn- 
side on the road, who had gone to perfect the de- 
tails for a second attack. Those present at the 
Phillips house were Generals Sumner, Hooker, 
Franklin, Hardie, and Colonel Taylor. I made a 
brief statement and explanation of the object of 
my mission, which deeply interested all present. 
They united in a desire that I should wait until 
the arrival of General Burnside, which occurred 
about 1 o'clock. As he came through the door he 
said : " Well, it's all arranged ; we attack at early 
dawn, the Ninth Corps in the center, which I shall 
lead in person"; and then seeing me he said: 
" Hawkins, your brigade shall lead with the 9th 
New York on the right of the line, and we'U make 
up for the bad work of to-day." 

When he had ceased there was perfect silence, 
and he was evidently astonished that no one ap- 
proved. With hesitation and gi-eat delicacy Gen- 
eral Sumner then stated the object of my visit, 
and suggested that General Burnside should ex- 
amine the rough di-awing then upon the table, 
and listen to some reasons why the attack con- 
templated ought not to be made. After I had 
explained the enemy's positions, called attention 
to several pertinent circumstances, and made 
something of an argument. General Burnside asked 
General Sumner what he thought, and he replied 
that the troops had undergone such gi-eat fatigue 
and privation, and met with such a disaster, that it 
would not be prudent to make another attack so 
soon. General Hooker, who was lying full length 
upon a bed in one corner of the room, upon being 
appealed to by General Burnside, sat up and said 
in the most frank and decided manner that the 
attack ought not to be renewed that morning. 
Then a general consultation took place, in which 
all who were i)resent joined, the result of which was 
a verbal order, transmitted through nu\ counter- 
manding the arrangements for a second attack. 

Of those present at the first interview, on the 
Fredericksburg side, Generals Getty, Willcox, But- 
terfield, and probably several others whom I do 
not now remember, are living. The only survivors 
of the Pliillips house interview are General Frank- 
lin and myself. In one of his letters to me, dated 
Hartford, Conn., December 17th, ISCcJ, he .says: 

"... I distinctly ncoUo.l your talk to Hnniwidc. 
to whii'li you n-fiT, and had lu- ben ho talked fo bcf.irc 
lio crossed the rivir, many lives would have been saved, 
as well as iiineh ereilit to himself and reputation to tho 
Ballaiit Army of the Potoniae." 





WHEN General Burnside assumed the command of the Army of the 
Potomac on the 9tli of November, 1862, he gave up the immense 
strategic advantage which McClellan had gained, and led the army to Fal- 
mouth on the Eappahannock Eiver, opposite the city of Fredericksburg. A 
few days after his arrival on the Rappahannock he called a council of war. 
It was a conference rather than a council, for he stated that he called the 
generals together to make known something of his plans, and not to put any 
question l)efore them for decision. The grand division commanders, Sumner, 
Franklin, and Hooker, were present, and also, I think, the corps commanders. 
I was present as commander of the Sixth Army Corps. The entire army was 
massed within a few miles of Falmouth, and the first object was to cross the 
river in our front, and gain a fair field for a battle. From the same ground 
Hooker afterward marched north-west, and by a series of fine movements 
placed himself in a position to offer battle at Chancellorsville on at least 
ecjual terms. The outcome of Hooker's campaign belied its beginning, but it 
led to the battle of Gettysburg, which more than compensated in results for 
the previous failui'e. J 

General Burnside opened the conference by stating that within a few days 
he proposed to cross the river to offer battle to General Lee, and that after 
a close study of the reports of his engineers he had chosen Skinker's Neck as 

^ When General Burnside determined to occupy 
Fredericksburg it was not held hy a large force of 
the enemy. A body of cavalry, sent from Warren- 
ton, could have seized the place without serious 
opposition, and could have held it until the advance 
of the infantry came up. In the preliminary discus- 
sion of the move from Warreuton to Fredericks- 

burg, the notion that a serious battle was necessary 
to enable the army to get into Fredericksburg was 
not entertained by any one. Sumner, who had the 
advance, reported that when he arrived at Fal- 
mouth he could even then have occupied Freder- 
icksburg without opposition, had his orders justified 
liim in crossing the river.— W. B. Franklin. 



the point of crossing. Skinker's Neck is a shoe-shaped bend in the Rappa- 
hannock River, about twelve miles below Fredericksburg. It offered all 
the necessary military features for forcing a crossing, but, like Butler's 
famous " bottle " at Bermuda Hundred, also presented great facilities for pre- 
venting the egress of an army which had effected an entrance on its penin- 
sula. After developing to a limited extent his plans, the general said that 
any one present was at liberty to express his views on the subject. General 
Sumner, if I recollect aright, remarked only that he would do his utmost to 
carry out the plans of the commanding general. General Franklin said that 
we could doubtless effect a crossing at the designated place ; he assumed that 
the movements, after crossing, had been carefully studied, and he stood ready 
to execute any orders he might receive. General Hooker then said, in suh- 
stance, that it was j^reposterous to talk about our crossing the river in the 
face of Lee's army; that he would like to be in command of fifty thousand 
men on the other side of the river, and have an enemy make the attemx)t. I 
then stated that I would guarantee the crossing of the river if my command 
had the advance. General Bui*nside closed the conference by stating that 
his mind was made up ; that we must prepare our commands for the work 
before them ; and that w^e should receive the proper orders in due time. 

Three or four days after that I was at Burnside's headquarters, and he 
invited me to take a ride with him. Riding along on the hills near the river, 

?^«>=^- ■' 


The hills oociipied by Stonewall JacUson's « 

1 R<1M A WVIt-TIMi; nUlTOC.KAl'U. 

land aiv sctn in lln- tllHtnni'c. 



ii;r.!) AS si;i;\ i-i.-om iiaiiii.tdn's cijossim; ~ ii;i:i>i:i!I( ivsr.i 


he pointed out some fine positions for artillery, and said : " My reserve artil- 
lery has as yet had no chance to show its value, and I am going to make the 
crossing here and below, under cover of the guns of the reserve artillery." 

To this I replied, " You can cross here without great difficulty, for this 
bank dominates the other, but when your army is across your troubles will 
begin," calling his attention at the same time to the range of hiUs on the 
other side, a mile or more l)ack from the river. 

" Oh ! " said Burnside, " I know where Lee's forces are, and I expect to 
surprise him. I expect to cross and occupy the hills before Lee can bring 
anything serious to meet me." 

I then said, " If you are sure of that, there is no more to be said on the 

On parting Gleneral Burnside said, " I wish you to say nothing to any one 
about my change of plan. I will make it known at the proper time." 

Though General Franklin and myself were on the most intimate terms, and 
occupied the same tent, I gave him no hint of the change. Two or three 
days before the movement G-eneral Franklin was notified of the point selected 
for his crossing, and I then told him the story of the change of plan. 

He merely said, " Your command is the strongest, and you must take the 


As I remember, it was on the afternoon of the 10th of December that 
General Franklin received an order to have the head of his command at a 
designated jjoint on the river, about one and a half miles below Fredericks- 
burg, and since known as Franklin's Crossing, at daylight on the morning of 
the nth, where he would at once begin crossing by Ijridges which would be 
found ready. 

On the morning of the 11th of December, at 5 o'clock, the First Corps, 
under Major-Greneral John F. Reynolds, marched to take position at the 
bridges, and cover the crossing of the Sixth Corps over the Rappahannock. 
A brigade of the corps had mov^ed at 2 o'clock a. m., to protect the engineer 
troops while throwing the bridges, which were expected to be finished by day- 
light. The work was for a while suspended on account of the fire of sliarp- 
shooters, covered by some fishing-huts and a thicket on the opposite shore. 
Two batteries placed on the bank opened with canister and shell, and caused 
the enemy to disappear, and work was resumed. When the head of the 
Sixth Corps reached the bank at 7:30 A. m., only three or four pontoons of 
each bridge had been placed in position, and the bridges were not comiJeted 
till about 1 p. M. It was not until about 4 p. m. that I received orders to begin 
the crossing. 

General Devens's brigade held the post of honor and began the movement, 
using both bridges. One of the commanders of the leading regiments, more 
patriotic than wise, had placed his band at the head of the column, and 
it was ordered to begin playing as it reached the bridge. This threw the 
men on the bridges into "step," and for some minutes it looked as though 
both bridges must go down. Fortunately, through the reckless riding of a 
"Wild Irishman" on the staff, an order reached tlie colonel, and the nmsic 
was stopi^ed before any harm was done. 

The troops Were rapidly thrown across, when an order came to recross all 
but one brigade. This was done and General Devens's brigade was left to 
keep the bridge-head. The cause of this was that the upper bridges opposite 
the town, intended for the use of the right wing, had not yet l)een finished. 
Sharp-shooters in the ])rick houses near the river had interfered with the 
work, and the heavy guns of the reserve artillerj^ could not make the same 
impression on masonry walls that our field-batteries had produced on thicket 
and hut. Some volunteers finally crossed the river to Fredericksburg in 
boats and cleared the other bank, and the bridge was rapidly laid. 

Of (iourse all chance of effecting a surprise was now over, and if W(^ per- 
sisted in crossing we must figlit for the hills soutli of the river. There was, 
however, a very fine opportunity for turning what had l»een done into a 
feint, and crossing the main army elsewhere. But this was not done, and 

early on the morning of the TJth the Sixth Corps recommen 1 the ]>assago 

of the river, marched to the front about a mile, and formed line of battle. 
Its right was thrown across Deep Run, which, between the Sixth Corps and 
the river, was an impassal)l(^ stream, se})a rating us, until bridged, from the 
right wing of the army. In the right front was an open field, traversed by 
Deep Run from left to right, bounded by the Iiills and naiTowing as it 





approached a gorge a mile or more away. In front of the left and right at a 
distance of perhaps half a mile was the ridge of hills occupied by the enemy. 

The First Corps, imder Major-General John F. Reynolds, followed the 
Sixth, and, forming on its left, curved back across the Richmond road and 
rested its left on the Rapi)aliannock River. In its right front was the range of 
hills at a short distance, which broke away, leaving an open space on the 
left between it and the river. Here were two corps with an impassable stream 
on their right, a formidable range of hills occupied by the enemy covering 
almost their entire front, and at their back a river with two frail bridges con- 
necting its shores. It takes soldiers who do not believe that war is an art to 
be perfectly at their ease under such circumstances. 

General Franklin, General Reynolds, and myself were on the most intimate 
social and official terms. We always discussed questions of general interest 
to the command, and after General Reynolds had placed his corps in position 


we met and looked over the situation as it then appeared to us. We unani- 
mously agi-eed that there was but one thing to do, and that was to put the 
forty thousand men of the Left Grand Division into columns of assault on 
the right and left of the Richmond road, carry the ridge, and tm-ii Lee's right 
flank at any cost. To do this the Sixth Corps must be relieved from its xjosi- 
tion in line, where it was covering the bridge. This could only be done after 
dark, but as it woidd take some time to get the columns formed, and as it was 
necessary that the men should get some rest before morning, the work of prep- 
aration must begin directly after dusk. In coming to this conclusion we had 
consideri^d the fact that Lee being on the exterior had longer lines than those 
of our army, and that therefore he could not have force enough on his riglit 
to resist an assault by forty thousand men, and that the demonstration made 
on his left would prevent the withdrawal of any of his force from that flank. 
Besides this we had in front of Reynolds open country of sufficient width to 
turn the hills which terminated to the right of the Richmond road. 

About 5 p. M. General Burnside came to the left wing, and after he had 
taken a hurried gallop along the lines General Franklin asked him to go to 
his tent, and there gave him the above-described plan as the only one that 
in om* judgment offered a fair hope of success. When General Burnside left 
us we were all of the opinion that he agreed with us, and the last re(iuest, 
urgently pressed upon him, was that he should at once give the order for 
Birney's and Sickles's divisions of the Third Corps (Hooker's Center Grand 
Division) to cross the bridge and be ready to begin to relieve the Sixth Corps 
in the lines at dusk. Under the supposition that the orders asked for woidd 
soon be received. General Franklin ga^e General Reynolds and myself ordei-s 
to do all the preliminary work possible ; which being done, we returned to 
General Franklin's headquarters to await the arrival of the messenger from 
General Burnside. As the precious time passed by we fell to discussing the 
condition of affairs. Burnside had proposed to effect a surprise, and now 
before Lee could be attacked he would have had forty-eight hours for concen- 
tration against us and for fortifying his positions on the hills. Burnside Iiad 
persisted in crossing the river after all hope of a surprise hnd faded away, 
and now we must fight our way out under great disadvantages. Had Bnrnsi(k» 
been forced into a move by the Administration? Und(>r tlie circumstances 
would he make a desperate fight or only go far enough to keep u]) a))) lea ranees ? 
Whatever was in store for us the Left Grand Division was a unit in senii- 
ment; the men were brave and well disciplined, and wc^ felt sure lliat wiili 
our forty thousand men we could force back Lee's riglil Hank and get a 
better i)ositi()n for a general battle, if one were then necessary. Would 
P>urnsid(^ adopt our plan, and if so, why this delay whieli was costing us so 
nuieh valuable time f We had all known Burnside socially, long and inti- 
mately, but in his new position of grave responsibility he was to ns entirely 

The weary hours of that long winter night wore away in lliis |.i-olitl. ss 
manner until about .") o'(dock, when (Jeneral K*eyno!.Is said : "1 kii"W I have 
hard work ahead of me and I must get some sleej.. Send for me if I am 




wanted." General Franklin tlien sent an aide to headquarters, who returned 
with the answer that the orders would " come presently." 

The order came, I think, at 7:45 a. m. : "Keep your whole command in 
position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road." Two-thirds of 
the command (the Sixth Corps) was so placed that it coiild not move, without 
danger of losing the bridges, until relieved by other troops or until Lee's right 
wing should be in full retreat. " And you will send out at once a division, at 
least, to pass below Smithfield," — a hamlet occupied by Reynolds on the 
previous evening, — " to seize if possible the heights near Captain Hamilton's, 
on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its 
line of retreat open.'''' 

. The peculiar wording of the order is positive evidence that when it .was 
penned Burnside's mind was still filled with the fallacy of effecting a surprise. 
The order recites that the division to be sent out by Franklin — and also 
one to be jjushed forward by Sumner on the right — was to seize, or attempt 
to seize, certain heights. The military man is habituated to use the word seize 
when an unguarded position is to be occupied, or a point in the lines of the 
enemy left weak through ignorance or neglect is to be taken by a sudden rush. 
Both of these operations are in the nature of a military surprise. When an 
advantage is to be gained by hard fighting or the weight of a mass of troops, 
the word carrij is instinctively used. In corroboration of this proposition, I 
will state that in the third interview I had with Burnside, after the battle, he 
said, "I sliouLl have ordered Franklin to carry the heights at Captain Hamil- 
ton's at all hazards." \ 

"\.Just as CJeneral Burnside was leavinfj, shortly suredme I would have the orders before miduight. 

after nif^litfall, I asked to he permitted to order Had the permission been granted, the First and 

General Stoneman's eorps (the Tliird) to cross at Sixth Corps would have been in position for the at- 

once. He declined to give the permission, but as- tackby daylight, the Third Corps takingthe place of 





The Sixth Corps had two divisions in line and one in reserve. It remained 
in an exposed position during the day, and suffered severely from artillery 
fire, while the enemy in its front were well covered by woods and rifle-pits. 

In obedience to his orders Reynolds moved to the attack at 8:30 a. M.,with 
his center division under Meade, which was to be supported by the division of 
Gibbon on the right and next to the Sixth Corps. The third division, under 
Doubleday, was in reserve and guarding 
Meade's left, ik Meade crossed the ravine 
in his front, and directed his course to- 
ward a point of woods coming down 
from the heights. The artillery on the 
crest was silenced by three batteries, 
and Meade pushed on, supported on 
his right by Gibbon, and, after severe 
fighting, carried the crest, capturing flags, 
and prisoners. In the dense woods on 
the height, the connection with Gibbon 
was lost, and Meade, after a stubborn contest, was finally driven back, Gib- 
l)on yet holding his ground. Two regiments from the Third Corps arriving 
were sent to Gibbon's left, but were soon overpowert^d, and they were forced 
back with Gibbon. The enemy made a strong show of- following up their 
success, but the arrival of two fresh brigades from the Third Corps checked 
them and drove them back to their sheltered positions. Gibbon's division, 
after its retreat, was relieved by Sickles's division of the Third Corps. 
Newton's division, the reserves of the Sixth Corps, arrived. late in the after- 
noon and took position on the left, but was not engaged. The enemy's bat- 
teries on their extreme right, ha^4ng a reverse fire upon Mi^ade, wlien he 
advanced up the crest, maintained their position throughout the battles 
Owing to the foggy character of the day our artillery on the left bank of the 
Rappahannock was obliged to fire somewhat at random, and for the same reason 
the fire from the enemy's batteries was not very well du-ected. The contest 
ended at niglitfall, our troops having made no material permanent advance. 

The military reader will see that had Meade and Gil)l)on had beliind them, 
when they carried the enemy's lines, the 25,000 men of the Sixtli Corjts in- 
stead of 2 regiments, simply, of the Tliird Corps, the probaliihties would all 

tlio Rixtli, which woiihl luive attiiekod with the 
First Corps, Had the necessary orders been re- 
ceived, even by midnight, the movements wouhl 
liiive boon made under cover of the darkness, and 
tho whole iiiglit after midnight would have l)een 
r("(|uired to make them. It seems that (Jeneral 
IJiiruside went to bed as soon as lie arrived at his 
headquarters, and did not write the orders until 
I he next morning. None of my urgent messages 
sent to him during the night were delivered to 
him, although their receipt at head(iuarters was 

. It will be seen that the order sent by (IcMieral 
Burnsidf^ under which the attack was made is 

entirely dilTerent from that lor an attack by forty 
thousand men, which I luul a right to expect from 
what took place at our interview of the previous 
evening. And its receipt at 7:4.". in the morning 
[it was dated ;">:.">") A. M.], insteail of midnight, 
was unaccountable, except uiuler the siijiposition 
that Burnside, for some reason that was unknown 
to us on the left, disai)proved of the plan to which 
we thought he had assented, or that no serious at- 
tack was tobemade from theleft.—W. H. FkaNKUN. 
■5^ It came into action shortly aftt'r Meade's ad- 
vance, to repel a threatened attack fnuu a largo 
force of cavalry which developed between our left 
and the M:issaponax Creek.— W. H. Fraxklin. 



have been in favor of a 
success. When night fell 
there were no longer forty 
thousand men in the Left 
Grand Division, and we 
had gained no important 

After Meade's division 
had been withdrawn from 
the front he came to Gen- 
eral Franklin's headquar- 
ters, and on being asked 
some question about the 
light said, " I found it 
quite hot enough for me," 
taking off his slouched hat 
and showing two bullet- 
holes between which and 
the top of his head there 
must have been little space. 
During one of the feeble, 
skirmishing attacks made 


EROM AN ENGRAVmG BY H. B. HALL. ^^^.^^ ^^1^1' iu thC daV, 

Meade, who was still at headquarters, was expressing great uneasiness lest the 
enemy should break through and capture the bridges. General Franklin quieted 
him by saying that the Sixth Corps could not be driven from its position. 

" Mansfield," as the Bernard house was called, was a large, stone mansion, that 
looked down on the Rappahannock River close beneath it, and was approached 
by an imposing drive, while behind was an open grove of magnificent trees ; 
in this grove was the headquarters of General Franklin. The house was evi- 
dently one of Virginia's ancestral homes, and had been in former days the 
center of generous hospitality. Though under artillery fire, it was used as a 
temporary hospital, and in it the brave Bayard died. The grove was filled 
with saddled horses.^ not for the use of fair ladies and gay cavaliers, as in the 
olden time, but for staff-officers and orderlies to carry orders into the fight 
and bring back reports from the field. The testy owner, who remained about 
the house during the early part of the day, and whose word had been law for 
so many years to all the country side, did not realize, when he demanded the 
immediate evacuation of his premises, that he spoke to a man who com- 
manded 40,000 men, and one who on that day had little regard for proprietary 
i-iglits, and did not stand much in awe of a Virginia magnate or constable. J 

^Whoii I first arrivcil at tlic licniaril house I upon staying at the house to protect it. Eeyuolds 

found Mr. Bernard hokling a lively interview with on such occasions was a man of few words, and I 

Reynolds. It soenaed that Mr. Bernard protested presently saw Mr. Bernard hurrying toward the 

against the use of Lis house and grounds liy tlie pontoon-bridges between two soldiers, and he was 

troops because they would spoil Ihein, and insisted not seen again iu that vicinity.— W. B. Franklin. 



During this day, as in all days of battle, many sad and many linmorous 
incidents occuiTed. Some of the shots that were fired too high for the Une of 
battle went hurtling through the headquarters of General Franklin into the 
open grove of large trees. General George D. Bayard, much endeared to us 
by his social qualities and his rare merits as a cavalry leader, was mortally 
wounded by a round shot through the thigh. Bayard and his friend, Captain 
H. G. Gibson, commanding a battery of fljdng artillery, were within ten feet 
of Franklin, and were just rising from the ground to go to luncheon when 
the shot came. It severed Gibson's sword-belt without injury to him, and 
struck Bayard. Many generals could have better been spared from the service. 

A few days before the battle there had come to the Sixth Corps the first 
importation of bounty men. They had been placed in the front to save 
the veterans for heavy work, and 
as their wounded men were car- 
ried back through the ranks of the 
old soldiers, the latter would cry 
out, " Take good care of those men; 
they have cost the Government a 
great deal of money." The l:)ouuty 
men were at first a by- word and a 
cause of irritation to the real vol- 
unteers. During the afternoon, 
hearing some heavy musketry fir- 
ing in my front, I went to ascer- 
tain the cause, and while riding 
along behind a regiment lying with 
their faces to the ground, a round 
shot struck the knapsack of a sol- 
dier, and, cutting it open, sent a 
cloud of underclothes into the air, 
and high above them floated a scat- 
tei-ed pack of cards. The soldici-, 
hearing the shouts of laughtei', 
turned over to see what was the 
matter, and when he saw the mis- 
liap which had befallen him made 
a feeble effort to join in the laugh. 

Between 1 and 2 a. m. of Decern- k 

bei' 14th a council of war of the 
grand division commanders was ordere(l, ;i 
liis intention of leading the Ninth ('<)i-}»s ( 
against the works which the Second Corp.-^ 
Hancock, had failed to carry. For some reason the project was abantloned. 
[See p. 127.] During the next two days the Left Grand Division remained 
in position, with no disturbance except that produced by an angry skirmisli 
line with an occasional artillery engagement. 

VOL.111. 10 



J^ J^/i,Q^^^h^</H<^ 

(1 ( icMU'ral liiirnsii 

lie announced 

is oM commaiHl) 

in an assault 

leil liv such men 

as Couch and 


Oil Monday afternoon (the 15th) I received an order from Greneral Franklin, 
then detained at headquarters, to withdraw the Left Grand Division after 
dark to the left bank of the river, and what remained of the forty thousand 
men of that command recrossed during the night without loss and without 
molestation from the enemy. 

After the battle I had four interviews with Burnside. The first was on 
Sunday, the l-ith of December. I found him alone in his tent walking up 
and down, apparently in great distress of mind, and turning to me he said, 
"Oh! those men! oh! those men!" I asked what he meant, and he said, 
" Those men over there ! " pointing across the river where so many thousands 
lay dead and wounded, " I am thinking of them all the time." 

I made some remark about the fate of soldiers and changed the subject. 
Burnside also said that he did not lead the Ninth Corps to the charge as he 
had said he would, because the generals on the right made such statements with 
reference to the demoralization of their commands that he feared to make 
the attempt. After we had recrossed the river I saw him again, when he told 
me that he had it in his mind to relieve Sumner from command, place Hooker 
in arrest, and Franklin in command of the army. 

In the third interview General Reynolds was with me. Burnside said 
that the men on the left did not fight well enough. To this we replied that 
the list of killed and wounded proved the contrary. He then said, " I did 
not mean that ; I meant there were not muskets enough fired," adding, " I 
made a mistake in my order to Franklin ; I should have directed him to carry 
the hill at Hamilton's at all hazards." ■>:r 

At the fourth interview he stated that the mistake was that Franklin did 
not get the order early enough ; that he had started it at 4 o'clock in the 
morning, but that General Hardie, to whom the order was committed, had 
stopped an hour and a half in camp to get breakfast. I then told him that 
we should have had the order before midnight in order to form such a column 
of attack as we had proposed. 

For a few days General Burnside was dazed by the defeat and grief -stricken 
at the loss of life; but he soon recovered, and planned and attempted to carry 
out his harmless " Mud Campaign," his last at the head of the Army of the 

■5^ The Committee on the Conduct of the War their forces to such an extent that the position in front 

received from General Burnside responses to ques- could be easily stormed and carried." 

tions as follows • ^" " "^^ '^hat do you attribute his failure to accomplish 


<?. "Do I understand you to say tliat yon expected A. "To the great strength of the position, and the 

General Friinklin to carry tlir point at tlic extreme left accumulation of tlie enemy's forces there." 

of tin- rid-.' in Ww rear of tin- town, and tlicrchy enable General Burnside then explained that the delay 

°r'^z:i:i^:::"s::;::s::zt;;:i';::^z^:,.^, - '»"><>i"g /te bridge gave *» ene^y ,ime ,. 

done would have placed our forces in rear of tlieir ex- accumulate his forces before he was able to order 
treme right, and which I thought at the time would shake the attack. — W. B. FRANKLIN. 




BY J. H. MOORE, C. S. A. 

THE morning of the 13th [of December] dawned 
with a dense fog enveloping the plain and city 
of Fredericksbiu-g, thi-ough which the brilliant rays 
of the sun struggled aboiit 10 in the morning. 
In front of the right of the Confederate army 
was tlisplayed the vast force of Franklin, march- 
ing and countermarching, hastily seeking tlie 
places assigned for the coming conflict. Here was 
a vast plain, now peopled with an anny worthy 
of its gi'and dimensions. A slight but dazzling 
snow beneath, and a brilliant sun above, inten- 
sified the leaping reflections from thousands of 
gleaming bayonets. Officers, on restless horses, 
rushed from point to point in gay uniforms. Field- 
artillery was whisked into position as so many frag- 
ile toys. Kank and file, foot and liorse, small-arms 
and field-ordnance presented so magnificent a 
pageant as to call forth the unbounded admira- 
tion of their adversaries. In a word, this Avas the 
grandest martial scene of the war. The contrast 
between Stonewall Jackson's corps and Franklin's 
grand division was very marked, and so far as ap- 
pearances went the former was hardly better tiian 
a caricature of the latter. 

When all was in readiness, adjutants stepped to 
the front and, plainly in oin- view, read the orders 
of the day. This done, the fatal advance across the 
plain commenced. With gay pennants. State, regi- 
mental, and brigade standards flying, this magnifi- 

cent army advanced in three closely compacted 
lines of battle. At intervals, in front, preceded 
by horse-artillery and flanked on either side by 
numerous field-pieces, hundreds of heaAy field- 
pieces from the north bank of the Rappahannock 
belelied forth their missiles of destruetion and 
swept the plain in advance of Franklin's columns, 
while at the same moment his smaller field-pieces 
in front and on the flanks joined in to sweep the 
open space on all sides. This mighty cannonad- 
ing was answered by the Confederate onlnance. 
Onward, steady and imwavering, these three lines 
advanced, preceded by a lieavy skirmish line, till 
they neared the railroad, when Jackson's right and 
right center poured into these sturdy ranks a 
deadly volley from small-arms. Spaces, gaps, and 
wide chasms instantly told the tale of a most fatal 
encounter. Volley aft(>r volley of small-arms con- 
tinued the work of destruction, wliile .lackson's 
artillery jiosted on the Federal left and at right 
angles to their line of advance kept up a withering 
fire on the lessening ranks. The enemy advanced 
far in front of tlie Kiver road [and crossing tlio 
railroad cliarged tlie slopes upon whidi our troops 
were posted], but at length wavered, lialted, and 
suddenly retreated to the protection of the railroad 
embankments. The struggle was kept up by shaqv 
shooters for some time, wlien another general 
advance was made against a furious cannonade of 

} CoudeuHod from w article In tlio •'SoutUoru Bivouac " for Aufeniet, 1880. 




small-arms and artillery. Again the scene of de- 
struction was repeated ; still the Federals crossed 
the railroad, when a gap in Jackson's line between 
Archer's and Thomas's brigades was discovered by 
some of the assailants. [See map, p. 74.] This 
interval was rushed for by a part of Franklin's 
troops as a haven of safety, while the rest of his 
command was repulsed in confusion. 

The left of Archer's l)rigade, that is, the 14th 
Tennessee and 19th Georgia, commanded by 
Colonel Forbes, -jIV ^^^^ a part of the 7th Ten- 
nessee, commanded by Colonel Goodner, believing 
they were about to be surromided, gave way. 
Their comrades on the right, unaware of the 
condition of affairs on the left, and seeing the 
enemy routed in their fi'ont, were amazed at 
this confusion. Officers and men on the right 
were enraged at what seemed to bo cowardice, 
and, rushing towai'd the broken lines, leveled 
their pistols and muskets and fired into these 
fleeing comrades. 

Presently the true condition of affairs appeared 
when the victorious brigades of Franklin emerged 
from the woods. Line and field officers rushed to 
and fro, wildly shouting, "Into line, into line!" 
and, even in the face of a flanking foo, the gallant 
Colonel Turney, who temporarily commanded Arch- 
er's brigade, succeeded in re-forming his regiments 
at right angles to the former line of attack. This 
gave a brief check to the victors. Still the infantry 
and artillery fire scourged the line. The rout 

t!V Colonel W. A. Forbes, of the 14tli TonncRsee, was 
mortally wouncled at the second battle of Bull Run, and 
the regiment wns etminiMndcd at rrcdcrickslmrg by 
Llcutenant-fciloiicl ,l. w. Lockcii.— Kditoks. 

or cajiture of the Confederates seemed inevitable. 
Turney was struck by a minie-ball, which entered 
his mouth and came out at his neck, and his ap- 
parently lifeless body was hurriedly placed on a 
blanket, and four of his devoted followers attempted 
to carry him to the rear. They had not proceeded 
far when a shell burst among them, and they in 
turn lay helpless by the side of their bleeding com- 
mander.^j Colonel Goodner also did gallant ser- 
vice in preventing a rout, for. with a part of the 
7th that still held its ground, he formed a line at 
right angles to their former position, and aided in 
checking this dangerous reverse. 

Up to the time of the break in our line no one 
in the ranks apprehended any danger. Those in 
front and near this scene of defeat and confusion 
made desperate efforts to rally the men and pre- 
vent a stampede, for we looked for nothing but 
defeat or capture. We were unaware of the fact 
that we had any reserves. Presently Early's divis- 
ion, in the very mood and spirit that had character- 
ized Archer's brigade before the breaking of the 
lines, came at double-quick to our relief, jesting 
and yellijig at us : "Here comes old Jubal ! Let 
old Jubal straiglittMi that fence ! Jubal's boys are 
always getting Hill out o' trouble!" 

A desperate encounter followed. The Federals 
fought manfully, but the artillery on our right, to- 
gether with the small-arms, litei'ally mowed them 
down. Officers and men lost courage at the sight of 
their lessening ranks, and in the utmost confusion 

3j Colonel Turney, thus painfully and dangerously 
wounded, has, for the last fifteen years, served the 
Rtatc of Tennessee as one of its supreuje judges.— 
.T. H. M. 



they again sought the shelter of the railroad. 
Archer's brigade, of Jackson's corps, was on the 
extreme right of A. P. Hill's front line, composed 
of the following regiments, posted in the order 
named: 19th Georgia, 14th Tennessee, 7th Ten- 
nessee, 1st Tennessee, and extended from the in- 
terval or space left unoccupied by Gregg's brigade 
to the railroad curve near Hamilton's Crossing. 
We occupied groimd slightly higher than the level 
of the plain over which the Federals had to pass. 
In our immediate rear and left was an irregular 
growth of timber of varied size, which obstructed 
the view in the direction of the Gregg interval. 

As the battle opened in the morning, the enemy 
was plainly in our view, and we could distinctly see 
their approach to the railroad in our front and to 
the left, where in every attempt- to advance they 
halted. Now and then they woiild make an effort 
to advance from the railroad to our lines. We 
who were on the right had no trouble to repulse 
those in our front, and, in fact, we successfully met 
every assault made on the right, and that, too, with 
little or no loss. We regarded the efforts of the Fed- 
erals, so far as the right was concerned, as futile in 
the extreme. In fact, their assaults on this part of 
the line appeared like the marching of men to cer- 
tain defeat and slaughter. Our infantry fire, aided 
by fifteen pieces of artillery placed at our right, did 
terrible execution as the poor fellows emerged from 
a slight railroad cut in front of a part of om- line. | 

On the morning of the 13th General Jack- 
son rode down his lines dressed in a new suit, 
presented to him, as we understood, by General 
Stuart. Some of our men facetiously remarked 
that they prefen-ed seeing him with his i-usty 
old cap on, as they feared he wouldn't get down 
to work. He inspected all of his positions, 
riding alone. After halting near the extreme 
right, the artillery fire was begun, and here I 
had an excellent opportunity to see him under 
fire. I watched him closely, and was unable to 
detect the slightest change in his demeanor. In 
a few minutes he rode off in the direction of Lee's 

A very general impression prevails, and it is in 
a gi-eat measure confirmed by writers on Freder- 
icksburg, that Jackson's lines were strongly for- 
tified. This is not correct: we had no time to 
construct anything like fortifications. D. H. Hill's 
division had been at Port Royal, eighteen miles 
below Fredericksburg, to prevent the Federals fi-om 
crossing at that point ; he left Port Royal after the 
enemy had abandoned the project of crossing there, 
and did not reach the position assigned him until 
about daj'light of the morning of the battle. 

The next morning the scenes of caniage were 
heart-sickening. To intensify the hoiTible pic- 
ture, the dead and the mortally wounded were in 
many instances burned in the sedge-grass, which 
was set on fire by bursting shells. 

4 The report of General Jolm F. Reynolds, comniand- 
iug the Fii-st Coi-ps, coutuinH the followiu;; account of 
the engagement of his troops at Hamilton's Crossing: 
" About 8 : 30 A. M. Meade's division advanced across the 
Smithfleld ravine, formed in column of two brigades, 
with the artillery between them, the Third Brigade 
marching by the flank on the left and rear. It moved 
down the river some 50O or 600 jards, when it tiu-ned 
sharp to the right and crossed the Bowling Green road. 
The enemy's artillery opened tire from the crest and the 
angle of the Bowling Green road. I directed General 
Meade to put his column directly for the nearest point 
of wood, and, having gained the crest, to extend his 
attack along it to the extreme point of the heights, 
where most of the enemy's artillerj^ was ]»)st('d. As the 
column crossed the Bowling Green road the artillery of 
his division was ordered into position on the rise of the 
ground between this road and the railroad; Cooper's 
and Ransom's l)atteii('H, to the front, soon joined by 
Anisdcn'H, to oi>p()se those of the enemy on the crest, 
while Simpson's liad to be thrown to the left, to oppose 
that on till' Bowling (irocn road, which was taking the 
column in Hank. Hall's ))attery was at the same time 
thrown to the front, on the left of Gibbon's division, 
which was advancing in line on Meade's right. The 
artillery combat here raged furiously for some time, 
until that of the enemy was silenced, when all of our 
batteries were directed to sliell the wood, wliere his 
infantry was supposed to be posted. This was con- 
tinued some half-honr, when the column of Meade, 
advancing in tine order and with gallant determina- 
tion, was directed into the point of wood which ex- 
tended this side of the railroad, with instructions, when 
they carried the crest and road which ran along it in 
their fi-ont, to move the First Brigade along the road, 
the Second Brigade to advance aiid hold the road, while 
the Third moved across the open Held, to support the 
First in carrying the extreme point of the ridge. At 
this time I sent orders to General Gil)bon to advance, iti 
connection with General Meade, and carry the wood in 
Ills front. The advanc<> was made under the fire of the 
enemy's batteries on his right and front, to which (,;ili- 

bon's batteries replied, while those of Smith joined in 
on the right. 

"Meade's division successfully carried the wood in 
front, crossed the railroad, charged up the slope of the 
hill, and gained the road and edge of the wood, driving 
the enemy from his strong positions in the ditches and 
railroad cat, captnringthe flags of 2 regimeutsaud send- 
ing about 200 prisoners to the rear. At the same time 
Gibbon's division had <rossed the railroad and entered 
the wood, driving back the first line of the enemy and 
capturing a number of prisoners; but, from the dense 
character of the wood, the connection between his di- 
vision and Meade's was broken. The infantry combat 
was hero kept up with great spirit for a short time, 
when Meade's column was vigorously assailed by the 
enemy's nmsked force, and, after a severe contest, 
forced back. Two regiments of Berry's brigade, Bir- 
neys division, arrived al)out this time, and were Im- 
mediately tlirown into the wood on Gibbon's left, to the 
support of the line; l)ut they, too, were soon overpow- 
ered, and the whole line retiretl from the wood, Meade's 
in some confusion, and, after an inefTectual effort by 
General Meade and myself to rally them under the 
enemy's fire, that of the artillery having resumed almost 
its original intensity, I directed Geiiernl Meade to n»-form 
his division across the Bowling Green road, and ortlered 
the remainder of Berry's brigade, which had come up, 
to the supi)ort of the liatteries. 

'•The enemy, showing himself in strong force in the 
wood, scemeii disposed to follow onr retiring troops, 
Imt the arrival of the other brigades of Birney's division 
on tin' ground at this critical moment, to oec>ii>y our 
line of battle, materially aided in saving Hall's l>atlery, 
which was now seriously threat incd l>\ the eniiny.and, 
together with our artillery tire, soon drove him to his 
sheltered positions and cover, from which his infantry 
did not again niiiiear. 

"(Jcneral Gil)bon's division was assailed In turn In 
the same manner, and compelled to retire from the 
wood soon after Meade's." (Jcneral C. Feger Jackson 
( onunanding the Third Brigade of Meade's division, was 
killed within the enemy's lines.— Editoks. 



GENERAL W. F. Smith, in bis article on " Frank- 
lin's Left Grand Division" [p. 137], makes 
mention of a round shot that ripped open a sol- 
dier's knapsack and distributed his clothing and 
cards. It was not a round shot, but the second 
" bolt " that came from the Whitworth gun that the 
" Johnnies " had run in on our fiank. And although 
we were surprised and durafounded at this attack 
from a new arm that appeared to take in about 
five miles of our line, the boys could not forego 
their little joke ; so when that column of cards was 
thrown some twenty feet in the air, on all sides 
could be heard the cry, " Oh, deal me a hand! " 

Three other shots in that battle did queer work. 
Ours was the last brigade (the "Iron Brigade" 
under Meredith) to cross on the pontoons, and we 
came to a halt upon the river-bank, for a few mo- 
ments, before going into position among the big 
cotton-wood trees at the Bernard House. We had 
been paid off that day, and the gamblers began to 
play at cards the moment we halted. A man who 
was about to " straddle" a "fifty-cent blind" had 
his knapsack knocked from under him by a solid 
shot, and he "straddled" half a dozen soldiers, 
who were covered with a cart-load of dirt. This 
was the first shot from the ' ' Johnnies " on our left. 
Their second passed over the river and struck a 
paymaster's tent. The struggle between the pay- 
master and the stragglers for possession of the 
flying greenbacks was both exciting and ridiculous. 

The next day, December 13th, our officers and 
the enemy's batteries kept us on the jump. Dur- 
ing a moment's halt, behind a slight rise of ground, 
we lay down. A soldier facing to the rear was in 
earnest conversation with a comrade. Suddenly 
he made a terrific leap in air, and from the spot 
of ground on which he had been sitting a solid 
shot scooped a wheelbarrow-load of dirt. It was 
a clear ease of premonition, for the man could 
give no reason for having jumped. 

General Smith also speaks of the veterans' 
ridicule of the bounty men. The 24th Michigan 
became part of our brigade shortly after Antie- 
tam, and we were told they were mostly bounty 
men. [See below.] We made unmerciful sport of 
them, but never a joke or word of abuse did I hear 
after the 24th had shoTvn its mettle in the battle 
of Fredericksburg. 

On the evening of December 14th, General 
Doubleday wanted our regiment (the 2d Wiscon- 
sin) to go on picket and make an effort to stop the 
firing upon the picket-line, for the shots of the 
Confederates covered the whole field, and no one 
could get any rest. We had not been in the picket- 
line more than twenty minutes before we made a 
bargain with the " Rebs," and the firing ceased, 
and neither they nor ourselves pretended to keep 
under cover. But at daylight the 24th Michigan 
came to relieve us. Before they were fairly in 
line they opened fire upon the Confederates with- 
out the warning we had agreed to give. We yelled 
lustily, but the rattle of musketry drowned the 
sound, and many a confiding enemy was hit. This 
irritated the Confederates, who opened a savage 
fire, and the 24th Michigan were put upon their 
good behavior; it was with difficulty a general 
engagement was prevented. All that day, until 
about 4 o'clock, the picket-firing was intense ; it 
was abruptly ended by a Confederate challenging 
a 6th Wisconsin man to a fist-fight in the mid- 
dle of the turnpike. The combatants got the 
attention of both picket-lines, who declared the 
fight a " draw." They ended the matter with a 
coffee and tobacco trade and an agreement to do 
no more firing at picket-lines, unless an advance 
should be ordered. It was this agreement that 
enabled Lieutenant Rogers to save a long picket- 
line that was to have been sacrificed when we fell 

Racine, Wis., October 3d, 1886. 


SINCE Private Smith, above, mentions the 24th 
Michigan as "bounty men," let me state that 
in July, 1802, a war meeting held in Detroit to 
promote enlistments under Lincoln's call for 
300,000 men was broken up by the disturbance 
created by a large number of Confederate refugees 
from Windsor, Canada, with the aid of some anti- 
war men here. To wipe out the unexpected insult, 
a second war meeting was held, which resolved to 
raise immediately an entire regiment, — the 24th 
Michigan, — in Wayne County alone, in addition to 
its rcfiidar quota ; and within 20 days said regiment 
was recruited and mustered, 1027 strong. Not a 
man of us received a cent of State or county bounty. 
Each man, however, did receive, in .advance, one 
month's pay and $2;" of the regular $100 govern- 
ment bounty promised to all soldiers enlisting for 
two years ; G73 of the men who were credited to 
Detroit received sums varying from $25 to $.50 
apiece as a gratuity from patriotic friends, while 
the remaining 354 of us never received a cent. 

Assigned to the "Iron Brigade," our regiment 
shared its hardships till the spring of 18G5, when 
its remnant was sent to guard conscripts at Spring- 
field, 111., and formed the escort at President Lin- 
coln's funeral. At Gettysburg it suffered probably 
as great a loss as any regiment of its size. One of 
the first infantry regiments to engage the enemy 
in the first day's fight, it went into that battle with 
28 officers and 468 men; total, 496. It lost that 
day 24 officers and 339 men ; total, 363, of which 
number 272, or about bo per cent, of the command, 
were hilled and wounded ; 91 were taken prisoners, 
over a third of whom died in Southern prisons ; 
twice that day was its entire color-guard shot down, 
and only 3 officers and 95 men were left to respond 
at roll-call. General Wadsworth thus commended 
its conduct on that day : "Colonel Morrow, the only 
fault I find with you is that you fought the 24th 
Michigan too long, hut God only Icnows what would 
have become of us had you not held the ground as 
long as you did." 


The composition, losaea, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official 
Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded ; m w for mortally wounded ; m for captured or missing ; c for captured. 

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC— Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside. 

Escort, etc. : Oneida (N. Y.) Cav., Capt. Daniel P. Maun ; 
l8t U. S. Cav. (detachment), Capt. Marcus A. Reno ; A 
and E, 4th U. 8. Cav., Capt. James B. Mclntyre. Prov- 
ost Guard, Brig.-Gen. MarsenaR. Patrick: AandB, Me- 
Clellan (111.) Dragoons, Capts. George W. Shears and 
David C. Brown; G, 9th N. Y., Capt. Charles Child ; 93d 
N. Y., Col. John S. Crocker ; 2d U. S. Cav., Maj. Charles 
J. Whiting ; 8th U. S., Capt. Royal T. Frank. Volunteer 
Engineer Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Daniel P. Woodbury : 15th 
N. Y., Maj. James A. Magruder; 50th N. Y., Msy. Ira 
Spaulding. Brigade loss : k, 8 ; w, 48 = 56. Battalion 
JJ. S. Engineers, Lieut. Charles E. Cross. Loss : w, 1 ; 
m, 2 = 3. 

ABTiLi.ERY, Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Artillery Re- 
serve, Lieut.-Col. William Hays: 5th N. Y., Capt. Elijah 
D. Taft ; A, 1st Batt. N. Y., Capt. Otto Diederichs ; B, 1st 
Batt. N. Y., Capt. Adolph Voegelee; C, 1st Batt. N. Y., 
Lieut. Bemhard Wever ; D, 1st Batt. N. Y., Capt. Charles 
Kusserow; K, Ist U. S., Capt. WilUam M. Graham; A, 
2d U. S., Capt. John C. Tidball; G, 4th U. 8., Lieut. Mar- 
cus P. Miller; K, 5th U. S., Lieut. David H. Kinzie; C, 
32dMass. (train guard), Capt. Josiah C. Puller. Unat- 
tached Artillery, Maj. Thomas S. Trumbull : B, 1st 
Conn. Heavy, Capt. Albert F. Brooker; M, Ist Conn. 
Heavy, Capt. Franklin A. Pratt. Artillery reserve loss : 
w, 8. 


SECOND ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Darius N. Couch. 
Staff loss: w, 1. 

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Winfleld S. Hancock. Staff 
loss : w, 3. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell (w), Col. 
George W. von Schack : 5th N. H., Col. Edward E. Cross 
(w), Maj. E. E. Sturtevant (k), Capt. James E. Larkin, 
Capt. Horace T. H. Pierce ; 7th N. Y., Col. George W. 
von Schack, Capt. G. A. von Bransen; 61st N. Y., Col. 
Nelson A. Miles ^ (w) ; 64th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Enos C. 
Brooks; ^ 81st Pa., Col. II. Boyd McKeen (w), Capt. Will- 
iam Wilson ; 14.5th Pa., Col. Hiram L. Brown (w), Lieut.- 
Col. David B. McCreary. Brigade loss: k, 108; w, 729; 
m, 115 = 952. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. 
Meagher: 28th Mass., Col. Richard Byrnes; 63d N. Y., 
Maj. Joseph O'Neill (w), Capt. Patrick J. Condon; 69th 
N. Y., Col. Rol)ert Nugent (w), Capt. James Saunders ; 
88th N. Y., Col. Patrick Kiilly ; 116th Pa., Col. Dennis 
Heenan (w), Lieut.-Col. St. Clair A. MulhoUand (w), 
Lieut. Francis T. Quinlan. Brigade loss : k, 50 ; w, 421 ; 
m, 74 = 545. Third Brigade, Col. Samuel K. Zook : 27th 
Conn.. Col. Richard S. Bostwick; 2(1 Del., Col. William 
P. Baily (w); .52d N. Y., Col. Paul Frank; 57th N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Alford B. Chapman (w), M!\j. N. Garrow 
Throop (w), Capt. .Tames W. Britt ; 66th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. 
James H. Bull (k), Capt. Julius Wehle (k), Capt. John S. 
IlammcU (w), Lieut. James G. Derriekson ; .53d Pa., Col. 
John li. Brooke. Brigade loss: k, 60; w, 427; m, 40 = 
527. Artillery: B, Ist N. Y., Capt. Rufus D. Pettit ; C, 
4th U. 8., Lieut. Evan Thomas. Artillery loss : k, 1 ; w, 
4 = 5, 

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gcn. Oliver O. Howard. Staff 
loss: w, 1. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Sully: 19th Me., Col. 
Frederick I). Sewall, Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Heath; 15th 
Mass., Maj. I'liilbrick (w), Capt. John Murkland, 
Capt. Charles II. Watson ; 1st Co. Mass. Sharp-shooters, 
Capt. William Pliimer; Ist Minn., Col. Georg(> N. Mor 
gan; 2d Co. Minn. 8harp-.shootcr8, Capt. William F. 

Russell; 34th N. Y., Col. James A. Suiter; 82d N. Y. (2d 
Militia), Lieut.-Col. James Huston. Brigade loss : k, 14 ; 
w, 77 ; m, 31 = 122. Second Brigade, Col. Joshua T. Owtn : 
69th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Dennis O'Kane ; 71st Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
John Markoe; 72d Pa., Col. De Witt C.Baxter; lOCth 
Pa., Col. Turner G. Morehead. Brigade loss: k, 27: w, 
203; m, 28 = 258. Third Brigade, CoL Norman J. Hall: 
19th Mass., Capt. H. G. O. WejTuouth ; 20th Mass. Capt. 
George N. Macy; 7th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Henry Baxter 
(w), Maj. Thomas II. Hunt : 42d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. George 
N. Bomfoid; 59th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William Northedge; 
127th Pa., Col. William W. Jennings. Brigade loss : k, 
63; w, 419; m, 33=515. Artillery: A, 1st R. I., Capt. 
William A. Arnold ; B, 1st R. I., Capt. John G. Hazard- 
Ai'tillei-y loss : w, 18. 
THIRD DIVISION, Brlg.-Geu. William H. Fi-ench. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Nathan Kimball (w). Col. 
John S. Ma.son : 14th Ind., Ma^j. Elyah H. C. Cavins ; 
24th N. J., Col. Wm. B. Robertson ; 28th N. J., Col. Moses 
N. Wisewell (w), Lieut -Col. E. A. L. Roberts; 4th Ohio, 
Col. John S. Mason, Lieut.-Col. James H. Godman (,w), 
Capt. Gordon .\. Stewart ; 8th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frank- 
lin Sawyer ; 7th W. Va., Col. Joseiih Snider (wi, Lieut.-Col. 
Jonathan H. Lockwood. Brigade loss: k, 36; w, 420; 
m, 64 = 520. Second Brigade. Col. Oliver H. Palmer: 14th 
Conn., Lieut.-Col. Sauford H. Perkins (w), Capt. Samuel 
H. Davis; 108th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles J. Powers; 
130th Pa., Col. Henry I. Zinn (k), Capt. William M. Porter. 
Brigade loss : k, 20 ; w, 207 ; m, 04 = 291. Th ird Brigade, 
Col. John W. Andiews, Lieut.-Col. William Jameson, 
Lieut.-Col. John \V. Mar.shaU : 1st Del., Maj. Thomas A. 
Smyth ; 4th N. Y., Col. John D. MacGregor (w), Lieut.- 
Col. William Jameson, M;y. Charles W. Kruger; lOth N. 
Y., Col. John E. Bendix (w), Capt. Salmon Winchester 
(m w), Capt. George F. Hopper; 132d Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
Charles Albright. Brigade loss : k, 32 ; w, 271 ; m, 39 = 
342. Artillery: G, 1st N. Y., Capt. John D. Frank; G, 
Ist R. I., Capt. Charles D. Owen. Artillery loss: k, 1; 
w, 6 = 7. 

ARTILLERY RESERVE, Capt. Chaples H. Morgan : I, Ist 
U. S., Lieut. Edmund Kirby ; A, 4th U. S., Lieut. Rufua 
King, Jr. Artillery Reserve loss : w, 7. 

NINTH ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Will- 
cox. Escort: B, 6th N. Y. Cav., Capt. Hilhuan A. Hall ; 
C, 6th N. Y. Cav., Capt. William L. Heermance. 
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gcu. William W. Burns. 

First Brif/ade, Col. Orlando M. Poe : 2d Mich., Lieut.- 
Col. Louis Dillman ; 17th Mich., Col. Williani H. With- 
ington; 20th Mich., Col. Adolphus W. Williams: 79th N. 
Y.. Lieut.-Col. Davitl Morrison. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 
12 = 13. Second Brigade, Col. Benjamin C. Christ : J9th 
Mass., Licut.-Col. Joseph II. Barnes; 8th .Mich., MiO. 
Ralph Ely; 27th N. .1.. Col. George W. Mindil: N. 
Y., Lieut.-Col. Joseph (ierhardt; 50th Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas S. Brenholtz. Brigade loss: w, 7: ui, 1=8. 
Third Brigade, Col. Daniel L«'asure: Mass.. Col. 
Henry Bowman; 4.5th Pa., Col. Thomas Welsh; looth 
Pa., Lieut -Col. D.ivid A. Ix'ckey. Brigade loss : w. X 
Arlillen/: I), 1st N. Y., Capt. Thomas W. Osborn ; L 
and M. 3d IT. S., Lieut. Horace J. Hayden. .Vrtillery 
loss: w, 2; m, 1=3. 

SECOND DIVISION. Brig.-Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis. Staff 
loss: w, 1. 

First Brii/adc, Brig.-Gen. James Nagle: 2»J Md., Col. 
Thomas I?. Allard ; N. H.. C«d. Simon G. Griffln : 9th 
N. H.. I,i.ut.-Col. John \V. Babbitt ; 48th Pa., Col. Joshua 
K.Siglric<l; 7tli K. 1. Col. Zenus R. ; 12th K. I.. Col. 

) Comniaiideil Gist ami (Mlli X. Y.. ci.usdlldated. 




George H. Browne. Brigade loss : k, 31 ; w, 421 ; m, 48 
= 500. Second Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Edward Ferrero : 2l8t 
Mass., Col. William S. Clark; 35th Mass., Maj. Sidney 
WiUard (k), Capt. Stephen H. Andrews; 11th N. H., Col. 
Walter Harrimau ; 51st N, Y., Col. Robert B. Potter ; Slst 
Pa., Col. John F. Hartranft. Brigade loss : k, 60 ; w, 393 ; 
m, 38 = 491. Artillerij : L, 2d N. Y., Capt. Jacob Roeiner ; 
D, Pa., Capt. George W. Durell ; D, 1st R. I., Capt. Will- 
iam W. Buckley ; E, 4th U. S., Lieut. George Dickenson 
(k), Lieut. John Egau. Artillery loss : k, 3 ; w, 12 = 15. 
TUiKD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty. 

First Bngade, Col. Rush C. Hawkins : 10th N. H., Col. 
Michael T. Douohoe; 13th N. H., Col. Aaron F. Stevens; 
25th N. J., Col. Andrew Derrora ; 9th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. 
Edgar A. Kimball; 89th N. Y., Col. Harrison S. Fair- 
child ; 103d N. Y., Col. Benjamin Ringold. Brigade loss : 
k, 14 ; w, 187 ; m, 54i= 255. Second Brigade, Col. Edward 
Harlaud: 8th Conn., Maj. John E. Ward, Capt. Henry M. 
Hoyt; 11th Conn., Col. Grifflii A. Stedman, Jr.; 15th 
Conn., Lieut.-Col. Samuel Tolles ; 16th Conn., Capt. 
Charles L. Upham ; 2lHt Coun., Col. Arthur H. Dutton ; 
4th R. I.. Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Curtis (k), Maj. Martin 
P. Buflfum. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 29; m, 10 = 41. 
Artillery: E, 2d U. S., Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin; A, 
5th U. S., Lieut. James Gilliss. 

CAVALRY DIVISION. Brig.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. 

First Brigade,BTig.-Gen. JohnF. Farnsworth: 8th 111., 
Col. William Gamble; 3d Ind., Maj. George H. Chap- 
man; 8th N. Y., Col. BenjamiD F.Davis. Second Bri- 
gade, Col. David McM. Gregg, Col. Thomas C. Devin: 
6th N. Y., Col. Thomas C. Devin, Lieut.-Col. Duncan 
Mc Vicar ; 8th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Amos E. Griffiths ; 6th U. 
8., Capt. George C. Cram. Artillery : M, 2d U. S., Lieut. 
Alexander C. M. Pennington, Jr. 

CENTER GRAND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Jos. Hooker. 

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. George Stoueman. 
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. David B. Birney. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson : 20th Ind., 
Col. John Van Valkenburg; 63d Pa., Maj. John A. 
Danks; 68th Pa., Col. Andrew H. Tippin; 105th Pa., Col. 
Amor A. MoKnight; 114th Pa.. Col. Charles H. T. Col- 
lis; 141st Pa., Col. Henry J. Madill. Brigade loss: 
k, 14; w, 106; m, 26=146. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
J. H. Hobart Ward: 3d Me., Col. Moses B, Lake- 
man; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker; 38th N. Y., Lieut.- 
Col. William Birney (w) ; 40th N, Y., Lieut.-Col. Nelson 
A. Gesner (w) ; 55th N. Y., Col. P. Regis de Trobriand ; 57th 
Pa., CoL Charles T. Cami)b(!ll (w), Lieut.-Col. Peter 
Sides; 99th Pa.. Col. Asher S. Leidy (w), Lieut.-Col. 
Edwin R. Biles. Brigade loss : k, 79 ; w, 397 ; m, 153 = 629. 
Third Bngade, Brig.-Gen. Hiram G. Berry: 17th Me., 
Col. Thomas A. Roberts; 3d Mich., Maj. Moses B. 
Houghton; 5th Mieh., Lieut.-Col. John Gilluly (k), Maj. 
Edward T. Sherlock; 1st N. Y., Col. J. Frederick Pier- 
son ; 37th N. Y., Col. Samuel B. Haymau ; lOlst N. Y.. 
Col. George F. Chester. Brigade loss : k, 19 ; w, 144 ; m, 
2 = 165. Artillery, Capt. George E. Randolph : E, 1st R. 
L, Lieut. Pardon S. Jastram ; F and K, 3d U. S., Lieut. 
John G. Turnbull. Artillery loss : k, 2 ; w, 8= 10. 
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gon. Daniel E. Sickles. 

First Brigade, Brif^.-Ocn. Jo.scpli B. Carr: 1st Mass., 
Lieut.-Col. ClarkB. Kalilwin, Col. Napoleon B. McLaugh- 
len; 11th Mass., Col. Williani I'.laisdcll; 16th Mass., Col 
Thomas R. Tannatt; id N. H., Col. Gilman Marston ; 
11th N. J., Col. Robert McAlli.ster; 26th Pa.. Lieut.-Col. 
Benjamin C. Tilghman. Brigade loss : k, 11 ; w, 68 ; m, 2 
= 81. Second Brigade, Col. George B. Hall: 70th N. Y., 
Col. J. Egbert Faniuiii ; 71st N. Y., Maj. Thomas Rafl'erty ; 
72d N. Y., Col. William O. Stevens; 73d N. Y., Col. Will- 
iam R. Brewster; 74th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William H. 
I^uusbury ; 120th N. Y., Col. George H. Sharpe. Brigade 
loss: w, 16. Third Brit/ade. Brig.-Gen. Joseph W. Re- 
vere: 5th N. J., Col. William J. Sewell ; 6th N. J., Col. 
George C. Burling; 7th N. .L, Col. Louis R. Froneiue ; 
8th N. J., (;ol. Adolphus J. Johnson ; 2d N. Y., Col. Sid- 
ney W. Park; 115th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William A. Olmsted. 
Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 1 = 2. Artillery, Capt. James E. 
Smith : 2d N. J., Capt. A. Judson Clark ; 4th N. Y.. Lieut. 
Joseph E. Nairn; H, 1st U. S., Lieut. Justin E. Dimick; 
K, 4th U. 8., Lieut. Francis W. Seeloy. Artillery loss : m, 1. 

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Amiel W. Whipple. Staff 
loss: m, 1. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. Sanders Piatt, Col. Emlen 
Franklin : 86th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Barna J. Chapin ; 124th 
N. Y., Col. A. Van Home Ellis; 122d Pa., Col. Emlen 
Franklin. Brigade loss : w, 3 ; m, 6 = 9. Second Brigade, 
Col. Samuel 8. Carroll : 12th N. H., Col. Joseph H. Pot- 
ter; 163d N. Y., Maj. James J. Byrne; 84th Pa., Col. 
Samuel M. Bowman ; lioth Pa., Lieut.-Col. James 
Crowther. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 88; m, 11 = 118. Artil- 
lery : 10th N. Y., Capt. John T. Bruen ; 11th N. Y., Capt. 
Albert A. von Puttkauimer; H, Ist Ohio, Lieut. George 
W. Norton. Artillery loss : w, 1. 

FIFTH ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Butterfleld. 
Staff loss: k, 1 ; w,l=2. 
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin. 

First Brigade, Col. James Barnes : 2d Me., Lieut.-Col. 
George Varney (w), Maj. Daniel F. Sargent ; 2d Co. Mass. 
Sharp-shooters, Capt. Lewis E. Wentworth ; 18th Mass., 
Lieut.-Col. Joseph Hayes; 22d Mass., Lieut.-Col. William 
8. Tilton ; Ist Mich., Lieut.-Col. Ira C. Abbott (w) ; 13th 
N. Y., Col. Elisha G. Marshall (w), Lieut.-Col. Francis A. 
Schoeffel; 25th N. Y., Capt. Patrick Connelly ; 118th Pa., 
Lieut.-Col. James Gwyn. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 381; 
m, 89=500. Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer: 
9th Mass., Col. Patrick R. Guiney ; 32dMas8., Col. Fran- 
cis J. Parker ; 4th Mich., Lieut.-Col. George W. Lumbard ; 
14th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Davies ; 62d Pa., Lieut.- 
Col. James C. Hull. Brigade loss, k, 23 ; w, 193; m, 6 = 
222. Third Brigade, Col. T. B. W. Stockton : 20th Me., 
Col. Adalbert Ames ; Brady's Co. Mich. Shai-p-shoot- 
ers, Lieut. Jonas H. Titus, Jr. ; 16th Mich., Lieut.-Col. 
Norval E. Welch; 12th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Robert M. 
Richardson; 17th N. Y., Capt. John Vickers; 44th N. 
Y., Lieut.-Col. Freeman Conner (w), Maj. Edward B. 
Knox; 83d Pa., Col. Strong Vincent. Brigade loss: 
k, 18 ; w, 158 ; m, 25 = 201. Artillery : 3d Mass., Capt. 
Augustus P. Martin; 5th Mass., Capt. Charles A. 
Phillips ; C, 1 st R. I. , Capt. Richard Waterman ; D, 
.5th U. S., Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett. Artillery loss: 
k, 2; w, 1 = 3. Sharji-shooters : 1st U. 8., Lieut.-Col. 
Casper Trepp. 
SECOND DIVISION, Brlg.-Geu. George Sykes. 

First Brigade, Lieut.-Col. Robert C. Buchanan : 3d U. 
S., Capt. John D. Wilkins ; 4th U. S., Capt. Htram Dryer; Battalion, 12th U. S., Capt. Matthew M. Blunt; 2d 
BattaUon, 12th U. 8., Capt. Thomas M. Anderson ; 1st 
Battalion, 14th U. S., Capt. John D. O'Connell ; 2d Bat- 
talion, 14th U. S., Capt. Giles B. Overton. Brigade loss: 
k, 5 ; w, 42 ; m, 4 = 51. Second Brigade, Maj. George L. 
Andrews, Maj. Charles S. Lovell : 1st and 2d U. 8. (battal- 
ion), Capt. Salem S. Marsh; 6th U. S., Capt. Levi C. 
Bootes; 7th U. 8. (battalion), Capt. David P. Hancock; 
10th U. S., Capt. Henry E. Mayuadier ; 11th U. S., Capt, 
Charles S. RusseU ; 17th and 19th U. 8. (battalion), Capt. 
John r. Wales. Brigade loss : k, 12; w, 114 ; m, H = 140. 
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. GouverneurK. Warren : 5th N. 
Y., Col. Cleveland Winslow; 140th N. Y., Col. Patrick H, 
O'Rorke; 146th N. Y'., Col. Kenner Garrard. Brigade 
loss : w, 6 ; m, 30 =36. Artillery : L, 1st Oliio, Lieut. Fred- 
erick Dorries ; I, 5th U. 8., Lieut. Malbone F. Watson. 
Artillery loss : w, 1. 

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys. 
Staff loss : w, 3. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Erastus B. Tyler : 91et Pa., 
Col. Edgar M. Gregory (w) ; I26th Pa., CoL James G. El- 
der (w), Lieut.-CoL David W. Rowe; 129th Pa., Col. 
Jacob G. Frick; 134th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Edward O'Brien. 
Brigade loss : k, 52 ; w, 321 ; m, 81 =454. Second Brigade, 
Col. Peter H. AUabach : 123d Pa., CoL John B. Clark; 
131st Pa., Lieut.-Col. William B. Shaut : 133d Pa., CoL 
Franklin B. Speakman ; 1.55th Pa., Col. Edw.ard J. AUeu. 
Brigade loss: k. 63; w, 448; n],.51=562. Artillery: C, 
1st N. Y.. I>ieut. William H. Phillips; E and G, Ist U. 8., 
Capt. Alanson M. Randol. 

CAVALRY BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. W^illiara W. Averell : 
Ist Mass., Col. Horace B. Sargent; 3d Pa., Lieut.-CoL 
Edward 8. Jones ; 4th Pa., Col. James K. Kerr ; 5th U. 8., 
Capt. James E. Harrison. Brigade loss: k, 1. Artillery: 
B and L, 2d U. 8., Capt. James M. Robertson. 



LEFT GRAND DIVISION, Maj.-Gou. William B. 

Escort: Gtli Pa. Cav., Col. Richard H. Rush. 

FIRST ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gea. John F. Reynolds. 

EscoH : L, l8t Me. Cav., Capt, Constantino Taylor. 
Escort loss : w, 3. 
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Abner Doubleday. 

First Brigade, Col. Walter Phelps, Jr.: 22d N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. John McKie, Jr.; 24th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Sam- 
uel R. Beardsley; 30th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Morgan H. 
Chrysler; 84th N. Y. (14th Militia), Lieut.-Col. William 
H. de Bevoise; 2d U. S. Sharp-shooters, Maj. Homer R. 
Stoughton. Brigade loss: k, 3 ; w, 24; m, 3=30. Sec- 
ond Brigade, Col. James Gavin: 7th Ind., Lieut.-Col. 
John F. Cheek; 76th N. Y., Col. William P. Wainwright; 
95th N. Y., Col. George H. Biddle ; 56th Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
J. William Hofmanu. Brigade loss: k, 5 ; w, 21=26. 
Third Brigade, Col. WilUam F. Rogers : 21st N. Y., Capt. 
George N. Layton ; 23d N. Y., Col. Henry C. Hoffman ; 
35th N. Y., Col. Newton B. Lord ; 80th N. Y'. (20th Militia), 
Lieut.-Col. Jacob B. Hardenbergh. Brigade loss : k, 10 ; 
w, 54; m, 3 = 67. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Solomon 
Meredith, Col. Lysauder Cutler: 19th Ind., Lieut.-Col. 
Samuel J. Williams; 24th Mich., Col. Henry A. Mor- 
row ; 2d Wis., Col. Lucius Fairchild ; 6th Wis., Col. Ly- 
sander Cutler, Lieut.-Col. Edward S. Bragg; 7th Wis., 
Col. William W. Robinson. Brigade loss : k, 9 ; w, 40 ; 
m, 16 =65. Artillenj, Capt. George A. Gerrish (w), Capt. 
John A. Reynolds : 1st N. H., Lieut. Frederick M. Edgell ; 
L, Ist N. Y., Capt. John A. Reynolds; B, 4th U. S.. 
Lieut. James Stewart. Artillery loss : k, 4 ; w, 22 =26. 
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gcu. John Gibbon (w), Brig.- 
Gen. Nelson Taylor. Staff loss : w, 1. 

First Brigade, Col. Adrian R. Root : 16th Me., Lieut.- 
Col. Charles W. Tilden ; 94th N. Y., Maj. John A. Kress ; 
104th N. Y., Maj. Gilbert G. Prey; lOoth N. Y., Maj. 
Daniel A. Sharp (w), Capt. Abraham Moore; 107th Pa., 
Col. Thomas F. McCoy. Brigade loss : k, 47 ; w, 373 ; m, 
55 = 475. Second Brigade, Col. Peter Lyle : 12th Mass., 
Col. James L. Bates; 26th N. Y., Lieut.-Col, Gilbert S. 
Jennings, Maj. Ezra F. Wetmore ; 90th Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
William A. Leech ; 136th Pa., Col. Thomas M. Bayne. 
Brigade loss : k, 51 ; w, 377 ; m, 32 = 460. Third Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Nelson Taylor, Col. Samuel H. Leonard; 13th 
Mass., Col. Samuel H. Leonard, Lieut.-Col. N. Walter 
Batchelder; 83d N. Y'. (9th Militia*, Capt. John Hen- 
drickson (w), Capt. Joseph A. Moesch (w), Lieut. Isaac E. 
Hoagland; 97th N. Y., Col. Charles Wheelock; 11th Pa., 
Col. Richard Coulter (w), Capt. Christian Kuhn; 88th 
Pa., Maj. David A. Griffith. Brigade loss : k, 41 ; w, 
258; m, 15=314. Artillery, Capt. George F. Leppion : 
2d Me., Capt. James A. Hall; 5tU Me., Capt. George 

F. Leppien; C, Pa., Capt. James Thompson; F, 1st 
Pa., Lieut. R. Bruce Ricketts. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 
15 = 17. 

THiuD DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. George G. Meade. 

First Brigade, Col. William Sinclair (wi. Col. William 
McCandle-ss: Ist Pa. Rc.-icrvcs, Cai«t. William C. Talley; 
2d Pa. Reserves, Col. William .M.-Candh'.-^s, Capt. Timo- 
thy Mealey; 6th Pa. RoMcrvrw, Maj Wellington H. Ent; 
13th Pa. Reserves (tst Uilhs), Caiit. Cliarlcs F.Taylor; 
121.stPa., Col. Cliaimiaii Rrigud.' k. 47 ; w, 
386; m, 77 = 510. Seroiid lirigadr. Col. Albert L. Magil- 
tou: 3d Pa. Reserves, Col. Horatio (}. Sickel; 4th Pa. 
R(^serves, Lieut. -( 'id. Richard II. Woolworth; 7th Pa. 
Reserves, Col. Henry C. Bolinger; 8th Pa. Reserves, 
Mil,). Silas M. Baily; 142d Pa., Col. Robert P. Cummins. 
Brigade loss: k, 65; w, 420; ju, 141 =0:12. Third lirigadr, 
Brig.-Gen. C. Foger Jackson (k). Col. Josei)li W. Fisher, 
Lieut. -Col. Robert Anderson: 5th Pa. Reserves, Col. 
Josei)li W. Fisher, Lieut.-Col. George Dare; 9th Pa. Re- 
servis, Lieut.-Col. Robert Anderson, Maj. James MeK. 
Hnodgrass; loth Pa. Reserves, M.ij. James B. Knox; 
11th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. Sanniel M. Jackson ; 12tli 
Pa. Reserves, Capt. Richard Gustiu. Brigade loss: k. 
66; w, 410; in, 215 = 681. Artillery: A, Pa., Lieut. 
John G. Simpson; B, 1st Pa., Capt. James H. Cooper ; 

G, Ist Pa., Capt. Frank P. Amsdon ; C, 5tli IT. S., 
Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom. Artillery loss : k, 7; w, 19; 
m, 4 = 30. 

SIXTH ARMY' CORPS, Maj.-Gen. WiUiam F. Smith. 

Escort: L, 10th N. Y. Cav., Lieut. George Vanderbilt; 
I, 6th Pa. Cav., Capt. James Starr; K, 6th Pa. Cav., 
Capt. Fi'ederick C. Newhall. 
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William T. H. Brooke. 

First Brigade, Col. Alfred T. A.Torbert: 1st N. J., Lieut.- 
Col. Mark W. Collet; 2d N. J., Col. Samuel L. Buck ; 3d 
N. J., Col. Henry W. Brown ; 4th N. J., Col. William B. 
Hatch (w), Lieut.-Col. James N. Duffy; 15th N. J., Lieut.- 
Col. Edward L. Campbell; 23d N. J., Col. Henry O. 
Ryerson. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 94; m, 50 = 162. Sec- 
ond Brigade, Col, Henry L. Cake : 5th Me., Col. Edward 
A. Scammon; 16th N. Y.,Col. Joel J. Seaver; 27th N.Y'., 
Col. Alexander D. Adams; 121st N. Y., Col. Emory 
Upton; 96th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Peter A. Filbert. Brigade 
loss: k, 4; w, 13 = 17. Third Brigade, Britr.-Gen. David 
A. Russell: 18th N. Y., Col. George R. Myers; 31st N. 
Y., Lieut.-Col. Leopold C. Newman; 32d N. Y.. Capt. 
Charles Hubbs; 95th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Elisha Hall. Bri- 
gade loss: w, 10. Artillery: A, Md., Capt. John W. 
Wolcott; Ist Mass., Capt. William H. McCartney; Ist 
N. J., Capt. WiUiam Hexamer; D, 2d U. S., Lieut. Ed- 
ward B. Williston. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 6=8. 
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gcn. Calvin E. Pratt: 6th Me., 
Col. Hiram Burnham; 43d N. Y^, Col. Beiyamin F. 
Baker; 49th Pa., Col. William H. Irwin; 119th Pa., Col. 
Peter C. Ellmaker; 5th Wis., Col. Amasa Cobb. Brigade 
loss: w, 23; m, 3 = 26. Second Brigade, Col. Henry 
Whiting: 26th N. J., Col. Andrew J. Morrison; 2d 
Vt., Lieut.-CoL Charles H. Joyce; 3d Vt., Col. Breed 
N. Hyde; 4th Vt., Col. Charles B. Stoughton; 5th Vt., 
Col. Lewis A. Grant; 6th Vt., Col. Nathan Lord, Jr. 
Brigade loss: k, 21 ; w, 121 ; m, 2 =144. Third Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Francis L. Vinton (w). Col. Robert F. Taylor. 
Brig.-Gen. Thomas II. Neill : 21st N. J., Col. Gilliam 
VanHouten; 20th N.Y'., Col. Ernst von Vegesack; 33d 
N. Y'., Col. Robert F. Taylor; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D. 
Bidwell; 77th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Winsor B. French. 
Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 14=15. Artillery: B, Md., Capt, 
Alonzo Snow; 1st N. Y'., Capt. Andrew Cowan ; 3d N. Y., 
Lieut. William A. Harn ; F, 5th U. 8., Lieut. Leouai-d 
Martin. Artillery loss ; w, 1. 
THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Geu. John Newton. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gcn. John Cochrane: 65th N. Y., 
Col. Alexander Shaler; 67th N. Y., Col. Nelson Cross; 
122d N. Y.,Col. Silas Titus; 23d Pa., M;y. John F. Glenn; 
61st Pa., Col. George C. Spear; 82d Pa., Col. David H. 
Williams. Brigade loss: k, 2 ; w, 19 ; m, 3 = 24. Second 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charh's Devens, Jr. : 7th Mass., 
Lieut.-Col. Franklin P. Harlow; 10th Mass., Col. Henry 
L, Eustis; 37th Mass., Colonel Oliver Edwards; 36th N. 
Y., Col. William H. Browne; 2d R. I.. Col. Frank 
Wheaton, Lieut.-Col. Nelson Viall. Brigade loss : k, 3 ; 
w, 14 =17. Third Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Rowley, Brig.- 
Gen. Frank Wheaton: 62d N. Y'., M:y. Wilson Hubbell ; 
93d Pa., Maj. John M. Mark ; 98th Pa.. Lieut.-Col. Adolph 
Mehler; 102d Pa.. Lieut.-Col. Joseph M. Kinkead ; 139tb 
Pa., Lieut.-Col. James D. Owens. Brigade lo.<s : w. 6; 
m, 6 =12. Artillery : C. 1st Pa.. Capt. Jeremiah McCar- 
thy ; D. 1st Pa., Capt. Michael Hall; G. 2d U. S.. Lieut. 
John H. Butler. Artillery loss : k, 2 ; w, 8 = 10. 

CAVALRY BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. George I). Bayanl 
(k). Col. David McM. Gregg: Indep't Co.. I). C.. Lieut. 
Williams H. Orton ; 1st Me.. Lieut.-Ctd. Calvin S. Douty ; 
Ist N. J.. Lieut.-Col. Joseph Kargo ; 2d N. Y.. Mii,i. Henry 
E. Davies; 10th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William Irvine; 1st 
Pa., Col. Owen Jcmes. Brigade loss : k. 1; w, 3=4. Ar- 
tillery: C, :}d IT. S.. Capt. Horatio G. Gibson. 

Total Union : killed. 1284; wounded. 9«M)0: capt- 
ured or missimi. 17C.9 = 12.653. 

Refiarding the strength of his army on the morning of 
December i:tth. General Burnsid.' says ("Ollieial Ree- 
ords,'" Vol. XXL, p. 90) : "The forces now under com- 
mand of (loneral Franklin consisted of ab..ut CO.OOOnien. 
assln)wn by the mornim: reports, ami was composed a« 
follows: sixth Corps. 21.0(H): First (^>rps. 18..'i00: Thini 
Corps (two divisions). lO.(HX): Ninth Corps (Burns's divls- 
i(mi. 4000 ; Bayard's cavalry. 3500. General Sumner had 
about 27.000 men, comprising his own grand division, 



except Biirns's division of the NintU Corps. General According to Burnside's return for December lOth 

Hooker's command was about 26,000 strong, two of ("Oflticial Records," Vol. XXI., p. 1121), tlie "present for 

General Stoneman's divisions having reported to Gen- duty equippod," or available for luie of battle, was 

eral Franklin." These numbers aggregate 113,000. 104,903 infantry, 5884 cavalry, and 5896 artiUery =116,683. 



FIRST ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet. 
McLAWs's DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. Lafayette McLaws. Staff 
loss: k, 1; w, 1 = 2. 

Eershato's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw : 
2dS. C, Col. John D. Kennedy; 3d S. C, Col. James D. 
Nance (w), Lieut.-Col. William D. Rutherford (w), Maj. 
Robert C. Maffett (w;, Capt. William W. Hance (w), Capt. 
John C. Summer (k), Capt. John K. G. Nance; 7th S. C, 
Lieut.-Col. Elbert Bland; 8th 8. C, Capt. E. T. Stack- 
house; 15th S. C, Col. W. D. De Saussure; 3d S. C. Bat- 
talion, Lieut.-Col. W. G. Rice. Brigade loss : k, 38 ; w, 
341—379. Barksdale's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William 
Barksdale: 13th Miss., Col. J. W. Carter; 17th Miss., 
Lieut.-Col. John C Fiser ; 18th Miss., Lieut.-Col. WlUiam 
H. Luse; 2l8t Miss., Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys. 
Brigade loss : k, 29 ; w, 151 ; m, 62 = 242. Cobb's Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Thomas R. R. Cobb (m w), Col. Robert Mc- 
Millan : 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan; 18th Ga., Lieut.- 
Col. 8. Z. Ruff; 24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan ; Cobb 

(Ga.) Legion, ; "^ PhilUps (Ga.) Legion, CoL B. F. 

Cook. Brigade loss : k, 33 ; w, 198 ; m, 4 = 235. Semtnes's 

Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Paul J. Semmes : 10th Ga., ; 

60th Ga., ; 51st Ga., ; 53d Ga., . Brigade 

loss: w, 4. ArtiUery, Col. Henry C. Cabell: N. C. Bat- 
tery, Capt. Basil C. Manly ; Ga. Battery, Capt. J. P. W. 
Read; 1st Richmond (Va.) Howitzers, Capt. E. S. Mc- 
Carthy; Ga. Battery (Troup Art'y), Capt. Henry H. 
Carlton. Artillery loss : w, 2. (Colonel CabeU also com- 
manded Nelson's battalion, and Branch's, Cooper's 
Dearing's, Ells's, Eubank's, Lane's, Macon's, and Ross's 
ANDERSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. Richard H. Anderson. 

Wilcox's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox: 8th 

Ala.. ; 9th Ala., ; lOth Ala., ; 11th Ala.. 

; 14th Ala., . Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 15=18. 

Mahone's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone: 6th Va., 

; 12th Va., ; 16th Va., ; 41st Va., ; 

61st Va., . Brigade loss :k, 2 ; w, 6 = 8. Feathcrston's 

Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. S. Featherston : 12th Miss., ; 

16th Miss.. ; 19th Miss.. ; 48th Miss. (5 co's), 

. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 38 = 43. Wright's Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright : 3d Ga., Col. Edward J. Walker; 
22d Ga., ; 48th Ga., Capt. M. R. Hall ; 2d Ga. Bat- 
talion, Capt. C. J. Moffott. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 1=3. 

Perry's Brigade, Brig.-(}en. E. A. Perry : 2d Fla., ; 

5th Fla., ; 8th Fla.. Capt. David Lang (w), Capt. 

Thomas R. Love. Brii,^i(lo. Iohh: k, 7; w, 38; m, 44 = 89. 
Artillery: La. Battery (Doiiiild.sonville Art'y), Capt. Vic- 
tor Maurin ; Va. Battery, (aiit. Frank Hugor; Va. Bat- 
tery, Capt. John W. Lewis ; Va. Battery (Norfolk Light 
Art'y Blues), Lieut. William T. Peet. Artillery loss : k, 
1; w, 8 = 9. 
PICKETT'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. George E. Pickett. 

OarnetVs Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Ri(!hard B. Garnett: 

8th Va., ; 18th Va., ; 19th Va., ; 28th Va., 

; 56th Va. , . Armistcad's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 

Lewis A. Arraistead: 9th Va., ; l4thVa., ; 38th 

Va., ; 53d Va., ; 57th Va., . Kemper's Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. James L. Kemper : 1st Va., ; 3d 

Va., ; 7th Va., ; lith Va., ; 24th Va., 

. Jenkins's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Micah Jenkins: 

l8t S. C. (Ilagood's); 2d 8. C. Rifles, ; 5th 8. C, 

; 6th 8. C, ; Hampton (S. C.) Legion, 

; Palmetto (S. C.) Sharp-shooters, . Corse's 

Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Montgomery D. Corse: 15th Va., 

; 17th Va., ; 30th Va., ; 32d Va., . 

Artillery (composition incomplete) : Va. Battery, Capt. 

James Dearing ; Va. Battery (Fauquier Art'y), Capt. R. 
M. Stribling; Va. Battery (Richmond Fayette Art'y), 
Capt. Miles C. Macon. Division loss : k, 3 ; w, 50 ; m, 1 = 54. 
HOOD'S DIVISION, Maj. -Gen. John B. Hood. 

Law's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. Mclver Law: 4th Ala., 

; 44th Ala., ; 6th N. C, ; 54th N. C, Col. 

J. C. 8. McDowell ; 57th N. C, Col. A. C. Godwin. Brigade 
loss : k, 50 ; w, 164 ; m, 5 = 219. Robertson's Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. J. B. Robertson : 3d Ark., ; 1st Tex., ; 4th 

Tex., ; 5th Tex., . Brigade loss: k,l; w, 4=5. 

Anderson's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George T. Ander.son: 1st 

Ga. (Regulars), ; 7th Ga., ; 8th Ga., ; 9th 

Ga., ; 11th Ga., . Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 8; m, 

4 = 14. Toombs's Brigade, Col. H. L. Benning : 2d Ga., 

; 15th Ga., ; 17th Ga., ; 20th Ga., . 

Brigade loss : k, 1 ; w, 12 ; m, 2 = 15. Artillery : S. C. 
Battery (German Art'y), Capt. W. K. Bachman ; 8. C. 
Battery (Palmetto Light Art'y), Capt. Hugh R. Garden; 
N. C. Battery (Rowan Art'y), Capt. James Reilly. 
RANSOM'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr. 

Ransom's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr.: 

24th N. C, ; 25th N. C, Lieut.-Col. Samuel C. Bry- 

son; 35th N. C, ; 49th N. C, ; Va. Battery, 

Capt. J. R. Branch. Brigade loss : k, 27 ; w, 127 = 154. 
Cooke's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John R. Cooke (w). Col. E. 

D. Hall: 15th N. C, ; 27th N. C, Col. John A. 

Gilmer, Jr.; 46th N. C, Col. E. D. Hall; 48th N. C, 
Lieut.-Col. Samuel H. Walkup; Va. Battery (Cooper's). 
Brigade loss : k, 52 ; w, 328 = 380. 

CORPS ARTILLERY (not assigned to divisions). 

WasJdngton (La.) Artillery, Col. J. B. Walton : 1st Co., 
Capt. C. W. Squires ; 2d Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson ; 3d 
Co., Capt. M. B. Miller; 4th Co., Capt. B. F. Eshleman. 
Battalion loss: k, 3; w, 24 = 27. Alexander's Battalion, 
Lieut.-Col. E. Porter Alexander : Va. Battery (Bedford 
Art'y), Capt. Tyler C. Jordan ; Va. Battery, Capt. J. L. 
Eubank; La. Battery (Madison Light Art'y), Capt. 
George V. Moody ; Va. Battery, Capt. William W. Par- 
ker; 8. C. Battery, Capt. A. B. Rhett; Va. Battery, 
Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr. Battalion loss : k, 1 : w, 10 = 11. 

SECOND ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Geiieral Thomas J. 
HILL'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. Daniel H. Hill. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes : 3d Ala., ; 

5th Ala., ; 6th Ala., ; 12th Ala., ; 26th 

Ala., . Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 14 = 16. Second 

Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George Doles : 4th Ga., ; 44th 

Ga., Col. John B. Estes ; 1st N. C, ; 3d N. C, 

Brigade loss : k, 2 ; w, 25 = 27. Third Brigade, Brig.. 

Gen. A. H. Colquitt: 13th Ala., ; 6th Ga., ^ ; 

23d Ga., ; 27th Ga., ; 28th Ga., . Bri- 
gade loss: w, 15. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alfred 

Iversou: 5th N. C, ; 12th N. C, ; 20th N. C, 

; 23d N. C, . Brigade loss: k, 1 ; w, 12=13. 

Fifth Brigade, Col. Bryan (Crimes: 2d N. C, ; 4th 

N. C, ; 14th N. C, ; 30th N. C, . Bri- 
gade loss : k, 8 ; w, 51 = 59. Artillery, M.njor H. P. Jones : 
Ala. Battery, Capt. R. A. Hardaway ; Ala. Battery (Jeff 
Davis Art'y), Capt. J. W. Bondurant; Va. Battery. 
(King William Art'y), Capt. Thomas H. Carter; Va. 
Battery (Morris Art'y), Capt. R. C. M. Page ; Va. Battery 
(Orange Art'y), Capt. C. W. Fry. Artillery loss: k, 4; 
W, 8 = 12. 
LIGHT DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. Ambrose P. Hill. 

First Brigade, Col. J. M. Brock enbrough : 40th Va., 

; 47th Va., Col. Robert M. Mayo ; 55th Va.. ; 

22d Va. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. E. P. Tayloe. Brigade 

3>The dash Indicates that the name of the commanding officer has not been found in the " Official Records."— Editors. 



loss: k, 10; w, 73 = 83. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
Maxcy Gregg (m w). Col. D. H. Hamiltoa : let 8. 
C. (Prov. Army), Col. D. H. Hamilton; 1st S. C. Rifles, 

; 12tli 8. C, ; 13th S. C, ; Uth S. C, 

Col. Samuel McGowan. Brigade loss : k and w, 303. 
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Edward L. Tliomas : 14tli 

Ga., ; 35th Ga., ; 45th Ga., ; 49th Ga., 

. Brigade loss : k, 42 ; w, 288 = 330. Fourth Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lano: 7th N. C, Lieut-Col. J. 
L. Hill ; 18th N. C, Col. Thomas J. Purdie (w) ; 28th N. 
C, Col. 8. D. Lowe ; 33d N. C, Col. Clark M. Avery ; 37th 
N. C, Col. W. M. Barbour (w). Brigade loss: k, 62 ; w, 
257; m, 216 = 535. Fifth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James J. 
Archer: 5th Ala., Battalion, Miyor A. S. Van de Graaff 
(w), Capt. 8. D. Stewart ; 19th Ga., Lieut.-Col. Andrew 
J. Hut chins; 1st Teun. (Prov. Army), Col. Peter Turney 
(w), Lieut.-Col. N. J. George (w), Capt. M. Turney (w), 
Capt. H. J. Hawkins; 7th Tenn., Col. John F. Goodner ; 
14th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. James W. Lockert. Brigade loss : 
k, 40; w, 211; m, 166 = 417. Sixth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
WilUani D. Pender (w), Col. AKred M. Scales: 13th N. 
C, Col. Alfred M. Scales; 16th N. C, Col. John S. McEl- 
roy; 22d N. C, Maj. Christopher C. Cole; 34th N. C, 

; 38th N. C, . Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 153 = 

169. Artillery, Lieut.-Col. R. L. Walker : N. C. Battery 
(Branch Art'y — section), Lieut. J. R. Potts; Va. Battery 
(Crenshaw's — section), Lieut. James EUett (k» ; Va. Bat- 
tery (Fredericksburg Art'y), Lieut. E. A. Marye; Va. 
Battery (Johnson's — section), Lieut. V. J. Clutter (w) ; 
Va. Batterj- (Letcher Art'y), Capt. G. Davidson ; 8. C. Bat- 
tery (Pee Dee Art'y), Capt. D. G. Mcintosh; Va. Battery 
(Purcell Art'y), Capt. W. J. Pegram Artillery loss : k, 11 ; 
w, 88 = 99. Division loss : k, 231 ; w, 1474 ; m, 417 = 2122. 
EWELL'8 DIVISION, Brig.-Geu. Jubal A. Early. 

Lawton's Brigade, Col. E. N. Atkinson (w and c). Col. 
Clement A. Evans : 13th Ga., Col. J. M. Smith ; 26th Ga., 
Capt. B. F. Grace ; 3l8tGa., Col. Clement A.Evans; 38th 
Ga., Capt. WilUam L. McLeod; 60th Ga., Col. W. H. 
Stiles; 61st Ga., Col. J. H. Lamar (w), Maj. C. W. McAr- 
thur. Brigade loss : k, 86 ; w, 633 = 719. Trimble's Bri- 
gade, Col. Robert P. Hoke: 15th Ala., ; 12th Ga., 

; 21st Ga., Lieut.-Col. Thomas W. Hooper; 21st N. 

C, ; 1st N. C. Battalion . Brigade loss : k, 8 ; 

w, 98 = 106. Early's Brigade, Col. James A. Walker : 13th 

Va., Lieut.-Col. James B. Terrill ; 25th Va., ; 3l8t Va. 

; 44th Va., ; 49th Va., ; 52d Va., ; 

58th Va., . Brigade loss : k, 17 ; w, 140= 157. Hays's 

Brigade, Brig -Gen. Harry T. Hays: 5th La., ;6th 

La., ; 7th La., ; 8th La., ; 9th La., . 

Brigade loss : k, 9 ; w, 44 ; m, 1 = 54. Artillery, Capt. J. W. 
Latimer: Va. Battery (Charlottesville Art'y), Capt. J. 
McD. Carrington; Md. Battery (Chesapeake Art'y), 
Lieut. John E. Plater; 1st Md. Battery, Capt. William F. 
Dement ; Va. Battery (Courtney Art'y), Lieut. W. A. 
Tanner; La. Battery (Guard Art'y), Capt. Louis D'Aquin 
(k); Va. Battery (Staunton Art'y), Lieut. Asher W. Gar- 
ber. Artillery loss : k, 4 ; w, 21 = 25. 
JACKSON'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William B. Taliaferro. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. F. Paxton : 2d Va., Capt. 
J. Q. A. Nad.iilwns.h; 4th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. D. Gard- 
ner (w), Maj. William Terry; 5th Va., Lieut.-Col. H. 
J. Williams; 27tli Va., Lieut.-Col. .lames K.Edmoudson ; 
33d Va.. Col. Edwin (J. L(>e. Brigade loss : k. 3 ; w, 44 ; 
in, 1 = 48. Seamd Brigade, Br\g.-Gon. Jolin R. Jones; 
2l8t Va., ; 42d Va., ;'48th Va., ; 1st Va. 

Battalion, . Brigade loss : k, 3 ; w, 34 = 37. Third 

Brigade, Col. E. T. H. Warren : 47th Ala., Capt. James 
M. Campbell; 48th Ala., Capt. C. B. St. John ; 10th Va., 
Capt. W. B.Yancey; 23d Va., Capt. A. J. Richardson; 
37th Va., Col. T. V. Williams. Brigade loss : w, 9. Fourth 
Brigade, Col. Edmund Pendleton: 1st La., Lieut.-Col. 
M. Nolan; 2d La., Maj. M. A. Grogan ; lOth La., Maj. 
John M. Legett; 14th La., Capt. H. M. Verlander; 15th 
La., Lieut.-Col. McG. Goodwyn. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 
35=37. Artillery, Capt. J. B. Brockenbrough : Va. Bat- 
tery (Carpenter's), Lieut. George McKendree; Va. Bat- 
tery (Danville Art'y), Capt. George W. Wooding (w) ; Va. 
Battery (Hani])den Art'y), Capt. William H. Cii.skie ; Va. 
Battery (Lee Art'y), Lieut. C. W. Statham ; Va. Battery 
(Lusk's). Artillery los.s : k, 2; w, 48; in, 1 = 51. 
RESERVE ARTILLERY,^ Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton. 

Broun' s Battalion, Col. J. Thompson Brown: Va. Bat- 
tery, Capt. James V. Brooke ; Va. Battery (Powhatan 
Art'y), Capt. Willis J. Dance; Va. Battery iSalem Art'y, 

Hupp's), ; Va. Battery (Rockl)ridge Arfy). Capt. 

William T. Poague; Va. Battery (3(1 Howitzers), Lieut. 
James Utz (k) ; Va. Battery, Capt. David Wat.son. Bat- 
talion loss: k, 10; w, 26 = 36. Sumter ( Ga.) Battalion, 
Lieut.-Col. Allen S. Cutts : Co. A, Capt. H. M. Ross ; Co. B. 
Capt. George M. Patterson ; Co. C, Capt. John Lane, y el- 
son's Battalion, Miij. William Nelson: Va. Battery (Am- 
herst Art'y), Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatriek ; Va. Battery 
(Fluvanna Art'y», Capt. John L. Massie; Ga. Battery, 
Capt. John Milledge, Jr. Miscellaneous Batteries (assign- 
ments not indicated) : Ga. Battery (Ella's), Lieut. W. F. 
Anderson; Va. Battery (Hanover Art'y), Capt. George 
W. Nelson. 
CAVALRY, M:ij.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart. 

First Brigade (a detachment was on a raid to the rear 
of the Union army), Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton : Ist N. C, 
Col. L. 8. Baker; 1st 8. C, Col. J. L. Beach ; 2d S. C. Col. 
M. C. Butler; Cobb (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. P. M. B. 
Y'oung; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. William W. 
Rich. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee : 1st 
Va., Col. James H. Drake; 2d Va., Col. Thomas T. Mun- 
ford; 3d Va., Col. T. H. Owen ; 4th Va., Col. AVilliams C. 

Wickham; 5th Va. . Third Brigade, Brig.-(;en. W. 

H. F. Lee : 2d N. C, Col. S. Williams ; 9th Va., Col. R. L. 
T. Beale; 10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis; 13th Va.. Col. 
J. R. Chambliss, Jr.; 15th Va.. Col. William B. Ball. 
Brigade loss: w, 7. Artillery, Maj. John Pelham : Va. 
Battery, Capt. James Breathed ; Va. Battery, Capt. R. 
P. Chew; S. C. Battery, Capt. J. F. Hart; Va. Battery, 
Capt. M. W. Henry ; Va. Battery, Capt. M. N. Moorman. 
Artillery loss : k, 3 ; w, 22 = 25. 

Total Confederate loss: Idlled, 608; wounded, 4116; 
captured or missing, 653= 5377. 

The "present for duty" in Lee's army (including all of 
Stuart's cavalry), as shown by his retui-u for December 
10th, was 78,513. To arrive at Lee's effective strength in 
the battle (not ofticially stated) there should be dedn»-ted 
the usual proitortion of noiwombatants. the detaclunent 
of Hampton's cavalry brigade, on a mid to the north of 
the Rappahannock, and the cavalry lirigade of W. E. 
Tones serving in the Shenandoah Valley. Acconliiic to 
the estimate of Mr. Thomas White, as given in Taylor's 
"Four Years with General Lee" (p. l.^<8i. this was .">8.500of 
all arms. Colonel Tuvlor (p. 81) says : " Less than 20.000 
Confederate troops (about one-fourth of th«> army under 
General Lee) were actively engaged."— Editoks. 

i^ Majors Gariiett, Ilaniilton, and T. J. Paw, .Jr.. ar»> nieiitioiicti in the n-porta as coininun.liiitr artillery battalion,-;, but 
the compo-sition of their coniinanils is not givou.— Editoks. 



BEFORE the first battle of Bull Run I had en- 
listed as a private in a company of Confed- 
erate cavalry of which William E. Jones, a West 
Point officer, was the captain, and that had been 
assigned to the 1st Virginia regiment of cav- 
alry, commanded by Colonel J. E. B. Stuart. We 
joined Stuart at Bunker Hill, a small village on 
the pike leading from Winchester, where Greneral 
Johnston had his headquarters, to Martinsburg, 
where Patterson with his army was lying. Stuart 
was watching Patterson. In a few days Patterson 
advanced and took possession of our camp, and 
our regiment retired tow^ard Winchester. Here 
I took my first lessons in war. Patterson had 
no cavalry except a battalion of regulars, and 
we had no artillery; so he contented himself 
with throwing an occasional shell at us, and we 
got out of the way of them as fast as we could. 
One day we were lying down in a large open field 
holding our horses when a battery suddenly ap- 
peared upon a hill about a mile off and opened on 
us. I saw a shell burst within a few yards of 
Captain Jones, who coolly ordered us to mount 
and fall into line. I do not think I was so naueh 
frightened at any time after that. Stuart sent one 
company of cavalry down toward Charlestown to 
observe Patterson, and with the remainder of his 
regiment started for Manassas and took part in that 
battle. I served also with Stuart on the Peninsula 
and in the Antietara campaign. 

When the year 18G3 arrived Fredericksburg had 
been fought, and the two armies, in winter quarters, 
were confronting each other on the Rappahannock. 
Both sides sought rest ; the pickets on the opposite 
banks of the river had ceased firing and gone to 
swapping coffee and tobacco. The cavalry had 
been sent to the rear to forage. But " quiet to quick 

bosoms is a hell." I did not want to rust away my 
life in camp, so I asked Stuart to give me a detail 
of men to go over to Loudoun County, where I 
thought I could make things lively during the win- 
ter months. Always full of enterprise, Stuart 
readily assented, and I started off on my career as 
a partisan. At the time I had no idea of organiz- 
ing an independent command, but expected to 
return to Stuart when the campaign opened in the 
spring. I was indifferent to rank, and would have 
been as contented to be a lieutenant as a colonel. 
I was somewhat familiar with the country where 
I began operations, having picketed there the year 
before. The lines of the troops attached to the 
defenses of Washington extended from about 
Occoquan, on the lower Potomac, through Centre- 
ville, in Fairfax County, to the Falls of the upper 
Potomac, and thence as far vpest as Harper's Ferry. 
This was a long line to defend, and before I went 
there had not been closely guarded. I began on 
the picket-lines ; my attacks were generally in the 
night-time, and usually the surprise compensated 
for the disparity in numbers. They would be re- 
peated the next, and often during the same night 
at a different point, and this created a vastly ex- 
aggerated idea of my foi-ce. Some conception may 
be formed of the alarm it produced from a fact 
stated by General Hooker, that in the spring of 
] 863 the planks on Chain Bridge were taken up 
every night to keep me out of Washington. At 
that time I could not muster over twenty men. A 
small force moving with celerity and threatening 
many points on a line can neutralize a hundred 
times its own number. The line must be stronger at 
every point than the attacking force, else it is 
broken. At that time Hooker asked that the cav- 
alry division belonging to the defenses of Wash- 



ington be sent to the front to reenforee Pleason- 
tou when he crossed the Eappahannock to engage 
Stuart in the great cavalry combat of June 9th. ^ It 
was refused on the ground that it was necessary to 
keep it where it was, in order to protect the commu- 
nication between the arm j^ and Washington. Afew 
days before that fight we struck the railroad within 
two miles of this cavalry camp, and captured and 
burned a train of supplies going up to Pleasonton. 
The 3000 men who came after me could not run any 
faster than the twenty with me. We vanished like 
the children of the mist, and the major-general who 
pursued reported that we had been annihilated. 
But within less than a week I pulled myself to- 
gether again, crossed the Potomac about twelve 
miles above Washington, and captured the cavalry 
camp near Seneca. 

I recur now to the time when I first arrived in 
the country which became the theater of the 
partisan war which I carried on until the surrender 
at Appomattox. As I have said, the line of out- 
posts belonging to the defenses of Washington 
formed the arc of a circle extending from the 
upper to the lower Potomac. The troops had been 
having an easy, lazy life, which was described in 
the stereotj'ped message sent every night to the 
Northern press, "All quiet along the Potomac." 
I saw that here was a bountiful harvest to be 
gathered, and that the reapers were fevT^. I gave 
constant employment to the Union troops, and they 
no longer led a life of drowsy indolence. I procured 
some guides who kuew every path of the countrj', 
and with the aid of friendly citizens found out 
where every picket was posted. A certain major- 
general came after me with a division of cavalry 
and a battery of artillery. After shelling the woods 
in every direction so as to be sure of my extermi- 
nation, and destroying many bats and owls, he took 
off as prisoners all the old men he could find. Ho 
had the idea that I was a myth and that these old 
farmers were the raiders. One old man appealed 
to his crutch to show the physical impossibility of 
his being a guerrilla. But the major-general was 
inexorable. He returned with his prizes to camp, 
but I was there almost a^ soon as he was. 

In the month of February, 1803, Brigadier-Gen- 
eral E. H. Stoughton was in commend of the troops 
in front of Washington, with his headquarters at 
Fairfax Court House. There was a considerable 
body also at Centreville, and a cavalry brigade was 
encamped on the pike leading from that place to 
Fairfax Court House, under command of Colonel 
Percy Wyndham. Stoughton was a West Point 
officer, and had served with distinction under 
McClellan on the Peninsula. Wyndham was an 
Englishman sei-ving as Colonel of the 1st New 
Jersey Cavalry. The year before he had started 
up the Shenandoah Valley to bag Ashby. but the 
performance did not come up to the manifesto ; in 
their first encounter Asliby bagged him. He was 
now given a chance to redeem liis reputation. My 
attacks on his linos had been incessant and very 
annoying. He struck blindly around like the Cyclojis 
in his cave, but nobody was hurt. The metliodical 

tactics he had learned in European wars were of no 
more use to him than a suit of armor of the Middle 
Ages. My men would dart down on his outposts 
like a hawk on its prey ; but when Wyndham came 
up in solid column the partisans had gone. In his 
vexation he sent me word that 1 was a horse-thief; 
to which I replied that all the horses I had stolen 
had had riders, and the riders had had sabers 
and pistols. 

While operating against the outposts it had been 
my custom to examine my prisoners separately, 
and in this way I learned all the interior arrange- 
ments of their camps. I was then meditating a 
bolder enterprise than I had ever undertaken, but 
had commimicated it to no one. This was to pene- 
trate the outer lines, and go right up to their head- 
quarters and carry off the general commanding 
and Colonel Wyndham. It looked extremely 
hazardous to attempt it; but as nothing of the 
sort ever had been done, I calculated there would 
be no precaution to prevent it. I was right. While 
I was maturing my plan I received aid from an 
unexpected source. One day a deserter, named 
Ames, wearing the stripes of a sergeant, came to me 
from a New York cavalry regiment of WjTidham's 
brigade. The Emancipation Proclamation which 
had been put in operation was the reason he 
gave for deserting the cause of the Union, but I 
always suspected that it was some personal wrong 
he had suffered. He seemed to be animated by the 
most vindictive hatred for his former comrades. I 
felt an instinctive confidence in his sincerity which 
he never betrayed. After I had thoroughly tested 
his fidelity I made him a lieutenant. He served 
with me until he was killed in October, 180-4. 

I questioned Ames closely about the location of 
the camps and outposts, and he confirmed the 
knowledge I had pro\'iously obtained. I deter- 
mined first to take him on a trial-trip down into 
Fairfax County. There was a cavalry post at a 
certain school-house, and I started with Ames one 
afternoon to attack it. A deep snow was on the 
ground, and it was raining and sleeting. About 
two weeks before, I had captured the same post, 
but I thought they would not expect me back so 
soon. To satisfy my men I did not let Ames carry 
any arms, for they all were certain that lu^ had been 
sent to decoy me into a trap. The soldiers in the 
Union camps slept soundly that night, for they 
felt sure that nothing but a wild animal would be 
abroad in such weather. I stopped wlien I got 
near the place I intended to attack, to make an 
inqiiiry of a farmer who lived near there as to the 
number of men on the ])ost. I called him out of 
bed. He came to the door in his night-dress, and 
the first thing he asked was, " How many men Imve 
you?" I said, "Seventeen." "How many," I 
asked, "are at the ])icket-post ?" "One hundred." 
lie answered. "T liavo boon down there this even- 
ing. You are certainly not going to attack thom 
with so few menf" " Yes," I replied ; "it is so 
dark they can't see us, and will think I have got a 
hundred too." Contrary to my usual practice, I 
went straight along the road. Wo got close on the 

) At Rruiidy ."Station.— Editoks. 



vedette, who challenged us, fired, and started into 
camp at full speed. We dashed on as close to 
his heels as the witches were on Tam O'Shanter's. 
The men were asleep in the school-house and their 
horses were tied with halters to the trees. If they 
had staid inside they could easily have driven us 


f)ff with their carbines. But every man ran for his 
horse, and we were just in time to scatter them. 
We got all the horses, but most of the men escaped 
in the darkness. In the charge, Ames rode by 
my side. We got off safe with our booty and 
prisoners. After daybreak, Colonel Wyndham 
followed at full speed for twenty miles on our 

track. All that he did was to go back to camp 
with a lot of broken down horses. Ames, like the 
saints, had been tried by tii'e ; he was never 
doubted afterward. The time had now come for 
me to take a bolder flight and execute my plan of 
making a raid on headquarters. 

It was on the afternoon of March 7th, 1863, that I 
started from Aldie with 29 men on this expedition. 
Ames was the only one who knew its object. It was 
pitch-dark before we got near the cavalry pickets at 
Chantilly. We passed in between them and Centre- 
ville. Here a good point in the game was won, for 
once inside the Union lines we would be mistaken for 
their own men. By an accident one-half of my com- 
mand got separated in the dark from the other, and 
it was nearly an hoxu* before I could find them. We 
passed along close by the camp-fires, but the senti- 
nels took us for a scouting party of their cavalry. I 
had felt very cold in the early part of the night, 
but my blood gi-ew warmer as I got farther in the 
lines, and the chill passed away. I had no reputa- 
tion to lose by failure but much to gain by suc- 
cess. I remembered, too, the motto that Ixion in 
heaven wrote in Minerva's album — "Adventures 
are to the adventurous." We sti-uck the road lead- 
ing from Fairfax Court House to the railroad sta- 
tion and then went on to the village. There were a 
few guards about, but they did not suspect us until 
they saw a pistol pointed at them. Of course they 
surrendered. Some refused to believe we were 
Confederates after we told them who we wei*e. A 
few sentinels hailed us with the formula, " Who 
comes there?" and were answered, "5th New 
York Cavalry." It was past midnight, and it was 
necessary to do our work quickly if it was to be 
done at all. The first thing I did was to detail 
squads of men to gather prisoners and horses. 
I was more anxious to catch Wyndham than any 
one else ; so I sent Ames, with a detachment, after 
him. But for once fortime had been propitious 
to him. Ho had gone down to Washington that 
evening. Ames got two of his staff and his imi- 
form, and brought them to me. One of these offi- 
cers was Captain Barker, of the 5th New York 
Cavalry, who had been Ames's captain. Ames 
brought him to me as a trophy, and seemed to feel 
a malicious pride in introducing him. I had sent 
another party to the house where Lieut. -Col. Kobert 
Johnstone, commanding the cavalry brigade, was 
sleeping. In some manner he had heard the alarm 
and had slipped out through the back-way into the 
garden in his night-clothes. His wife met my men 
like a lioness at the door. I was gi-eatly disap- 
pointed in not getting Wyndham. The capture of 
his staff-officers and fine horses was not an equiva- 
lent for the loss of the chief. The other details did 
their work rapidly, and soon collected at oiir rendez- 
vous in the court-yard a large number of prisoners 
and fine steeds. The prisoners seemed to be utterly 
dumfounded. About this time Joe Nelson rode up 
to me with a prisoner who said he belonged to the 
guard at General Stoughton's headquarters, and 
with a party of five or six I immediately went there. 
We dismounted, and with a loud rap on the front 
door awoke the inmates. An upper window was 
raised and some one called out, "Who is there ?" 



The answer was, " We have a dispatch for General 
Stoughton." An officer (Lieutenant Prentiss) came 
to the front door to get it. I caught hold of his 
shirt and whispered my name in his ear, and told 
him to lead me to the general's room. Eesistauee 
was useless, and he did so. A light was struck, 
and before us lay the sleeping general. He quickly 
raised himself in bed and asked what this meant. I 
said, "General, get up — dress quick — you are a 
prisoner." " What ! " exclaimed the indignant gen- 
eral. " My name is Mosby ; Stuart's cavalry are in 
possession of this place, and General Jackson holds 
Centreville." "IsFitz Leehere?" "Yes." "Then 
take me to him; we were classmates." "Very 
well; but dress quick." Two of my men assisted 
him to put on his clothes. My motive in deceiving 
him in regard to the amount of my force was to 
deprive him of all hope of rescue. I was in a most 
critical situation, for in addition to several thousand 
troops in the surrounding camps, a considerable 
number were quartered in the houses in the village. 
If there had been the least concert among them 
they could easily have driven us out ; but, although 
we remained there an hour, not a shot was fii'ed ; 
as soon as our presence became known each man 
tried to save himself. Stoughton did not delay a 
moment, for he had no idea how few of us there 
were. A couple of men had been left to hold our 
horses while we were in the house. One of these, 
George Whitescarver, surrounded and captured a 
guard of six men sleeping in a tent. Stoughton's 
horses all stood at the door as we came out, with 
saddles and bridles on. Lieutenant Prentiss 
started, but soon parted company with us. We 
could not see where he went. When I got to the 
court-yard I found all my different squads col- 
lected there with their prisoners and spoils. No 
sign of resistance had been shown. The prisoners 
outnumbered us three or four to one, and each 
was mounted and leading a horse. The cavalcade 
started in an opposite direction from where we ill- 
tended to go, in order to deceive ourpui-suers. After 
going a few hundred yards we turned and flanked 
the cavalry camp, and struck the pike to Centreville. 
Stoughton soon discovered how few of us there 
were. I did not allow him to hold his bridle-reins, 
but gave them to one of my men (Hunter), who rode 
beside him. Stoughton remarked, " This is a bold 
thing you have done; but you will certainly be 
caught; our cavalry will soon be after you." " Per- 
haps so," I said. It was so dark that the blue 
could not be distinguished from the gray. Hence 
the prisoners all thought there were at least one 
hundred of us. We lost many of them before we 
got beyond the lines. They were all formed in a 
column of fours, and after we got on the pike I rode 
some distance in the rear wliilo Hunter, with 
Stoughton, was leading in front. We went at a 
trot and the chances of our escape were improving. 
No one seemed to be on our track, as oui* winding 

about had baffled pursuit. It never entered the 
head of any one that I would march up the pike in 
the face of two or three thousand troops at Centre- 
ville. When within a mile of that place, and just 
about the break of day, we came \i\nni a camp-fire 
which had e\adently just been deserted. A picket 
had been posted there on the evening before to stay 
during the night. The officer, thinking it unneces- 
sary to remain longer, had gone into camp. As we 
had taken the precaution to cut the telegraph wires, 
no news had yet reached Centreville of our work 
at the Com-t House. When I saw the picket-tii-e on 
the pike I halted the column and galloped forward 
to reconnoiter. Seeing that no one was there, 
I called to Hunter to come on. It was necessary 
to make a circuit aroimd Centreville, and to pass 
between encampments of Union troops on both 
sides of it. I was certain to be lost if I went either 
too far to the left or the right. Just as we turned 
off from the pike Captain Barker made a desperate 
attempt to escape. He darted from the line, but 
my Hungarian Jake was at his heels, and sent a 
harmless shot after him just as his horse fell in a 
ditch. I rode up to him and inquii-ed if he was 
hurt. He said "No,'' and Jake assisted him to 
mount. No one else eared to repeat the experi- 
ment. We passed within a few hundred yards of the 
forts, and could see the guns pointing through the 
embrasures and hear the challenge of the sentinels 
as they walked on the parapets. My heart began to 
beat with joy. The odds were now rapidly getting in 
my favor. We were soon on the other side of Centre- 
ville. Although we could be plainly seen from there, 
it was probably supposed that we were a scout- 
ing party of Federal cavalry. When we got to Cub 
Eun, it was so swollen by the melting snows that 
it could not be forded. We were still within easy 
cannon-shot of the guns on the heights, and there 
was no time to be lost, I acted on the maxim of 
plucking the flower safety from the nettle danger, 
and plunging into the brimming stream swam over. 
The rest followed, Stoughton being next to me. 
The first thing he said as he shivered with cold was, 
"This is the first rough treatment I have received." 
I knew that no cavalry would ever swim after me, 
LeaAang Hunter to come on with my men and pris- 
oners, I galloped on ah<>ad with George Slater and 
once more got on the i)ike at Groveton. This was 
the very spot whore, tlu> year before. Fit/. John Por- 
ter had made his disastrous assault on Jackson. 
From this hill I had a view of the pike seven miles 
back to Centreville. No enemy was in pursuit. I 
was safe. Just then Hunter appeared and the sun 
rose. It seemed to me that it never shone with 
such splendor before. I turned over my jirisoners 
to Stuart at Culpeper Court House. He was as 
much delighted by wliat I had done as I was. and 
published a general order announcing it to the 
cavalry, in which lie said that it was "a iVat un- 
paralleled in the war." 



THE original instructions to General Geoi-ge 
Stoneman for the cooperation of the cavalry 
in the Chancellorsville campaign directed him to 
cross the Rappahannock on the 13th of April, at 
some point west of the Orange and Alexandria 
raih-oad, and throw his whole force, excepting one 
brigade, between Lee's position on the Rappahan- 
nock and his base at Richmond. The object was 
the isolation of the enemy "from his supplies, 
eliccking his retreat, and inflicting on him every 
p()ssil)le injury which will tend to his discomfiture 
and defeat." This movement was delayed by heavy 
rains, and on the 28th of April the instructions 
were modified. The new plan was to cross the Rap- 
pahannock at the fords immediately north-west 
of Fredericksburg on the evening of the 28th, or 
the morning of the 29th, and move in two columns, 
operating on the lines of the Orange and Alexan- 
dria and the Richmond and Fredericksburg rail- 
roads toward Richmond, The movements of the 
corps are given in detail in the report of General 
Stoneman : 

" On April 27tli, I, then beins at Warrenton Junction, 
■with the corps encamped along the Orange and Alexan- 
dria railroad, received a telegram directing me with my 
commanders to meet some persons from headquarters 
Army of the Potomac at Morrisville on the following 
(lay [the '2Sth] at 2 P. M. Arriving there with my com- 
ukiikIcis, I found the comniandiug general and his staff, 
and h^ariicd that a portion of the army was about to 
cross the Uappahanuock at Kelly's Ford that day. . . . 
From Morrisville to where the cavalry corps lay was 
thirteen miles ; from there to where some of the extreme 
pickets were was thirteen more, so that it was quite 
late at night before the command was all assembled 
and ready to start, and owing to the state of the roads, 
the result of the recent heavy rains, and the darkness 
of the night, rendered doubly obscure by a dense fog, 
the corps did not reach the river imtil nearly 8 A. M. of 
the 29th. Arriving at the river, we found but one ford 
witliin the limits prescribed in our instructions which 
eoiild be passed over, and that not by packed mules or 
artillery. By dint of great exertion we succeeded In 
getting all over the river by 5 p. M. I assembled the 
division and brigade commanders, spread our maps, and 
had a thorough understanding of what we were to 
do. . . . Instructions were given to have all the 
packed mules and led horses sent in the direction of 
Gernninna Mills, and to follow in the rear of the army 
and remain with it until we formed a junction there- 
with, which we (xiK'ctcd \v(mld be in the vicinity of 
ItichiMond, and for each offlcer and man to take with 
him no more than he could carry on his horse, myself 
and staff setting yje example." 

Averell, with three brigades, was to advance on 
Culpeper Court House, wliile Stoneman, with three 
brigades numbering about 3500, under D. McM. 
Gregg, was to take the shorter roTite via Stevensbiirg, 
a liamlet 7 miles east of Culpeper Court House. 
The operations the first day, the 29th, after cross- 
ing, consisted in dri\angin the outpostswhieh were 
encountered on both roads. The report continues : 

"About 9 A. M., April ;)Oth, a staff-officer of General 
Averell overtook me. . . . lie also handed me a note 
picked up by some one, and sent me by General Averell, 
and to the following effect : 

"'[Important.] llKAnQiiAKTEits. Cavaluy Divi.siov, near 
Brandy Station, Va., April '29tli, 186.S. fOLONF.i. (^iiamhliss, 

13th Virginia Cavalry. Colonel: The major-general coni- 
maiidiug directs me to say that he wishes you to get a mau 
posted so as to have a view of tlie road leading down on the 
other side to Kelly's loid, and tind out what kind of troops 
marched down belniid \hr wai^oiis. The enemy liave made 
a demonstration toward ^ti\ t-iisburg, but so far it amounts 
to nothing. Tlie general is very anxious to know where to 
look for Stoneman, as we have heardnothing from him. Most 
respectfully, your obedient servant, R. Channing PidCE, 
Assistant Adjutant-General.' 

" Feeling eatisfled that wo should And Raccoon Ford 
guarded, and that its passage would be disputed, I 
strudv t lie Itapidan Kiver about six miles below ; crossed 
over tlu- portion of the command under General Buford, 
who .scut a iiarty under Captain Peter Peun Gaskell, of his 
staff, who, at a dash, cleared the ford above, capturing 
an officer, Lieutenant Bourier [James Boulware] of the 
9th Virginia Cavab-y, and six privates of the 9th and 10th 

major-general GEORGE STONEMAN. 

Virginia Cavalry. The rest of the cavalry and the artil- 
lery made their escape. The main body immediately 
crossed at tlu' Raccoon Ford, the rear getting over about 
10 p. M. No tires liuilt to-night, as we were in plain view 
from Clark's Mountain, a few miles to the south of the 
ford, and on the top of which the enemy have a signal 
station. We learned here that Stuart, with Fitzhugh 
Lee's brigade, had that morning crossed at Somerville 
Ford, five miles above Raccoon Ford, and had gone 
toward Frcdcricksl)nrg, and we thought it more than 
probable that wc should find him on the Plank road at 
Verdiervillc, where \vc hadto strike it on our way south. 
Orders were is-ncil ti> be in the saddle at 2 o'clock in the 
morning, and we lax down on the wet ground to get a 
couple of liours' sleep. Two o'clock came, but the fog was 
so thi( k that it was impossible to move, more particu- 
larly as we had no guide to show us the road. Daylight 
came, and we pushed on ; struck the turnpike ; found no 
enemy, but saw by his trail that he had gone toward 
Fredericksburg. From here I pushed Gregg's division 
on to Louisa Court House, on the Virginia Central Kail- 
road, where it arrived about 2 A. M., May 2d, and imme- 
diately commenced tearing up the track of the railroad, 
destro.^ing the telegraph, etc. Buford's brigade en- 
camped that night on the south bank of the North Anna. 
About 10 A. M., May 2d, I had the whole force united at 
Louisa Court House. From here I pushed a squadron 

i See map, p. 1.55 of this volume, and also p. 164 of Volume II.— Editors. 




of the let Maine, under Captain Tucker of that regi- 
ment, toward Gordonsville to find out the whereabouts 
of the enemy in that direction, as we knew that six or 
seven trains had passed up the evening previous loaded 
with troops. The captain drove in thi'ir i)ickets upon 
the main body, the 9th Virginia Cavalry, which in turn 
attacked him, killing 1 man, wounding 1, and captiu'ing 
1 lieutenant and 23 men. Captain Lord, with the 1st U. 
S. Cavalry, was sent to Tolcrsvillu Station, and from 
there to Fredorickshall Station, twelve miles from 
Louisa Court House. From here a party under Lieuten- 
ant went to the Xorth Anna and destroyed Carr's 

Bridge, which is on the main road leading from (Spotsyl- 
vania to Goochland, on the James River, and is out; of 
the principal highways. After having dcstr()yc<l the 
Virginia Central railroad and telegraph, burned the de- 
pots, water-tanks, etc., for eighteen miles, and accom- 
plished all that time would permit, we pushed on to 
Yanceyville, on the South Anna, and from there to 
Thompson's Cross-roads, ten miles lower down the 
river, where we arrived al>out 10 p. m.. May 2d. 

"At this point the James and 8outh Anna rivers are less 
than 12 miles apart, and here I determined to make the 
most of my 35C0 men in carrying out my previously con- 
ceived plan of operations. . . . One party, the 1st New 
Jersej', under Colonel [Percy] Wyndham, was to strike 
the James River at Columbia, at thejunctionof the James 
and Rivanna rivers, to destroy, if possible, the large 
canal aqueduct over the Rivanna, and from thence pro- 
ceed along the canal in the direction of Richmond, doing 
all the harm possilde. . . . Another party, the 2d New 
York, Colonel [Judson] Kilpatrick, was to push onto the 
railroad bridges over the Chickahominy, destroy them 
and the telegrnph, and oi)erate in the direction of Rich- 
mond, foui- miles distant from the bridges. Another force, 
the 12tli Illinois Cavahy, Colonel Hasbrouck Davis, was 
to strike the t \vi > lailroads at or in the vicinity of Ashland, 
on the Fredernkslnirg, and Atlee's, on the Virginia Cen- 
tral, and do all the harm it could. Another party, the ist 
Maine and 1st Maryland, with a section of artillery, all 
under General firegg, was to follow down the South 
Anna River, destroy all the road bridges thereon, and, 
if possible, th(^ two railroad bridges across that river. 
Another party, the 5th U. S. Cavalry, under Captain 
Drummond, was to follow this last and see that the de- 
etrnction was eomplete. Captain Merritt, with a flying 
party of the l-t Marvlaul, was sent out to do what he 
thought he eould acidiiiiilish in the way of destroying 
bridges, etc. These ditt'erent parties all got ofl' by 3 a. i\i. 
on the 3d. 

"... Colonels Wjnidham, Kilpatrick, and Davis 
were directed either to return or to push on and bring up 
at either Yorktown or (iloiicester Point. The rest were 
ordered to return to the reserve with myself. Colonel 
Wyndham and Captain Lord returned the same day. 
GeneraKireggand Captainw Merritt and Drummond the 
next day. Colonels Kili.atrick and Davis pushed on 
through to (lloucester Point. . . . We remained at Shan- 
non's Cross-roads during the 4th, and on the monung of 
the .itli moved to Yatieey ville, on the South .\nna, where 
we were Joined by (ieneral Oregg, Colonel Wyndham, 
and Captains Merritt and Diumraond, each with his 

Tlie operations of the column under General 
Avorell aro tlius described l)y him in a commu- 
nication to the editors dated May 11 th, 1 :^S8 : 

" We encountered the enemy's cavalry, two thousand 
Strong, imdcr General W. H. F. Lee on the morning of 

the 30th, and drove it through Culpeper Court House in 
the direction of Rapidan Station. 

" On the 1st we pressed the enemy's cavalry and 
pushed our right to within three miles of Orange Court 
House in an effort to dislodge the enemy from a strong 
position occupied by him on the south hank of the Rapi- 
dan, after he had crossed and destroyed the bridge. 

" Whih^ thus engaged on the morning of the 2d we 
were recalled to the Army of the Potomac at U. S. Ford 
by orders from General Hooker. We reached Ely's 
Ford of the Rapidan after dark on the evening of the 
2d, and were fired upon by the enemy's infantry from 
the opposite bank. A part of Mclntosli's Ijrigade forded 
the river, dismounted, drove away the enemy, some of 
the 13th North Carolina, and captured some prisoners. 
Karly on the morning of the 3d we crossed the Rapi- 
dan and entered the right of our lines. 

" It was found necessary to issue immediate orders 
sending cavalry to protect the right and rear of the 
army, which had become exiiosed to danger from the 
enemy's cavalry set fi-ee by our recall." 

The column with Stoneman now prepared to re- 
turn to the army. His report continues : 

" The six days having now expired, during which we 
were assured by the commanding general he would cer- 
tainly communicate with us, and no communication 
having been received, no retreating enemy having been 
seen or heard of, and no information as to the condition 
of things in the vicinity of Frederick.sburg, except vague 
rumors of our defeat ami capture, having been obtained. 
supplies for man and beast beeoming scarce, having ac- 
complished all that we were sent to perfonn, and having 
come to the conclusion that Ccdonels Kilpatrick and 
Davis, with their commands, had gone in the direction 
of Yorktown, I determined to make the best of oui- way 
back to the Army of the Potomac. 

"To take the enemy by surprise and penetrate his 
coimtry was easy enough ; to withdraw from it was a 
more difHcult matter. We knew that Lee and Hampton 
were to the west of us. . . . We knew also that there 
W!is a strong force at and in the vicinity of Gordonsville, 
and heal (1 that anotlii'r force was at Louisa Coui-t House, 
and a small force of infantry at Tolersville. 

"After thinking the matter over. I determined to .«end 
General Buford, with 650 picked horses of his brigade, to 
threat<'n any force in the vicinity of Gordonsville, and 
induce Lee and IIani[iton to believe that we were going 
to get out l)y that way ; and another force, under Captain 
Rodenbough, was sent in the direction of Bowling Green, 
with the view of threatening the enemy's communica- 
tion in that direction, and, under cover of night, with 
the main body, to take the middle road leading through 
Tolersville, and crossing the North Anna near the Vic- 
toria Iron Works; from thence to Orange Springe, where 
all were to rendezvous the next day. 

"All our plans and calculations worked adminibly, 
and though we had no little difficulty in finding and fol- 
lowing the almost impassable roads, owing to the inky 
darkness of the night and the inc.ssant pouring of the 
rain, the whole command was asseml>l<d at Oningo 
Springs at 1> m. on the fith. Here we first Jtcgan to hear 
rumors. Through negroes, of the repulse and withdrawal 
of our army to the north side of the Rappahannock. 

"After watering and feeding our animals, we pushed 
on to the riank road leading from Fredericksburg to 
Orange Court House, and from thence to Raccoon Ford, 
which, to onr great. joy, we found fordable, and were all 
over safe by daylight on the uiorulng of the 7th." 








IN the latter part of January, 1863, the Army of the Potomac under Burn- 
side was still occupying its old camps on the left bank of the Rappahan- 
nock, opposite Fredericksburg. After the failures under Burnside it was 
evident that the army must have a new commander. For some days there 
had been a rumor that Hooker had been fixed upon for the place, and on 
the 26th of January it was confirmed. This appointment, undoubtedly, 
gave very general satisfaction to the army, except perhaps to a few, mostly 
superior officers, who had grown up with it, and had had abundant oppor- 
tunities to study Hooker's military character; these believed that Mr. 
Lincoln had committed a grave error in his selection. The army, from its 
former reverses, had become quite disheartened and almost sulky ; but the 
quick, vigorous measures now adopted and carried out with a firm hand had 
a magical effect in toning up where there had been demoralization and 
inspiring confidence where there had been mistrust. Few changes were 
made in the heads of the general staff departments, but for his chief -of-staff 
Hooker applied for Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone, who, through some 
untoward influence at Washington, was not given to him. This was a 
mistake of the war dignitaries, although the officer finally appointed to the 
office, Major-General Daniel Butterfield, proved himself very efficient. Burn- 
side's system of dividing the army into three grand divisions was set aside, 
and the novelty was introduced of giving to each army corps a distinct badge, 
an idea which was very popular with officers and men. ^ 

} Roprinted with permission from the "Pliiladel- 
pliia Times." — Editors. 

3i Tliis idea originated with General Butterfield, 
who not only instituted the badges, but devised 
them in detail. As organized by Hooker the First 
Corps was commanded by Reynolds ; the Second by 
Couch; the Third by Sickles; the Fifth by Meade; 
the Sixth by Sedgwick ; the Eleventh by Howard ; 
the Twelfth by Slocum, and the cavalry corps by 

Stoneman. In each corps the badge of the First 
Division was red ; of the Second Division, white ; of 
the Third Division, blue. After the battle of Chieka- 
mauga (Sept. 19th and 20th, 1863), the Eleventh 
and Twelfth corps were sent west, and on April 
4th, 18G4, they were consolidated to form the new 
Twentieth Corps, which retained the star of the 
Twelfth for a badge. The old Twentieth lost its 
designation Sept. 28th, 18G3.— Editors. 



Some few days after Mr. Liiieoln's visit to the army in April [see p. 11!)] 
I was again thrown with the President, and it happened in this wise. My 
pickets along the river were not only on speaking terms witli those of the 
enemy on the other side of the river, but covertly carried on quite a trade 
in exchanging coffee for toljacco, etc. This morning it was hallooed over 
to our side : " You have taken Charleston," which news was sent to head- 
quarters. Mr. Lincoln hearing of it wished me to ^come up and talk the 
matter over. I went and was ushered into a side tent, occupied only by him- 
self and Hooker. My entrance apparently interrupted a weighty conversa- 
tion, for both were looking grave. The President's manner was kindly, while 
the general, usually so courteous, forgot to be conventionally polite. The 
Charleston rumor having been briefly discussed, Mr. Lincoln remarked that 
it was time for him to leave. As he stepped toward the general, who had risen 
from his seat, as well as myself, he said : " I want to impress upon you two 
gentlemen in your next fight," — and turning to me he completed the sen- 
tence, — " put in all of yom- men" — in the long run a good military maxim. 

The weather growing favorable for military operations, on April 12th were 
commenced those suggestive preliminaries to all great battles, clearing out the 
hospitals, inspecting arms, looking after ammunition, shoeing animals, issuing 
provisions, and making every preparation necessary to an advance. The next 
day, the 13th, Stoneman was put in motion at the head of ten thousand finely 
equipped and well organized cavalry to ascend the Eappahannock and, swing- 
ing around, to attack the Confederate cavalry wherever it might be found, 
and " Fight ! fight ! fight ! " At the end of two days' march Stoneman found 





the river so swollen by heavy rains that he was constrained to hold np, upon 
which Hooker suspended his advance until the 27th. This unexpected delay 
of the cavalry seemingly deranged Hooker's original plan of campaign. He 
had hoped that Stoneman would have been able to place his horsemen on the 
railroad between Fredericksburg and Eichmond, by which Lee received his 
supplies, and make a wreck of the whole structure, compelling that general to 
evacuate his stronghold at Fredericksburg and vicinity and fall back toward 

I estimate the grand total of Hooker's seven corps at about 113,000 men ready 
for duty, although the data from which the conclusion is arrived at are not 
strictly official. This estimate does not include the cavalry corps of not less 
than 11,000 duty men, nor the reserve artillery, the whole number of guns in 
the army being 400. Lee's strength in and around Fredericksburg was placed 
at between 55,000 and 60,000, not including cavalry. It is not known if 
Hooker's information concerning the Confederate force was reliable, but Peck, 
operating in front of Norfolk, notified him that two of Lee's di\dsions under 
Long-street were on the south side of the James. The hour was, therefore, 
auspicious for Hooker to assume the offensive, and he seized it with a boldness 
which argued well for his fitness to command. The aim was to transfer his 
army to the south side of the river, where it would have a manoeuvring footing 
not confronted by intrenched positions. On the 27th of April the Eleventh 
and Twelfth corps were set in motion for Kelly's Ford, twenty-five miles 
up the Rappahannock, where they concentrated on the evening of the 28th, 
the Fifth, by reason of its shorter marching distance, moving on the 28th. 
The object of the expedition was unknown to the corps commanders until 
communicated to them after their arrival at the ford by the commanding 


general in person. | The Eleventh Corps crossed the Rappahannock, fol- 
lowed in the morning by the Twelfth and Fifth corps — the two former 
striking for Grermanna Ford, a crossing of the Rapidau, the latter for Ely's 
Ford, lower down the same stream. Both columns, successfully effecting 
crossings with little opposition from the enemy's pickets, arrived that- 
evening, April 30th, at the point of concentration, Chancellorsville. It had 
been a brilliantly conceived and executed movement. 

In order to confound Lee, orders were issued to assemble the Sixth, Third, 
and First corps under Sedgwick at Franklin's Crossing and Pollock's Mill, 
some three miles below Fredericksburg, on the left, before daylight of the 
morning of the 29th, and throw two Inidges across and hold them. This was 
done under a severe fire of sharp-shooters. The Second Corps, two divisions, 
marched on the 28th for Banks's Ford, four miles to the right ; the other 
division, Gibbon's, occupying Falmouth, near the river-bank, was directed to 
remain in its tents, as they were in full view of the enemy, who would readily 
observe their withdrawal. On the 29th the two divisions of the Second 
Corps reached United States Ford, held by the enemy ; but the advance of 
the right wing down the river uncovered it, whereupon a In-idge of pontoons 
was thrown across and the corps reached Chancellorsville the same night as 
the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth. The same day, the 30th, Sedg^vick was 
instructed to place a corps across the river and make a demonstration upon 
the enemy's right, below Fredericksburg, and the Third Corps received orders 
to join the right wing at Chancellorsville, where the commanding general 
arrived the same evening, establishing his headquarters at the Chancellor 
House, which, with the adjacent grounds, is Chancellorsville. All of the 
army lying there that night were in exuberant spirits at the success of their 
general in getting "on the other side" without fighting for a position. As I 
rode into Chancellorsville that night the general hilarity pervading the camps 
was particularly noticeable ; the soldiers, while chopping wood and lighting 
fires, were singing merry songs and indulging in peppery camp jokes. 

Tlie position at Chancellorsville not only took in reverse the entire system 
of the enemy's riv^er defenses, but there were roads leading from it directly 
to his line of communication. [See maps, pp. 155, 158.] But in order to gain 
the advantages now in the commanding general's grasp he had divided his 
army into two wings, and the enemy, no ordinary enemy, lay between them. 
The line of communication connecting the wings was by way of United States 
Ford and twenty miles long. It was of vital importance that the line be 
shortened in order to place the wings within easy sui>port of each otlu^-. Tlio 
possession of Banks's Ford, foreshadowed in the instructions given to Slocum, 
would accomplish all that at present could be wished. 

There were three roads over which the right wing could move upon Fred- 
ericksburg : the Orange turnpike, from the west, passed through Chauceilors- 

4 General Hooker sent for me on the niglit of the command. Althouf,'h antii-ipatinp the narrative, 

27th to ride over to his heachiuartcrs, where lie I may say T tliink it was a si},Mial misfortune to 

explained to me, as next in rank, his plan of earn- our aruis that he diil not delay joiiiiun tliat wiuj; 

paign. Ho informed me tliat, under certain con- until tlie morning' of Miiy 1st. wIkmi he would liavo 

tingeneies, the riglit wing would be placed at my found Banks's For.l in our possession.— D. N. C. 


ville, and was the most direct ; the United States Ford road, crossing the f onner 
at Chancellorsville, became the Plank road, bent to the left and united with the 
turnpike five miles or so from Chaucellors ville ; the third road fell back from 
Chancellorsville toward the Rappahannock, passed along by Banks's Ford, 
six miles distant, and continued to Fredericksburg. That wing was ready for 
the advance at an early hour in the morning of May 1st, but somehow things 
dragged ; the order defining the movement, instead of being issued the pre- 
vious night, was not received by the corps commanders, at least by me, until 
hours after light. Meade was finally pushed out on the left over the Banks's 
Ford and turnpike roads, Slocum and Howard on the right along the Plank 
road, the left to be near Banks's Ford by 2 p. m., the right at the junction of 
its line of movement with the turnpike at 12 m. No opposition was met, 
excepting that the division marching over the turnpike came upon the enemy 
two or three miles out, when the sound of their guns was heard at Chancel- 
lorsville, and Greneral Hooker ordered me to take Hancock's division and pro- 
ceed to the support of those engaged. After marching a mile and a half or 
so I came upon Sykes, who commanded, engaged at the time in drawing back 
his advance to the position he then occupied. Shortly after Hancock's troops 
had got into a line in front, an order was received from the commanding gen- 
eral " to withdraw both divisions to Chancellors\dlle." Tui-ning to the officers 
around me, Hancock, Sykes, Warren, and others, I told them what the order 
was, upon which they all agreed with me that the gi-ound should not be aban- 
doned, because of the open country in front and the commanding position. 
An aide. Major J. B. Burt, dispatched to General Hooker to this effect, came 
back in half an hour with positive orders to return. Nothing was to be done 
but carry out the command, though Warren suggested that I should disobey, 
and then he rode back to see the general. In the meantime Slocum, on the 
Plank road to my right, had been ordered in, and the enemy's advance was 
between that road and my right flank. Sykes was fii'st to move back, then 
followed by Hancock's regiments over the same road. When all but two of the 
latter had withdrawn, a third order came to me, brought by one of the gen- 
eral's staff: " Hold on until 5 o'clock." It was then perhaps 2 p. m. Disgusted 
at the general's vacillation and vexed at receiving an order of such tenor, I 
rephed with warmth unbecoming in a subordinate : " Tell General Hooker he 
is too late, the enemy are already on my right and rear. I am in full retreat." 
The position thus abandoned was high ground, more or less open in front, 
over which an army might move and artillery be used advantageously ; more- 
over, were it left in the hands of an enemy, his batteries, established on its 
crest and slopes, would command the position at Chancellorsville. Every- 
thing on the whole front was ordered in. General Hooker knew tliat Lee 
was apprised of his presence on the south side of the river, and must have 
expected that his enemy would be at least on the lookout for an advance 
upon Fredericksburg. But it was of the utmost importance that Banks's 
Ford should fall hito our liands, therefore the enemy ouglit to liav(^ be(^n 
pressed until their strength or weakness was developed; it would then have 
been time enough to run away. 

/, y^^^-r-^^^ 


Mott's Run, with a considerable brushy ravine, cuts the tm-npike three- 
fourths of a mile east of Chancellorsville. Two of Hancock's regiments, under 
Colonel Nelson A. Miles, subsequently the Indian fighter, were directed to 
occupy the ravine. Continuing my way through the woods toward Chancel- 
lorsville, I came upon some of the Fifth Corps under arms. Inquiring for their 
commanding officer, I told him that in fifteen minutes he would be attacked. 
Before finishing the sentence a volley of musketry was fired into us from the 
direction of the Plank road. This was the beginning of the battle of Chancel- 
lors\alle. Troops were hurried into position, but the observer required no 
wizard to tell him, as they marched past, that the high expectations which 
had animated them only a few hours ago had given place to disappointment. 
Proceeding to the Chancellor House, I narrated my operations in front to 
Hooker, which were seemingly satisfactory, as he said: "It is all right. 
Couch, I have got Lee just where I want him ; he must fight me on my own 
ground." The retrograde movement had prepared me for something of the 
kind, but to hear from his own lips that the advantages gained by the suc- 
cessful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive 
battle in that nest of thickets was too much, and I retired from his presence 
with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man. The army 
was directed to intrench itself. At 2 a. m. the corps commanders reported to 
General Hooker that their positions could be held; at least so said Couch, 
Slocum, and Howard. 

Until after dark on May 1st the enemy confined his demonstrations to find- 
ing out the position of our left with his skirmishers. Then he got some guns 
upon the high ground which we had abandoned as before mentioned, and 
cannonaded the left of our line. There were not many casualties, but that 
day a shell severely wounded the adjutant-general of the Second Corps, now 
General F. A. Walker. Chancellorsville was a strategic point to an offensive 
or retreating army, as roads diverged from it into every part of Virginia ; but 
for a defensive position it was bad, particularly for such an army as Hooker 
had under him, which prided itself upon its artillery, which was perhaps equal 
to any in the world. There were no commanding positions for artillery, and 
but little open country to operate over ; in fact, the advantages of gi'ound for 
this arm were mainly with the attacking party. 

During the 29th and 30th the enemy lay at Fredericksburg observing 
Sedgwick's demonstrations on the left, entirely unconscious of Hooker's suc- 
cessful crossing of the right wing, until midday of the latter date, but that 
night Lee formed his plan of operations for checking the farther advance 
of the force which had not only turned the left fiank of his river defenses 
but was threatening his line of communication with Kichmond as well as the 
rear of his center at Fredericksburg. Stonewall Jackson, who was watching 
Sedgwick, received instructions to withdraw his corps, march to the left, 
across the front of Hooker's intrenched ]iosition, until its right Hank was 
attained, and assault with his column of -J^,!)!)!) men, while iiis i-ommanding 
general would, with what force he could si»are, guard the api>roaches to 

1 62 



On the morning of May 2d our line had become strong enough to resist a 
front attack unless made in great force ; the enemy had also been hard at 
work on his front, particularly that section of it between the Plank road and 
turnpike. Sedgwick, the previous night, had been ordered to send the First 
Corps (Reynolds's) to Chancellorsville. At 7 a. m. a sharp cannonade was 
opened on our left, followed by infantry demonstrations of no particular 
earnestness. Two hours later the enemy were observed moving a mile or 
so to the south and front of the center, and later the same column was 
reported to the commander of the Eleventh Corps by General Devens, whose 
division was on the extreme right flank. At 9 : 30 a. m. a circular directed to 
Generals Sloeum and Howard called attention to this movement and to the 
weakness of their flanks. ^ 

At 11 A. M. om' left was furiously cannonaded by their artillery, established 
on the heights in front of Mott's Run, followed by sharp infantry firing on the 
fronts of the Second and Twelfth corps. As time flew along and no attack 
came from the enemy seen moving in front, Hooker conceived that Lee was 
retreating toward Gordons\alle. There was color for this view, as the main 
road from I'redericksburg to that point diverged from the Plank road two 
miles to the left of Chancellorsville, and passed along his front at about the 
same distance. Hooker therefore jumped at the conclusion that the enemy's 
army was moving into the center of Virginia. But instead of the hostile 
column being on the Gordonsville road in retreat, it was Stonewall's corps mov- 
ing on an interior neighborhood road, about one mile distant, and in search 

i See p. 219 for a cony of this circular order. Maps showing: the positions of the Eleventh and 
Twelfth corps appear on pages 191-201. — Editors. 


of our right flank and rear. At 2 p. m. I went into the Chancellor House, when 
General Hooker greeted me with the exclamation: "Lee is in full retreat 
toward Gordonsville, and I have sent out Sickles to capture his artillery." 
I thought, without speaking it : " If your conception is correct, it is very 
strange that only the Third Corps should be sent in pursuit." Sickles 
received orders at 1 p. m. to take two divisions, move to his front and attack, 
which he did, capturing some hundreds of prisoners. The country on the 
front being mostly wooded enabled the enemy to conceal his movements and 
at the same time hold Sickles in check with a rear-guard, which made such 
a show of strength that reenforcements were called for and furuislied. In 
the meantime Jackson did not for a moment swerve from his pm*pose, but 
steadily moved forward to accomplish what he had undertaken. 

It was about 5 : 30 in the evening when the head of Jackson's column 
found itself on the right and rear of the army, which on that flank consisted 
of the Eleventh Corps, the extreme right brigade receiving its first intimation 
of danger from a volley of musketry fired into their rear, followed up so 
impetuously that no efficient stand could be made by the brigades of the 
corps that successively attempted to resist the enemy's charge. ^Mien 
General Hooker found out what that terrific roar on his right flank meant 
he quickly mounted and flew across the open space to meet the onset, passing 
on his way stampeded pack-mules, officers' horses, caissons, with men and 
horses running for their lives. Gathering up such troops as were nearest to 
the scene of action, Berry's division from the Third Corps, some from the 
Twelfth, Hays's brigade of the Second, and a portion of the Eleventh, an 
effectual stand was made. Pleasonton, who was returning from the front, 
where he had been operating with Sickles (at the time Jackson atta(.*ked), 
taking in the state of things, rapidly moved his two regiments of cavalry 
and a battery to the head and right flank of the enemy's advance columns, 
when, making a charge and bringing up his own guns, with others of the 
Eleventh and Third Corps, he was enabled to punish them severely. 

Pickets had been thrown out on Howard's flank, but not well to the right 
and rear. I suspect that the prime reason for the surprise was that the 
superior officers of the right corps had been put off their guard by adopting 
the conjecture of Hooker, "Lee's army is in full retreat to Gordonsville," as 
well as by expecting the enemy to attack precisely where ample preparations 
had been made to receive him. It can be emphatically stated that no corps 
in the army, surprised as the Eleventh was at this time, could have held its 
ground under similar circumstances. 

At half-past two that afternoon the Second ('orps' lines were assaulted l>y 
artillery and infantry. Just previous to Jackson's attack on the right a 
desperate effort was made by Lee's people to carry the left at Mott's Kun, but 
the men who held it were there to stay. Haoker, desiring to know X\\o enemy's 
strength in front of the Twelfth Corps, advanced Slocum into tlic thicket, 
but that officer found the hostile line too well defench^l for him to ix-netrate 
it and was forced to recall the attacking party. When night ]mt an end to 
the fighting of both combatants. Hooker was ol)lig<Ml to form a new line for 




''"' ' "''^^/ \ n< /'„'/,/ ^m%'H '1:1' "l"ll\ I 

' '4 


his right flank perpendicular to the old one and barely half a mile to the 
right of Chancellorsville. Sickles was retired, with the two columns, from his 
advanced position in the afternoon to near where Pleasonton had had his 
encounter, before mentioned, some distance to the left of the new line of our 
right flank and close up to the enemy. The situation was thought to be a 
very critical one by Greneral Hooker, who had simply a strong body in front 
of the enemy, but without supports, at least near enough to be used for 
that purpose. At the same time it was a menace to Jackson's right wing 
or flank. Before midnight some of the latter's enterprising men pushed 
forward and actually cut off Sickles's line of communication. When this 
news was carried to Hooker it caused him great alarm, and preparations 
were at once made to withdraw the whole front, leaving General Sickles to 
his fate ; but that officer showed himself able to take care of his rear, for he 
ordered after a little while a column of attack, and communication was 
restored at the point of the bayonet. 

The situation of Jackson's corps on the morning of May 3d was a desperate 
one, its front and right flank being in the presence of not far from 25,000 
men, with the left flank subject to an assault of 30,000, the corps of Meade and 
Reynolds, by advancing them to the right, where the thicket did not present 
an insurmountable obstacle. It only required that Hooker should brace 
himself up to take a reasonable, common-sense view of the state of things, 
when the success gained by Jackson would have been turned into an over- 
whelming defeat. But Hooker became very despondent. I think that his 
being outgeneraled by Lee had a good deal to do with his depression. After 
the right flank had been established on the morning of the 3d by Sickles 


getting back into position our line was more compact, with favorable posi- 
tions for artillery, and the reserves were well in hand. Meade had been 
di-awn in from the left and Reynolds had arrived with the Fu-st Corps. The 
engineers had been directed on the previous night to lay out a new line, its 

front a half mile in rear of Chancellorsville, with the flanks thrown back, 

the right to the Eapidan, a little above its junction with the Rappahannock, 
the left resting on the latter river. The Eleventh Corps, or at least that 
portion which formed line of battle, was withdrawn from the front and sent 
to the rear to reorganize and get its scattered parts together, leaving the fol- 
lowing troops in front : one division of the Second Corps on the left from 
Mott's Run to Chancellorsville, the Twelfth Corps holding the center and 
right flank, aided by the Third Corps and one division of the Second Corps 
(French's), on the same flank ; the whole number in front, according to my 
estimate, being 37,000 men. The Fkst and Fifth corps in reserve num- 
bered 30,000, and, placing the number of reliable men in the Eleventh Corps 
at 5000, it will be seen that the reserves nearly equaled those in line of battle 
in front. 

After the day's mishaps Hooker judged that the enemy could not have 
spared so large a force to move around his front without depleting the 
defenses of Fredericksburg. Accordingly, at 9 P. M., an imperative order was 
sent to the commander of the left wing to cross the river at Fredericksburg, 
march upon Chancellorsville, and be in the \dcinity of the commanding gen- 
eral at daylight. But Sedgwick was already across the river and three miles 
below Fredericksburg. It was 11 p. m., May 2d, when he got the order, and 
twelve or fourteen miles had to be marched over by daylight. The night was 
moonlight, but any officer who has had experience in making night marches 
with infantry will understand the vexatious delays occurring even when the 
road is clear ; but when, in addition, there is an enemy in front, with a line 
of fortified heights to assault, the problem which Sedgwick had to solve will 
be pronounced impossible of solution. However, that officer set his column 
in motion by flank, leaving one division that lay opposite the enemy, who were 
in force to his left. The marching column, being continually hai'assed by skir- 
mishers, did not arrive at Fredericksburg until daylight. The first assault 
upon the heights behind the town failed. Attempts to carry them by flank 
movements met with no success. Finally a second storming party was organ- 
ized, and the series of works were taken literally at tlie point of the bayonet, 
though at heavy loss. It was then 11 a. m. The column immediately started for 
Chancellorsville, being more or less obstructed by the enemy until its arrival 
near Salem Heights, 5 or 6 miles out, where seven brigades under Early, six 
of which had been driven from the defenses of Fredericksbm-g, made a stand 
in conjunction with supports sent from Lee's army before Chancellorsville. 
This was about the middle of the afternoon, when Sedgwick in force attacked 
the enemy. Though at first successful, he was subsequently com})ell«'d to 
withdraw those in advance and look to his own safety by throwing his own 
flanks so as to cover Banks's Foi-d, the friendly proximity of which eventually 
saved this wing from utter annihilation. 

1 66 



At about 5 A. M., May 3d, fighting was begun at Chaueellorsville, when 
the Third (Sickles's) Corps began to retire to the left of our proper right 
flank, and all of that flank soon became fiercely engaged, while the battle ran 
along the whole line. The enemy's guns on the heights to our left, as well as 
at every point on the line where they could be established, were vigorously 
used, while a full division threw itself on Miles at Mott's Run. On the right 
flank our guns were well handled, those of the Twelfth Corps being conspicu- 
ous, and the opposing lines of infantry operating in the thicket had almost 
hand-to-hand conflicts, capturing and recapturing prisoners. The enemy 
appeared to know wiiat he was about, for pressing the Third Corps vigorously 
he forced it back, when he joined or rather touched the left of Lee's main 
body, making their line continuous from left to right. Another advantage 
gained by this success was the possession of an open field, from which guns 
covered the ground up to the Chancellor House. Upon the south porch of 
that mansion Greneral Hooker stood leaning against one of its pillars, observ- 
ing the fighting, looking anxious and much careworn. After the fighting had 
commenced I doul)t if any orders were given by him to the commanders on 
the field, unless, perhaps, "to retire when out of ammunition." None were 
received by me, nor were there any inquiries as to how the battle was going 
along my front. On the right flank, where the fighting was desperate, the 
engaged trooj^s were governed by the corps and division leaders. If the ear 
of the commanding general was, as he afterward stated, strained to catch 
the sound of Sedg\vick's guns, it could not have heard them in the continuous 
uproar that filled the air around him ; but as Sedgwick, who was known as a 
fighting officer, had not appeared at the time set — daylight — nor for some 
hours after, it was conclusive evidence that he had met with strong opposi- 
tion, showing that all of Lee's army was not at Chaueellorsville, so that the 


moment was favorable for Hooker to try his opponent's strength with every 
available man. Moreovei-, the left wing might at that very time be in jeopardy, 
therefore he was bound by every patriotic motive to strike hard for its relief. 
If he had remembered Mr. Lincoln's injunction (" Gentlemen, in your next 
fight put in all of your men "), the face of the day would have been changed 
and the field won for the Union arms. 

Not far from 8:30 a. m. the headquarters pennants of the Third and Twelfth 
corps suddenly appeared from the right in the open field of Chancellorsville ; 
then the Third began to fall back, it was repoi'ted, for want of ammunition, 
followed by that portion of the Twelfth fighting on the same flank, and the 
division of the Second Corps on its right. It is not known whether any efforts 
were made to supply the much-needed ammunition to the Third as well as 
the Twelfth Corps, whose ammunition was nearly used up when it retu-ed. 
My impression is that the heads of the ordnance, as well as of other impor- 
tant departments, were not taken into the field during this campaign, which 
was most unfortunate, as the commanding general had enough on his mind 
without charging it with details. 

The open field seized by Jackson's old corps after the Third Corps drew off 
was shortly dotted with guns that made splendid practice through an open- 
ing in the wood upon the Chancellor House, and everything else, for that 
matter, in that neighborhood. Hooker was still at his place on the porch, 
with nothing between him and Lee's army but Geary's division of the Twelfth 
and Hancock's division and a battery of the Second Corps. But Geary's right 
was now turned, and that flank was steadily being pressed back along his 
intrenched line to the junction of the Plank road and the turnpike, when a 
cannon-shot struck the pillar against which Hooker was leaning and knocked 
him down. A report flew around that he was killed. I was at the time but 
a few yards to his left, and, dismoimting, ran to the porch. The shattered 
pillar was there, but I could not find him or any one else. Hurrying through 
the house, finding no one, my search was continued through the back yard. All 
the time I was thinking, " If he is killed, what shall I do with this disjointed 
army!" Passing through the yard I came upon him, to my g]-eat joy, mounted, 
and with his staff also in their saddles. Briefly congratulating him on his 
escape — it was no time to blubber or use soft expressions — I went about my 
own business. This was the last I saw of my connnanding general in front. The 
time, I reckon, was from 9:15 to 9:30 a. m., I think nearer the former than the 
latter. He prol^ably left the field soon after his hurt, but he neitlit>r notified 
me of his going nor did he give any orders to me whatever. Having some 
little time before this seen that the last stand would be about the Chancellor 
House, I had sent to the rear for some of the Second Corps batteries, whicli 
had been ordered there by the commanding general, but word came back that 
they were so jammed in with other carriages that it was imp(^ssible to extii- 
cate them. General ]\reade, heai-ing of my wants, kindly sent forward the ^th 
Maine battery belonging to his corps. It was posted in rear of the Clianct^llor 
House, where the United States Ford road entin-s the thickest. Witli sudi 
precision did the artillery of Jackson's old cori)s i)lay ui^on this battery tliat 



all of the officers and most of the non-commissioned officers and men were 
killed or wounded. The gallant Kirby, whose guns could not be brought up, 
was mortally wounded in the same battery \ of which I had for the time placed 
him in command, and my horse was killed under me while I was trying to 
get some men to train a gun on the flank of the force then pushing Geary's 
division. The enemy, having 30 pieces in position on our right, now advanced 
some of his guns to within 500 or 600 yards of the Chancellor House, where 
there were only four of Pettit's Second Corps guns to oppose them, making 
a target of that building and taking the right of Hancock's division in reverse, 
a portion of which had been withdrawn from its intrenchments and thrown 
back to the left to meet the enemy should he succeed in forcing Mott's Run. 
This flank was stoutly held by Colonel Miles, who, by the bye, had been carried 
off the field, shot through the body. Lee by this time knew well enough, if 
he had not known before, that the game was sure to fall into his hands, and 
accordingly plied every gun and rifle that could be brought to bear on us. 
Still everything was firmly held excepting Geary's right, which was slowly 
falling to pieces, for the enemy had his flank and there was no help for it. 
Hiding to Geary's left, I found him there dismounted, with sword swinging 
over his head, walking up and down, exposed to a severe infantry fire, when 
he said : " My division can't hold its place ; what shall I do ? " To which I 
replied : " I don't know, but do as we are doing ; fight it out." 

\ The 5th Maine battery, Capt. G. F, Leppien, was the proper commander of Battery I, 1st U. S. 

belonged to the First Corps. Captain Leppien and Artillery, Second Corps. The 5th Maine lost 6 men 

Lieutenants G. T. Stevens and A. B. Twitchell were killed and 19 wounded ; 43 horses were disabled, 

wounded, Capt. Leppien mortally. Lieut. E. Kirby and the guns were hauled off by hand.— Editors. 



It was not then too late to save the day. Fifty pieces of artillery, or even 
forty, brought up and run in front and to the right of the Chancellor House, 
would have driven the enemy out of the thicket, then forcing back Geary's 
right, and would have neutralized the thirty guns to the right which were 
pounding us so hard. But it is a waste of words to write what might have 
been done. Hooker had made up his mind to abandon the field, otherwise he 
would not have allowed the Third and part of the Twelfth Corps to leave 
their ground for want of ammunition. A few minutes after my inter^dew 
with Geary a staff-officer from General Hooker rode up and requested my 
presence with that general. Turning to General Hancock, near by, I told 
him to take care of things and rode to the rear. The Chancellor House was 
then burning, having been fired in several places by the enemy's shells. 

At the farther side of an open field, half a mile in the rear of Chancellors- 
ville, I came upon a few tents (three or four) pitched, around which, mostly 
dismounted, were a large number of staff-officers. General Meade was also 
present, and perhaps other generals. General Hooker was \ji\\g down I 
think in a soldier's tent by himself. Raising himself a little as I entered, he 
said : " Couch, I turn the command of the army over to you. You will with- 
draw it and place it in the position designated on this map," as he pointed to 
a line traced on a field-sketch. This was perhaps three-quarters of an horn* 
after his hurt. He seemed rather dull, but possessed of his mental faculties. 
I do not think that one of those officers outside of the tent knew what orders 
I was to receive, for on stepping out, which I did immediately on getting my 
instructions, I met Meade close by, looking inquiringly as if he expected that 



finally he would receive the order for which he had waited all that long 
morning, " to go in." Colonel N. H. Davis broke out : " We shall have some 
fighting now." These incidents are mentioned to show the temper of that 
knot of officers. No time was to be lost, as only Hancock's division now held 
Lee's army. Dispatching Major John B. Burt with orders for the front to 
retire, I rode back to the thicket, accompanied by Meade, and was soon 
joined by Sickles, and after a little while by Hooker, but he did not interfere 
with my dispositions. Hancock had a close shave to withdraw in safety, his 
line being three-fourths of a mile long, with an exultant enemy as close in 
as they dared, or wished, or chose to be, firing and watching. But every- 
thing was brought off, except five hundred men of the Second Corps who, 
through the negligence of a lieutenant charged by Hancock with the 
responsibility of retiring the force at Mott's Run, were taken prisoners. 
However, under the circumstances, the division was retired in better shape 
than one could have anticipated. General Sickles assisted in getting men 
to draw off the guns of the Maine battery before spoken of. General Meade 
wished me to hold the strip of thicket in rear of Chancellorsville, some six 
hundred yards in front of our new line of defense. My reply was : " I shall 
not leave men in this thicket to be shelled out by Lee's artillery. Its posses- 
sion won't give us any strength. Yonder [pointing to the rear] is the line 
where the fighting is to be done." Hooker heard the conversation, but made 
no remarks. Considerable bodies of troops of different corps that lay in 
the brush to the right were brought within the lines, and the battle of 
Chancellorsville was ended. My pocket diary. May 3d, has the following: 
" Sickles opened at about 5 a. m. Orders sent by me at 10 for the front to 
retire; at 12 m. in my new position " ; the latter sentence meaning that at that 
hour my corps was in position on the new or second line of defense. 

As to the charge that the battle was lost because the general was intoxicated, 
I have always stated that he probably abstained from the use of ardent spirits 
when it would have been far better for him to have continued in his usual 
habit in that respect. The shock from being violently thrown to the ground, 
together with the physical exhaustion resulting from loss of sleep and the 
anxiety of mind incident to the last six days of the campaign, would tell on 
any man. The enemy did not press us on the second line, Lee simply varying 
the monotony of watching us by an occasional cannonade from the left, a part 
of his army having been sent to Salem Church to resist Sedgwick. Sedgwick 
had difficulty in maintaining his ground, but held his own by hard fighting 
until after midnight. May 4tli-5th, when he recrossed at Banks's Ford. 

Some of the most anomalous occurrences of the war took place in this 
campaign. On the night of May 2d the commanding general, with 80,000 
men in his wing of the army, directed Sedgwick, with 22,000, to march to his 
relief. While that officer was doing this on the 3d, and when it would be 
expected that every effort would be made by the right wing to do its part, 
only one-half of it was fought (or rather half -fought, for its ammunition was 
not replenished), and then the whole wing was withdrawn to a place where 
it could not be hurt, leaving Sedgwick to take care of himself. 


At 12 o'clock on the ni^lit of the 4th-5th General Hooker assembled his 
corps commanders in council. Meade, Sickles, Howard, Reynolds, and my- 
self were present; Greneral Slocum, on account of the long distance from 
his post, did not arrive until after the meeting was broken up. Hooker 
stated that his instructions compelled him to cover Washington, not to 
jeopardize the army, etc. It was seen by the most casual observer that he 
had made up his mind to retreat. We were left by ourselves to consult, 
upon which Sickles made an elaborate argument, sustaining the views of the 
commanding general. Meade was in favor of fighting, stating that he 
doubted if we could get off our guns. Howard was in favor of fighting, 
qualifying his views by the remark that our present situation was due to the 
bad conduct of his corps, or words to that effect. Reynolds, who was lying 
on the ground very much fatigued, was in favor of an advance. I had 
similar views to those of Meade as to getting off the guns, but said I 
" would favor an advance if I could designate the point of attack." Upon 
collecting the suffrages, Meade, Reynolds, and Howard voted squarely for 
an advance, Si(.-kles and myself squarely no ; upon which Hooker informed 
the council that he should take upon himself the responsibility of retiring the 
army to the other side of the river. As I stepped out of the tent Reynolds, 
just behind me, broke out, " What was the use of calling us together at this 
time of night when he intended to retreat anyhow?" 

On the morning of May 5th, corps commanders were ordered to cut roads, 
where it was necessary, leading from theii* positions to the United States 
Ford. During the afternoon there was a very heavy rainfall. In the mean- 
time Hooker had in person crossed the river, but, as he gave orders for the 
various corps to march at such and such times during the night, I am not aware 
that any of his corps generals knew of his departure. Near midnight I got 
a note from Meade informing me that General Hooker was on the other side 
of the river, which had risen over the bridges, and that communication was 
cut off from him. I immediately rode over to Hooker's headquarters and 
found that I was in command of the army, if it had any commander. General 
Hunt, of the artillery, had brought the information as to the condition of the 
bridges, and from the reports there seemed to be danger of losing them 
entirely. After a short conference with Meade I told him that the recrossing 
would be suspended, and that "we would stay where we were and fight it 
out," returning to my tent with the intention of (Mijoying what I had not had 
since the night of the 30tli ultimo — a good sleep; but at 2 a. m., communi- 
cation liaving been reestablished, I received a sliarp message from Hookei-, 
to order the recrossing of the army as he had directed, and everything was 
safely transferred to the north bank of the Rappahannock. 

In looking for the causes of the loss of ChancellorsvilIt\ tlit» ]»riin;n-y ones 
were tliat Hooker expected Lee to fall 1)ack without risking battle. Finding 
himself mistaken he assumed the defensive, and was (mtgentM-aled and 
became demomlized by the superior tactical boldness of the enemy. 



IN the latter part of April, 1863, GeDeral Hooker 
decided to undertake an offensive campaign with 
the Army of the Potomac against the Army of North- 
ern Virginia, under General Lee. At this time the 
two armies faced each other : Lee's, numbering about 
UMON cAv*LRv-M*Ns HAT. 60,000 mcu, bciug at Fredericksburg, and the Army of 

the Potomac, numbering about 130,000 men, at Falmouth, on the north side 
of the Rappahannock River opposite Fredericksburg. Hooker directed 
three corps of the army, the First, the Third, and the Sixth, comprising 
59,000 men, under the command of General Sedgwick, to cross the Rappa- 
hannock River below Fredericksburg and hold Lee's army in that position, 
while he himself moved secretly and with celerity three corps, the Fifth, 
the Eleventh, and the Twelfth, numbering 42,000 men, up the river, cross- 
ing it and concentrating them at Chancellorsville, ten miles west of Fred- 
ericksburg, with the purpose of moving down upon General Lee's army to 
take it in rear and flank — two divisions of the Second Corps being placed 
to cover Banks's Ford, the third division being left at Falmouth, while a 
brigade and battery were stationed at United States Ford to facilitate the 
crossing. The Cavalry Corps, with the exception of one small brigade 
of three regiments and a battery of horse artillery, which was left under 
my command with the army, was ordered under the command of Gen- 
eral Stoneman to make a raid in rear 
of Lee's army, and destroy his railroads 
and his communications with Richmond. J 

-=-=ii j:^-v \A- 




Tliis rogiraeiit (of N\Tiipple'6 division, Third CorpH) with the 84th Pcnnsylv.'iuia performed desperate service near 
Fairview on Sunday morning, May 3d, the 84th losing 215 men and the llOth losing 45 men.— Editors. 

\ This corps did great service by drawing off Gen- 
eral Lee's cavalry, niulor General J. E. B. Stuart, 
to Brandy Station and Oulpeper, tlius depriving 
General Lee of their services ; for General Hooker 
moved the three corps with him with such celerity 

that they passed between Stuart and Lee's army, 
and Stuart could not get through to communicate 
to Lee what was going on. It will bo seen later on 
what a loss this was to Lee, and what a great ad- 
vantage it was to the Army of the Potomac. — A. P. 




)M A wAit-rnit 

On the 26tli of April General Hooker gave his orders for the right wing of 
the army to move, the Eleventh and Twelfth corps to be followed by the 
Fifth ; the Eleventh and Twelfth to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, 
and the Rapidan River at Germanna Ford ; the Fifth Corps marching from 
Kelly's Ford to Ely's Ford, nearer to the mouth of the Rapidan and to Chan- 
cellorsville. The left wing of the army, under General Sedgwick, was oi-dered 
to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg on the morning of the 
29th ; its duty was to keep the enemy as long as possible before Fredericks- 
burg, to pursue him if he attempted to fall back on Richmond, and to take 
possession of his works and his line of retreat if he marched upon Chancellors- 
ville; in other words, Sedgwick was told to hold Lee at Fredericksburg until 
Hooker could come down upon him from Chancellorsville and crush liini. 

The right wing of the army crossed Kelly's Ford on the morning of the 
29th, and the Eleventh and Twelfth corps reached Germanna Ford that 
evening. I had the advance of this column with two regiments of cavalry 
and a battery of horse artillery ; the third regiment of the cavalry brigade I 
sent with the Fifth Corps to Ely's Ford. In the afternoon, at Germanna 
Ford, I surprised and captured a picket of some fifty of Stuart's cavalry 
soldiei-s. With them was an engineer officer belonging to Stuart's statf. On 
searching the party, as is done with all prisoners, I found on this engineer 
officer a very bulky volume, which proved to be a diary tliat he had been 
keeping throughout the war. I spent the greater part of the night in reading 
it, in hopes of finding something that would be of advantage to us ; nor was 
I disappointed. This diary stated that in the first week in ^Farch a council 
of war had been held at General Stnart's luMidcinarters, which had been 
attended by Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, Kwell, and Stuart. They were in 
conference over five hours, and came to the decision tiiat the next battle 
would be at or near Chancellorsville, and thai tliat i)ositi<»ii mnsl be prepai-ed. 



The next day, the 30th of April, I moved on toward Chancellorsville, and 
at 1 o'clock in the day I captured a courier or orderly from General Lee, who 
had a dispatch from Lee, dated at Fredericksburg, noon of that day, and 
addressed to Major-Greneral McLaws, stating that he had just been informed 
that the enemy had concentrated in force near Chancellorsville, inquiring 
why he had not been kept advised, and saying that he wished to see McLaws 
as soon as possible at headquarters. At 2 o'clock p. m., one hour later, I 
reported to Greneral Hooker at Chancellorsville, and submitted to him the 
diary and General Lee's dispatch, both of which he retained, and I suggested 
that we had evidently surprised General Lee by our rapid movements across 
the river, and, as Lee had prepared for a battle at Chancellorsville, we had 
better anticipate him by moving on toward Fredericksburg. A march of 
three or four miles would take us out of the woods into a more open country, 
where we could form our line of battle, and where our artillery could be used 
to advantage ; we would then be prepared to move on Fredericksburg in the 
morning. Besides, such a movement would enable us to uncover Banks's 
Ford, which would shorten our communication with General Sedgwick over 
5 miles, and bring us within 3^ miles of Falmouth by that Ford. 

I was much surprised to find that General Hooker, who up to that time 
had been all vigor, energy, and activity, received the suggestion as a matter 
of secondary importance, and that he considered the next morning sufficiently 
early to move on Fredericksburg. Up to that time General Hooker's strategy 
had l^een all that could have been desired. He had outflanked the enemy 
and had surprised him by the rapidity of his movements. At 2 o'clock p. m., 
on the 30th of April, General Hooker had ninety chances in his favor to ten 




against him. The very cavahy under Stuart that Lee depended on to keep 
him ad\dsed had been cut off by the prompt action of the army, and we had 
it over the signature of Greneral Lee himself that his army had been suii3rised. 
General Hooker had it in his power at that time to have cioished Lee's army 
and wound up the war. The Army of the Potomac never had a better oppor- 
tunity, for more than half its work had been done before a blow had been 
struck, by the brilliancy of its strategy in moving upon Chancellorsville. 

I camped my command about a mile from General Hooker's headquarters, 
which were at the Chancellor House, and such were my misgivings as regarded 
the situation of the army that about dusk I called upon the general again 
and stated to him our perilous position. 

To the east, toward Fredericksburg, the woods were thick for three or four 
miles ; to the south, toward Spotsylvania Court House, the woods extended 
about the same distance; to the west, from Hazel Grove, the same condition 
of things existed; while the country between Chancellorsville and the Rappa- 
hannock River, in our rear, was rough, broken, and not at all suitable for the 
operations required of an army. The position of the army at Chancellorsville 
extended about three miles from east to west in the narrow clearings, which 
did not afford sufficient ground to manoeuvre an army of the size of the Army 
of the Potomac. Besides this, we were ignorant of what might be going on 
outside of this cordon of woods, and were giving the enemy every opportu- 
nity to take us at a disadvantage. Every instinct indu(,'ed me to suggest to 
General Hooker, to relieve ourselves from our emlmrrassments, to send the 
Eleventh Corps, which was in a miserable position in the woods, down to 
Spotsylvania Court House by the Jack Shop road, and make the line of battle 
from Chancellorsville to Spotsylvania. This proposition was not approved, 
and I then asked permission to send some cavalry to Spotsylvania, to find out 
what was going on in the open country beyond the woods. General Hooker 
assented to this, and I ordered the 6th New York Cavalry, under Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Duncan Mc Vicar, to proceed down the road from Chancellors- 
ville to Spotsylvania, ascertain if the enemy were anywhere in that vicinity, 
and, having done so, retui'n before daybreak. This could easily be done, as 
the distance was not more than eight miles. Colonel McVicar executed his 
orders in splendid style ; he went to Spotsylvania, saw no enemy, but on his 
return, it being moonlight, he found a body of cavalry in liis front, barring 
his passage to Chancellorsville. He immediately dej)loyed his Regiment, s(^mo 
three or four hundred strong, and after a murdci-ous lire from the saddle he 
charged the enemy with sabers and comi>let«>ly routed them. This force was 
the 5th Virginia Cavalry, and with it were (leiuM-al Stuai-t and statV. They 
scattered in every direction and were ]>ursued by the (ith New Yt)rk Cav- 
alry until the 2d Virginia Regiment, coming to their assistance, sto])i)ed the 
pursuit. The fith New York Cavalry tlien, unmolested, returned to Chancel- 
lorsville, but without tlieii- brave conunan<ler, who was killed in the thickest 
of the fray. 

This action made a strong inqn-ession on llie Confederates, ;ind Stuart, in 
order to avoid another such encounter, started his cavah-y in the direction 



of Spotsylvania Court House, but hw 
rear-guard threw the whole column 
into confusion by the cry, " The enemy 
is upon us." Major von Borcke, a dis- 
tinguished officer, who was on General 
Stuart's staff, and was present on 
this occasion, in describing it, says: 
" Shots were fired at hazard in every 
direction. The 1st and 3d Virginia 
Regiments, no longer recognizing each 
other, charge upon each other mutu- 
ally ; Stuart's mounted men, generally 
so brave and so steadfast, no longer 
obey the orders of their officers, and 
gallop off in great disorder. At last 
quiet is restored, and the brigade final- 
ly reaches Spotsylvania Court House, 
while the small band which has caused 
so much alarm to Stuart was quietly 
returning to Chancellorsville." 

The next morning at daylight (Fri- 
day, May 1st) I reported to General 
Hooker the result "of this reconnois- 
sance, and he began to realize the im- 
portance of the information that had 
been conveyed the day before in the 
diar}^ of Stuart's engineer officer. The 6th New York Cavahy were only 
able to report that they had cut their way through a heavy body of cavalry, 
and this by moonlight ; they were unable to say whether any infantry or 
artillery were in that direction. 

To move the army down on Fredericksburg with an unknown force on its 
rear and flank was a hazardous experiment. What could have been done 
with safety the day before now became doubtful, and it was this uncertainty 
that paralyzed the vigor and action of General Hooker throughout the 1st of 
May. Although he started the Second, Fifth, Twelfth, and Third corps in 
the direction of Tabernacle Church on the way to Fredericksburg, the move- 
ment was not of such a character as to bring success. Upon meeting a stub- 
born resistance from General Jackson's forces, and fearing that if he should 
become deeply engaged a force from Spotsylvania would take him in the rear 
and flank, he withdrew the army and placed it in position at Chancellorsville, 
From that time the whole situation was changed. Without striking a blow, 
the army was placed on the defensive. The golden moment had been lost, 
and it never appeared again to the same extent afterward — an illustration 
that soldiers' legs have as much to do with winning victories as theii" arms. 

General Lee knew that General Hooker had taken his army back to its 
position at Chancellors\dlle. The Third Corps had already been taken from 





General Sedgwick at Fredericksburg, and at 2 o'clock on the morning of May 
2d the First Corps was also ordered up to Chancellors ville, leaving Sedgwick 
with the Sixth Corps. These movements did not escape the attention of Gen- 
eral Lee, so he decided to assume the offensive and put in operation the plan 
which had been suggested by Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Stuart 
at their council of war in the first week in Marcli. He left a sufficient force 
at Fredericksburg to watch Sedgwick, while with the bulk of his army he 
moved on Chancellorsville, sending a force under Generals Jackson, A. P. 
Hill, and Stuart, to make a turning movement and to attack the Union 
forces in the rear and right flank, and roll them up. Lee himself, in the 
meantime, with the remainder of his forces, occupied the attention of 
the left and center of Hooker's ai'my, to prevent any interference with 
the flank movement. General Lee's strategy was the same that Hooker 
had carried out so successfully until he stopped at Chancellorsville. Lee 
was equally successful in his movements, and we will now investigate the 
causes of his failure to give the Army of the Potomac a crushing blow. 

On the 2d day of May the right of the Army of the Potomac was the 
Eleventh Corps, in the woods near Dowdall's Tavern (Melzi Chancellor's) ; the 
Thu'd Corps connected it with the Twelfth Corps at Fairview and Chancellors- 
ville, facing south toward the woods ; while the Second and the Fifth corps 
were posted to prevent any attack taking the position in the rear and flank 
from the east. Throughout the morning of the 2d of May, attacks w«.n'e made 
on different portions of our line from the east to the west. These attacks 
occurred at intervals of an hour or more, but always farther to the west. I 
was satisfied this was done to withdraw oui* attention from the real point of 
attack, and I mentioned this to Hooker, who had become more and more im- 
pressed with the belief that the information contained in the diary of Stuart's 
engineer officer was correct, and that Lee had adopted a plan to carry it out. 

In the afternoon of May 2d General Sickles, commanding the Third Corps, 
sent in word that the enemy were retreating toward Gordonsville, and that 
their wagons and artillery could be seen passing by the Furnace road some 
three miles to the south. General Hooker sent for me on receiving this 
report, and stated that he was not sure the enemy were retreating; that he 
wanted an officer of experience in that part of the field, and that he wished me 
to take my command there and keep him promptly informed of everything 
that was going on. I asked him if he considered me to be under the orders of 
anyone. He replied (piickly, "You are under my orders only; use your 
best judgment in doing whatever you think ought to be done." 

On arriving at Hazel Grove, about one mile from Chancellorsville, 1 found 
that General Sickles was moving two of the divisions of the Third Cori»s in 
the direction of Catherine Furnace, and shortly aftei- ho became engaged 
there with a strong rear-gnard. Hazel Grove was the liigliest ground in 
the neighborhood and was the key of our position, and I saw that if Lee's 
forces gained it the Army of the Potomac woidd be worst <m1. 

General Sickles wanted some cavaliy to ])roteet liis thinks, and 1 gave him 
the Gth New York. This left me witli* onlv the Sth and 17th Pennsylvania 


regiments and Martin's New York battery of horse artillery. I posted this 
command at the extreme west of the clearing, about two hundred yards 
from the woods in which the Eleventh Corps was encamped. This i)osi- 
tion at Hazel Grrove was about a quarter of a mile in extent, running nearly 
north-east and south-west, but was in no place farther than two hundi'ed 
yards from the woods, and on the south and east it sloped off into a marsh 
and a creek. It commanded the position of the army at Fairview and Chan- 
cellorsville and enfiladed oui* line. The moving out to the Furnace of the 
two divisions of the Third Corps left a gap of about a mile from Hazel Grove 
to the right of the Twelfth Corps. Shortly after General Sickles had been 
engaged at the Furnace, he sent me word that the enemy were gi\ang way 
and cavalry could be used to advantage in pursuit. Before moving my com- 
mand I rode out to the Furnace to comprehend the situation. It was no jjlaee 
for cavalry to operate, and as I could hear spattering shots going more and 
more toward the north-west, I was satisfied that the enemy were not retreat- 
ing. I hastened back to my command at Hazel Grove ; when I reached it, 
the Eleventh Corps to oui' rear and our right was in full flight, panic-stricken 
beyond description. We faced about, having then the marsh behind us. It 
was an ugly marsh, about fifty yards wide, and in the stampede of the 
Eleventh Corps, beef cattle, ambulances, mules, artiUery, wagons, and horses 
became stuck in the mud, and others coming on crushed them down, so that 
when the fight was over the pile of debris in the marsh was manj^ feet high. 
I saw that something had to be done, and that very quickly, or the Ai-my of 
the Potomac would receive a crushing defeat. The two cavalry regiments 
were in the saddle, and as I rode forward Major Keenan of the 8th Pennsyl- 
vania came out to meet me, when I ordered him to take the regiment, charge 
into the woods, which, as we had previously stood, were to our rear, and 
hold the enemy in check until I coidd get some guns into position.^ He 
replied, with a smile at the size of the task, that he would do it, and started 
off hnniodiately. Thirty men, including Major Keenan, Captain Arrowsniith, 
and Adjutant Haddock, never came back. I then directed Captain Martin to 
bring his guns into battery, load with double charges of canister, and aim them 
so that the shot woidd hit the ground half-way between the guns and the woods. 
I also stated that I would give the order to fire. Just then a handsome young 
lieutenant of the 4th U. S. Ai'tillery, Frank B. Crosby (son of a distinguished 
lawyer of New York City), who was killed the next day, galloped up and said, 
" General, I have a battery of six guns ; where shall T go ? wliat shall I do ? '' I 
told him to place his battery in line on the right of Martin's battery, and gave 
him the same instructions I had given Martin as to liow I wanted him to serve 
his guns. These 2 batteries gave me 12 guns, and to obtain more I then 
charged 3 squadi'ons of the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry on the stragglers of 
the Eleventh Corps to clear the gi-onnd, and with the assistance of tlie rest 
of the regiment succeeded in placing 10 more jiicces of artiller\- in line. 
The line was then ready for Stonewall Jackson's onset. It was dnsk when 
his men swarmed out of the W(H)ds for a (piarter of a mile in our front 

3^Seo also statomcnts of Major Edward J. CarpoiittT ami others on p. 1 ST.— Kditors. 



(our rear teu minutes before). They came on in line five and six deep, with 
but one flag — a Union flag dropped by the Eleventh Corps. 

I suspected deception and was ready for it. They called out not to shoot, 
they were friends ; at the same time they gave us a volley from at least 
five thousand muskets. As soon as I saw the flash I gave the command 
to fire, and the whole line of artillery was discharged at once. | It fairly 
swept them from the earth ; before they could recover themselves the line 
of artillery had been loaded and was ready for a second attack. After 
the second discharge, suspecting that they might play the trick of having 
their men lie down, draw the fire of the artillery, then jump up and charge 
before the pieces could be reloaded, I poured in the canister for about twenty 
minutes, and the affair was over. \ 

When the Eleventh Corps was routed, the situation was this : The nearest 
infantry to me was the right of the Twelfth Corps, over a mile off, and 
engaged by the forces under Greneral Lee, who was trying to prevent them 
from impeding the movements of General Jackson. The two divisions of the 
Third Corps were nearly a mile to the west, at the Furnace. Had Jackson 

4. Major Clifford Thomson, aide-de-camp on Gen- 
eral Pleasonton's staff, in a letter written in 1866 
gives the following account of the fight at Hazel 
Grove : 

" General Pleasonton rode from gun to gun, directing 
the gunners to aim low, not to get excited, to make 
every shot tell ; the staff-ofticers, catching their cue from 
him, did the same, and while at lii'st there had beeu cou- 
siderahle excitement and apprehension among us, it 
soon quieted down, and every thought and action was 
directed to getting the best service out of those guns 
that they were capable of rendering. Recovering from 
the disorder into which Keenan's charge had thrown 
them, the enemy could be seen forming line of battle 
in the edge of woods now in oiu' front. They were 
scarcely two hundred yards distant ; yet such was the 
gloom that they could not be clearly distinguished. 
General Pleasonton was about to give the order to fire, 
when a sergeant at oue of the guns said : 

'" (Jciicral, aren't those our troops? I see our colors 
in tlu! Hue!' This was true, for where he pointed our 
colors could be seen — trophies picked upon the field. 
General Pleasonton turned to me and said : 

" ' Mr. Thomson, ride out there and see who those 
people are.' 

" For myself, I was not at all curious about ' those 
people,' being perfectly willing to wait till they intro- 
duced themselves. Riding out between our guns, I 
galloped to within thirty or forty yards of them; all 
along the line they cried out to me, ' Couie on; we're 
friends! ' It was quite dark and I (!ould not make out 
their uniforms, liut I could hc<; three of our flags, and 
these CMUscd me to liesit;(te; I ciinie to u halt, peering 
into tlie darkness to uiiike. sure, when a bullet whistled 
by ine, ;ind then came ' the rebel yell.' The line charged 
up the liill toward our guns, and I led it ! Lying down 
upon mv hors(!'s neck, I gave him the si)ur. and the yells 
of the ' .Tohnnics ' behind further st iuiulated him. so that 
wo got overtlie ground in a lively manner. with the 
report of the first shot fired at me (Jeneral I'leascuiton 
had opened fire, and those twenty-two guns belche-dforth 
destruction at a fearfully rapid rate. Although lying 
down on my horse I kept an eye on the guns and guided 
my horse between the flashes, and in less time than it 
takes to tell it T was on the safe side of them. It was 
load and fire at will for some minutes ; the enemy was 
mowed down in lieaps; they could make no headway 
against such a cyclone, and ran back down the slope to 

the cover of the woods. But still the canister was 
poured into them, and a second attempt to charge 
the guns failed. Soon Sickles's corps moved from its 
advanced position and interposed between us and the 
woods ; parties sent out over the field which had been 
swept by our guns found the dead and dying lying in 
heaps. Old artillery officers have informed me that they 
never before heard such rapid firing as occurred at t lat 
engagement ; the roar was a continuous one, and the 
execution terrific. After it had ceased I rode up to 
General Pleasonton and said : 

" • General, those people out there are rebels ! ' 

" There was a grave twinkle in his eye as he held out 
his hand and replied : 

" ' Thomson, I never expected to see you again ; I 
thought if they didn't kill you I should, but that was no 
time to stop for one man.' 

" I should have agreed with him more cordially if 
that one man had been somebody else. After .Sickles 
had made his dispositions in our front, we were Mith- 
drawn to get forage for our horses, and our part in the 
battle of Chanceliorsville was done. Word had gone 
out through the army that Pleasonton and his staff 
had l)een killed ; so, when tired, sleepy, very dirty, and 
extremely hungry, we next morning rode quietly into 
our headquarters camp, at the rear, we were looked 
upon as persons risen fi-om the dead. One thing I have 
forgotten to mention, and that is that we had virtually 
no support for those twenty-two guns during the action. 
There was a portion of the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry 
under the hill, but the men were new recruits and had 
not, I beUeve, been imder fire previous to that occasion. 
Had the enemy succeeded in gaining the crest of the 
knoll, the support would not have made a mouthful for 
a single company of Jackson's men. When President 
Lincoln visited the army a day or two after this fight, 
Oent>ral Pleasonton chanced to caU at Hooker's head- 
quarters, when that olflcer said : 

" ' Mr. President, this is General Pleasonton, who 
saved the Army of the Potomac the other night.' 

"The President acknowledged the service in his 
usual grateful manner. Only Insjiiration, or the instinct 
of a natural soldier, could have enabled Pleaso!it(m to 
accomplisli s:> much in so short a time with so small a 
force. The fight at Hazel Grove was one of those sharp 
and decisive actions pregnant with great results." 

\ See also statements of Captain James F. Hun- 
tington on p. 188. — Editoks. 


captured the position at Hazel Grove, these two divisions would have been 
cut off from the army. He would have seen General Hooker and his staff' 
getting what troops he could to prevent the routed Eleventh Corps from 
demoralizing the rest of the army, and the fatal position which that portion 
of the army occupied rendered it an easy task to have crushed it. Neither 
the Second Corps nor the Twelfth Corps was in position to have defended 
itself against an attack by Jackson from Hazel Grove. 

For half an hour General Jackson had the Army of the Potomac at his 
mercy. That he halted to re-form his troops in the woods, instead of forging 
ahead into the clearing, where he could re- 
form his troops more rapidly, and where he 
could have seen that he was master of the 
situation, turned out to be one of those 
fatahties by which the most brilliant pros- 
pects are sacrificed. When he advanced 
upon the artillery at Hazel Grove Jackson 
had another opportunity to win, if his in- 
fantry had been properly handled. The fire 
of his infantry was so high it did no harm ; 
they shoidd have been ordered to fire so low 
as to disable the cannoneers at the guns. 
Had his infantry fire been as effective as 
that of our artillery, Jackson would have TIkdVr of'thk^tiViui) divVsiV.n'of the 

. T ,-, •,. " rm ,•■,-, n THIRD CORPS, MORTALLY WOINDKD BY 

carried the position. The artillery fire w^as a shakp-suootek on the mornin.; of 
effective because I applied to it that priii- may4,i863. from a photograph. 
ciple of dynarnics in which the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of 
reflection, — that is to say, if the muzzle of a gun is three feet from the ground 
and it is discharged so that the shot will strike the gi'ound at a distance of 
one hundred yards, it will glance from the earth at the same angle at which 
it struck it, and in another one hundred yards will be three feet from the 
ground. I knew my first volley must be a crushing one, or Jackson, Avitli his 
superior numbers, would charge across the short distance which separated 
us and capture the artillery before the guns could be reloaded. 

After the fight at Hazel Grove I sent into the woods and captured a nnnibcr 
of Jackson's men. I asked them to what commarid they belonged. Om^ of 
them said to General A. P. Hill's corps, and added, "Tliat was a pretty trick 
you })layed us this evening." I asked to what he referred. He replied, " By 
withdrawing your infantry, and catching us on your guns," — tlius sliowiiig 
that the flight of the Eleventh Corps was looked upon as a ruse. To my 
question, if they had suffered much, he said that they had been badly cut 
up; that General Jackson had been badly wounded; also General A. W Hill, 
and their chief of artillery. I asked how he knew General Jackson had been 
wounded. He stated that lie saw him when lie was carried otT the field in a 
litter. This information I immediately rejtorted to General Hooker, when lie 
directed me to withdraw my command from that ])osition and go into camp 
on the north side of the Rappahannock Kiver. It was 4 a. m. of the ;>d of 



May when I moved from Hazel Glrove. Sickles, with the two divisions of 
the Third Corps, reached Hazel drove from the Furnace between half-past 
nine and ten on the night of the 2d of May. Some of his troops had fighting 
in the woods before I left, but I am unable to say what was its character. 

On the morning of the 3d of May (Sunday) General Stuart was in com- 
mand of Jackson's forces, Jackson and A. P. Hill having been wounded, as 
reported by the prisoner taken the night before. Stuart prepared, with his 
usual impetuosity, to renew the attack early that morning, and by one of 
those unfortunate occm-rences so prevalent during the war, he caught the 
Third CorjDS in motion to take up a new position, connecting with the Twelfth 
Corps at Fairview, and facing to the west. This withdrawal enabled Stuart 
to take the position at Hazel Grove from which Jackson had been repulsed 
the evening before. He saw its advantages at once, and, placing some thirty 
pieces of artillery there, he enfiladed the Twelfth Corps at Fair\4ew and 
Chancellorsville, and punished the Third Corps severely. The Third Corps 
was fighting throughout the day under great disadvantages. To add to the 
embarrassments of the army, General Hooker that morning was disabled by 
a concussion, and the army was virtually without a head, the different corps 
commanders fighting their commands on the defensive. Such extraordinary 
conditions forced the Army of the Potomac to fall back from Chancellors- 
ville and Fairview, and form a new line of battle to the north and some dis- 
tance from Chancellorsville. This line presented a front to the enemy that 
could not be enfiladed or turned. Desultory fighting, especially with artillery, 
was kept up on the 4th of May ; but Hooker's battle ended on the 3d, after 
the army had gained its new position. 

It is useless to speculate what General Hooker would have done if he had 
not been disabled. Up to the evening of the 2d of May the enemy had 
suffered severely, while the Army of the Potomac had comparatively but 
few killed and wounded ; but the unfortunate circumstances that contracted 
the lines of om* army enabled the enemy to inflict the severest punishment 
uj^on all the troops that were engaged. In fact, the greatest injury was 
inflicted on the 3d of May, while the army had no commander. Had the First 
Corps, which had not been engaged, and the Fifth Corps, still fresh, been 
thrown into the action in the afternoon of Sunday, the 3d of May, when Lee's 
troops were exhausted from the struggle, they would certainly have made 
Chancellorsville what it should have been, — a complete success. These two 
corps mustered from 25,000 to 30,000 men. There was no one to order them 
into the fight, and a second golden opportunity was lost. The army recrossed 
the Rappahannock River on the night of May 5th, and took up again the 
position at Falmouth which they had occupied before the campaign. 



ON the afternoon of May 2d, 18G3, the Sth 
Pennsylvania Cavalry were ordered to dis- 
mount, slack saddle-girths, and rest in the vicinity 
of General Hooker's headquarters at Chancellors- 
ville. Some of the men fell asleep holding their 
horses, some began talking of the battle, while a 
knot of officers, who always improved such occa- 
sions in this way, sat down to their favorite game 
of poker. Suddenly an order from headquarters 
made a complete change in the scene. At the 
word "Mount! " the sleepers as well as the talkers 
sprang to their saddles, the gamblers snatched up 
their stakes and their cards, and a regiment of 
cavalry took the place of a lounging crowd. 

Passing to the left of the Chancellorsville House, 
we crossed our line of battle at the edge of a wood 
and came up with a reconnoitering party that had 
captured the 23d Georgia. We had heard that 
Lee was retreating, and supposed that this un- 
fortunate regiment had been sacrificed to give the 
main body a chance to escape ; but while we were 
commiserating the poor fellows, one of them de- 
fiantly said, "You may think you have done a 
big thing just now, but wait till Jackson gets 
round on your right." 

We laughed at his harmless bravado, for we 
did not think he would betray Jackson's move had 
he known anything about it; but while we were 
yet trying to get through the thick wood the roar 
of musketry and artillery on our right confirmed 
his speech. We now came back at a gallop toward 
a point between the place where we were rest- 
ing and the place where the battle was raging. 
As we rode into an elevated clearing, called 
Hazel Grove, the regiment (the Sth Pennsylvania) 
was brought into line. We surmised a disaster 
and neiTously braced ourselves for the ordeal, not 
knowing whether we wore to make an attack or 
wait there to receive one. 

The roar of musketry was now heavier and 
nearer; the vast woods between us and Dowdall's 
tavern seemed to shake with it. There was no 
time to ask or to wonder what had happened, for 
the regiment was ordered off at a gallop. After 
riding about three hundred yards we turned into a 
narrow road that promised to take us into the midst 
of the enemy. Half a dozen horsemen in cadet 
gray — most likely a general's staff reconnoitering, 
as they did not ride in ranks — were in the road 
ahead of us, and turned and fled back to their 

The word "Charge!" was now passed from tlie 
leading squadron, and sabers flew into the air along 
oui' line ; but none too soon, for we were already 
in tlie midst of the foe, and they were ready for us. 
The UTifortunato scpiailron tliat led caught all the 
fire as we dashed along t lie narrow lane, and we wlio 
rode next it got oidy the smoke from the enemy's 
guns. We could reach nothing as yet, and could 
see nothing but fire and smoke. f<ir their line of 
battle was safely posted behind a thicket that lined 

the left of the road, while their rifles were aimed 
through it. 

It was a long lane and a hot lane to go through ; 
but the lane had a turn, and we got to it at last 
when we reached the Plank road and struck 
Rodes's division right in the front. We struck it as 
a wave strikes a stately ship : the ship is staggered, 
maybe thrown on her beam ends, but the wave is 
dashed into spray, and the ship sails on as before. 

Major Keeiian, who led his battalion in the 
charge, the captain in command of the leading 
squadron, the adjutant, and a few score of their 
followers went down at this shock together. The 
detail sent over to recover their bodies after the 
battle said that the major had thirteen bullets in 
his body, the adjutant nine, and others fewer. It 
was reported by some who rode close upon the 
major that in falling he shouted, "To the right! " 
seeing that the impenetrable masses on his left 
could not be forced, and that there was no way 
out but over the thinner lines on the right, "\r\lien 
turning at full speed, my horse was killed and I 
was pitched over his neck on the roadside. Here 
I parted company with the regiment. When I 
jumped to my feet I had time to take only one 
glance at my surroimdings. My sole thought was 
to escape capture or death. On one side were 
the heavy lines of Confederate infantry doubled 
and bent by the charge, their officers trying to 
recover their alignment ; on the other side the sur- 
vivors of the leading squadrons were galloping in 
the Plank road, the others breaking over the Con- 
federate skirmish lines as far back as I could see 
into the woods. 

By instinct I tin-ned toward the woods on the 
right of the Plank road as the best way out, and 
made a dash at the lines, which had just recovered 
from their surprise that a cavalry regiment should 
have ridden over them, and were firing after it. 
They were loading when I ran out between them, 
and when they began to fire I dropped down be- 
hind some trees that had been cut to make an 
abatis, or had been shot down by tlie cannon; 
when the volley was over I jumped up and ran 
as fast as before. 

Tiie Plank road, and the woods that bordered 
it, presented a scene of terror and confusion such 
as I had never seen before. Men and animals 
were dashing against one another in wild dismay 
before the line of fire that came crackling and 
crashing after them. The constantly approaching 
rattle of musketry, the crash of the shells tlirough 
tlio trees, seemed to come from tliree sides upon 
the broken fragments of tlio Eleventh Corps that 
crowded each other on tlu^ road. Tlie horses of 
the men of my regiment who had been shot, 
mingled with the pack-muli>s tliat carried the am- 
munition of the Eleventli (\irjis. tore like wild 
beasts through the woods. I triotl in vain to catch 


employment of the mules for ammunition 




service was a device of General Hooker's, and this 
was the only field where they played their part. 
Each mule carried four or five boxes of spare am- 
munition, and being tied in couples, they seemed 
easier to catch than a horse. As a pair of them 
made for opposite sides of a tree, I ran toward them 
to get one, but before I could succeed a shell from 
the direction of the Plank road struck the tree, 
exploded the ammunition, and slaughtered the 

T now gave up hope of a mount, and seeing the 
Confederate lines coming near me, tried to save 
myself on foot. Once, when throwing myself down 
to escape the fury of the fire, I saw a member of 
my own regiment, whose horse also had been shot, 
hiding in a pine top that had been cut down by a 
shell. He had thrown his arms away that he 
might run the faster, and he begged me to do the 
same. This I refused to do, and I got in safely 
with my arms, while he was never seen again. I 
turned into the Plank road to join the very bad 
company that came pouring in by that route. More 
than half of the runaways had thrown their arms 
away, and all of them were talking a language that 
I did not understand, but, by their tones, evidently 
blaming some one for the disgrace and disaster that 
had befallen their corps. They appeared to share 
the prevailing confusion on that part of the field, 
where the front and the rear seemed reversed. 
Yet, as misery loves company, I cast my lot vrith 
them and continued my flight. 

I doubt if any of us knew where we were going, 
further than that we were fleeing before the pur- 
suing lines of the enemy. One of my own com- 
pany, who was captured in the cliarge, afterward 
told me that in leaping an abatis, he was lifted 
from his saddle by a vine and remained suspended 
till made a prisoner. 

In the very height of the flight, we came upon 
General Howard, who seemed to be the only man 
in his own command that was not running at that 
moment. He was in the middle of the road and 
mounted, his maimed arm embracing a stand of 
colors that some regiment had deserted, while with 
his sound arm he was gesticulating to the men to 
make a stand by their flag. ^ With bared head he 
was pleading with his soldiers, literally weeping as 
he entreated the unheeding horde. Under different 
circumstances I should have considered it my duty 
to follow and find my command, and report for duty 
with it. But I could not go past the general. 
Maimed in his person and sublime in his patri- 
otism, he seemed worthy to stand by, and out of 
pure compliment to his appearance I hooked up 
my saber and fell into the little line that gathered 
about him. As the front became clear, we fired 
a few shots at the advance line of the Confeder- 
ates, but a fresh mass of fugitives in blue soon 
filled the road, and we had to stop firing. The 
general now ordered us to cover the whole line of 
retreat so as to let none pass, and the oflicers, in- 
spired by his devotion, ran in front of their men, 
drew their swords, and attempted to stop them. 
As the number constantly increased, the press- 
ure became greater upon the line that blocked 
the way ; but this line was constantly reenforced 
by officers and others, and offered some resistance 
to the pressure. At last the seething, surging sea 
of humanity broke over the feeble barrier, and 
General Howard and his oflSeers were carried 
away by main force with the tide. Pharaoh and 
his chariots could have held back the walls of the 
Eed Sea as easily as those officers could resist 
this retreat. I started again on my race for life, 
this time alone, and toward the slopes of the Chan- 
cellorsville plateau, where it seemed to me prob- 
able that my regiment would re-form after the 

My course was right-oblique from the road, and 
I had not gone far before I saw lines that I knew 
were not retreating. Their flags were flying, and 
my heart took a bound as I beheld battery after 
battery galloping into position, and regiment after 
regiment wheeling into line behind them. A line of 
battle showed itself at last ; the Third Corps had 
come up to stop the successful charge, and Jack- 
son's men would find a difference between attack- 
ing the Third Corps in front and the Eleventh in 
the rear. Seeing the guns unlimber and load. I 
made my greatest effort at speed, but not caring 
for a few fugitives, the guns belched forth their 
fire before I could get in. However, I came safely 
through, and at last paused for a long breath. While 
congratulating myself upon my escape, I looked 
behind the line of battle, and there saw my own 
regiment drawn up for a charge, the line not so 
long as half an hour before by one-third, but still as 
shapely and resolute as ever. The horses were 
blown and nervous, and the men were, no doubt, 
a little depressed by the rough usage they had 
met with. A horse, that had followed the com- 
pany riderless from the charge, was given to me. 

) See Gcucral Howard's descriiitioii on p. 200.— Editors. 



ami my confidence and self-respect came back as 
I mounted him, for I was no longer a fugitive, but 
a soldier. 

The fighting now began in earnest. The splen- 
did divisions of Birney, Berry, and Whipple had to 
be met and vanquished before a farther advance 
could be made, and before Jackson could attain 
the great object of his 
mai'ch to our rear. The 
gathering darkness was 
favorable to the Con- 
federates, for th<\\- 
could get near the gun^ 
before being seen; but 
it also added to the tci - 
ror of tlie batteries 
which were discharge 
double-shotted at the 
assailants, and lit u 
the heavens with fii 
that seemed supernal 

The slope was so steep that a line of battle could 
be formed in front of the guns and a double skir- 
mish line in front of that. 

Oui- regiment now moved up to the guns, enabling 
us to see better the slopes and the woods when lit 
up by the fiashes. Sometimes darkness and still- 
ness would reign for a few minutes, and we would 

ural. Tliu dusky liiii'S I'l'U luu'k iiitu tlic wumls 
in disorganized masses as often as th(>y advanced, 
and the cheers of our troops rang out at each re- 
treat. From tlie ))()ldness and tiie freiiuency of 
the Confederate charges it was found necessary to 
move the infantry in front of the guns, lest the 
enemy should seize them before being discovered. 

VOL. HI. 13 

think till' h>Mg day's lighting was over, but it w«>uld 
ircsinlly breakout again. Tlio steiiltiiy rush from 
the woods could bo heard tirst, then the sharp 
crack of the skirmishei-'s ritle. then a yell and »i 
louder nisliing of tiicir lines nu't by tlie loud roll 
of tlie line ..f l.attl.'"s lire. As th.' cheer of our 
nu'u announced that the enemy's line was again 
in retreat, the blaze of f.u-ty or lifty cannons from 
the right to the left w«.uM light up the scene and 
carry death over the heads of our men into the 
woods beyon«l. 


At last Jackson's men paused, for they had been 
marching and fighting since morning, and human 
nature could endure no more. But they were not 
allowed to hold the ground they had won ; an ad- 
vance was now ordered on our side, and it was 
made with a vigor that avenged the discomfiture 
of our comrades. Though it was now midnight 
the woods were lit up with the flame of the mus- 
ketry as the combatants came face to face among 
the trees, and the battle began anew. The artil- 
lerists pushed on their guns by hand a hundred 

yards behind the infantry line, and shook the 
woods in their depths, as they had the hills to 
their foundations. At last, at 2 o'clock in the 
morning, we were told to sleep on our arms. But 
who could sleep while counting the dead of our 
commands ? Comrades were gone ; file-leaders and 
file-closers were gone ; officers of every grade had 
perished. Stonewall Jackson himself had gone 
down in his greatest charge ; and his men never 
again fought as on that day, nor came down on our 
flank with such fury. 



JUST as we reached Hazel Grove, at Scott's Run 
Crossing, at half -past 6 o'clock p. M., May 2d, 
a staff-officer rode up in a state of great excite- 
ment and reported to General Sickles that the 
enemy had flanked General Howard's corps, and 
that he had been sent for a regiment of General 
Pleasonton's cavalry. General Sickles immediately 
ordered General Pleasonton to send a regiment. 
General Pleasonton then ordered me to report with 
my regiment as quickly as possible to General 
Howard, whom I would probably find near the old 
Wilderness church. There were no other orders 
given to me or to any officer of my regiment. 4- 

I found the regiment, standing to horse, on the op- 
posite or north side of Hazel Grove, near the road. 
The wood in front was so thick with underbrush 
that a bird could scarcely fly through it ; much less 
could a cavalry charge have been made. On in- 
quiring for the adjutant of the regiment, and on 
being informed by some of the men where he was, 
I rode to the poiut designated and found Major 
Peter Keeiian, Captain William A. Dailey, Adju- 
tant J. Haseltine Haddock, and Lieutenant Andrew 
B. Wells playing cards under a tree. When I 
ordered them to mount their commands they were 
all in high spirits about the game, Keenan remark- 
ing : "Major, you have spoiled a good game ! " 

After mounting the regiment I rode off at its 
head in my proper place, followed by four other 
officers, all of whom belonged in front except 
Lieutenant Carpenter, who commanded the second 
company of the first squadron, and might properly 
have been in the rear of the first company, where 
he undoubtedly would have been had I supposed 
there was danger ahead. The officers in front were : 
Major PennockHuey, commander of the regiment; 
Major Peter Keenan, commander of the first bat- 
talion; Captain Charles Arrowsmith, commander 
of the first squadron ; Lieutenant J. Edward Car- 
penter, commander of the second company; and 
Adjutant J. Haseltine Haddock, whose place was 
with me unless otherwise ordered. We rode through 
the wood toward the Plank road; there was no 
unusual stir or excitement among the men or oflfi- 

l3> Extracted by permission and coudeused from " A 
True History of the Cliargc of the 8th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry at Chanecllorsville," by rcunock Huey, Phila- 
delphia, 1885.— Editors. 

cers of the regiment, the impression being that the 
enemy were retreating, and all who had not heard 
of General Howard's disaster felt happy with the 
thought that the battle was almost over. No one 
in the regiment, with the exception of myself, knew 
where we were going or for what purpose. 

From the information I had received from Gen- 
eral Pleasonton, and from hearing the aide make 
his report before I started, I had no idea that we 
would meet the enemy till after I had reported to 
General Howard. Therefore the surprise was as 
great to us as to the enemy, as we were entirely 
unprepared, our sabers being in their scabbards. 
When we arrived almost at the Plank road, we dis- 
covered that we had ridden right into the enemy, 
the Plank road in our front being occupied by 
them in great force, and that we were completely 
surroimded, the woods at that point being filled 
with flankers of Jackson's column, who were 
thoroughly hidden from our view by the thick 
undergrowth. It was here that I gave the com- 
mand to " draw sabers and charge,'' which order 
was repeated by Major Keenan and other officers. 
The charge was led by the five officers already 
named, who were riding at the head of the regi- 
ment when we left Hazel Grove. On reaching the 
Plank road it appeared to be packed about as 
closely with the enemy as it possibly could be. 

We turned to the left, facing the Confederate 
column, the regiment crowding on, both men and 
horses in a perfect fi'enzy of excitement, which 
nothing but death could stop. We cut our way 
through, trampling down all who could not escape 
us, and using our sabers on all within reach, for a 
distance of about 100 yards, when we received a 
volley from the enemy, wliicli killed Major Keenan, 
Captain Arrowsmith, and Adjutant Haddock, three 
of the noblest and most gallant officers of the war, 
besides a large number of men. All three of the 
above-named officers fell at the same time and 
from the same volley, Major Keenan falling against 
me and lighting on the ground under my horse. A 
few days afterward liis body was found near the 
spot where he had fallen. 

4- General Huey was at this time Ma,ior (afterward 
Colonel) of the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, and was 
the senior offlcer present with it. [See also p. 187.]— 





THERE was no confusion at Hazel Grove when 
the regiment received its orders and left that 
place. No enemy was in sight. Indeed, until after 
the 8th Pennsylvania had left the place there was 
not the slightest evidence that the enemy was in 
the immediate neighborhood, excepting, perhaps, 
that the musketry-firing seemed to be drawing 
nearer. The charge of the regiment was made on 
the Plank road, about three-quarters of a mile 
from where Pleasonton was at Hazel Grove, and 
was first 'ordered by the commanding officer of 
the regiment at the moment when the emergency 

The writer of this, although himself a participator 
in the charge, was unable to recognize General 
Pleasonton's description of it and the surround- 
ing scenes attending it. [See p. 179.] A letter 
from the writer to a member of his family, vsTitten 
three days after the charge, is now before him. 
From this letter the following is extracted: 

" We lost, however, I regret to say, three gallant offi- 
cers, Major Keeuan, Captain Arrowsmlth and Adjufant 
Haddock. Major Huey and . . . were the only ones 
who came out from the head of the column. All the rest 
were killed, wounded, or prisoners." 

Wlien this letter was written on the 5th of May, 
IS 03, there was no thought of controversy. It 
was intended only for the eye of the person to 
whom it was written, with no idea that it would be 

General Pleasonton's report of the operations of 
his command at Chancellorsville, dated May 18th, 
18 63, makes no mention of Keenan, but com- 
mends Huey as the commander of the regiment 
and indorses his report. In Major Huey's report 
of the operations of the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, 
dated May 9th, 1863, he states that he was 
ordered to report, with his command, to General 
Howard, and no mention is made of any order 
from General Pleasonton to charge. This report 
was before Pleasonton when his own report was 
made, and no exception was ever taken to it. 
In Colonel Thomas C. Deviu's report of the 2d 
brigade, dated May 12th, 1863, he states that 
the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry was sent to the sup- 
port of General Howard, and Major Huey is com- 
plimented as the commander of the regiment. No 
mention is made of an order to Keenan to charge, 
and Keenan is only referred to as having gallantly 


OUR regiment, on the second day of May, 1863, 
was awaiting orders in a clearing of wooded 
country called Hazel Grove. We had been there 
some little time. Everything was quiet on the 
front. The men were gathered in groups, chatting 
and smoking, and the officers were occupied in 
much the same manner, wondering what would 
turn up next. 

About 4 o'clock I suggested a game of draw 
poker. An empty cracker-box, with a blanket 
thrown over it, served as a card-table. The party 
playing, if I mistake not, was composed of Major 
Keenan, Adjutant Haddock, Captain Goddard, 
Captain W. A. Daily, and myself. We had been 
playing about two hours — the game was a big one 
and we were all absorbed in it — when, about 6 P. M., 
it was brought to an abrupt end by the appearance 
of a mounted officer. Riding up to where we were 
playiTig, he asked in an excited manner : " Who is in 
command of this regiment ? " Major Keenan, who 
was seated beside me, turned his head and said, in 
a joking way: "I am; what's the trouble?" Our 
visitor replied : " General Howard wants a cavalry 
regiment." And before wo had time to ask further 
questions he was off, and the next moment we were 
all on our feet, and our game was ended. I remem- 
ber it perfectly well, for I was out of pocket on the 
play. ^ The regiment was mounted, I mountinp: at 
the same time and alongside of Major Keenan. We 
then moved out of Hazel Grove by twos. Keenan, 
Haddock, Arrovvsmith, Huey, and Cai-penter moved 

out with the first squadron. I remember distinctly 
seeing that group of officers, and did not see Gen- 
eral Pleasonton at the time. 

I was under the impression, and believe that the 
other officers also were, that we were on our road 
to report to General Howard. Anyhow, I fell in 
with the second squadron, Captain William A. 
Corrie being in command, and he and I rode to- 
gether at the head of it. When we passed out of 
the clearing there were no officers or men on our 
flank, all was in order ahead, and the command 
was moving at a walk. The command entered 
the woods and was still moving on a walk, when, 
at the distance of about one mile from where 
we had mounted, Captain Corrie and myself saw 
the first squadron take the trot, leaving a space 
between us of about twenty-five yards. At the 
same time we heard the command, " Draw sabers," 
and saw the first squadron draw them. We then 
heard the musketry-firing. It was given in con- 
tinuous but distant volleys. 

We of the second squadron knew that our time 
was at liand, and Cai>tain Corrie gave the onler to 
draw sabers and charge. Taking a trot, we found 
that the road took a bend as we jiroceedecl. Wlu-n 
we turned the corner of the wood-road a sight met 
our eyes that it is impossible for me to describe. 
After charging over tlie dead men and horses of 
the first squadroTi we charged into .Tnckson's col- 
umn, and. as luck would liave it, found them with 
empty guns — thanks to our poor comrades ahead. 

I Taken by pcrraiseion from the " Philadolpliia Weekly Press." Octolier 13th, 1886. and oondonsed.— Editors*. 
A Captain Wells has elsewhere said that at G:JO by liis watdi, Major TIncy rodo up and pave the order to 
mount.— Editors. 


The enemy were as thick as bees, and we appeared 
to be among thousands of them in an instant. 

After we reached the Plank road we were in 
columns of foui-s and on the dead run, and when 
we struck the enemy there occurred a "jam" of 
living and dead men, friends and enemies, and 
horses, and the weight of the rear of our squadron 
broke us into utter confusion, so that at the mo- 
ment every man was for himself. 

The third squadron, which Captain P. L. Goddard 
commanded, was in our rear, and came thundering 
along after us, but as to the balance of the regi- 
ment I do not know how they came in or got out. 

The enemy wei'e as much surprised as we were, 
and thought, no doubt, as they now say, that the 
whole cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac 
was charging them. I distinctly remember hearing 
a number of them call out, " I surrender, I sur- 
render." We did not stop to take any prisoners 
for fear of being captured ourselves, — I had been 

caught once and was just out of Libby prison and 
did not want to be captm-ed again, — but made for 
our lines as best we could. 

The whole affair was accidental. We were on 
our way to report to General Howard, some three 
miles from where we were encamped, and the 
country that General Howard's staff-officer had 
just passed over in quest of the cavalry had in the 
meantime been crossed by Stonewall Jackson's 
troojjs, and in following tjae same track we natu- 
rally ran into them. The officers who were at the 
head of our column, seeing the situation, had only 
an instant to determine what was to be d6ne. We 
could not turn around and get out in the face of 
the enemy, and the only thing left for us was to go 
through them, " sink or swim." 

Can any man who was a soldier for one moment 
imagine an officer deliberately planning a charge 
by a regiment of cavalry, strung out by twos in a 
eolvmin half a mile long in a thick wood ? 



^rxT'HEN Jackson's advance struck the Eleventh 
VV Corps, four batteries had been for some 
time waiting orders in the extensive clearing 
known as Hazel Grove. Of these, "H," 1st Ohio 
Light Artillery, and the 10th and 11th New York 
Independent Batteries belonged to Whipple's di- 
vision of the Third Corps. They were left there 
when that division passed through en route to join 
the force operating imder General Sickles near the 
Furnace. Later, Martin's horse battery, with 
Devin's cavalry brigade, arrived and took gi'ound 
on the opposite or south side of the field. When 
the sound of battle indicated that the enemy were 
driving in the right of the army, and were ap- 
proaching Hazel Grove, the batteries of Whipple's 
division were brought into position under my 
direction, as acting chief of artillery. Although 
the movement was delayed by causes beyond my 
control until its execution had become exceedingly 
difficult, our eighteen guns were established in 
battery, ready to open before the enemy fired 
a shot or were in a position to do so. General 
Pleasonton seems to be unaware of that fact, or 
he would hardly have failed to allude to it. It is, 

f^Jw reply to statements contained in General Pleas- 
oiitoii'H paper, y. 179.— Editors. 

^ (ieiKial Sickles says in lii8 official report: " I coa- 
fliled to I'lcasoiitou tlie direction of the artillery — three 
batteries of my reserve — Clark's, Lewis's |loth New 
York, of Huntington's command] andTurnbnll's. and his 
own horse-battery. . . . The fugitives of tlie Kleventh 
Corps swarmed from the woods and swept frantically 
over the cleared fields in which my artillery was parked. 
. . . The enemy showing himself on the plain. Pleas- 
onton met the attack at short range with the well- 
directed fire of twenty-two pieces doulih-sliot fed with 
canister." According to this one of Huntington's three 

therefore, fair to presume that his attention was 
engrossed by the supervision of Martin's battery, 
as detailed in his paper. General Sickles, on his 
arrival, soon after the firing ceased, sent for 
me and warmly expressed his approbation of the 
manner in which my command had held the 
ground. ) 

Nothing on wheels from the Eleventh Corps 
passed through Hazel Grove. The vehicles that 
stampeded through my lines while in process of 
formation were forges, battery-wagons, ambu- 
lances, etc., belonging to the Third Corps, left in 
the cross-road leading to the Plank road, when 
that corps went out to the Furnace to attack Jack- 
son's column. So whatever else may have formed 
the components of the remarkable tumi(lus de- 
scribed by General Pleasonton, it certainly did not 
contain the debris of the Eleventh Corps. As for 
the tiinudus itself, it escaped my observation when 
I crossed the bog he refers to on Sunday morning 
with my battery, or what there was left of it, at the 
pressing solicitation of Archer's Confederate bri- 

Boston, October 14th, 188G. 

batteries (Lewis's 10th New York) was placed under 
Pleasonton's control. Probably this battery, with Turn- 
bull's, Clark's, and Martin's, made up the twenty-two 
guns mentioned by both Sickles and Pleasonton. Gen- 
eral Hunt, the chief of artillery of the army, says : " When 
the Eleventh Corjis was broken up and routed on the 
2d, . . . (4eTieral Pleasonton collected some batteries 
belonging to different corps (Martin's Horse Artillery, 
Gth New York, six 3-ineh guns, Clark's B, 1st New 
Jersey, six lO-pounders ; Lewis's 10th New York, six 
light IS-pounders; TurnbuU's F and K, 3d U. S., six 12- 
pounders), and with them formed a large battery of 
twenty-four guns."— Editors. 




THE country around Chancellorsville for the most part is a wilderness, 
with but here and there an opening. If we consult the recent maps (no 
good ones existed before the battle), we notice that the two famous rivers, the 
Rapidan and the Eappahannock, join at a point due north of Chancellors- 
ville ; thence the Rappahannock runs easterly for two miles, till suddenly at 
the United States Ford it turns and flows south for a mile and a half, and 
then, turning again, completes a horse-shoe bend. Here, on the south shore, 
was Greneral Hooker's battle-line on the morning of the 2d of May, 1863. 
Here his five army corps, those of Meade, Slocum, Couch, Sickles, and 
Howard, were deployed. The face was toward the south, and the ranks 
mainly occupied a ridge nearly parallel with the Rapidan. The left touched 
the high ground just west of the horse-shoe bend, while the bristling front, 
fringed with skirmishers, ran along the Mineral Spring road, bent forward to 
take in the cross-roads of Chancellorsville, and then, stretching on westerly 
through lower levels, retired to Dowdall's Tavern. Just beyond Dowdall's 
was a slight backward hook in the line, partially encircling Talley's Hill, a 
sunny spot in the forest between the Orange Plank road and the j^ike. This 
pike is an old roadway which skirts the northern edge of Talley's farm, and 
makes an angle of some forty degrees with the Orange Plank roatl. 

At dawn of that eventful day General Hooker was at Chancellorsville. 
Slocum and Hancock were just in his front, infantry and artillery deployed 
to the right and left. French's division was in his rear. ^Meade occupied the 
extreme left, and my corps, the Eleventh, the right. Sickles connectcil me 
with Slocum. Our lines covered between five and six miles of frontage, and 
Hooker was near the middle point. The main body of our cavalry, under 
Stoneman, had gone off on a raid upon Lee's communications, and the 
remainder of the Army of tlie Potomac was under the sturdy Sedgwick, 
beyond Fredericksbui-g. 

Our opponents, under (Jeneral l^.l)ei-t E. Lee, the evening before, were 
about two miles distant towai-d Fi-edeiicksbuig, and thus between us and 
Sedgwick. Lee had immediately witli him the divisions of ^NFcLaws, Andei-- 
son, Rodes, Colston, and A. P. liill, besides some cavalry under Stuart. He 




held, for his hue of battle, a comparatively short front between the Rappa- 
hannock and the Catherine Furnace, not exceeding two miles and a half in 
extent. His right wing, not far from the river, was behind Mott's Run, which 
flows due east, and his left was deployed along the Catherine Furnace road. 

Could Hooker, on the first day of May, have known Lee's exact location, 
he never could have had a better opportunity for taking the offensive. But 
he did not know, and after the few troops advancing toward Fredericksburg 
had met the approaching enemy he ordered all back to the " old position," 
the Chancellorsville line, which I have just described. 

On the preceding Thursday, the last of April, the three corps that con- 
stituted the right wing of the army, Meade's, Slocum's, and mine, had crossed 
from the north to the south side of the Rapidan, and by 4 o'clock in the after- 
noon had reached the vicinity of Chancellorsville, where Slocum, who was 
the senior commander present, established his headquarters. I, approaching 
from Germanna Ford, halted my divisions at Dowdall's Tavern and encamped 
them there. Then I rode along the Plank road through the almost continuous 
forest to the Chancellorsville House. There I reported to Slocum. He said 
that the orders were for me to cover the right of the general line, posting my 
command near Dowdall's Tavern. He pointed to a place on the map marked 
"Mill" near there, on a branch of Hunting Run [see map, p. 193], and said, 
" Establish your right there." General Slocum promised, with the Twelfth 
Corps, to occupy the space between his headquarters and Dowdall's clearing ; 
but, finding the distance too great, one of his division commanders sent me 
word that I must cover the last three-quarters of a mile of the Plank road. 



at 6p.Tn.yray2. 1863. 


This was done by a brigade of General Steinwehr, the commander of my left 
division, though with regret on oui' part, because it required all the corps 
reserves to fill up that gap. 

The so-called Dowdall's Tavern was at that time the home of Melzi Chan- 
cellor. He had a large family, including several gi'own people. I placed my 
headquarters at his house. In front of me, facing south along a curving 
ridge, the right of Stein wehr's division was located. He had but two brigades. 
Barlow on the Plank road and Buschbeck on his right. With them Stein- 
wehr covered a mile, lea\ang but two regiments for reserve. These he put 
some two hundred yards to his rear, near the little "Wilderness Church." 

Next to Stein wehr, toward our right, came General Carl Schurz's division. 
First was Captain Dilger's battery. Dilgcn* was one of those handsome, 
hearty, active young men that 
everybody liked to have near. 
His guns pointed to the south- 
west and west, along the 
Orange Plank road. Next 
was Krzyzanowski's brigade, 
about half on the front and 
half in reserve. Schurz's right 
brigade was that of Schim- 
melfennig, disposed in the 
same manner, a part deployed 
and the remainder kept a few 
hundred yards back for a re- 
serve. Schurz's front line of 
infantry extended along the 
old turnpike and faced to the 
south-west. The right di\'ision 
of the corps was commanded 
by General Charles Devens, 

afterward attorney-general in the cabinet of President Hayes. Devens 
and I together had carefully reconnoitered both the Orange Plank road 
and the old tm-npike for at least three miles toward the west. After this 
reconnoissance he established his division, — the Second Brigade, under 
McLean, next to Schurz's first, and then pushing out on tlie i)ike for half a 
mile lie deployed the other, Gilsa's, at right angles facing west, connecting 
his two parts by a thin skirmish-line. Colonel Gilsa's brigaile was afterward 
drawn back, still facing west at right angles to the line, so as to make a more 
solid connection, and so that, constituting, as it did, the main rigiit tlank, 
the reserves of the corps could be brought more promj^tly to its support, 
by extending its right to the north, should an enemy by any p(^ssible con- 
tingency get so far around. A section of Dieckniann's battery wliicli looked 
to the west along the old ])ike was located at the angle. 

The reserve batteries, twelve gims, wiM-e put upon a ridge alneast of the 
Uttle church and pointed toward the north-west, with a view to sweep all 


approaches to the north of Gilsa, firing np a gradually ascending slope. This 
ridge, where I stood during the battle, was central, and, besides, enabled the 
artillerymen to enfilade either roadway, or meet an attack from south, west, 
or north. Here epaulments for the batteries were constructed, and cross- 

intrenchments for the battery supports 
were dug, extending from the little 
church across all the open ground that 
stretched away from the tavern to the 
right of Devens's line. 

To my great comfort. General Sickles's 
corps came up on Friday, May 1st, and 
took from our left Stein wehr's three- 
quarters of a mile of the Plank road. 
Thus he relieved from the front line 
Barlow's large brigade, giving me, 
besides the several division reserves, 
' ' - General Barlow with 1500 men as a 

DowDALL's TAVERN, HOWARD'S HEADQUARTERS, gcucral rcscrvc for tlic corps. Thcse 
KROH A WAR-TIME PHOTooRAPH. ^^^.^ masscd ucar thc cross-iutrcnch- 

ments, and held avowedly to support the batteries and protect General 
Devens's exposed right flank. 

As to pickets, each division had a good line of them. My aide, Major 
Charles H. Howard, assisted in connecting them between divisions, and dur- 
ing the 2d of May that fearless and faithful staff-officer, Major E. Whittlesey, 
rode the entire circuit of their front to stimulate them to special activity. 
Those of Devens were "thrown out at a distance from a half-mile to a 
mile and stretching well around covering our right flank " ; J and the picket- 
posts in front on the pike were over two miles beyond the main line. 

The nature of the country in the neighborhood of the three adjoining farms, 
Dowdall's, Talley's, and Hawkins's, became well known to the Army of the 
Potomac in subsequent experiences, never to be forgotten. It is the terrible 
" Wilderness " where, later in the war, so many brave men fell. Here were 
stunted trees, such as scraggy oaks, bushy firs, cedars, and junipers, all entan- 
gled with a thick, almost impenetral)le undergrowth, and criss-crossed with an 
abundance of wild vines. In places all along the 

south-west and west front the forest appeared ^^>^^^ 

impassable, and the skirmishers could only \lj^^A^suJi^>^^^^^^ 
work their way through with extreme difficulty. ^_y^S^^ / /"'^a 

To the officers of the Eleventh Corps tlie r '^'^ - ' ' R 
position was never a desirable one. It pre- 
sented a flank in the air. We were more than 
four miles south from Ely's ford, where were 
Hooker's nearest cavalry flankers. In his re- ' ^ 

port after the battle, General Schurz says : dowdall's tavern in issi. 

^See General Devens's report of Chaneellorsville (''Official Records," Vol. XXV., Part I., 
p. 632).— O. O. H. 




" Our right ought to have been drawn back toward the Eapidan, to rest on 
that river at or near the mouth of Hunting Run, the corps al)andouing so 
much of the Plank road as to enable it to establish a solid line." Yes ; but 
we were ordered to Dowdall's Tavern, and not to the Eapidan, three or four 
miles in our rear ! And our right was fixed for us at the " Mill." It is true 
the mill no longer existed, but the point required was not doubted. Again, 
this position, which Schurz reconnnended in his report subsequent to our 
battle, was the very one into which Hooker's whole army was forced two 
days afterward. He was so cramped by it that he did not dare to take the 
offensive. In that position, "solid" and fortified as it was, our army, out- 
numbering Lee's, was so badly handled by the enemy that Hooker at last 
deemed it safer to return to the north side of the Rappahannock. 

The strength of Hooker's five corps, and Reynolds's, wliich was not far 
behind, was, on the morning of the 2d of May, about OO,^)!)!) effectives. The 
right corps, the Eleventh, had in all, artillery and infantiy, twi^lve thousand 
men. Lee faced us with five large divisions, having on the spot alunit 40,000 
rifles, with considerable artillery. 

In my youth my brother and I had a favorite spot in an upper field of my 
father's farm from wiiicli we were accustomed, after the first s>nuptoms of a 
coming storm, to watch the operations of the contending winds ; the sudden 



gusts and whirlwinds; the sideling swallows excitedly seeking shelter; the 
swift and swifter, black and blacker clouds, ever rising higher and pushing 
their angry fronts toward us. As we listened we heard the low rumbling 
from afar; as the storm came nearer the woods bent forward and shook 
fiercely their thick branches; the lightning zigzagged in flashes, and the 
deep-bassed thunder echoed more loudly, till there was scarcely an interval 
between its ominous crashing discharges. In some such manner came on that 
battle of May 2d to the watchers at Dowdall's Tavern and Talley's farm-house. 
The first distant symptom occurred on the evening of May 1st. Then was 
heard the sudden crack of rifle-shooting. It began with Steinwehr's skir- 
mishers, and then passed on to Schurz. Schimmelfennig pushed out a 
brigade straightforward toward the south-west and received a sudden fire of 
artillery from the intruders. They left him and pushed on. 

It was " a rolling recohnoissance," evidently to determine, for Lee's and Jack- 
son's information, the position of our flank. They probably had, however, some 
more certain knowledge, gained from one or two of the enterprising residents 
let loose during that Friday by our general forward movement. We forgot 
these friends to Lee as we excitedly marched to Friday's battle. When we 
unexpectedly came back, some of these residents, with little baskets of pro- 
visions in hand, were gone beyond recall. I suspect that the commander of 
the "roUing reconnoissance " and the said residents formed part of the 
famous night conference of Lee and Jackson, where cracker-boxes served as 
seats and tables. G-eneral Lee says : " It was therefore resolved to endeavor 
to turn his right flank and gain his rear, leaving a force in front to hold him 
in check and conceal the movement. The execution of this plan was intrusted 

to Lieutenant-General Jackson with 
his three divisions." 

Jackson's movement, with a stronger 
indication of battle, began at sunrise, 
Rodes, Colston, and A. P. Hill, in the 
order named, following the old road 
by the Catherine Furnace, there shov- 
ing off farther south to get beyond 
the sight of our men ; then sweeping 
around by a private road, well known 
to them, up to the Orange Plank road ; 
and thence on, perhaps a mile farther, 
through the wild forest till the old 
turnpike was found and crossed. The 
Catherine Furnace, nearly opposite 
Sickles's right and two and a half 
miles distant, gave an open reach and 
fully exposed the moving column to 
view. Except at that point the Con- 
federates were covered by woods and 
by Stuart's busy and noisy cavalry. 





, ''^' J 

About sunrise at Dowdall's I heard cheering. It Avas a hearty sound, with 
too much bass in it for that of the enemy's charge. It was occasioned l)y 
General Hooker, with Colonel Comstock and a few staff-officers, riding along 
slowly and inspecting the lines. Oeneral Sickles says of this : " It is impos- 
sible to pass over without mention the irrepressible enthusiasm of the troops 
for Major-General Hooker, which was evinced in hearty and prolonged cheers 
as he rode along the lines of the Third, Eleventh, and Twelfth corps." 

I was ready, mounted, and with my officei-s joined the ever-increasing caval- 
cade. Hooker observed the troops in position ; Barlow, who filled the cross- 
trenches an hour later, had not yet come out of the front line, so that my 
reserves just at that time were small. Hooker noticed the breastworks, 
unusually well built by Schurz and Devens. He passed to the extreme right, 
and then returned by the shortest route. As he looked over the barricades, 
while receiving the salutes and cheers of the men, ho said to me, " How 
strong ! How strong ! " 

I still had much extension, so that there were gaps along Scluirz's and 
Devens's fronts. Colonel Comstock spoke to me in his quiet way : " General, 
do close in those spaces ! " 

I said, "The woods are thick and entangled; will anybody c*)!!!.' throui^di 
there ? " 

" Oh, they may ! " 

His suggestion was heeded. During the I'ortMioon (Jciieral Sickles discov- 
ered Jackson's moving colu!nn. It was i)assing toward Orange Court HiMise, 
so everybody said. Sickles forwarded all reports to General Hooker, who 
now returned to Chancellorsville. He tried to divine Jacksi^iV ])urpose. 

About midday Sickles received General Hooker's orders to advance scnith 
cautiously. Soon after, perhaps by 2 r. m., there was a stronger apprehension 


of a conflict, for there was a sharp skirmish in the direction of Catherine 
Fiu-nace. The rattle of musketry followed ; then in a little time was heard 
the booming of cannon. I sent the news to every division and said, " Be 
ready." ^ Slocum went forward to the aid of Sickles, and Hancock was behind 
him with support. Next, the enemy was reported to be in full retreat. 
General Hooker so telegraphed to Sedgwick; Captain Moore, of his staff, 
who had gone out with Birney to see the attack upon Jackson, came hurriedly 
to me with an order from Gleneral Hooker for my reserve brigade, Barlow's. 
Major Howard rode rapidly to Sickles, that he might point out exactly 
where to locate the brigade. The major was also to ascertain the nearest 
route, so as to save time and not weary the men by a circuitous march. 

It was already past 4. There was much excitement among the groups of 
officers at the different points of observation. We who were at Dowdall's had 
been watching the enemy's cavalry, which kept pushing through the woods 
just far enough to receive a fire, and then withdrawing. Devens and his bri- 
gade and regimental commanders gathered, in various ways, all the informa- 
tion possible, while from a high point they obtained glimpses of a moving 
column crossing the Plank road and apparently making off. I sent out scouts, 
who returned with reports that the enemy was not more than three or four 
miles off, and in motion. Schurz was anxious and, with my approval, moved 
a part of his reserves to the north of Hawkins's farm into good position to 
cover Devens's flank. Devens held at least two regiments well in hand, for the 
same purpose, and Steinwehr's whole division I knew could just face about 
and defend the same point. A few companies of cavalry came from Pleason- 
ton. I sent them out. " Go out beyond my right ; go far, and let me know 
if an assault is coming." All my staff, Asmussen, Meysenberg, Whittlesey, 
C. H. Howard, Schofield, Dessauer, Stinson, Schirmer, and Hoffmann, were 
keenly on the alert. We had not a very good position, it is true, but we did 
expect to make a good strong fight should the enemy come. 

General Hooker's circular order to " Slocum and Howard " neither reached 
me, nor, to my kaowledge, Colonel Meysenberg, my adjutant-general. | From 
some confused notion it was issued to " Slocum and Howard," when Slocum 
was no longer within two miles of me, and had not been in command of my 
corps after Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. Slocum, naturally supposing 
that I had a copy, would not think of forwarding a joint order to me after 
that, and certainly no such order came to me. But Generals Devens, Scliurz, 
and Stoinwehr, my division commanders, and myself did precisely what we 
should have done had that order come. The three reserve batteries were 
put in position, and the infantry reserves were held well in hand for the pos- 
sible emergency. My aide had now returned from Sickles, near the Furnace, 

3^ Devens states in his official report that at inter- in one of the two "Letters Received" hooks of 

valsVjetween 11 A. M. and 6 :30 p.m. he reported to Howard's headquarters. The entry in Howard's 

corps headquarters that the enemy in force was book appears to have been made in the latter part 

threatening his front and his right flank. — Editors, of June. In Hooker's book a notation in red ink 

4- See pp. 219 and 220. The original dispatch reads, "Copy furnished General Howard"; and 

is not on file in the War Records Office, but a copy the inference is that it was this "copy" that was 

of it exists in Hooker's "Letters Sent" book and entered in Howard's book in June.— Editors. 



and reported in substance that he (Sickles) was glad to receive the help ; that 
he was abont to make a grand attack, having been for some time dri\dug the 
enemy, and expected soon a brilliant result; that he desired to place my 
reenforcement upon his right flank in the forward movement. 

Such was the state of things when, through Captain Moore, GTeneral Hooker 
directed to Sickles's attack, at the Furnace, all of my general infantry reserves, 
consisting of Barlow's stanch brigade. Steinwehr and I, with Major Howard 
as guide, went far enough southward to see what was to be done with our 
men, and to see if Steinwehr's di- 
vision, as was probable, must swing 
in to the left in support of Sickles's 
promised attack. There was no real 
battle there, so we returned rapidly 
to our post at the tavern and dis- 

Meanwhile the Confederate Gen- 
eral Rodes had been reaching his 
place in the Wilderness. At 4 p. m. 
his men were in position; the line 
of battle of his own brigade touched 
the pike west of us with its right and 
stretched away to the north ; beyond 
his brigade came Iverson's in the 
same line. On the right of the pike 
was Doles's brigade, and to his right 
Colquitt's. One hundred yards to 
the rear was Trimble's division (Col- 
ston commanding), with Ramseur on the right following Colquitt. After 
another interval followed the division of A. P. Hill. The advance Confeder- 
ate division had more men in it than there were in the Eleventh Corps, now 
in position. Counting the ranks of this formidable column, beginning with 
the enveloping skirmish line, we find 7, besides the 3 ranks of file-closers. 
Many of them were brought into a solid mass by the entanglements of the 
forest, and gave our men the idea that battalions were formed in close 
columns doubled on the center. With as little noise as possible, a little 
after 5 r. m., the steady advance of the enemy began. Its first lively effects, 
like a cloud of dust driven before a coming shower, ajipeariMl in tlie startled 
rabbits, squirrels, quail, and other game flying wildly hitlier and thither in 
evident terror, and escaping, where possible, into adjacent clearings. 

The foremost men of Doles's brigade took about half an hour to strike our 
advance picket on the pike. This picket, of course, created no delay. Fif- 
teen minutes later he reached our skirmishers, who seem to have resisted 
effectively for a few minutes, for it required a main line to dislodge them. 
Doles says, conc(U-ning the next check he received, "After a resistance of 
about ten minutes we drove him [Devens] from his ])ositiou on the left and 
carried his battery of two guns, caissons, and hoi'ses/' 



This was the fire that Stein wehr and I heard shortly after our return from 
Barlow. Somebody's guns thundered away for a few short minutes, and then 
came the fitful rattle of musketry; and before I could again get into the 
saddle there arose the ceaseless roar of the terrible storm. 

I sent out my chief-of -staff, Colonel Asmussen, who was the first officer to 
mount, — " The firing is in front of Devens, go and see if all is in order on the 
extreme right." He instantly turned and galloped away. I mounted and set 
off for a prominent place in rear of Schm*z's line, so as to change front to the 
north-west of every brigade south-east of the point of attack, if the attack 
should extend beyond Devens's right flank ; for it was divined at once that 
the enemy was now west of him. I could see numbers of our men — not the 
few stragglers that always fly like chaff at the first breeze, but scores of 
them — rushing into the opening, some with, arms and some without, running 
or falling before they got behind the cover of Devens's reserves, and before 
General Schurz's waiting masses could deploy or charge. The noise and the 
smoke filled the air with excitement, and to add to it Dieckmann's guns and 
caissons, with battery men scattered, rolled and tumbled like runaway wag- 
ons and carts in a thronged city. The guns and the masses of the right bri- 
gade struck the second line of Devens before McLean's front had given way ; 
and, more quickly than it could be told, with all the fury of the wildest hail- 
storm, everything, every sort of organization that lay in the path of the mad 
current of panic-stricken men,^ had to give way and be broken into fragments. 

My own horse seemed to catch the fury ; he sprang — he rose high on his 
hind legs and fell over, throwing me to the ground. My aide-de-camp, Des- 
sauer, was struck by a shot and killed, and for a few moments I was as help- 
less as any of the men who were speeding without arms to the rear. But 
faithful orderlies helped me to remount. Schurz was still doing all he could 
to face regiments about and send them to Devens's northern flank to heliD the 
few who still held firm. Devens, already badly wounded, and several officers 
were doing similar work. I rode quickly to the reserve batteries. A staff- 
ofificer of Greneral Hooker, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Dickinson, Assistant 
Adjutant-Genera], joined me there; my own staff gathered around me. I 
was eager to fill the trenches that Barlow would have held. Buschbeck's 
second line was ordered to change front there„ His men kept thek ranks, 
but at first they appeared slow. Would they never get there ! 

Dickinson said, " Oh, General, see those men coming from that hill way off 
to the right, and there's the enemy after them. Fire, oh, fire at them ; you 
may stop the flight ! " 

" No, Colonel," I said, " I will never fire on my own men ! " 

\ Colonel von Gilsa's report of the crisis is as " The enemy iittacked now from the front and rear, 

follows: find then of conrse my brave hoys were obliged to fall 

ba(!k, the 54th New York and the right wing of the 

"... A patrol of the 45th New York regiment 153d PeunHylviuiia forciug their way back through the 

reported masses of the enemy in au open field opposite enemy's skirminliors in their roar. . . . Retreating I 

mj^ line. I reported this fact at onee to the division (^xpe(•ted surely to rally my lirigade behind our second 

commander, and at tlu^ sauie moment my skirmishers line, formed by the Thli'd Division, but I did not find the 

were driven in by ovcrwhclniiug forces of the enemy. second line; it was abandoned before we reached it." 

The whole lino at once litcaiiKMUgaged furiously, and ,. ^ , .„ , 

my brigade stood bravely, fired three times, and stood ^ o» Gilsa's brigade lost 133 killed and wounded 

still until after they had outflanked me on my right. out of an effective of 1400 men.— Editors. 




IN 1864. 

As soon as our men were near 
enough the batteries opened, firing 
at first shells and then canister over 
their heads. As the attacking force 
emerged from the forest and rushed 
on, the men in front would halt and 
fire, and, while these were reloading, 
another set would run before them, 
halt and fire, in no regular line, but 
in such multitudes that oui' men went 
down before them like trees in a hur- 

By extraordinary efiiort we had filled 
all our long line 
of cross-intrench- 
ments, mainly with 
fragments of or- 
ganizations and in- 
dividual soldiers. 
Many oflScers mn- 
ning away stojiped 
there and did what 
they could, but 
others shouted, 
"We've done all we 
can," and ran on.\ 
Schirmer managed 

the reserve artillery 
fairly. Dilger, the 
battery commander 
on Schurz's left, roll- 
ed the balls along 
the Plank road and 
shelled the wood. 
General Stoinwchr was on hand, cool, 
collected, and judicious. Like Blair at 
Atlanta, he had made his men (who 
were south of Dowdall's) spring to the 
reverse side of their intrenchments 
and be ready to fire the instant it was 

Let us pause here a monuMit and fol- 
low Doles, who led the enemy's attack. 
He states that, after his first success- 

\ General Sclmrz states in liis report that the masses 


rallietl liere were rporpniiz*'*! and 

led forward'two or three times, but were dispersed by the enemy's flank lire.- Editors. 


ful charge, " the command moved forward at the double-quick to assault 
the enemy, who had taken up a strong position on the crest of a hill in 
the open field." This position was the one on Hawkins's farm where 
Devens's and Schm*z's reserves began their fight. But wave after wave of 
Confederate infantry came upon them, and even their left flank was unpro- 
tected the instant the runaways had passed it. To our sorrow, we, who 
had eagerly observed their bravery, saw these reserves also give way, and 
the hill and crest on Hawkins's farm were quickly in the hands of the men 
in gray, ik 

Doles, who must have been a cool man to see so clearly amid the screech- 
ing shells and all the hot excitement of battle, says again : " He " (meaning 
our forces from Schimmelfennig's and Buschbeck's brigades, and perhaps 
part of McLean's, who had faced about and had not yet given way) " made a 
stubborn resistance from behind a wattling fence on a hill covered thickly 
with pines." 

Among the stubborn fighters at this place was Major Jeremiah Williams. 
The enemy was drawing near him. His men fired with coolness and delib- 
eration. His right rested among scrubby bushes and saplings, while his left 
was in comparatively open ground. The fire of the approaching enemy was 
murderous, and almost whole platoons of our men were falling ; yet they held 
their ground. Williams waited, rapidly firing, till not more than thirty paces 
intervened, and then ordered the retreat. Out of 333 men and 16 commis- 
sioned officers in the regiment (the 25th Ohio), 130, including 5 officers, were 
killed or wounded. Major WiUiams brought a part of the living to the breast- 
works near me; the remainder, he says, were carried off to the rear by another 
regimental commander. 

During the delays we had thus far caused to the first division of our 
enemy, all his rear lines had closed up, and the broad mass began to 
appear even below me on my left front to the south of Steinwehr's knoll. 
Then it was, after we had been fighting an hour, that Sickles's and Pleas- 
onton's guns began to be heard, for they had faced about at Hazel Grove 
obliquely toward the north-west, and were hurrying artiUery, cavalry, and 
infantry into position to do what they could against the attack now reach- 
ing them. 

I had come to my last practicable stand. The Confederates were slowly 
advancing, firing as they came. The twelve guns of Schirmer, the corps 
chief of artillery, increased by a part of Dilger's battery, fired, at first with 
rapidity ; but the battery men kept falling from death and wounds. Sud- 
denly, as if by an order, when a sheet of the enemy's fire reached them, a 
large number of the men in the supporting trenches vacated their positions 
and went off. 

No officers ever made more strenuous exertions than those that my staff 
and myself put forth to stem the tide of retreat and refill those trenches, 

_ -^ In justice to the men of Devens's division who first resisted Doles it shonld be stated that the offi- 
cial report of the latter shows that his column was engaged at the outset by Union skirmishers, and 
" subjected to a heavy musketry fire, with grape, canister, and shell."— Editors. 


20 1 


Positions Ercning- of May 2 
Second Positions of \ 
FirstVivision Morning- ) 

Dowdalls»i Tavern 


but the panic was too great. Then 
our artillery fire became weaker and 

I next ordered a retreat to the edge 
of the forest toward Chancellorsville, 
so as to uncover Steinwehr's knoll, the 
only spot yet fii^mly held. The batter- 
ies, except four pieces, were drawn off 
and hurried to the rear. The stand at 
the edge of the forest was necessarily 
a short one. 

General Steinwehr, being now ex- 
posed from flank and rear, having 
held his place for over an hour, drew 
off his small remnants and all moved 
rapidly through openings and woods, 
through low ground and swamps, the 
two miles to the first high land south 
of Hooker's headquarters. 

Captain Hubert Dilger with Ms bat- 
tery sturdily kept along the Plank road, 
firing constantly as he retired. The 
Confederate masses rushed after us in 
the forest and along all paths and 
roads with triumphant shouts and re- 
doubled firing, and so secured much 
plunder and many prisoners. 

It was after sundown and growing 
dark when I met General Hiram G. 

•Berry, commanding a division of the Third Corps, as I was ascending the 
high ground above named. " AVell, General, where now % " he asked. " You 
take the right of this road and I will take the left and try to dct'ciid it,'' 
I replied. 

Oui' batteries, with many others, were on the crest facing to the rear, and as 
soon as Steinwehr's troops had cleared the way these guns began a terril>lo 
cannonade and continued it into the night. They fired into the forest, now 
full of Confederates, all disorganized l)y their exciting chase, and every effort 
of the enemy to advance in that direction in the face of the fire waseff'ectually 
barred by the artillery and supporting troops. 

Stonewall Jackson fell that evening from bullet-wounds, in the forest in 
front of Berry's position. And here, on the forenoon of the next day, May 
3d, the gallant General Berry met his death. It was here, to<\ tliat officers 
of the Eleventh Corps, tliough mortified by <lefeat, successfully rallied tlu» 
scattered brigades and divisions, and, after shielding the battcrii's, went 
during the night to replace the men of the Fifth C(>rj)s and thereafter 
defend the left of the general line 





Twenty-three years ago, in my report to General Hooker, I wrote the fol- 
lowing : 

" Now, as to the causes of this disaster to my corps : 1st. Though con- 
stantly threatened and apprised of the moving of the enemy, yet the woods 
were so dense that he was able to mass a large force, whose exact where- 
abouts j neither patrols, reconnoissances, nor scouts ascertained. He suc- 
ceeded in forming a column opposite to and outflanking my right. 

" 2d. By the panic produced by the enemy's reverse fire, regiments and 
artillery were thrown suddenly upon those in position. 

"3d. The absence of G-eneral Barlow's brigade, which I had previously 
located in reserve and en echelon with Colonel von Gilsa's, so as to cover his 
right flank. This was the only general reserve I had." 

Stonewall Jackson was victorious. Even his enemies praise him ; but, 
providentially for us, it was the last battle that he waged against the Ameri- 
can Union. For, in bold planning, in energy of execution, which he had the 
power to diffuse, in indefatigable activity and moral ascendency, Jackson 
stood head and shoulders above his confreres, and after hit death Gleneral 
Lee could not replace him. 

I General Devens's report is very explicit upon 
this point, and states as follows : 

"Colonel von Gilsa'e sMrmisliers were, between 3 and 
4 o'clock in the afternoon, attacked by the skirmishers 
of the enemy with the evident intention of feeling our 
position. After this Colouel von Gilsa's skirmishers 
were pushed farther to the front, and the major-general 
commanding the corps again rode down the line. After 

his return a company of cavalry was sent me for the 
purpose of making further examination of the woods, 
which examination, though not thoroughly made, was 
still sufficient to show that the enemy's cavalry were 
deployed along the front of my First Brigade, accom- 
panied by some pieces of horse artillery. I directed the 
captain commanding the cavalry to retuna and report 
at corps headquarters." 
See also note on p. 198. — Editors. 




T daybreak on the morning of the 29th of April, 1863, 
sleeping in our tents at corps headquarters, near Hamil- 
ton's Crossing, we were aroused by Major Samuel Hale, of 
Early's staff, with the stirring news that Federal troops 
were crossing the Rappahannock on pontoons under cover 
of a heavy fog. General Jackson had spent the night at 
Mr. Yerby's hospitable mansion near by, where Mrs. Jack- 
sTONEWALWACKsoK's SOU [hls sccoud wlfc] had brought her infant child for the 
^, . T ^ XT f 11 • father to see. He was at once informed of the news, and 

Mnjor Jprt. Hotclikiss, _ .... 

who owns the " oirt gray promptly issued to his division commanders orders to pre- 

cap," writes that Jackson „ . *. i • t ,. t t -i ,i 

wore it through the vai- parc lor actiou. At his directioii 1 rode a mile across the 
omi ulZ^aYcimvlS^t ^elds to amiy headquarters, and finding General Robert E. 
At Frederick City, in "the Lec still slumbcring quietlv, at the suggestion of Colonel 

Antietam campaign, be o x .. 7 00 

bought a soft hat for bis Vcuable, wliom I fouud Stirring, I entered the general's 
icksburg, gave bini the cap tcut and awokc him. Tumiug Ms feet out of his cot he 

as a souvenir.- EDITORS. ^^^ ^^^^^ .^^ ^-^^ ^^ j ^^^^ j^.^ ^^^ ^.^^^^ ^^.^^^ ^^^ ^^,^^^^ 

Expressing no surprise, he playfully said : " Well, I thought I heard firing, 
and was beginning to think it was time some of you young fellows were 
coming to tell me what it was all about. Tell your good general that I am 
sm'e he knows what to do. I will meet him at the front very soon." 

It was Sedgwick who had crossed, and, marching along the river front to 
impress us with his numbers, was now intrenching his line on the river road, 
under cover of Federal batteries on the north bank. 

All day long we lay in the old lines of the action of December preceding, 
watching the operation of the enemy. Nor did we move through the next day, 
the 30th of April. During the forenoon of the 29th General Lee had been 
informed by General J. E. B. Stuart of the movement in force by General 
Hooker across the Rappahannock upon Chancellorsville ; and during the 
night of Thursday, April 3()th, General Jackson withdrew his corps, leaWng 
Early and his division with Barksdale's brigade to hold the old lines from 
Hamilton's Crossing along the rear of Fredericksburg. 

By the light of a brilliant moon, at midnight, that jiassed into an early 
dawn of dense mist, the troops were mm-ed, by the Old ^line road, out of 
sight of the enemj^, and al)out 11 a. m. of Friday, ^lay 1st, they readied 
Anderson's position, confronting Hooker's advance from Chancellorsville, 
near the Tabernacle Church on the Plank road. To ihccI the whole Army 
of the Potomac, under Hooker, General Lee liad of all arms about (.)(),0l)0 
men. General Longstreet, with part of his coqis, was absent below Peters- 
burg. General Lee had two divisions of Longstreet's corps, Anderson's, and 
McLaws's, and Jackson's corps, consisting of four divnsions, A. P. Hill's, D. H. 
Hill's, commaiKled by Rodes, Trimble's, conimande<l l>y Colston, and Early's; 





and about 170 pieces of field-artillery. The divisions of Anderson and 
McLaws had been sent from Fredericksburg to meet Hooker's advance from 
Chancellorsville ; Anderson on Wednesday, and McLaws (except Barksdale's 
brigade, left with Early) on Thursday. At the Tabernacle Church, about four 
miles east of Chancellorsville, the opposing forces met and brisk skirmishing 
began. On Friday, Jackson, reaching Anderson's position, took command of 
the Confederate advance, and urged on his skirmish line under Brigadier- 
General Ramseur with great vigor. How the muskets rattled along a front 
of a mile or two, across the unfenced fields, and through the woodlands! 
What spirit was imparted to the line, and what cheers rolled along its length, 
when Jackson, and then Lee himself, appeared riding abreast of the line along 
the Plank road ! Slowly but steadily the line advanced, until at night-fall all 
Federal pickets and skirmishers were driven back upon the body of Hooker's 
force at Chancellorsville. 

Here we reached a point, a mile and a half from Hooker's lines, where 
a road turns down to the left toward the old Catherine Furnace [see map, 
p. 158] ; and here at the fork of the roads General Lee and General Jack- 
son spent the night, resting on the pine straw, curtained only by the close 
shadow of the pine forest. A little after night-fall I was sent by General 
Lee upon an errand to General A. P. Hill, on the old stone turnpike a mile 
or two north ; and returning some time later with information of matters on 
our right, I found General Jackson retired to rest, and General Lee sleeping at 


the foot of a tree, covered with his army cloak. As I aroused the sleeper, he 
slowly sat up on the ground and said, "Ah, Captain, you have retui-ned, have 
you ? Come here and tell me what you have learned on the right." Laying 
his hand on me he drew me down by his side, and, passing his arm around 
my shoulder, di-ew me near to him in a fatherly way that told of his wann 
and kindly heart. When I had related such informatiou as I had secui'ed for 
him, he thanked me for accomplishing his commission, and then said he 
regi-etted that the young men about General Jackson had not relieved him 
of annoyance, by finding a battery of the enemy which had harassed our 
advance, adding that the young men of that day were not equal to what they 
were when he was a young man. Seeing immediately that he was jesting and 
disposed to rally me, as he often did young officers, I broke away from the 
hold on me which he tried to retain, and, as he laughed heartily through the 
stillness of the night, I went off to make a bed of my saddle-blanket, and, 
with my head in my saddle, near my horse's feet, was soon wi-apped in the 
heavy slumber of a wearied soldier. 

Some time after midnight I was awakened by the chill of the early morn- 
ing hours, and, turning over, caught a glimpse of a little flame on the slope 
above me, and sitting up to see what it meant, I saw, bending over a scant 
fire of twigs, two men seated on old cracker boxes and warming their hands 
over the little fire. I had but to rub my eyes and collect my wits to recog- 
nize the figures of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson. Who can tell the 
story of that quiet council of war between two sleeping armies ? Nothing 
remains on record to tell of plans discussed, and dangers weighed, and a 
gi-eat purpose formed, Ijut the story of the great day so soon to follow. 

It was broad daylight, and the thick beams of yellow sunlight came through 
the pine branches, when some one touched me rudely with his foot, saying : 
" Get up. Smith, the general wants you ! " As I leaped to my feet the rhyth- 
mic click of the canteens of marching infantry caught my ear. Already in 
motion ! What could it mean ! In a moment I was mounted and at the side 
of the general, who sat on his horse by the roadside, as the long line of our 
troops cheerily, but in silence as directed, poured down the Furnace road. 
His cap was pulled low over his eyes, and, looking up from under the visor, 
with lips compressed, indicating the firm purpose within, he nodded to me, 
and in brief and rapid utterance, without a superfluous word, as though all 
were distinctly formed in his mind and beyond question, ho gave me orders 
for our wagon and ambulance trains. From the open fields in our rear, at 
the head of the Cathari)in road, all trains were to be moved upon that road 
to Todd's Tavern, and tlience west l)y interior roads, so that our troops would 
be between them and the enemy at Chancellors ville. ]\[y (M-ders having l)een 
deUvered and the trains set in motion, I retui-ned to the site of (Uir niglit's 
bivouac, to find that General Jackson and his staff had followed the march- 
ing column. 

Slow and tedious is the advance of a mounted officer who has to pass, in 
narrow wood roads thi-ough d(Mise thickets, the ])acked column of niareliing 
infantry, to be recognized all along tlie line and good-naturedly chaffed by 


many a gay-spirited fellow: "Say, here's one of Old Jack's little boys let 
him by, boys ! " m the most patronizing tone. " Have a good breakfast this 

nTi;/?'Y • " " ^'^^'' ^''"'^"^ ^P' ^^ ^^^'^^ ^^t^^ it for getting behind." 
lell Old Jack we're all a-comin'." "Don't let him begin the fnss till we 
get thar ! " And so on, until about 3 p. m., after a ride of ten miles of tortuous 
road, I found the general, seated on a stump by the Brock road, writing this 
dispatch, which, through the courtesy of the Virginia State Library is here 
given m f ac-simile : ' 





The place here mentioned as Chancellor's was also known as Dowdall's 
Tavern. It was the farm of the Rev. Melzi Chancellor, two miles west of 
Chancellors\alle, and the Federal force found here and at Talley's, a mile 
farther west, was the Eleventh Corps, under General Howard. General Fitz 
Lee, with cavahy scouts, had advanced until he had ^dew of the jiosition of 
Howard's corps, and found them unsuspicious of attack. 

Keaching the Orange Plank road. General Jackson himself rode witli Fitz 
Lee to reconnoiter the position of Howard, and then sent the Stonewall 
l)rigade of Virginia troops, under Brigadier-General Paxton, to hold the 
point where the Germanna Plank road obliquely enters the Orange road. 
Leading the main column of his force farther on the Brock r<iad to the old 
turnpike, the head of the column turned shari)ly eastward toward Chancel- 
lorsville. [See maps, pp. I.IH, 191.] About a mile had been i)assed, when he 
halted and began the dis})osition of his force's to attack Howard. H<^des's 
division, at the head of the column, was thrown into line of l>attle, with Col- 
ston's forming the second line and A. P. Hill's th<' third, while th.' artillery 
under Colonel Stapleton Crutchficld moved in colmnii on tlu' road, or was 
])arked in a field on the right. The wcll-li-aiiicd skinnishcr^ of K'odes's 
division, under Major Eugene Bhu'kfonl, were thrown to the It must 
have been between 5 and (> o'clock in the evening, Satunlay, May iM, when 



these- dispositions were completed. Upon his stout-built, long-paced little 
sorrel, General Jackson sat, with visor low over his eyes and lips compressed, 
and with his watch in his hand. Upon his right sat Greneral Robert E. Rodes, 
the very picture of a soldier, and every inch all that he appeared. Upon the 
right of Rodes sat Major Blackford. 

" Ai-e you ready. General Rodes f " said Jackson. 
" Yes, sir ! " said Rodes, impatient for the advance. 
" You can go forward then," said Jackson. 

A nod from Rodes was order enough for Blackford, and then suddenly the 
woods rang with the bugle call, and back came the responses from bugles on 
the right and left, and the long line of skirmishers, through the wild thicket 

of undergrowth, sprang 
eagerly to their work, 
followed promptly by 
the quick steps of the 
line of battle. For a 
moment all the troops 
seemed buried in the 
depths of the gloomy 
forest, and then sudden- 
ly the echoes waked and 
swept the country for 
miles, never failing un- 
til heard at the head- 
quarters of Hooker at 
Chancellors\ille — the 
wild " rebel yell " of the 
long Confederate lines. 
Never was assault de- 
livered with grander 
enthusiasm. Fresh from 
the long winter's waiting, and confident from the preparation of the spring, 
the troops were in fine condition and in high spii'its. The boys were all back 
from home or sick leave. " Old Jack" was there upon the road in their midst ; 
there could be no mistake and no failure. And there were Rodes and A. P. 
Hill. Had they not seen and cheered, as long and as loud as they were per- 
mitted, the gay-hearted Stuart and the long-bearded Fitz Lee on his fiery 
charger? Was not Crutchfield's array of brass and iron "dogs of war "at 
hand, with Poague [Rockbridge Artillery] and Palmer [1st Richmond How- 
itzers, then under McCarthy], and all the rest! 

Alas ! for Howard and his unformed lines, and his brigades with guns 
stacked, and officers at dinner -or asleep under the trees, and butchers deep 
in the blood of beeves ! Scattered through field and forest, his men were pre- 
paring their evening meal. J A little sliow of earth- work facing the south was 
quickly taken by us in reverse from the west. Flying battalions are not 
^But see notes, pp. 198 ami 202.— Editors. 



This picture is from a pliotograpli taken at tlie Maryland State, Fair at 
Hagerstown, in 1884. At that time "Old Sorrel" was thought to he about 
thirty-four years old. At the fair, relic-hunters plucked away much of liis 
mane and tail.— Editoks. 



flying buttresses for an army's 
stability. Across Talley's fields the 
rout begins. Over at Hawkins's 
liill, on the north of the road, Carl 
Schurz makes a stand, soon to be 
driven into the same hojDeless 
panic. By the quiet Wilderness 
Church in the vale, leaving wound- 
ed and dead everywhere, by Melzi 
Chancellor's, on into the deep 
thicket again, the Confederate 
lines pressed forward, — now bro- 
ken and all disaligned by the den- 
sity of bush that tears the clothes 
away; now halting to load and 
deliver a volley upon some regi- 
ment or fragment of the enemy 
that will not move as fast as 
others. Thus the attack upon 
Hooker's flank was a grand suc- 
cess, beyond the most sanguine 

The writer of this narrative, an 
aide-de-camp of Jackson's, was 
ordered to remain at the point 
where the advance began, to be 
a center of communication be- 
tween the general and the cavalry on the flanks, and to deliver orders 
to detachments of artillery still moving up from the rear. A fine black 
charger, with elegant trappings, deserted by his owner and found tied to a 
tree, became mine only for that short and eventful night-fall; and about 
8 p. M., in the twilight, thus comfortably mounted, I gathered my couriers 
about me and went forward to find General Jackson. The storm of battle 
had swept far on to the east and become more and more faint to the ear, 
until silence came with night over the fields and woods. As I rode along 
that old turnpike, passing scattered fragments of Confederates looking for 
their regiments, parties of prisoners concentrating under guards, wounded 
men by the roadside and under the trees at Talley's and Chancellor's, 1 had 
reached an oi)en field on the right, a mile west of Chancellorsville, when, in 
the dusky twilight, I saw horsemen near an old cabin in the tield. Turning 
toward them, I found Rodes and his staft' engaged in gathering the br«)ken 
and scattered troops that had swept the two mih's of battle-lield. "Central 
Jackson is just ahead on .the road, Captain," said li.xNs; "tell him I will be 
here at this cabin if I am wanted." I had not gone a hundred yards before 1 
heard firing, a shot or two, and then a conii)any volle\- upon tlie right of the 
road, and another upon the l*>t't. A few moments farther on I met Captain 








Murray Taylor, an aide of A. P. Hill's, with tidings that Jackson and Hill 
were wounded, and some around them killed, by the tire of their own men. 
Spurring my horse into a sweeping galloj^, I soon passed the Confederate 
line of battle, and, some three or four rods on its front, found the general's 
horse beside a pine sapling on the left, and a rod beyond a little party of men 
caring for a wounded officer. The story of the sad event is briefly told, and, 
in essentials, very much as it came to me from the lips of the wounded 


general himself, and in everything confirmed and completed by those who 
were eye-witnesses and near companions. 

When Jackson had reached the point where his line now crossed the turn- 
pike, scarcely a mile west of Chancellors ville, and not half a mile from a line 
of Federal troops, he had found his front line unfit for the farther and vigor- 
ous advance he desired, by reason of the irregular character of the fight- 
ing, now right, now left, and because of the dense thickets, through which it 
was impossible to preserve alignment. Division commanders found it more 
and more difficult as the twilight deepened to hold theii* broken brigades 
in hand. Eegretting the necessity of 
relieving the troops in front, General 
Jackson had ordered A. P. Hill's divis- 
ion, his third and reserve line, to be 
placed in front. "While this change was 
being effected, impatient and anxious, the 
general rode forward on the turnpike, 
followed by two or three of his staff and 
a number of couriers and signal ser- 
geants. He passed the swampy depres- 
sion and began the ascent of the hill 
toward Chancellorsville, when he came 
upon a line of the Federal infantry lying 
on their arms. Fired at by one or two 
muskets (two musket-balls from the en- 
emy whistled over my head as I came 
to the front), he turned and came back 
toward his line, upon the side of the road 
to his left. As he rode near to the Con- 
federate troops, just placed in position 
and ignorant that he was in the front, the 
left company l)egan firing to the front, and two of his party fell from their 
saddles dead — Captain Boswell, of the Engineers, and Sergeant Cunlift'o, of the 
Signal Corps. Spurring his horse across the road to his right, ho was mot by 
a second volley from the right company of Pender's North Carolina brigade. 
Under this volley, when not two rods from the troops, the general rooeivod 
three balls at the same instant. One penetrated the palm of his right hand 
and was cut out that night from the l)ack of his hand. A second jiassod 
around the wrist of the left arm and out tlirough tho loft hand. A tliinl ball 
passed through the left arm half-way from shoulder to elbow. Tho large bono 
of the upper arm was splintered to the elbow- joint, and tlio wound bled 
freely. His horse turned quickly from the fire, through tin 
which swept the cap from tho general's lu^id, and scratelie* 
leaving drops of blood to stain his face. As he lost liis 
bridlo-roin, he reeled from the saddle, and was caught by tho 
tain Wilbourn, of tho Signal Corps. Laid upon tho ground, there eamo at onoe 
to his succor General A. P. Hill and members of his staff. The writer roaehcHl 




k bushes 
upon tho 
inns of Cap- 






his side a minute after, to find General Hill holding the head and shoulders 
of the wounded chief. Cutting .open the coat-sleeve from wrist to shoulder, 
I found the wound in the upper arm, and with my handkerchief I bound the 
arm above the wound to stem the flow of blood. Couriers were sent for Dr. 
Hunter McGuire, the surgeon of the corps and the general's trusted friend, 
and for an ambulance. Being outside of our lines, it was urgent that he 
should be moved at once. With difficulty litter-bearers were brought from the 
line near by, and the general was placed upon the litter and carefully raised 

to the shoulder, I myself bearing one 
corner. A moment after, artillery from 
the Federal side was opened upon us ; 
gi-eat broadsides thundered over the 
woods ; hissing shells searched the dark 
thickets through, and shrapnels swept 
the road along which we moved. Two 
or three steps farther, and the litter- 
bearer at my side was struck and fell, 
but, as^the litter turned. Major Wat kins 
Leigh, of Hill's staff, happily caught it. 
But the fright of the men was so great 
that we were obliged to lay the litter 
and its burden down upon the road. 
As the litter-bearers ran to the cover 
of the trees, I threw myself by the gen- 
eral's side and held him firmly to the 
ground as he attempted to rise. Over 
us swept the rapid fire of shot and 
shell — grape-shot striking fire upon 
the flinty rock of the road all around us, and sweeping from their feet 
horses and men of the artillery just moved to the front. Soon the firing 
veered to the other side of the road, and I sprang to my feet, assisted the 
general to rise, passed my arm around him, and with the wounded man's 
weight thrown heavily upon me, we forsook the road. Entering the woods, 
he sank to the ground from exhaustion, but the litter was soon brought, and 
again rallying a few men, we essayed to carry him farther, when a second 
bearer fell at my side. This time, with none to assist, the litter careened, 
and the general fell to the ground, with a groan of deep pain. G-reatly 
alarmed, I sprang to his head, and, lifting his head as a stray beam of moon- 
light came through clouds and leaves, he opened his eyes and wearily said : 
" Never mind me. Captain, never mind me." Raising him again to his feet, 
he was accosted by Brigadier-General Pender : " Oh, General, I hope you 
are not seriously wounded. I will have to retire my troops to re-form 
them, they are so much broken by this fire." But Jackson, rallying his 
strength, with firm voice said: "You must hold your gi^ound, General 
Pender; you must hold your ground, sir!" and so uttered his last com- 
mand on the field. 




(tv^vncellDW-vilU [y^u^t. 

This i)icture is from a photograph taken at a reunion 
of Union and Confederate officers and soldiers in May, 
1884. The original house (see p. 190) was set on fire by 
Confederate shells on Sunday, May 3d, shortly after 
Hooker was injured while standing on the porch. The 

picture faces south; Jackson attacked the Eleventh 
Corps fiom the left (west) by the Plank road, which 
passes in front of the Chancellor House. The cross- 
road in the foreground leads northward to Ely's Ford 
and United States Ford. See map, p. 158.— Editors. 

Again we resorted to the litter, and with difficulty Lore it through the l)ush, 
and then under a hot fire along the road. Soon an ambulance was reached, 
and stopping to seek some stimulant at Chancellor's (Dowdall's Tavern), we 
were found by Dr. McGuire, who at once took charge of the wounded man. 
Passing back over the Imttle-field of the afternoon, we reached the Wilderness 
store, and then, in a field on the north, the field-hospital of our eori)s under 
Dr. Harvey Bhxck. Here we found a tent prepared, and after midiiiglit the U'ft 
arm was amputated near the shoulder, and a ball taken from the right hand. 

All night long it was mine to watch by the suft'erer, and keep him warmly 
wrapped and undisturbed in his sleep. At 9 a. m., on the next day, when 
he aroused, cannon firhig again filled the air, and all the Sunday tlirough the 
fiercer l)attle raged, General J. E. B. Stuart commanding the Confederates in 
Jackson's place. A dispatch was sent to the conunanding general to announce 
formally his disability, — tidings General Lee had received during the night 
with profound grief. There came back the following note : 

*' Gknekal : I h.ave just received your noto. informinp: mo that you were w«)umle(l. I t-anuot 
express my rej^ret at the occun-ence. Couhl I liavc direeted events, I shouKl have eh«»s»'n. for 
the good of the country, to have been disabk'd in your stead. T conirratulate you ui>t)n tlie 
victory which is due to youi* skill and energy. Most truly yours, R. E. Lee, Genek.m.." 



When this dispatch was handed to me at the tent, and I read it aloud, 
General Jackson turned his face away and said, " G-eneral Lee is very kind, 
but he should give the praise to God." 

The long day was passed with bright hopes for the wounded general, with 
tidings of success on the battle-field, with sad news of losses, and messages 
to and from other wounded officers brought to the same infirmary. 

On Monday the general was carried in an ambulance^ by way of Spotsyl- 
vania Court House, to most comfortable lodging at Chandler's, near Guinea's 
Station, on the Eichmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad. And here, 
against oui' hopes, notwithstanding the skill and care of wise and watchful 
surgeons, attended day and night by wife and friends, amid the prayers and 
tears of all the Southern land, thinking not of himself, but of the cause he 
loved, and for the troops who had followed him so well and given him so 
great a name, our chief sank, day by day, with symptoms of pneumonia and 
some pains of pleurisy, until, at 3 : 15 p. m. on the quiet of the Sabbath after- 
noon. May 10th, 1863, he raised himself from his bed, saying, " No, no, let us 
pass over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees " ; and, falling again 
to his pillow, he passed away, " over the river, where, in a land where war- 
fare is not known or feared, he rests forever ' under the trees.' " 

His shattered arm was buried in the family burying-ground of the Ellwood 
place — Major J. H. Lacy's — near his last battle-field. 

His body rests, as he himself asked, " in Lexington, in the Valley of Vir- 
ginia." The. spot where he was so fatally wounded in the shades of the 
Wilderness is marked by a large quartz rock, placed there by the care of 
his chaplain and friend, the Rev. Dr. B. F. Lacy, and the latter's brother, 
Major Lacy. 

Others must tell the story of Confederate victory at Chancellorsville. It 
has been mine only, as in the movement of that time, so with my pen now, 
to follow my general himself. Great, the world believes him to have been in 
many elements of generalship ; he was greatest and noblest in that he was 
good, and, without a selfish thought, gave his talent and his life to a cause 
that, as before the God he so devoutly served, he deemed right and just. 





N October, 1876, I accompanied General Hooker to the battle-fields 
of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Antietam, — fields on which 
he had borne conspicuous parts. It was the only 
occasion on which he visited them after the battles. 
He had previously placed in my hands his official 
papers and memoranda for the preparation of a his- 
tory of the Battle of Chancellorsville, at the same 
time requesting me to make this journey with him, 
that I might have the advantage of a thorough 
knowledge of the field, and of his interpretation of the manner in which 
the battle was fought. At this period he was partly paralyzed from the 
injury received in the Chancellorsville battle, and he could move only 
with great difficulty by the aid of his valet. 

After our arrival at Fredericksburg, General Hooker was the recipient of 
many courteous attentions from the leading citizens, and at night he was 
serenaded, when a great crowd assembled in front of the hotel, to whose 
repeated cheers he made a brief response, in which he said that he had -sdsited 
their city but once before, and although his reception now was not nearly so 
warm as on that former day, yet it was far more agreeable to him, — a conceit 
which greatly pleased his hearers. 

Our drive over the Fredericksburg field, which we visited on the way, 
was on one of the most perfect of autumnal days, and at every turn 
fresh reminiscences of that battle were suggested. As we approached the 
flag-staff of the National Cemetery, on the hill adjoining Marye's Heights, 
where more than fifteen thousand of the Union dead of Fredericksburg, 
Chancellorsville, the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania are bnri(Hl, General 
Hooker said: 

"I never think of this ground but with a shuddei-. The whole scene is indel- 
ibly fixed in my mind, as it appeared on that fatal day. Here on this ground 
were ranged the enemy's cannon, and the heights farther to his left were thickly 
planted with pieces; all the infantry he could use was disposed behind earth- 
works and stone walls. How this could have been selected as the point, above 
all others, for attack, and followed up mitil four whole divisions had l>een 
sacrificed, I cannot comprehend. As I stand here to-day, the inii)(>ssil)ility 
of carrying this ground by direct assault is no more ai)parent than it was 
when I made my observation preparatory to ordering IIiinii»hreys\s division 
forward. But it is evident that General Burnside never forgave nie for coun- 
seling him on that occasion as I did, for on January l2:)d h«^ drew ii]) an order, 
known as General Ord(>rs, No. 8, of his series, dishonorably dismissing me 
from the service, together with thre(> other in-oniiiient gtMieral ollieers, at the 


same time relieving five other officers from duty. I was grossly maligned by 
the press of that day, and it was generally beheved by the people at the North 
that I had not faithfully supported General Burnside in this battle, and that 
I was aiming thereby to supplant him. If these brave men who are sleeping 
here beneath our feet could speak, they would bear testimony to my sincerity 
and fidelity to the cause we were battling for ; and though I have suffered 
in silence, and my reputation has been grossly aspersed, I have rested in the 
firm belief that my conduct on that day would be justified by the American 

These Orders, No. 8, J were prepared on the 23d of January, 1863, and would 
have been immediately promulgated had not General Burnside been coun- 
seled first to lay them before President Lincoln, of whom he asked that they 
be approved, as drawn, or that his own resignation be accepted. The Presi- 
dent refused to accept his resignation, but relieved him of the command of 
the Army of the Potomac ; and so little effect had the order upon the mind 
of Mr. Lincoln that he decided to place Hooker, at whom the shaft was chiefly 
aimed, at the head of the army. And yet so strong a hold had this unjust 
opinion on the public mind that even the President was tinctured with it, 
and in his remarkable letter of January 26th to General Hooker, informing 
him of his appointment, he said : 

" I have placed yoii at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this 
upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that 
there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I beheve you to be 
a brave and skillful soldier, which, of course, I hke. I also believe you do not mix poUtics with 

^Following is the text of the orders: "Head- tary service of the United States. (.3.) Brigadier- 
QUARTERS, Army OF THE PoTOMAC, January 23d, GeneralJohn Newton, commanding Third Division, 
1863. General Orders, No. S. (1.) General Sixth Ai"my Corps, and Brigadier-General John 
Joseph Hooker, major-general of volunteers and Cochrane, commanding First Brigade, Third Di vis- 
brigadier-general, U. S. Army, having been guilty ion, Sixth Army Corps, for going to the President 
of unjust and unnecessary criticisms of the ac- of the United States with criticisms upon the plans 
tions of his superior officers, and of the author- of their commanding officer, are, subject to the 
ities, and having, by the general tone of his approval of the President, dismissed from the 
conversation, endeavored to create distrust in the military service of the United States. (4.) It 
minds of officers who have associated with him, being evident that the following-named officers 
and having, by omissions and otherwise, made re- can be of no further service to this army, they are 
ports and statements which were calculated to hereby relieved from duty, and will report in 
create incorrect impressions, and for habitually person, without delay, to the Adjutant-General, 
speaking in disparaging terms of other officers, is U. S. Army : Major-General W. B. Franklin, 
hereby dismissed the service of the United States commanding Left Grand Di-\dsion ; Major-General 
as a man unfit to hold an important commission W. F. Smith, commanding Sixth Coi'ps ; Briga- 
during a crisis like the present, when so much dier-General Samuel D. Sturgis, commanding 
patience, charity, confidence, consideration, and Second Division, Ninth Corps ; Brigadier-General 
patriotism are duo from every soldier in the field. Edward Ferrero, commanding Second Brigade, 
This order is issued subject to the approval of the Second Division, Ninth Army Corps; Brigadier- 
President of the United States. (2.) Brigadier- General John Cochrane, commanding First Bri- 
General W. T. H. Brooks, commanding First Divis- gade. Third Division, Sixth Corps ; Lieutenant- 
ion, Sixth Army Corps, for complaining of the policy Colonel J. H. Taylor, Assistant Adjutant-General, 
of tlie Government, and for using language tending Eight Grand Division. By command of Major- 
to demoralize his command, is, subject to the ap- General A. E. Burnside. Lewis Eichmond, 
proval of the President, dismissed from the mill- Assistant Adjutant-General." % 

ijj In the "Official Records" the above order is accom- prints, Is referred to in tlie correspondence between 

paiiiod by the following note of explanation: "This Hiilh'ck and Franklin, and in Burnside's testimony 

order wiis not approved by the President, iind was, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War." 
therefore, never issued. It appeared in the public Ewtoks. 


your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, 
if not an indispensable, quaUty. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does 
good rather than harm ; but I think that during General Bumside's command of the army you 
have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did 
a great wi-ong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have 
heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently sajing that both the aiTay and the Gov- 
ernment needed a Dictator. Of coui'se it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given 
you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now 
ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support 
you to the utmost of its abihty, which is neither more nor less than it has done and wiU do for 
all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of 
criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. 
I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive 
again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware 
of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward, and give 
us victories." 

The caution against rashness may have been suggested to the mind of Mr. 
Lincoln by the epithet of " Fighting Joe Hooker," which the general never 
heard without expressing his deep regret that it was ever applied to him. 
" People will think I am a highwayman or a bandit," he said ; when in fact 
he was one of the most kindly and tender-hearted of men. 

We were accompanied on our ride to the Chancellorsville field, some ten or 
twelve miles above Fredericksburg, by Major Greorge E. Chancellor, a son of 
Melzi Chancellor, whose home at the time of the battle was at Dowdall's 
Tavern, where General Howard had his headquarters. On setting out, General 
Hooker suggested that we should take some lunch along with us, as, when he 
was there last there was very little to eat in all that region. Major Chancellor 
thought it unnecessary, and, in fact, we were feasted most sumptuouslj^ at his 
father's house. 

Upon our arrival at the broad, open, rolling fields opposite Banks's Ford, 
some three or four miles up the stream, General Hooker exclaimed, wa\'ing 
his hand significantly : " Here, on this open ground, I intended to fight my 
battle. But the trouble was to get my army on it, as the banks of the stream 
are, as you see, rugged and precipitous, and the few fords were strongly for- 
tified and guarded by the enemy. By making a i)owerful demonstration in 
front of and below the town of Fredericksburg with a part of my army, I 
was able, unobserved, to withdraw the remainder, and, marching nearly thirty 
miles up the stream, to cross the Rappahannock and the Rapidan unoi)posed, 
and in four days' time to arrive at Chan(M'llorsville, within fivt> miK>s of this 
coveted ground, ^t — and all this without General Lee having <liscoveriMl tliat 
I had left my position in his front. So far, I regarded my movciiuMit as n 

3>Tlie (lonionstratioiis began on April 21st, and the Seeonil Corps, itossimI 11u> Kappaliainiock at 

wero niado at inti'i-vals at Kelly's Ford, Rappahan- Kelly's Ford on the 'JStli and •J'.'tli by poiitoon- 

noek Bridge, and Port Royal. Tlie movement of bridges, and passed the Rapidan l>y fonling and 

Sedgwick below the town was disclosed to Lee on by means of pontoons, arriving at Cluiueellors- 

the 29th, when the pontoons were laid and the ville on the .SOtii. The Third ('orps. after taking 

crossing took place at the point where Franklin's part in tlie demonstrations before Frederieksburg. 

Left (Iraiid Division crossed in December, 1 S(;2. crossed tlie Rapitahannock at United States Fonl 

Hooker's flanking column, consisting of the Fifth, and reached Cliancellorsville on May 1st. and was 

Eleventh, and Twelfth corps and two divisions of followed by the First Corps on the 2d.— Editors. 

VOL. III. 15 


great success. On the morning of the fifth day my army was astir, and 
was put in motion on three Hues through the tangled forest (the Wilder- 
ness) which covers the whole country around Chancellorsville, and in three 
hours' time I would have been in position on these crests, and in posses- 
sion of Banks's Ford, in short and easy communication with the other wing 
of my army. But at midnight General Lee had moved out with his whole 
army, and by sunrise was in firm possession of Banks's Ford, had thrown up 
this line of breastworks which you can still follow with the eye, and it was 
bristling with cannon from one end to the other. Before I had proceeded 
two miles the heads of my columns, while still upon the narrow roads in these 
interminable forests, where it was impossible to manoeuvi^e my forces, were 
met by Jackson with a full two-thirds of the entire Confederate army. I had 
no alternative but to turn back, as I had only a fragment of my command 
in hand, and take up the position about Chancellorsville which I had occupied 
during the night, as I was being rapidly outflanked upon my right, the enemy 
having open ground on which to operate. 

" And here again my reputation has been attacked because I did not under- 
take to accomplish an impossibility, but turned back at this point; and every 
history of the war that has been written has soundly berated me because I 
did not fight here in the forest with my hands tied behind me, and allow my 
army to be sacrificed. I have always believed that impartial history would 
vindicate my conduct in this emergency." 

Soon after leaving the open ground opposite Banks's Ford we entered 
the dense forest, or " Wilderness," which covers the entire Chancellorsville 
battle-ground, — "a dense forest," says G-eneral Warren, "of not very 
large ti'ees, but very difficult to get through ; mainly of scrubby oak, what 
they call black-jack there, so that a man could hardly ride through it, and 
a man could not march through it very well with musket in hand, unless he 
trailed it." 

Every important position was observed and commented upon by the man 
who on those fierce battle-days had wielded, on this very ground, an army of 
a hundred thousand men. On approaching the pine-tree under which Gen- 
erals Lee and Jackson had planned the mode of attack, General Hooker 
observed : " It was under that tree that the mischief was devised which 
came near ruining my army. My position at Chancellorsville was a good 
one for this monotonous country. I felt confident when I reached it that I 
had eighty chances in a hundred to win. To make sure that everything was 
firm and strong, very early on the 2d of May, the first day of the battle, I 
rode along the whole line, and personally examined every part, suggesting 
some changes and counseling extreme vigilance. Upon my return to head- 
quarters I was informed that a continuous column of the enemy had been 
marching past my front since early in the morning, as of a corps with all its 
impedimenta. This put an entirely new phase upon the problem, and filled 
me with apprehension for the safety of my right wing, which was posted to 
meet a front attack from the south, but was in no condition for a flank attack 
from the west ; for this marching of the enemy's corps, to my mind, meant 


a flank movement upon my right. I immediately dictated a dispatch | to 
* Generals Sloeum and Howard,' the latter commanding the Eleventh Corps, 
which stood upon the extreme right, saying that I had good reason to beheve 
that the enemy was moving to our right, and that they must be ready to 
meet an attack from the west. This was at 9 : 30 in the morning. In the 
course of two hours I got a dispatch from Greneral Howard, saying that he 
could see a column of the enemy moving westward, and that he was taking 
the precautions necessary ' to resist an attack from the west.' ^ I had previ- 
ously put Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps on an interior line looking 
westward, and had it fortified, so that if Howard should give way, this interior 
line would be for safety, as it afterward proved my salvation. 

" I sent Sickles to pierce this moving column of the enemy, and made prepa- 
rations to flank the portion of Lee's army that was still upon my front, in the 
direction of Fredericksburg, and, sweeping down in reverse, to destroy it if 
possible. But a swamp intervened which had to be corduroyed, and a small 
stream had to be bridged, which consumed time ; and though Sickles was 
successful in breaking in upon the enemy's column and making some captures, 
yet, before he was in position to make his decisive attack, Jackson, who had 
led his column by a long circuit, out of sight and hearing, through the dense 
forest, came in upon my right flank, and by one concentrated blow of his 
whole corps, some 25,000 men, had crushed and put to flight almost the entire 
corps of Howard ; and it was with the utmost difficulty that I could lead up 
my reserves to the interior line of Williams, and bring Jackson's victorious 
forces to a halt. This failure of Howard to hold his ground cost us om* posi- 
tion, and I was forced, in the presence of the enemy, to take up a new one. 
Upon investigation I found that Howard had failed pi-operly to obey my 
instructions to prepare to meet the enemy from the west." In this connec- 
tion the following extracts from a letter to Hooker from Schurz (who sub- 
sequently gave General Hooker leave to print it) will be read with interest : 

'' 40 W. 32d St., New York, April ^'id, 1S76. 

" My Dear General : Yom* letter of the 8tli inst. was forwarded to me from St. Louis, and 
reached me here early this mox-ning, and I hasten to reply. I regret very much that, my papei-s 
being boxed up, I have no access to a memorandum of tiie cu'ciunstances connected with the 

I " H'dq'rs, Army op the Potomac, Chancel- son to suppose that the enemy is moving to our 
lorsville, Va., May 2d, 18G3, 9:30 a. m. Vir- right. Please advance your pickets for purposes 
cular. Major-Generals Slocum and Howard : of observation as far as may be safe, in order to 
I am directed by the Major-General coinmandiiig obtain timely information of their approacli. J. 
to say that the disposition you liave nuide of yoiu- H. Van Alex. BrigadiiT-Gcncral ami Aidc-de- 
corps has been with a view to a front attack by the camp.'" [Tliis is the dispatdi wliii-h Gout'ral How- 
enemy. If he should throw himself upon your ard states he did not receive at the time. See p. 
flank, he wishes you to examine the groimd and I'JO. In the "Official Records" the wonl circular 
determine upon the position you will take in does not appear, and the address is " Major-Geu- 
that event, in order that you may be prepared erals Howard and Slocum.''— KniTous.] 
for him in whatever direction he advances. He ^ " IlEADQrARTKRS. 11th Cori-s. May 'Jd. 10 
suggests that you have heavy reserves well in m. to 1 1 o'k [1 1> : .">(> a. M.] Ma.i.-(;km,. Hookkk, 
hand to meet this contingency. The right of your Gomd'g Army. General: From (Wn. IVvcns's 
lino does not appear to be strong enough. No headquarters we can observe a column of infantry 
artificial defenses worth naming have been thrown moving westward on a road parallel with this on a 
up, and there appears to be a scrtrcitv of tnx.i.s at riilge about 1 '... to '2 mil.'s south of this. I am 
that point, and not, in the general's opinion, as taking measures to resist an attack from the west. 
favorably posted as might be. We have good rea- Kespectfully, O. O. Howard. Maj.-Geu." 


battle of Chancellorsville, as they came under my observation, which memorandum I put on 
paper shortly after that event. So I have to depend upon my memory in answering your ques- 
tions. According to my recollection, you are mistaken in your impression that General Howard 
put your dispatches and orders into his pocket without communicating them to his division 
commanders. About noon or a Httle after on the day of the attack on the Eleventh Corps I 
was at General Howard's headquarters, a house on the Chancellorsville road near the center of 
our position. General Howard, being very tired, wanted to rest a little, and asked me as next 
in rank to open dispatches that might arrive and to wake him in case they were of immediate 
importance. Shortly after a courier arrived with a dispatch from you calling General Howard's 
attention to the movement of the enemy toward our right flank, and instructing him to take 
precautionary measures against an attack from that quarter. I went into General Howard at 
once and read it to him, and, if I remember rightly, while we were speaking about it another 
courier, or one of your young stafP-officers, arrived with a second dispatch of virtually the 
same purport. We went out and discussed the matter on the porch of the house. I am not 
sure whether General Steinwehr was present or not. . . . . 

'' I have seen it stated that my troops were already gone when General Devens's division in 
its hurried retreat reached my position. This is utterly untrue. Some of my regiments, which 
had remained in their old position, succeeded in wheeling round under the fire of the enemy j 
others were swept away, but those whose front I had changed during the afternoon in antici- 
pation of the attack held their ground a considerable time after the debris of General Devens's 
division had swept through our line. I saw General Devens, wounded, carried by, and he had 
long been ... in the rear when we were overpowered and fell back upon Colonel BvTSch- 
beck's position, where General Howard in the meantime had been trying to rally the routed 
troops. This also you will find in my report. My loss in killed and wounded was quite heavy : 
if I remember rightly, about twenty per cent. 

" I ought to add that he [Genei'al Howard] thought he could not carry out as well as he 
desired your instruction to hold a strong reserve in hand, for the reason that General Barlow's 
brigade of Steinwehr's division had been ordered to the support of Sickles. All the precaution 
that was taken against a flank attack, aside from what I did without orders, was the construc- 
tion of a small rifle-pit across the Chancellorsville road in the rear of my division, near the 
house [Dowdall's Tavern] occupied by General Howard as headquarters. ... Of coui-se 
this hasty note is not written with any expectation on my part to see it printed as part of an 
historical narrative. It is simply to give you the information you wish for, and which it gives 
me pleasure to furnish. Very truly yours, C. SCHURZ. 

'' Major-General Hooker. 

" P. S. — Whether General Howard received on that day any dispatches or instructions from 
you subsequent to those mentioned, I do not know." "\ 

When we arrived at the Chancellor House (which is all there is of Chancel- 
lorsville), where General Hooker had his headquarters, and where he received 
the hurt that came near proving mortal. General Hooker said, " I was stand- 
ing on this step of the portico on the Sunday morning of the 3d of May, and 

\ The following are extracts from the official ground we tbeu occupied, with cm- front at right angles 
report of General Schui-z, who shows, besides, that ^^^'^ ^^^ Plank road, lining the church grove and the 

his division made strenuous efforts to stem the 
assaults of Jackson's men : 

border of the woods east of the open plain with infantry, 
placing strong echelons behind both wings, and distribut- 
ing the art iUery along the front on ground most favorab 

"In tlic coui'sc of tlio forenoon I was informed that for its action, especially on the eminence on the right 

large columns of the enemy could be seen from General and left of DowdaU's Tavern. . . . In the absence of 

Devens's liea(l(iuartcis. i]io\iiii,M'riim east to west. . . . orders, but becoming more and more convinced that the 

I (>liser\((l them plainly as they moved on. I rode back enemy's attack would come from the west and fall ui)OU 

to your [(ieucral Howard's] lieadciuarters, and on the our rigid an<l rear, I took it upon my own i-esponsibility 

way ordered Captain Dil^rer to look for good artillery to detach two regiments from the second line of my 

positions on the field fronting west, as the troops would Second Brigade and to place them in a good position on 

in all probability have to execute a change of front. the right and left of Ely's Ford road, west of Hawkins's 

Tlie mattei' wjis largely discussed at your liea(l(|Uiirter8, farm, so as to check tlie enemy if he should attack our 

and I entertaine<l and expressed in our informal convor- extreme right and penetrate through the woods at that 

eations the opiuiou that wc should form upon the opeu point. This was subsequently approved by you. • • • 


was giving direction to the battle, which was now raging with great fury, the 
cannon-balls reaching me from both the east and the west, when a solid shot 
struck the pillar near me, splitting it in two, and throwing one-half longitudi- 
nally against me, striking my whole right side, which soon turned h\dd. For 
a few moments I was senseless, and the report spread that I had been killed. 
But I soon revived, and, to correct the misapprehension, I insisted on being 
lifted upon my horse, and rode back toward the white house, which suljse- 
quently became the center of my new position. Just before reaching it, the 
pain from my hurt became so intense that I was likely to fall, when I was 
assisted to dismount, and was laid upon a blanket spread out upon the ground, 
and was given some brandy. This revived me, and I was assisted to remount. 
Scarcely was I off the blanket when a solid shot, fired by the enemy at Hazel 
Grove, struck in the very center of that blanket, where I had a moment 
before been lying, and tore up the earth in a savage way." As he ended 
this recital Greneral Hooker turned to Major Chancellor, who was standing 
by, and said, "Ah, Major! Your people were after me with a sharp stick on 
that day." 

A short distance from the Chancellor House, in the du-ection of Dowdall's 
Tavern, our carriage was halted, and, dismounting, Major Chancelh^r led us 
a few paces out of the road, along a faint cart-path, when he said, " This is 
the place where Stonewall Jackson received the wounds that pi'oved mortal." 
" I have always been struck," observed General Hooker, " with the last words 
of General Jackson, evincing how completely he was absorbed in the progi-ess 
of the battle. In his delirium he was still upon the field, and he cried out, 
' Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action — pass the infantry to the front 
rapidly — tell Major Hawks — 'when he stopped with the sentence unfinished. 
After a little his brow relaxed, as if from relief, and he said, ' Let us cross 
over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees,' — and these were his 
last words." 

AiTiving at Dowdall's Tavern, General Hooker pointed out the excellent 
position here afforded for Howard's corps to have made a stout defense. 
" Buschbeck's brigade of that corps," said he, " did wonders here, and held the 
whole impetuous onset of the enemy in check for an hour or more, which 
gave me opportunity to bring my reserves into position. The loss of tliis 
ground brought me into so cramped a condition that I was obliged to take up 
a new position, which I successfully accomplished. I now ordered Stnlgwick, 
who commanded the Sixth Corps, the largest in my army, some 22,000 men, 

With those exceptions, no change was inailc in the posi- Corps, and the Eleventh Corps for the fiiihire of the 

tiou occupied by the corps. The losses suffered by my canipiiijrn. Preposterous as this Is, yet we Imve been 

division in the action of May 2d were very severe in overwhelmed by the army and the pn-ss with abus*' and 

proportion to my whole effective force. I had 15 officers insult beyoiid measure. Wc liavi- borne as niudi a.s 

killed, 23 wounded, and ir> missing, and 102 men killed, human nature can cnduri'. I am far from sayiiiK'that on 

305 wounded, and 441 missing'.— total, '.);■.:). •j^ . • • My May 2d everybody did Ills duty to tlit> best of his power, 
whole loss amounted to about 23 per cent. ... In "But one thinjr I will say. because I know it : tlii»«' 

closiuf,' this r(i)ort T i)cir li-ave to make on(> a<lditional men ar(> no cowanls. . . . I have st-en. with my own 

nMiiark. The Klcvciilli Corps, and, by error or malice, eyes, troops who now affect to look down uinm the 

especially the Thinl Division, has been held up to the Eleventh Corps with sovcreijrn contempt l>ehave much 

whohMOuntry as a band of cowards. My division has worse under circumstances far less trying'. ..." 
been miule responsible for the defeat of the Eleventh EoiTOKS. 

i^ Tliis was the loss r.'iuMte.l l.v (Ji'ii.nil Sclmrz. lint a rrcnitly fvix.-.l tal.l.' »UUr War n.i.iirtmrnt show h !»offl,-,'r« niiil 120 
iiu-n kiUcil, 32 otllccrs and 4t;i iii.n wouikI.mI, an.l 8 olllccrs ami .''.Ml men captund or lulsstiik'. a total o( H'JO.- Kl'iroKU. 




which had been left to demonstrate in front of Fredericksburg, to cross the 
river and move rapidly up to my left. The effect of so heavy a body of fresh 
troops coming in upon the enemy's flank I calculated would be decisive. But 
Sedgwick was dilatory in moving, J which gave the enemy time to concen- 
trate and stop him before he had moved over half the distance, and I 
consequently got no help from him." 

I ventured to ask why he did not attack when he found that the enemy had 
weakened his forces in the immediate front and sent them away to meet Sedg- 
wick. " That," said he, " would seem to have been the reasonable thing to do. 
But we were in this impenetrable thicket. All the roads and opeiiings lead- 
ing through it the enemy immediately fortified strongly, and planted thickly 
his artillery commanding all the avenues, so that with reduced numbers he 
could easily hold his lines, shutting me in, and it became utterly impossible 
to manoeuvre my forces. My army was not beaten. Only a part of it had been 
engaged. The First Corps, commanded by Reynolds, whom I regarded as the 
ablest officer under me, was fresh and ready and eager to be brought into 
action, as was my whole army. But I had been fully convinced of the futil- 
ity of attacking fortified positions, and I was determined not to sacrifice my 
men needlessly, though it should be at the expense of my reputation as a fight- 
ing officer. We had already had enough grievous experience in that line. 
I made frequent demonstrations to induce the enemy to attack me, but he 
would not accept my challenge. Accordingly, when the eight days' rations 
with which my army started out were exhausted, I retired across the river. 
Before doing so I sent orders to General Sedgwick to hold his position near 

^See statements in "Sedgwick at Fredericksburg and Salem Heights," p. 224.— Editors. 



Banks's Ford, on the south side of the stream, and I would bring my whole 
army to his support ; but the order failed to reach him until he had already 
recrossed the river. ^ Could I have had my army on the open grounds at that 
point where I could have manoeuvred it properly, I felt assured that I could 
have gained a decisive victory. But this, my last chance, was frustrated." j 

^ The " Official Records " (Vol. XXV. , Part II. , p. 
418) show that Sedgwick recrossed the Rappa- 
hannock in obedience to an order from General 
Hooker, dated May 5th, 1 A. M., and received by 
Sedgwick at 2 A. M. At 1 : 20 A. M. Hooker sent 
the following order to Sedgwick (Ibid., p. 419): 
"Yours received, saying you should hold position 
[as ordered]. Order to withdraw countermanded." 
This countermand was received by Sedgwick at 
3:20 a. m., but meanwhile almost his entire com- 
mand had recrossed under the order of 1 a. m. — 

^ The subjoined letter has been kindly fui-nished 
to us for publication by Lieutenant Worth G. Ross, 
son of the late Colonel Samuel Ross, to whom it is 
addressed. It is believed that it had not been 
printed before its appearance in "The Century" 
for April, 1888.— Editors. 

" Lookout Valley, Tenn., Fcbruarj^ 28th, 1864. 
" My Dear Colonel : For some reaeou your letter was 
a long time in reaching me. When the Eleventh Corps 
gave way on Saturday, Berry's division and Hays's 
brigade were dispatched to seize and hold the ground 
occupied by the left of that corps. Berry double-quicked 
his men to the point, but was too late. The enemy were 
already in possession. When this was reported to me I 
directed my engineers to establish a new Ime, which 
was pointed out to them on the map, and at the same 
time stated to them that we would probably have to 
move on it as soon as the enemy opened on us in the 
morning, as his batteries would sweep the plain in 
front of the Chancellorsville House, and, besides, en- 
filade the line held by the Second and Twelfth corps 
nearly its entire length. Soon after these instructions 
were given to the engineers, peremptory orders were 
sent to 0( in ral Sedgwick to advance over the Plank 
roadfnmi Frediri<'kslmrgand attack tlieenemy in front 
of the Second and Twelfth col i)m at daylight. My single 
object in iK.lding on to the jiosition as long as I did was 
to hear Sedgwick's guns, which I iiKinicntarily expected. 

of course. General Warren had been sent to guide him. 
The orders reached him between lo and 11 o'clock, [he] 
had but eight miles to march, a l)right moonlight night, 
with only a small force to oppose. Probably had he 
marched as directed, not a gun would have been flred. 
With Lee in my front and Jackson on my flank I was un- 
willing to attempt to force my way through Lee, espe- 
cially as the roads through the forests would only enable 
me to present my columns with narrow fronts, which 
the enemy could cut down as fast as they were exposed. 
I knew that I could do this, and I gave the enemy credit 
for being able to do as much as I could, but no more. 
Had Sedgwick come upon Lee's rear, the latter would 
have found himself between two armies, and would 
doubtless have followed Jackson's flank movement, 
which I desired, as that would throw the enemy off the 
short road to Richmond and our troops on it. I do not 
know that you ever heard that I had one and a half 
millions of rations .afloat in the Potomac to throw up the 
Pamunkey Kiver in view of this contingency. 

" I recrossed the Happahannock. expecting to return 
at or near Franklin's Crossing, where I had elbow-room 
[see p. 74], and at least an even chance for being victo- 
rious, and so stated to the President at the time. Ko 
general battle was fought at Chancellorsville. for I was 
unwilling to give battle with such great odds 
me. I rejoice that what was not gained was not lost. 

" We lost no honors at Cliancellors\-ille. With all of our 
misfortunes the enemy's loss exceeded our own by one- 
third. Of this I have abundant evidence in the official 
returns of the enemy's casualties, as they have from 
time to time been published. [But see p. 238.] If I did 
not cross the river again it will appear that it was for 
reasons over which I had no control. The rains had 
nothing to do with our returning from Chancellorsville, 
for it had been determined on in my mind long before 
the rain commenced falling. I do not like to be quoted 
as authority on this subject until after the offlciiil report 
is published, and for the flattering terms in which you 
speak of me— »io^ erer. I hope that .vou and yours are 
well. My kindest regards to Mrs. Ross and my beet 
wishes for yourself. Your friend, 

'• Joseph Hookek, 

" Coloxel Sami'el Ross, 

Commanding Brigade. Twelfth Corps." 


I V 




FEOM our encampment on the Stafford Heights, the bright camp-fires of 
the enemy and the scenes of the terrible encounters under Burnside were 
daily presented to our sight from December, 1862, until the following April. 
During this period, with the exception of a futile movement on the right 
known as the " Mud March,' the army remained quiet. The pickets stationed 
on either bank of the Rappahannock were within hailing distance of each 
other, and dress and faces could be easily distinguished. By the comity that 
prevailed, there was no firing from either side. One could ride or walk down 
to the banks of the river with perfect security. Sometimes "Johnny Eeb," as 
he was called, would rig up a little raft, and, loading it with tobacco, start it 
with sails and rudder set for the other shore. When the precious freight was 
unloaded, the craft, generously burdened with coffee and salt, would be headed 
by " Yank " in an opposite direction, where it would be received with loud 
expressions of thanks. In this and other ways the asperities of the war were 
mollified. As time rolled on and the weather improved, arrangements were 
made for an advance. The men were well clothed, rested, and eager to move 
again to test the fortunes of war. 

Of the several plans of attack. Hooker determined to march around the 
enemy's left flank to Chancellorsville, leaving a portion of the army at Fred- 
ericksburg to conceal the real movement. The army struck camp on the 
27th of April, and on the 30th Hooker established his headquarters at Chan- 
cellorsville. The same evening, in general orders, he said, "It is with 
heartfelt satisfaction the commanding general announces to the army that 
the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must 
either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us 
battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him." Hooker 


forgot the injimction of Ahab to Benhadad : "Tell him," he said, "Let not 
him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off." 

While the right wing was concentrating at Chancellorsville, the corps of 
Sedgwick and Eeynolds, after considerable opposition, crossed the Rappahan- 
nock on pontoon-bridges below Fredericksburg, and by the evening of the 
30th were deployed on the wide i^lain where Franklin's Left Grand Di\'ision 
had fought in the previous battle. Sickles's corps was in supporting distance. 
The position of Lee's army remained unchanged until the 29th, when Lee 
was informed that large bodies of Federals were moving toward Chancellors- 
ville. It was the first information he had received of Hooker's movement on 
his left, and it is said he was incensed at the delay of the communication. 
[See p. 233.] At midnight Anderson's division of Lee's army hurriedlj^ moved 
from Fredericksburg and intrenched about foui* or five miles from Hooker's 

In an address of Fitzhugh Lee delivered to the Association of the Army of 
Northern Virginia he stated : " General Robert E. Lee said that Jackson had 
first preferred to attack Sedgwick's corps in the plain at Fredericksburg ; Lee 
told him he felt it was as impracticable as at the first battle of Fredericksbm-g ; 
it was hard to get at the enemy and harder to get away, on account of the 
artillery on the north bank, if we drove them into the river ; but, said he to 
Jackson, ' If you think it can be done, I will give you orders for it.' Jackson 
then asked to be allowed to examine the grounds, and did so during the after- 
noon, and at night came to Lee and said he thought he (Lee) was right ; it 
would be inexpedient to attack them. 'Move then,' said Lee, 'at dawn 
to-morrow, up to Anderson.' " 

Sickles's and Reynolds's corps ha\dng subsequently been ordered to Chan- 
cellorsville by Hooker, Sedgwick was left alone below Fredericksburg with 
about 24,000 men, the Sixth Corps being by several thousand the largest in 
the army. 

During the evening of the 2d of May Hooker sent word to Sedgwick " to 
take up his line on the Chancellorsville road and attack and destroy any 
forces he might meet." He also added that "he (Sedgwick) would i)robably 
fall upon the rear of Lee's forces, and between them they would use Lee ujt." 
If Hooker thought an insignificant force was in Sedgwick's front, the engage- 
ment soon to take place showed how mistaken he was. Sedgwick received 
the order about 11 o'clock at night. He at once advanced his command to 
the Bowling Green road and then marched ])y the right Hank toward Freder- 
icksburg. Newton's division was in the advance. The night was dark and 
the road made darker by the foliage of the trees on either side. The progress 
was n(»cessarily slow. Frequent short halts were made while the skirmishers 
were feeling their way. Once, when the halt was jirolongt^l and nothing 
broke the deep silence of the night except an occasional shot followed by the 
never-to-be-forgotten pinfi of the minie-ball. General Newton, who was rid- 
ing with the third or fourth regiment from the advance, called out : " Ts any 
one of my staff here?" Those present promi)tly responded, ;ni<l 1 was 
directed to "ride ahead and tell Colonel Slialei- to brush away tho enemy's 

\k\^r-^/^ m"- \: 

m?) ■■•'i*%fl -"_-^^ ! I 


pickets." The road was filled with soldiers, some lying down, others resting 
on their guns, but a passage was quickly cleared. At Hazel Run Colonel 
Shaler and Colonel Hamblin were found standing together. Here the enemy 
made a determined resistance. Their pickets were but a few yards distant. 
On the other side of the creek the road made a sharp ascent and curved to 
the right. In a subdued tone Colonel Shaler said : " Colonel Hamblin, you 
have heard the order from Greneral Newton ? " At once Colonel Hamblin left. 
In a moment there was the noise of hurrying feet, the troops quickly disap- 
peared in the dark ; a shout, a bright, sudden flash, a roll of musketry fol- 
lowed, and the road was open. 

It was the gi-ay of morning when the advance reached the rear and left of 
Fredericksburg. A negro who came into the lines reported the heights occu- 
pied and that the enemy were cutting the canal to flood the roads. To ascer- 
tain whether this was true, another delay was caused. No one in the command 
was acquainted with the topography of the country, and the advance was 
compelled to move with great caution through the streets and in the outskirts 
of the town. As the morning dawned, Marye's Heights, the scene of the 
fierce attacks under Burnside in the previous December, were presented to 
our view. Several regiments were speedily moved along the open ground in 
the rear of the town toward the heights, and this movement discovered the 
enemy in force behind the famous stone wall at the base of the hill. Lee had 
left Early with his division and Barksdale's brigade, a force of about ten 
thousand men, to hold Fredericksburg Heights. They were protected by 
strong works and supported by well-served artillery. It was at once felt 
that a desperate encounter was to follow, and the recollections of the pre- 
vious disaster were by no means inspiriting. 

It was Sunday morning, the 3d of May, and the weather was beautiful. 
The town was perfectly quiet, many of the inhabitants had fled, not a person 
was to be seen on the streets, and the windows and blinds of the houses were 
closed. The marks of the fierce cannonade to which the place had in*e\iously 
been exposed were everywhere visible. 

As soon as practicable and as secretly as possible, Sedgwick prepared to 
attack the heights. Gibbon, of the Second Corps, who had been left on the 
north bank, crossed shortly after Sedgwick had captured the town and moved 
to the right, but his advance was stopped by the canal in front, ovtu- which 
it was impossible to lay bridges in face of the fire from the artillery and 
infantry on the hill. Sedgwick says, " Nothing remained but to carry the 
works by direct assault." The attack on Marye's Heights was made under 
direction of Newton. Two columns, each marching l)y fours, were formed on 
the Plank and Telegraph roads, and were supported by a line of infantry from 
the Light Brigade on tlie left, commanded by Colonel Burnham. The I'ight 
column, under Colonel (leorgo C. Spear, was composed of the (ilst Pennsyl- 
vania and the 43d New York. These two regiments belonged to the Light 
Brigade. This column was supi)orted by tlu* (ITth New York and SiM Penn- 
sylvania, under Colonel Alexander Sluiler. Tlie left column consisted of the 
7th Massachusetts and the 36th New York, under (\)loii»'l Tlionias I). Johns. 


The line of battle, commanded by Colonel Hiram Burnham, was composed of 
the 5th Wisconsin (acting as skirmishers), the 6th Maine, 31st New York 
(these three regiments also belonging to the Light Brigade), and the 23d 
Pennsylvania. Howe's division was posted south of Hazel Run, and cooper- 
ated handsomely, capturing five guns, j 

The order to advance was given at 11 o'clock. Sedgwick and Newton with 
the deepest interest watched the attack from the garden of a brick resi- 
dence situated on the outskirts of the town and to the left _ 
of the Telegi-aph road, which commanded a full view of 
the assault. The movements of the enemy showed 
that they were actively preparing to receive the at- 
tack, but th.^ men behind the stone wall were con- 
cealed from view. As the left column emerged 
from the town and was passing near Sedgwick 







- ' and N(^wton, the enemy's battery opened, 
' .! ^ / and a portion of a bursting shell struck and 
J' f-^ killed Major Elihu J. Faxon, of the 36th New 
' York, while mounted and riding with his com- 
mand, and wounded several others. There was an 
exclamation of horror and a momentary scattering of 
the rear of the column, but the men quickly closed up and pressed on. 
Colonel Spear, commanding the right column, was killed at about the 
same time. Both columns and line, in light marching order, advanced at 
double-quick without firing a shot. The enemy kept up an incessant artil- 
lery fii'e, and the noise was deafening. Their musketry fire was reserved 
until our men were within easy range. Then a murderous storm of shot 
from the stone wall, and grape and canister from the hill, burst upon the 
columns and line. For a moment the head of the left column was checked 
and broken. The column on the right was also broken. Colonel Burn- 
ham's line of blue on the gi*een field paused as if to recover breath, and 

\ Brooks's division was posted along Deep Run Rim to guard against an attack on the flank of the 
as far as Bernard's house. Bartlett's brigade of storming column, and was sharply engaged during 
this di\ision held the railroad crossing at Deep the forenoon. — Editors. 


slightly wavered. Sedgwick and Newton looked on with unconcealed anx- 
iety, and turned to each other, but remained silent. The suspense was 
intense. Was it to be a victory or a defeat f Was the place a second time 
to be a " slaughter-pen ! " Was the Sixth Corps to be driven into the river ? 
Staff-officers, waving their swords and hurrahing to the men, dashed down 
the Telegi'aph road. A blinding rain of shot pierced the air. It was more 
than human nature could face. The head of the column as it reached the 
lowest part of the decline near a fork in the road seemed to melt away. 
Many fell ; others bending low to the earth hurriedly sought shelter from the 
undulations of ground and the fences and the two or three wooden structures 
along the road. Out of 400 comprising the 7th Massachusetts, 150 were killed 
and wounded. Colonel Johns, commanding, was severely wounded. Then, as 
if moved by a sudden impulse and nerved for a supreme effort, both columns 
and the line in the field simultaneously sprang forward. The stone wall was 
gained and the men were quickly over it.^ Just as my horse was jumj^ing 
through a break in the wall one of the enemy, standing slightly to the left 
and about a horse's length from me, raised his gun and fired. The excitement 
of the hour must have unnerved his hand, for the ball zipped harmlessly by to 
my right. In a second a bayonet was thrust into his breast by one of our men 
on my left. Along the wall a hand-to-hand fight took place, and the l)ayonet 
and the butt of the musket were freely used. The brilliant and successful 
charge occupied perhaps ten or fifteen minutes, and immediately after the wall 
was carried the enemy became panic-stricken. In the flight they threw away 
guns, knapsacks, pistols, swords, and everything that might retard their 
speed. One thousand prisoners were taken, besides several battle-flags and 
pieces of artillery. The commander of a Louisiana battery handed his saber 
to Colonel Thomas S. Allen, of the 5th Wisconsin. This regiment out of 500 
men lost 123, and the 6th Maine out of about the same numl)er lost 107 in 
killed and wounded. Over 600 were killed and wounded in the direct assault 
upon the heights, and the loss to the corps on the entire front was about 1000. 
General G. K. Warren, who had arrived that morning with instructions 
from headquarters, said in his telegram to Hooker : " The heights were car- 
ried splendidly at 11 A. m. by Newton." Upon reaching the summit of the 
sharp hill, after passing through the extensive and well-wooded grounds of 

% A private of Company F, 7th Massachusetts, our side in front of the sunken road was a pood stone 

writes to the editors: vrnW. even with the level of the field. In this sunken 

road were two Confederate lines of battle, the front lino 

"The assault took place Sunday, May 3d, at about 11 flriuf? <>n our ehargiuf? lines on the left of the road and 
o'cloek A. M., tlic 7th Massachusetts leading the loft col- the rear line sittinjj on their heels, with their backs 
unm, the 3(itli New York Volunteers in support. Both afjainst the terrace wall at the base of the hill and rear 
marched by the flank. Our conipauy (F), leadiuK the of the road. About opposite the rijrht of our refrinient 
7th, consefpiently caught the wholes body of the first wns a depression on llie hill made some lime. I should 
fire of the 'Johniues,' which they witlilu>ld until we think, by water from the land aliove, but ntiw grassed 
were certainly witliiu twenty-five yards. As some of over; at the head of this depression was a battery 
the olficcrs sang out ' Retreat, Retreat.' tlie men began placed, I suppose, to rake the ravine or depressum. 
to yell ' Forward ! don't go l)a(k ! we sha'n't get so close Some one looked through the board fence, and saw the 
up again." Lleutenaut-Coloncl Franklin 1*. Harlow was enemy's fiank. In a moment the men rushed to the 
the man above all otliers who held tlie men up to tlieir fence', and we went tlirouirli i)ell-mell riglit upon tho 
work, and I have never yet seen his name even worthily flankof tlie Confederates, at the sanu> time giving them 
mentioned. .Tust before and in front of the wall facing tin- contents of the nniskcts point-blank without aim- 
down tlie street is a house standing in a small jdat, V- ing. The whole thing was a surprise; they were not 
shaped, and inclosed by a high board fence. This wall jirepared for anything from this iiuartcr. as we were 
in our front along the base of the hill was a rongli stone hidden from theui, and they from us, by the house aud 
wall forming the rear bank of the suuken road, while on fence." EDITORS. 




the Marye House, an exciting scene met the eye. A single glance exhibited 
to view the broad plateau alive with fleeing soldiers, riderless horses, and 
artillery and wagon trains on a gallop. The writer hurried back to Sedg- 
wick, who was giving directions for Brooks and Howe to come up, and sug- 
gested that it was a rare opportunity for the use of cavalry. With evident 
regret Sedgwick replied that he did not have a cavalryman. The carrying of 

the heights had completely divided the enemy's 
forces, throwing either flank with much confu- 
sion on opposite roads, and it seemed as though 
a regiment of cavalry might not only have cap- 
tured many prisoners, 
guns, ammunition, and 
wagons, but also have 
cleared the way for the 
corps almost as far as 
the immediate rear of 
Lee's army at Chancel- 

Newton's division, ex- 
hausted by the night 
march, the weight of 
several days' rations 
and sixty rounds of am- 
munition, and by the 
heat, fatigue, and ex- 
citement of battle, were 
allowed to halt for a 
short time. Many were soon asleep, while others made coffee and partook of 
their first meal that day. 

Brooks's division soon came up from below Hazel Run, and took the 
advance. Newton and Howe followed. The enemy in the meantime had 
united their forces, and delayed the rapid advance by frequent stands, 
retiring successively from hill to hill, and opening with artillery. Eavines 
running at right angles to the main road and the rolling character of the 
country were favorable for impeding the pursuit, which was continued for 
three or four miles until we reached Salem Church, an unpretentious red-brick 
structure situated on a ridge covered with dense woods and undergrowth. 
To-day it bears many scars of the contest waged around it. 

At this point the enemy were in position with four fresh brigades with- 
drawn from Hooker's front, and prepared to contest any fai-ther advance. 
Lee had met with such complete success in his attack upon Hooker that he 
felt he could well spare these troops and not suffer. Brooks on the left of the 
road and Newton on the right quickly formed their commands and made sev- 
eral gallant assaults. The fight was very severe in the thick woods, and for a 
time was waged with varying success. The crest of the woods and a little 
school-house near the church were gained, and once it was thought they could 


The view is from the Plank road. On the left is what remains of the Con- 
federate trenches. The bricks on the four sides of the chtirch are spotted 
with bullet-marks, and especially on the line of the upper windows toward 
the road, showing that many Union soldiers aimed high. This church was a 
refuge for many Fredericksburg families during Burnside's battle.— Editors. 


be held, but the enemy, in superior numbers, j^ressed on, and the ground and 
the chm-ch were left in their possession. The contest did not last long, but 
nearly 1500 were killed and wounded. Bartlett's brigade, numbering less than 
1500, lost 580 officers and men. That night the soldiers slept on their arms. 

It was understood throughout the Sixth Corps that as soon as it should 
become engaged with the enemy Hooker would immediately attack in his 
front, and prevent any reenforcements from being sent against Sedgwick. 
All during that Sal^bath day and the next the sound of Hooker's guns were 
eagerly listened for. No sound would have been more welcome. But after 
10 o'clock Sunday morning axes and spades were used at ChanceUorsville 
more than the guns. The feeling became widely prevalent that the Sixth 
Corps would be compelled to take care of itself. At first it was cautiously 
whispered that Hooker had failed, and soon the worst was surmised, and it 
was concluded that no help could be expected from him. His dash, prompt- 
ness, and confidence as a division and corps commander were gone. 

Lee that night withdrew his troops, flushed with their brilhant success, 
from the front of Hooker, with the exception of Jackson's corps, and marched 
against Sedgwick. Still Hooker remained inactive ; with a force greatly in 
excess of the enemy in his front, he made no effort to relieve Sedgwick from 
his perilous position. Works were thrown up by the enemy along the Salem 
Church ridge, and they extended their right until on Monday morning Marye's 
Heights and Fredericksburg, won at so gi'eat a sacrifice, were again theirs. 

Sedgwick's position, as finally established, was in the shape of a horseshoe, 
both flanks resting on the river, the line covering Banks's Ford. His line of 
battle was between five and six miles in length. Frequent attempts had been 
made, during Sunday morning, to communicate with Banks's Ford and to 
direct the laying of pontoon-bridges, but for some time roving bodies of cav- 
alry frustrated this. The late Colonel Henry W. Farrar, then on the staft' of 
Sedgwick, while carrying a message for this purpose, was captured and taken 
to Richmond. The 4th of May dragged wearily, skirmishing continued all day, 
the weather was hot, Sedgwick's position was most critical, and the keenest 
anxiety was felt. Lee was in our front with a force nnicli larger than Sedg- 
wick's then available command of about eighteen thousand men, and an 
attack was momentarily expected, but fortunately Lee consumed the whole 
day in establishing his lines. The greatest vigilance and activity were exer- 
cised by our men in throwing up rifle-pits. Hooktn- sent word to Sedgwick 
to look well to the safety of his corps, and either to fall back upon Freder- 
icksburg or recross at Banks's Ford ; he also added that he could do nothing 
to relieve him,| Sedgwick accordingly intrusted Newton with tlie arrange- 

4 These inoiructions to Sedgwic-k were sent and loiniminiintcd with him. Hy this louto ami the 

throuKh General G. K. Warren, Hooker's chief United stat.s .Min.' Ford I r.-tunu-d to 

„ . 1111 I 4. o 1 • 1 * nfarChaniillorHvillo, whichlrtaihrdat 11 r M. Hound. 

of engineers, who luid been sent to Sedgwick to ^^^ „,^ ,.,.^,„^ ,,j j,,,. „^,jjj,, „, „„„ ,,„;,„ „„„ ....^ ,i„^. i„„i 

render what assistance he might, and who had f.,ii,.n hack from the Chanc-lloisvill.- hoiiso about n ndh'. 
returned to Hooker on Sunday evening. Warren After rt'iM)rliujc to the ^reufral. and pettinK his ideas, I 
says: telegraphed the followins to Geuernl Sedgwick at inid- 

" As soon as General Pedgwlck's advaiici- liad laiiscd " *^ ^ • 
the retreat of the troops at Banks's Ford |:ilioul 1 i-. m.. •• • i \\\u\ cvcrytlilnn snni; hcri*. Wo roiitract«'d tlio lino a 

May 3d], Oeueral Beuhani had tlirown a l)ri<lf;c acrosa litth', ami npidsod the last Hssault with oaso. (Joiieral 




ments for the withdrawal. Newton quickly made himself acquainted with 
the roads leading to Banks's Ford and succeeded in establishing communica- 
tion with General Henry W. Benham, who was in charge of the pontoons at 
that place. 

At 6 o'clock in the evening the enemy attacked Brooks and Howe on the 
center and left, with the design of cutting off the corps from Banks's Ford. 
Howe not only maintained his position until night-fall, but also made several 
counter-charges, capturing several hundred prisoners. Brooks also held on 
until dark, but in retiring was closely pursued by the enemy. The whole corps 
then successfully fell back to Banks's Ford, and the long and painful suspense 
of the day was over. The picket line in front and on the left of Salem ridge 
was withdrawn by General David A. Russell in person. I had been directed 
to assist him. That sterling soldier dismounted, moved along the line saying, 
"Quietly, men, quietly; don't make any noise " ; but the jingle of the canteens 
and other unavoidable sounds on the evening air revealed the movement to 
the vigilant enemy, and they followed closely, yelling and firing until the 
double-quick step brought us to our main column on the march, about a mile 
distant. Several of the enemy's scouts penetrated almost to the ford and 
threw up rockets to mark our position. The enemy's artillery responded to 
the signal, shelling both troops and bridges, but with little injury. During 
the night we recrossed the river and took position to meet the enemy should 
they, as expected at the time, cross to the north side to renew their attack, 
or attempt to destroy our depots for supplies near Fredericksburg. We 
captured 5 battle-flags and 15 pieces of artillery, 9 of which were brought off. 
Fourteen hundred prisoners were taken, including many officers of rank. 

Hooker wiHhes tlieni to attack liim to-morrow, if tlipy will. 
Ho does not desire you to attack again in force unless he 
attacks liiin at the same time. He says 3'ou are too far away 
from him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, 
and keep up communication with General Benham at Banks's 
Ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place, if you 
tliink best. To cross at Banks's Ford would Imng you in 
supporting distance of the main body, and would bo better 
than falling back to Fredericksburg.' 

" This dispatcli was written at a time when I was ex- 
ceedingly exhausted. It did not reach General Sedg- 
wick till late in the forenoon of the 4th, so I have been 
told, and was the only instruction lie received. The 
enemy attacked him in strong force the next day, and, 
having resisted them till the evening, he withdrew 
across the river at Baulis's Ford." 




THE assertion that Hooker's move upon Clian- 
cellorsville was a surprise to General Lee is 
a great mistake. Every day Lee had information 
of Hooker's movements. The following letter, 
sent by Lee to Jackson, and by the latter to me, 
has never been out of my possession since. It 
shows the x-emarkable intuition that enabled 
General Lee on so many occasions to foresee and 
pfenetrate the intentions of his antagonist. In this 
ease a demonstration had been made on our ex- 
treme right at Poi-t Royal, and without waiting 
for orders I had gone with a brigade and battery to 
meet it. I reported the facts to General Jackson, 
and it is my letter to him to which Lee refers : 

" Headquarters, A. N. Va., April 23, 1863. Lieut.- 
Gen'l T. .T. Jackson, Com'g Corps. Gen'l: 1 have 
received General Colston's letter of 8}^ o'clock to-day 
wlilcli you forwarded to rae. I think from the account 
given me by L't-Col. Smith of the Engineers, who was 
at Port Royal yesterday, of the enemy's operations 
there, the day and night previous, that his present pur- 
pose is to draw our troops in that direction while he 
attempts a passage elsewhere. I would not, then, send 
down more troops than are actually necessary. I will 
notify Gen'ls McLaws and Anderson to he on the alert, 
for I think that if a real attempt is made to cross the 
river it will be above Fredericksbm-g. Very respect- 
fully, R. E. Lee, Gen'l." 

The letter was indorsed by Jackson, "Respect- 
fully referred to General Colston for his guidance." 
It was also marked "confidential," and both the 
front and the back of the envelope were marked 
*' private," so that not even my adjutant-general 
should open it in case of my absence. 

The Federal writers have wondered why Jack- 
son's corps did not complete its work on the even- 
ing of May 2d. They do not realize the condition 
of our troops after their successful charge on 
Howard. We had forced our way through brush 
so dense that the troops were nearly stripped of 
their uniforms. Brigades, regiments, and com- 
panies had become so mixed that they could not 
be handled ; besides which the darkness of even- 
ing was so intensified by the shade of the dense 
woods that nothing could be seen a few yards off. 
The halt at that time was not a mistake, but a 
necessity. So far from intending to stop, Jackson, 
when he was wounded, was hurrying A. P. Hill's 
division to the front to take the place of Rodes's 

and mine and to continue the attack ; A. P. Hill was 
also wounded soon afterward, and the advance of 
his troops in the narrow road on which alone they 
could move was checked by the shell and canister 
of twelve Napoleon guns, from an elevation within 
five hundred yards. The slaughter and confusion 
were greatly increased by this terrible fire in the 
night, so that the pause in the attack was one of 
those fatalities of war that no foresight can prevent. 

It was about 1 o'clock on Sunday, May 3d, 
that Lee received information that Early had been 
driven from Marye's Heights and was falling back 
before Sedgwick. Jackson's corps, which had 
been fighting since 6 o'clock the previous even- 
ing, with very little rest during the night, renew- 
ing the conflict at daylight, and capturing the 
positions at Chancellorsville, was much diminished 
by casualties and much exhausted by fatigue, hun- 
ger, and thirst ; but it was preparing to move upon 
Hooker's last line of intrenchments, erected dui-- 
ing the night on very strong positions. My di\is- 
ion was in the lead in line of battle. It was then 
that I received an order to report at once in per- 
son to General Lee. I found him standing in a 
small tent pitched by the roadside. His plain 
gi'ay sack-coat, with only three stars on the rolling 
collar, was, like his face, well sprinkled with the 
dust of the battle-field. In low, quiet tones he 
said to me: "General, I wish you to advance 
with your division on the United States Ford road. 
I expect you will meet with resistance before you 
come to the bend of the road. I do not want you 
to attack the enemy's positions, but only to feel 
them. Send your engineer officer with skirmishers 
to the front to reconnoiter and report. Don't 
engage seriously, but keep the enemy in check and 
prevent him from advancing." 

I am confident that these were almost the exact 
words of General Lee, to which he added, "Move 
at once," which I did. I was not a little puzzled 
at the time (jiot knowing the situation at Fred- 
ericksburg), and I wondered why we were not to 
continue our advance and hurl Hooker into the 
river. Lee left the field at Chancellorsville imme- 
diately after giving me the above orders, and hast- 
ened to Early's support with McLaws's di\ision, 
Mahone's brigade, and other troops, and compelled 
Sedgwick to retreat across the Rajipahannock. 



The composition, losses, and strength of cacli army as hero stated give the gist of all the data obtainable lu the Offlclal 
Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded ; m w for mortally woiin<le<l : m for captured or missing ; c for captured. 


ARMY OK THE POTOMAC- Miyor-Gcnoral .Joseph Hooker. 

Staff 1( 

s: w. 1. 

rrnrost Otinrd, Priir.-Gcn. Miirscna R. Patrick: 93d N. 
Y., C..1. John S. Crocker; E mid I, C.tli Pn. Cav., <'ai)t. 
James Stiur; Stli IT. 8. (G co's), Cnpt. K. W. H. Road; 
Detachment Regular Cav., Lieut. Tattnall Paiildiug. 
Patrick's Brif/nde, Col. William F. Rogers : B, Md. Art'y, 
VOL. III. 16 2 

Capt. Alon/.o Snow; 21st N Y., Lieut. -Col. Chester W. 
Sternberg; a;<d N. Y.. Col. Henry C. Hotnmni : N. 
Y., Col. John G. Todd ; 80tli N. Y. (20th Militia), Col. 
Theodore B. Gates; 12th Ohio Battery, Cnpt. Aaron C. 
Johnson. Engineer Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Henry W. Ben- 


ham: 15th N. Y., Col. Clintou G. Colgate; SOth N. Y., 
Col. Charles B. Stuart ; BattaUon U. 8. Eugineers, Capt. 
Chauncey B. Reese. Brigade loss : k, 1 ; w, 6 ; m, 1 = 8. 
Guards and Orderlies, Oueida (N. Y.) Cav., Capt. Daniel 
P. Mann. 

ARTILLERY, Blig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Artillery Re- 
serve, Capt. William M. (Graham, Brig. -Gen. Robert O. 
Tyler: B, Ist Conn., Lieut. Albert F. Brooker; M, Ist 
Conn., Capt. Franklin A. Pratt; 5th N. Y-., Capt. Elijah 
D. Taft; 15th N. Y., Capt. Patrick Hart; 29th N. Y., 
Lieut. Gustav von Blucher; 30th N. Y., Capt. Adolph 
Voegelee ; 32d N. Y., Lieut. George Gaston; K, Ist U. 8., 
Lieut. Lorenzo Thomas, Jr. ; C, 3d U. 8., Lieut. Henry 
Meinell; G, 4th U. 8., Lieut. Marcus P. Miller; K, 5th U. 
S., Lieut. David H. Kinzie; C, 32d Mass., Capt. Josiah C. 
Fuller. Tnti)i (iiKtrd, 1st N. J. (7 co's), Col. WiUiam 
Birney, Capt. Kubtrt S. Johnston. 

FIR8T ARMY CORPS. Maj.-Geu. John F. Reynolds. 
Escort: L, Ist Me. Cav., Capt. Constautine Taylor. 
FIRST Divisiox, Brig.-Gon. Jiinus S. Wadsworth. 

First Brigade, Col. Walter Phelps, Jr. : 22d N. Y., Maj. 
Thomas J. 8troug; 24th N. Y., Col. Samuel R. Beardsley ; 
SOth N. Y., Col. Wm. M. Searing ; 84th N. Y. (14th Militia), 
Col. Edward B. Fowler. Brigade loss: w, 37. Second 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler: 7th Ind., Lieut.- 
Col. Ira G. Grover; 76th N. Y., Col. William P. Wain- 
wright; 95th N. Y., Col. George H. Biddle; 147th N. Y., 
Col. John G. Butler; 56th Pa., Col. J. William Hofmann. 
Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 25; m, 5 = 33. Third Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Gabriel R. Paul : 22d N. J., Col. Abraham G. 
Demarest; 29th N. J., Col. William R. Taylor ; 30th N. 
J., Col. John J. Cladek ; 31st N. J., Lieut.-Col. Robert R. 
Honeyman ; 137th Pa., Col. Joseph B. Kiddoo. Brigade 
loss: k, 1; w, 15 = 16. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Sol- 
omon Meredith : 19th Ind., C(»l. Samuel J. Williams ; 
24th Mich., Col. Henry A. Morrow; 2d Wis., Col. Lucius 
Fairchild; 6th Wis., Col. Edward S. Bragg; 7th Wis., 
Col. William W. Robiuson. Brigade loss : k, 11 ; w, 46 ; 
m, 3 =60. Artilleri/, Capt. John A. Reynolds : Ist N. H.. 
Capt. Frederick M. Edgell; L, Ist N. Y., Capt. John A. 
Reynolds ; B, 4th U. S., Lieut. James Stewart. Artillery 
loss: w, 9; m, 2 = 11. 
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gcu. John C. Robinson. 

First Brigade, Col. Adrian R. Root; 16th Me., Col. 
Charles W. Tildeu ; 94th N. Y., Capt. Samuel A. Motfett ; 
104th N. Y., Col. Gilbert G. Prey; 107th Pa., Col. Thomas 
F. McCoy. Brigade loss : w, 5. Second Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Henry Baxter: 12th Mass., Col. James L. Bates; 
26th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Gilbert 8. Jennings ; 90th Pa., Col. 
Peter Lyle ; 136th Pa., Col. Thomas M. Ba ync. Brigade 
loss : k, 1 ; w, 16 ; m, 5 =22. Thinl Brigade, Col. Samuel 
H. Leonard: 13th Mass., Lieut.-Col. N. Walter Batchel- 
der ; 83d N. Y. (9tli Militia). Lieut.-Col. Joseph A. Moesch; 
97tli N. Y., Col. Cluirlis Wluclock ; 11th Pa., Col. Richard 
Coulter; 88th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Louis Wagner. Brigade 
loss: k, 2; w, 13 ; m, 1 =16. Artillcrg, Capt. Dunbar R. 
Ran.som: 2d Me., Capt. James A. Hall; 5th Me., Capt. 
George F. Leppien (w), Lieut. Ednnind Kirby (m w), 
Lieut. Greenleaf T. Stevens ; C, Pa.. C■.^^t. James Thomp- 
son ; C, 5th U. 8., Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom. Artillery 
loss : k, 7 ; w, 25 = 32. 
THIRD DIVISION, Maj.-Gei). Abner Doubleday. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Rowley : 12l8t 
Pa., Col. Chapman Biddle; 135th Pa., Col. James R. 
Porter ; 142d Pa., Col. Robert P. Cummins ; 151st Pa., Col. 
Harrison Allen. Brigade loss: k, 1 ; w, 12; m, 36 = 49. 
Second Brigade, Col. Roy Stone : 143d Pa., Col. Ednmnd 
L. Dana; 149th Pa., Lient.-Col. M^alton Dwight; 1.50th 
Pa., Col. Langhonie Wister. Brigade loss : w, 3. Artil- 
lery, Maj. EzraW. Matthews: B, 1st Pa., Capt. James 
H. Cooper; F, Ist Pa., Lieut. R. Bruce Ricketts; G, Ist 
Pa., Capt. Frank P. Amsdeu. Artillery loss: w, 9 : m, 
2 = 11. 

SECOND ARMY CORPS, Ma,i.-Gen. Darius N. Couch. 
Staff loss : w, 1. 

Escort, D and K, 6th N. \ Cav., Capt. Riley Johnson. 
Lobs : w, 2. 

FIRST DIVISION, Maj. -Gen. Wrnfleld 8. Hancock. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell: 5th N. 
H., Col. Edward E. Cross,^ Lieut.-Col. Charles E. Hap- 
good; 61st N. Y., Col. Nelson A. Miles (w), Lieut.-Col. 
K. Oscar Broady ; 81st Pa., CoL H. Boyd Me Keen (w) ; 
148th Pa., Col. James A. Beaver (w), Mari. George A. 
Fairlamb. Brigade loss: k, 36; w, 196; m, 46 = 278. 
Second Brigade, Bi'ig.-Gen. Thomas F.Meagher: 28th 
Mass., Col. Richard Byrnes; 63d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Rich- 
ard C. Bentley ; 69th N. Y., Capt. James E. McGee ; 
88th N. Y., Col. Patrick Kelly ; 116th Pa. (battalion), 
Maj. St. Clair A. MulhoUand. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 
63 ; m, 31 = 102. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Samuel K. 
Zook : 52d N. Y., Col. Paul Frank, Lieut.-Col. Charles 
G. Freudenberg; 57th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. ALford B. 
Chapman; 66th N. Y.,3^ Col. Orlando H. Morris; 140th 
Pa., Col. Richards P. Roberts. Brigade loss: k, 13; w, 
97; m, 78 = 188. Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke: 
27th Conn., Col. Richard 8. Bostwick ; 2d Del., Lieut.- 
Col. David L. Strieker ; 64th N. Y., Col. Daniel G. Bing- 
ham ; 53dPa., Lieut.-Col. Richards McMichael ; 145th Pa., 
Col. Hiram L.Brown. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 64; m, 
446 = 529. Artillery, Capt. Rufus D. Pettit : B, 1st N. Y., 
Capt. Rufus D. Pettit ; C, 4th U. 8., Lieut. Evan Thomas. 
Artillery loss : k, 2 ; w, 25 = 27. 
SECOND DIVISION, Blig.-Gen. John Gibbon. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Sully, Col. Henry W. 
Hudson, Col. Byron Laflin : 19th Me., Col. Francis 
E. Heath; l.5th Mass., Maj. George C. JosUu; 1st 
Minn., Lieut.-Col. WiUiam Colvill, Jr. ; 34th N. Y., Col. 
Byron Laflin, Lieut.-Col. John Beverly; 82d N. Y. 
(2d Militia), Col. Henry W. Hudson, Lieut.-Col. James 
Huston. Brigade loss: w, 16; m, 4=20. Second 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen: 69th Pa., Col. 
Dennis O'Kane; 71st Pa., Col. Richard P. Smith; 72d 
Pa., Col. De Witt C. Baxter ; 106th Pa., Col. Turner 
G. Morehead. Third Brigade, Col. Norman J. Hall : 19th 
Mass., Lieut.-Col. Arthur F. Devereux; 20th Mass., 
Lieut.-Col. George N. Macy; 7th Mich., Capt. Amos E. 
Steele, Jr. ; 42d N. Y., Col. James E. Mallon ; 59th N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Max A. Thoman; 127th Pa., Col. WiUiam W. 
Jennings. Brigade loss : k, 3 ; w, 56; m, 8 =67. Artil- 
lery : A, 1st R, I., Capt. WUliam A. Arnold ; B, Ist R. 
I., Lieut. T. Fred. Brown. Sharp-shooters: Ist Co. 
Mass., Capt. WilUam Plumer. 
THIRD DIVISION, Maj.-Geu. WiUiam H. French. 

First Brigade, Col. Samuel 8. CarroU: 14th Ind., Col. 
John Coons ; 24th N. J., Col. William B. Robertson ; 28th 
N. J., Lieut.-Col. John A. WUdrick (c), Maj. Samuel K. 
Wilson; 4th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Leonard W. Carpenter; 
8th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Franklin Sawyer ; 7th \V. Va., Col. 
Joseph Snider, Lieut.-Col. Jonathan H. Lockwood. Bii- 
gade loss: k, 29; w, 182; m, 57 = 268. Second Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. William Hays (e). Col. Charles J. Powers: 
14th Conn., Maj. Theodore G. EUis ; 12th N. J., Col. J. 
Howard Willets (w), Maj. John T. Hill ; 108th N. Y., Col. 
Charles J. Powers, Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pierce; 130th 
Pa., Col. Le\a Maish (w), Maj. Joseph 8. Jenkins. Bri- 
gade loss: k, 26; w, 242; m, 61 = 319. Thii-d Brigade, 
Col. John D. MacGregor, Col. Charles Albright: Ist 
Del., Col. Thomas A. Smyth ; 4th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Will- 
iam Jameson; 132d Pa., CoL Charles Albright, Lieut.- 
Col. Joseph E. Shreve. Brigade loss : k, 8 ; w, 80 ; m, 
11=99. Artillery: G, 1st N. Y., Lieut. Nelson Ames; 
G, Ist R. I., Capt. George W. Adams. Artillery loss: 
k. 5; w, 18 = 23. 

ARTILLERY RESERVE: I, 1st U. 8., Lieut. Edmund 
Kirby (m w while commanding 5th Maine BatterjO ; A, 
4tli U. 8., Lieut. Alonzo H. Cushing. Artillery loss : w, 2. 

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles. 
Staff loss : w, 1. 

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Geu. David B. Birney. Staff loss : 
w. 2. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Geu. Charles K. Graham, Col. 
Thomas W. Egan : 57th Pa., Col. Peter Sides; 63d Pa., 
Lieut.-Col. William S. Kirkwood (m w), Capt. James F. 
Ryan; 68th Pa., Col. Andrew H. Tippin; 105th Pa., Col. 

i In tfinitorary coiniiiaiul of 
■^ Served temporarily with tl 

force con-sisting of the 5th N. H., 88th N. Y., and Slst Pa. 
> First Brigade. 


Amor A. McKuight (b), Lieut.-Col. Calviu A. Craig ; 114th 
Pa.. Col. Charles H. T, CoUis, Lieut.-Col. Frederick F. Ca- 
vada; 14l8tPa., Col. Ileury J. Madill. IJii-udeloss: k,72; 
w, 490; m, 194=756. Second lirii/di/c, ]!rif;.-Geu. J. II. 
Hobart Ward: 20th Ind., Col. Jolm; 3d Me., 
Col. Moses B. Lakeman; 4th Me., Col. Klijah Walker; 
38th N. Y., Col. P. Regis de Trobriand; 40th N. Y., Col. 
Thomas W. Egan ; 99th Pa., Col. Asher 8. Leidy. Bri- 
gade loss: k, 11; w, 124; m, 113=248. Third Brigade, 
Col. Samuel B. Haymau : 17th Me., Lieut.-Col. Charles B. 
Merrill, Col. Thomas A. Roberts ; 3d Mich., Col. Byron K. 
Pierce (w), Lieut.-Col. Edwiu S. Pierce; 5th Mich., 
Lieut.-Col. Edward T. Sherlock (k), Ma^j. Johu Pulford; 
IstN. Y., Lieut.-Col. Francis L. Lelaud ; 37th N. Y., Lieut.- 
Col. Gilbert Riordau. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 283; m, 
253=566. Ariillery, Capt. A. Judson Clark: 2d N. J., 
Lieut. Robert Sims ; E, Ist R. I., Lieut. Pardon 8. Jas- 
tram ; F and K, 3d U. S., Lieut. John G. Turnbiill. Artil- 
lery loss : k, 6 ; w, 26 ; m, 3 = 35. 

SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Geu. Hiram G. Berry (k), Brig.- 
Gen. Joseph B. Carr. Staff loss: k, 1. 

First Briijdde, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Carr, CoL William 
Blaisdell : Ist Mass., Col. Napoleon B. McLaughlen ; 11th 
Mass., Col. William Blaisdell, Lieut.-Col. Porter D. Tripp ; 
16th Mass.. Li. iit.-Col. Waldo Merriam ; 11th N. J., Col. 
Robert McAllister: 2Gth I'a., Col. Benjamin C. Tilgliman 
(w), Miy. Robert L. Bodiin-. Brigade loss : k, 52; w, 387; 
m, 65= 504. Second liriymlc, Brig.-Gen. Joseph W. Re- 
vere, Col. J. Egbert Farimiti : 70th N. Y., Col. J.Egbert 
Farnum, Lieut.-Col. Thomas Holt ; 7l8t N. Y., Col. Henry 
L. Potter; 72d N. Y., Col. William O. Stevens (k), Maj. 
John Leonard; 73d N. Y., Maj. Michael W. Burns; 74th 
N.Y., Lieut.-Col. William H. Lounsbury (w), Capt. Henry 
M. AUes (w), Capt. Francis E. Tyler; 120th N. Y., Lieut.- 
Col. CorneliusD. W(Htl)rook. Brigade loss: k, 26; w, 160; 
m, 131 = 317. Third Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott 
(w), Col. William J. Sewell: 5th N. J., Col. William J. 
Sewell, Maj. Ashabel W. Angel (w), Capt. Virgil M. 
Healy; 6th N. J., Col. George C. Burling (w), Lieut.- 
Col. Stephen R. Gilkyson ; 7th N. J., Col. Louis R. Fran- 
cine, Lieut.-Col. Francis Price; 8th N. J., Col. John 
Ramsey (w), Capt. John G. Langston ; 2d N. Y., Col. Sid- 
ney W. Park (w), Lieut.-Col. William A. Olm.sted; 115th 
Pa., Col. Francis A. Lancaster (k), Maj. John P. Dunne. 
Brigade loss : k, 57 ; w, 422 ; m, 48 = 527. Ariillery, Capt. 
Thomas W. Osborn: D, 1st N. Y., Lieut. George B. Wins- 
low; 4th N. Y., Lieut. George F. Barstow, Lieut. William 
T. McLean; II, 1st U. 8., Lieut. Ju.stin E. Dimick (m w), 
Lieut. James A. Sanderson ; K, 4th U. 8., Lieut. Francis 
W. Seeley. Artillery loss : k, 12 ; w, 68 = 80. 
TiiiUD DIVISION, Mi\i.-Gen. Amiel W. Whipple (m w), 
Brig.-(;( II. Cliarles K. Graham. Staff loss: w, 1. 

First Brigade, Col. Emlen Franklin : 86th N. Y., Lieut.- 
Col. Barna .1. Chapin (k), Capt. Jacob H. Lansing; 124th 
N. Y., Col. A. Van Ilorue Ellis; 122d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Ed- 
ward McGovern. Brigade lose : k, 47 ; w, 304; m, 32 = 383. 
Second Brigade, Col. Samuel M. Bowman: 12th N. H., 
Col. Joseph H. Potter (w) ; 84th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Milton 
Opp ; 110th Pa, Col. James Crowther (k), Maj. David M. 
Jones (w and c). Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 290; m, 236 = 
577. Third Brigade. Col. Hiram Berdan : Ist U. S. Siiarp- 
shooters, Lieut.-Col. (aspai-Trepp ; 2d U. 8. Sharp-shoot- 
ers, Miy. Homer U. Stoiigliton. Brigade loss: k, 11 ; w, 
61 ; m, 12=84. Artilleri/, Capt. Albert A. von Putlkam- 
mer, Capt. James F. Huntington : 10th N. Y., Lieut. 
Samuel Lewis; lltli N. Y., Lieut. John E. Burton; II, 1st 
Ohio, Capt. James F. Huntington. Artillery loss: k, 2 ; 
w, 26; m, 9 = 37. 

FIFTH ARMY CORPS, M:\1.-Gen. George G. Meade. 
FiKST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffln. 

First llrigade, Brig.-Gen. James Barnes : 2d Me., Col. 
Ot^orge Variiev; 18th Mass.. Col. Josej)!! Hayes; 22d 
Mass., Col. William S. Tilton ; 2d Co. .Mass. Sharp-shoot- 
ers, Lieut. Kobrrt Siiiitli; Ist, Col. Ira C. Abbott; 
13tli N. V. (battalion), Capt. William Downey; 25tli N. 
Y., Col. Charhs A. John.son; list li Pa , Col. Charles M. 
Prevost. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 40; m, 4=48. Second 
Brigade. Col. James McQuade, C«d. Jacob B. Sweitzer: 
9th Mass., Col. Patrick R. (iuiney ; 32d Mass., Lieut.-Col. 
Luther Stephenson ; 4th Mich., Col. Harrison H. Jeffords ; 

14th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Davies; 62d Pa., Col. 
Jacob B. Sweitzer, Lieut.-Col. James C. Hull. Brigade 
loss : k, 9 ; w, 46 ; m, 7 = 62. Third Brigade, Col. Thomas 
B. W. Stockton : 20th Me., Lieut.-Col. Joshua L. Cham- 
berlain ; Brady's Co. Mich. Sharp-shooters ; 16th Mich., 
Lieut.-Col. Norval E. Welch; 12th N. Y., Capt. William 
Huson; 17th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Nelson B. Bartram ; 44th 
N. Y., Col. James C. Rice; 83d Pa., Col. Strong Vincent. 
Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 18=20. .Ir/iV/en/, Capt. Augustus 
P. Martin: 3d Mass., Capt. Augustus P. Martin; 5th 
Mass., Capt. Charles A. PhiUips ; C, 1st R. I., Capt Rich- 
ard Waterman; D. 5th U. S., Lieut. Charles E. Hazlctt. 
Artillery loss : k, 2 ; w, 4 ; m, 2 = 8. 
SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Geu. George Sykes. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres: 3d U. 8. 
(6 co's), Capt. John D. Wilkins; 4th U. S. (4 co's), Capt. 
Hiram Dryer ; 12th U. S. (5 co's 1st Battalion and 3 co's 
2d Battalion), Maj. Richard S. Smith ; 14th U. S. (6 co's let 
Battalion and 2 co's 2d Battalion), Capt. Jonathan B. 
Hagar. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 17; m, 30 = 51. Second 
Brigade, Col. Sidney Burbauk : 2d U. S. (5 co's). Capt. 
Salem 8. Marsh (k), Capt. Samuel A. McKee; 6th U. S. (5 
co's), Capt. Le\i C. Bootes ; 7th U. 8. (4 co's), Capt. David 
P. Hancock; 10th U. 8. (3 co's). Lieut. Edward G. Bush; 
11th U. S. (6 co's 1st Battalion and 2 co's 2d Battalion), 
Miy. De L. Floyd-Jones; 17th U. S. (5 co's 1st Battalion 
and 2 co's 2d Battalion), Maj. George L. Andrews. Bri- 
gade loss; k, 17 ; w, 108; m, 22 =147. Third Brigade, Col. 
Patrick H. O'Rorke: 5th N. Y., ('ol. Cleveland Winslow ; 
140th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Louis Ernst ; 146th N. Y., Col. 
Kenner Garrard. Brigade loss : k, 4 ; w, 29 : m, :J8 = 71. 
ArtiUerg, Capt. Stephen II. Weed: L, 1st Ohio, Capt. 
Frank C. Gibbs; I, 5th U. S., Lieut. Malbone F. Watson. 
Artillery loss : k, 2 ; w. 13 ; m, 1 = 16. 
THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gcu. Andrew A. Humphreys. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Erastus B. Tyler: 9l8t Pa., 
Col. Edgar M. Gregory (w), Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Sinex; 
126th Pa., Lieut.-CoL David W. Rowe (w) ; 129th Pa., Col. 
Jacob G. Frlck; 134th Pa., Col. Edward O'Brien. Bri- 
gade loss : k, 21 ; w, 166 ; m, 53 = 240. Second Brigade, 
Col. Peter H. Allabach : 123d Pa., Col. Johu B. Clark ; 
131st Pa., Miy. Robert W. Patton ; 133d P:i., Col. Frank- 
lin B. Speakmau ; 155th Pa., Lieut.-Col. John H. Cain. 
Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 31; m, 2 = 37. ArtiUerg, Capt. 
Alanson M. Randol: C, 1st N. Y., Capt. Almont Barnes; 
E and G, 1st U. 8., Capt. Alan.sou M. Randol. 

SIXTH ARMY CORPS, Miy.-Gen. John Sedgwick. 
Staff loss, w, 1 ; m, 1 = 2. 

Escort: Maj. Hugh M. Janeway : L, 1st N. J. Cav., 
Lieut. Voorhees Dj'e; H, 1st Pa. Cav., Capt. William 8. 

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gcn. William T. H. Brooks. Staff 
loss : w, 1. 
Provost Guard: A, C, and H, 4th N. J., Capt. Charles 
Ewing. Loss: w, 1. First Brigade, Col. Henry W. 
Brown (w), Col. William II. Penrose, Col. Sanniel L. 
Buck (w). Col. William II. Penrose: 1st N. J., Col. 
Mark W. Collet (k), Lieut.-Col. William Henry. Jr.; 
2dN. J.. Col. Samuel L. Buck, Lieut.-Col. Churl, s Wi-i- 
becke; 3d N. J.. Miij. J. W. II. Stickney ; 15th N. J.. Col. 
William II. Penrose, Lieut.-Col. Edward L. Campbell; 
23d N. J., Col. E. Burd <^;rubl). Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 
359; m, 86 = 511. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph J. 
Bartlett: 6th Me., Col. Clark S. Edwjirds ; I6ili N. Y., 
Col..Toel J. Seiiver ; 27th N. Y., Col. Alexander I). Adams ; 
121st N. Y., Col. Emory Upton ; '.KJth Pa.. Miy. William H. 
Lessig. Brigade loss : k. 101 ; w. 368 ; m. 143 = Ol.'. Th ird 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. David \. Russell: 18th N. Y.. Col. 
Georire R. Myers; 32d N. Y.. Col. Francis E Pinto; 49th 
Pa., Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Hulings; '.tsth Pa., C.d. Gus- 
tavus W. Town (k). Lieut.-Col. Elisha Hall (k). Capt. 
Theodore H. McCalla : 119th Pa.. Col. Peter C. Ellmaker. 
Brigade l.iss : k. 3.''.: w. 197: m. 136=36.'*. Ariillery, 
Miy. John A. Tomiikius: 1st Capt. Williiim II. 
McCartiiiv; 1st N. J.. Lieut. Augustln N. Parsons: .V, 
Md.. Cai)t'. Jinnes H. Rigby ; I). 2d V. S.. Lieut. Edward 
B. Willislon. Artillery loss: k. 2; w. fi = 7. 
Si-.roND DIVISION. Brig.-Gen. .Vlbton P. Howe. 

Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. (Jrant: 26th N. J.. Col. 
Andrew J. Morrison. Lieut. Col. Edward Martindale; 2d 


Vt., Col. Jaiues H. Walbridge ; 3d Vt., Col. Thomas O. 
Seaver, Lieut.-Col. Samuel E. Pingree; 4tli Vt., Col. 
Charles B. Stoughton ; 5th Vt., Lieut.-Col. Johu R. 
Lewis; 6th Vt., Col. Elisha L. Barney. Brigade loss: 
k, 39; w, 295; m, 97 = 431. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
Thomas H. Neill; 7th Me., Lieut.-Col. Selden Connor; 
2l8t N. J., Col. Gilliam Van Houten (m w), Lieut.-Col. 
Isaac 8. Mettler; 20th N. Y., Col. von Vegesack; 
33d N. Y., Col. Robert F. Taylor ; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel 

B. Bid well; 77th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Winsor B. French. 
Brigade : k, 52 ; w, 394 ; m, 404 = 850. Artillery, Maj. 
J. Watts de Peyster: Ist N. Y., Capt. Andrew Cowan; 
F, 5th U. S., Lieut. Leonard Martin. Artillery loss: w, 
8; m, 1=9. 

THIRD DIVISION, Maj. -Gen. John Newton. 

First Brigade, Col. Alexander Shaler : 65th N. Y., Lieut. 
Col. Joseph E. Hamblin ; 67th N. Y., Col. Nelson Cross; 
122d N. Y., Col. Silas Titus; 23d Pa., Col. John Ely; 82d 
Pa., Mfij. Lsaae C. Bassett. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 86; 
m, 67 = 160. Second Brigade, Col. William H. Browne (w), 
Col. Henry L. Eustis : 7th Mass., Col. Thomas D. Johns 
(w), Lieut.-Col. Franklin P. Harlow; 10th Mass., Lieut.- 
Col. Joseph B. Parsons ; 37th Mass., Col. Oliver Edwards ; 
36th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James J. Walsh; 2d R. I., Col. 
Horatio Rogers, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 42; w, 21%; m, 
22 = 342. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton : 
62d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Theodore B. Hamilton; 93d Pa., 
Capt. John S. Long; 98th Pa., Col. John F. Ballier (w), 
Lieut.-Col. George Wynkoop; 102d Pa., Col. Joseph M. 
Kinkead; I39th Pa., Col. Frederick H. Collier. Brigade 
loss: k, 48; w, 237; m, 200=485. Artillery, Capt. Jere- 
miah McCarthy : C and D, 1st Pa., Capt. Jeremiah Mc- 
Carthy; G, 2d U. 8., Lieut. John H. Butler. Artillery 
loss : k, 1 ; w, 4 ; m, 4 = 9. 

LIGHT DIVISION, Col. Hiram Burnham : 6th Me., Lieut.- 
Col. Benjamin F. Harris ; 31st N. Y., Col. Frank Jones ; 
43d N. Y., Col. Benjamin F. Baker; 6l8t Pa., Col. George 

C. Spear (k), Maj. George W. Dawson; 5th Wis., Col. 
Thomas S. Allen; 3d N. Y. Battery, Lieut. William A. 
Ham. Division loss : k, 94 ; w, 404 ; m, 310 = 808. 


Escort : I and K, 1st Ind. Cav., Capt. Abram Sharra. 

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles Devens, Jr. (w), 

Brig.-Gen. Nathaniel C. McLean. StaflFloss : w, 1. 

First Brigade, Col. Leopold von Gilsa : 41st N. Y., Maj. 
Detleo von Einsiedel ; 45th N. Y., Col. George von Ams- 
berg; 54th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles Ashby, Maj. Stephen 
Kovacs; 153d Pa., Col. Charles Glanz, Lieut.-Col. Jacob 
Dachrodt. Brigade loss : k, 16 ; w, 117 ; m, 131 = 264. 
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Nathaniel C. McLean, Col. 
Johu C. Lee : 17th Conn., Col. William H. Noble (w), Maj. 
Allen G. Brady ; 25th Ohio, Col. William P. Richardson 
(w), Maj. Jeremiah Williams; 55th Ohio, Col. John C. 
Lee, Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Gam bee; 75th Ohio, Col. 
Robert Reily (k), Capt. Benjamin Morgan ; 107th Ohio, 
Col. Seraphim Meyer (w), Lieut.-Col. Charles Mueller. 
Brigade loss : k, 45 ; w, 348 ; m, 299 = 692. Unattached, 
8th N. Y. (1 CO.), Lieut. Herman Rosenki-anz, Artillery : 
13th N.Y., Capt. Julius Dieckmanu. Artillery loss : w, 
11; m,2 = l3. 
SECOND DIVISION, BriiT.-Gcn. Adolph von Steinwchr. 

First Iiri:/(id(\ Col. A(lol])lius Biiscli))fck : 29th N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Louis Hartniann (w), Maj. Alex, von Schlucm- 
bach; 154th N. Y., Col. Patrick H. Jones (w), Lieut.-Col. 
Henry C. Loomis ; 27th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Lorcnz Cantador ; 
73d Pa., Lieut.-Col. William Moore (w). Brigade loss: 
k, 26; w, 229; m, 228=483. Second Brigade. Brig.-Gen. 
Francis C. Barlow: 33d Mass., Col. Adin P.. Underwood; 
134th N. Y., Col. Charles R. Coster; liiCth N. Y., Col. 
James Wood, Jr. ; 73d Ohio, Col. Orlaud Smith. Brigade 
loss: w, 9; m, 14=23. Artillery: T, 1st N. Y., Capt. 
Michael Wiedrich. Artillery loss : k, 1 ; w, 10 ; m, 2 = 13. 
THIRD DIVISION, Mf^.-f !eii. Carl Schurz. StaflFloss : m", 1. 

First JiHgade, Brig.-G.ii. Alexander SchinMiiclfciinig: 
82d ni.. Col. Frederick Heckcr (w), Maj. Ferdinand IT. 
Rolshauseu (w), Capt. Jacob La.salle; Osth N. Y., Col. 

Gotthilf Bourry ; 157th N. Y., Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr. ; 
61st Ohio. Col. Stephen J. McGroarty ; 74th Pa., Lieut.- 
Col. Adolph von Hartung. Brigade loss: k, 84; w, 215; 
m, 120 = 419. Second Brigade, Col. W. Krzyzanowski : 
58th N. Y., Capt. Frederick Braun (k), Capt. Emil Koenig; 
119th N. Y., Col. EUas Peissner (k), Lieut.-Col. John T. 
Lockman; 75th Pa., Col. Francis Mahler; 26th Wis., Col. 
William H. Jacobs. Brigade loss: k, 36; w, 219; m, 
153 = 408. TJnattnehed, 82d Ohio, Col. James S. Robinson. 
Loss: k, 8; w, 48; m, 25 = 81. Artillery: 1, 1st Ohio, 
Capt. Hubert Dilger. Artillery loss : k, 1 ; w, 10 = 11. 

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Licut.-Col. Louis Schiruier: 2d 
N. Y., Capt. Hermann Jahn ; K, 1st Ohio, Capt. William 
L. De Beck ; C, 1st W. Va., Capt. Wallace Hill. Reserve 
artillery loss : w, 3. 

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slo- 
cum. Staff loss : w, 1. 

Provost Ouard : 10th Me. (battalion), Capt. John D. 
Beardsley. Loss : w, 2 ; m, 1 = 3. 

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams. Staff 
loss : m, 1. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph F. Kuipe : 5th Conn,, 
Col. Warren W. Packer (c), Lieut.-Col. James A. Betts, 
Maj. David F. Lane ; 28th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Elliott W. 
Cook (c), Maj. Theophilus Fitzgerald; 46th Pa., Maj. 
Cyrus Strous (k), Capt. Ed. L. Witman ; 128th Pa., Col. 
Joseph A. Matthews (c), Maj. Cephas W. Dyer. Brigade 
loss : k, 5 ; w, 53 ; in, 394 = 452. Second Brigade, Col. 
Samuel Ross : 20th Conn., Lieut.-Col. William B. Woos- 
ter (c), Maj. Philo B. Buckingham; 3d Md., Lieut.-Col. 
Gilbert P. Robinson ; 123d N. Y., Col. Archibald L. Mc- 
Dougall; 145th N. Y., Col. E. Livingston Price (w),Capt, 
George W. Reid. Brigade loss: k, 42; w, 253; m, 
204 = 499. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Ruger : 
27th Ind., Col. Silas Colgrove (w) ; 2d Mass., Col. Sanuiel 
M. Quincy; 13th, N. J., Col. Ezra A. Carman, Maj. John 
Grimes (w), Capt. George A. Beardsley; 107th N. Y., 
Col. Alexanders. Diveu; 3d Wis., Col. William Ilawley. 
Brigade loss : k, 81 ; w, 465 ; m, 68 = 614. ^1 rlillcn/. Capt. 
Robert H. Fitzhugh: K, 1st N. Y., Lieut. Edward L. 
Bailey; M, 1st N. Y., Lieut. Charles E. Winegar (c), 
Lieut. John D. Woodbury; F, 4th U. S., Lieut. Franklin 
B. Crosby (k), Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg. Artillery 
loss : k, 7 ; w, 30 ; m, 9 = 46. 
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gcu. John W. Geary. 

First Brigade, Col. Charles Candy : 5th Ohio, Lieut.- 
Col. Robert L. Kilpatrick (w), Matj. Henry E. Symmes; 
7th Ohio, Col. William R. Creighton; 29th Ohio, Lieut.- 
Col. Thomas Clark ; 66th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Eugene Pow- 
ell ; 28th Pa., Maj. Lansford F. Chapman (k), Capt. Conrad 
U. Meyer; 147th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Alio Pardee, Jr. Bri- 
gade loss : k, 58 ; w, 314 ; m, 151 = 523. Second Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Thomas L. Kane : 29th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Will- 
iam Rickards, Jr. ; 109th Pa., Col. Henry J. Stainrook 
(k), Capt. John Young, Jr. ; 111th Pa., Col. George A. 
Cobham, Jr.; 124th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Simon Litzenberg; 
125tli Pa., Col. Jacob Higgins. Brigade loss : k, 16 ; w, 90, 
m, 33 = 139. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George 8. Greene : 
60th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John C. O. Redingtcm ; 78th N. Y., 
Maj. Henry R. Stagg, Capt. William H. Raiulall ; 102d N. 
Y., Col. James C. Lane ; 137th N. Y.. Col. David Ireland; 
149th N. Y., Maj. Abel G. Cook (w), Capt. Oliver T. May, 
Lieut.-Col. Koert S. Van Voorhis. Brigade loss: k, 49; 
\v, 219 ; m, 260 = 528. Artillery, Capt. Joseph M. Knap : 

E, Pa., Lieut. Charles Atwell (w), Lieut. James D. McGiU; 

F, Pa., Capt. Robert B. Hampton (k), Lieut. James P. 
Fleming. Artillery loss : k, 3 ; w, 15 = 18. 

CAVALRY CORPS, 4- Brig.-Gen. George Stoneman. 
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. 

First lirigadr. Col. Benjamin F. Davis; 8th 111., Lieut.- 
Col. David R. Clendenin; 3d Ind., Col. George IT. Chap- 
man; 8th N. Y.. ; 9th N. Y., Col. William Sackett. 

Brigade loss: k, 1; w. 8; m, 22 = 31. Second Brigade, 
Col. Thomas C. Dovin : L, 1st Mich., Lieut. John K. 
Truax ; (Uli N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Duncan McVicar (k), Capt. 
William E. Beardsley; 8th Pa., Maj. Pennock Huey; 
17th Pa., Col. Josiah H. Kellogg; 6th N. Y. Battery, 

4 The Second and Third Divisions, First llrigado, First Division, and the Reserve Brigade, with Robertson's 
and Tiilball's batteries, ou the " Stouemau Raid." 


Lieut. Joseph W. Martin. Brigade loss: k,12; w,54; ni, 

134 = 200. 

SECOND DIVISION, Brig-Gen. William W. Averell. 

First Brigade, Col. Horace B. Sargent: Ist Mass., 
Lieut.-Col. Greely S. Curtis; 4th N. Y., Col. Louis P. 
DiCesuola; 6th Ohio, Ma,j. Benjamin C. Stanhope; let 
R. I., Lieut.-Col. John L. Thompson. Brigade loss: w, 
6; m, 2 = 8. Second Brij/dde, Col. John B. Mcintosh : 3d 
Pa., Lieut.-Col. Edward S. Jones; 4th Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
William E. Doster: 16th Pa., Lieut.-CoL Lorenzo D. 
Rogers. Artillery : A, 2d U. S., Capt. John C. Tidball. 
THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Geu. David McM. Gregg. 

First Brigade, Col. Judson Kilpatriek: Ist Me., C(d. 
Calvin S. Douty; 2d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Henry E. Davies, 
Jr. ; 10th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William Irvine. Brigade 
loss : k, 1 ; w, 1 ; m, 24 = 26. Second Brigade, Col. Percy 
Wyndham : 12th 111., Lieut.-Col. Hasbrouck Davis ; Ist 
Md., Lieut.-Col. James M. Deems ; Ist N. J., Lieut.-Col. 
Virgil Brodrick; Ist Pa., Col. John P. Taylor. Brigade 
loss: k, 2; w, 3; m, 40 = 45. Reserve Cavalry Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. John Buford: 6th Pa., Maj. Robert Morris, 
Jr. ; IstU. S., Capt. R. S. C. Lord; 2dU. S., Maj. Charles J. 
Whiting; 5th U. S., Capt. James E. Harrison; 6th U. S., 
Capt. George C. Cram. Brigade loss : k, 1 ; w, 3 ; m, 
75 = 79. Artillery, Capt. James M. Robertson : B and L, 
2d U, S., Lieut. Albert O. Vincent; M, 2d U. S., Lieut. 
Robert Clarke; E, 4th U. 8., Lieut. Samuel 8. Elder. 

The casualties in the Union forces during the campaign 
were as follows : 




(iemiaiina Ford April 29 



















Fiaiiklin'.>i Crossing, April 29 — 

Frt/Jnii!?lVN' f'ros8ingV'Ai)rii"'29 — 

st"i.nrHMVr">l^tia,'Ai)V.29 — Mayli 
Old Wiiu. MM ss Tavern, April 30.. 






Sp.itsvlvaiiia r. U., AprU 30 

Kapi.ian Slati.iii, May 1 

CliaiiccUc.isvnie.May 1-6 

FrLdtiick.sbuig, or Marye's and 
Salem Heights, May 3,4 





Grand total 





According to the returns for April 30, 1863 ("Ottieial 
Records," Vol. XXV., Pt. II., p. 320), the eflfective 
strength of Hooker's army was. in round numbers, about 
130,000, distributed as follows: Infantry, 111,000; cavalry, 
11,000 ; and artillery, 8000, with 404 pieces of the latter arm. 


MfLAWS's DIVISION, Majj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws. 

Wofford's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. T. Woflord: 16th 

Ga., ; \ 18th Ga., ; 24th Ga., ; Cobb's 

(Ga.) Legion, ; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, . Bri- 
gade loss : k, 74 ; w, 479 ; m, 9 = 562. Semmes's Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Paul J. Semmes : 10th Ga., Lieut.-Col. W. C. 
Holt; 50th Ga., Lieut.-Col. F. Kearse; 51st Ga., Col. W. 
M. Slaughter (ki, Lieut.-C(d. Edward Ball (w) ; 53d Ga., 
Col. James P. Siuims. Brigade loss : k, 85 ; w, 492 ; m, 26 
= 603. Kershaw's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Ker- 
shaw: 2d 8. C, Col. John D. Kennedy; 3d S. C, Maj. 
R. C. Maflfett; 7th 8. C, Col. Elbert Bland; 8th S. C, 
Col. John W. Henagan; 15th S. C, Lieut.-Col. Joseph 
F. Gist; 3d 8. C. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. W. G. Rice. 
Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 90; m, 2 = 104. Barksdale's 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Barksdale : 13th Miss., Col. 
J. W. Carter; 17th Miss., Col. W. D. Holder; 18th Miss., 
CoL Thomas M. Griffin; 2l8t Miss., Col. B. G. Hum- 
phreys. Brigade loss: k, 43 ; w, 208; m, 341 = 592. Artil- 
lery, Col. Henry C. Cabell: (ia. Battery (Troup Art'y), 
Capt. H. H. Carlton ; Ga. Battery, Capt. John C. Fraser ; 
Va. Battery (ist Howitzers), ("apt. E. S. McCarthy; N. 
(;. Battery, Cai»t. B. C. Manly. Artillery loss : k, 5 ; w, 
21 ; m, 2 = 28. 
ANDERSON'S DIVISION, Miy -Gcn. Richard H. Anderson. 

Wilcox's Brigade, Brig.-Geu. Cadmus M. Wilcox : 8th 
Ala., Col. Y. L. Royston (w), Licut.-Col. H. A. Herbert; 
9th Ala., Miy. J. H. J. Williams; 10th Ala., Col. William 
II. Forney; 11th' Ala., Col. ,L C. C. Sanders; 14th Ala., 
Col. L. Pinckard (w). Brigade loss : k, 72 ; w, 372 ; m, 91 
=.53.-.. yVright's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright: 3d 
Ga., Mixj. J. F. Joncis (w), Capt. C. H. Andrews; 22d (^a., 
Lieut.-Col. J. Wasden ; 48th Ga., Lieut.-Col. R. W. Cars- 
well; 2d Ga. Battalion, MiU- George W. Ross. Brigade 
loss: k, 25; w, 271=296. Mahone's Brigade, Brig.-{Jen. 
William Mahone: 6th Va., Col. George T. Rogers; 12th 
Va., Li('Ut.-Col. E. M. Feild; Ifith Va.. Licut.-Col. R. O. 
Whitehead; 41st Va., Col. William A. Parham; 61st Va., 
CoL V. D. (Jroner. Brigade h)8s: k, 24; w, 134; m, 97 = 
255. Posey's Brigade, Brig.-Geu. Carnot Posey: 12th 
Miss.. Lieut.-Col. M. B. Harris (w), Miijl. S. B. Thomas; 

16th Miss., Col. Samuel E. Baker; 19th Miss., Col. N. H. 
Harris; 48th Miss., Col. Joseph M. Jayne (w). Brigade 
loss: k, 41; w, 184; m, 65 = 290. Ferry's Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. E. A. Perry : 2d Fla., ; 5th Fla., ; 8th Fla., 

. Brigade loss: k, 21 ; w%88=109. Artillery, lAeut.- 

Col. J. J. Garnett : Va. Battery, Capt. C. R. Grandy ; Va. 
Battery (Lewis's), Lieut. Nathan Penick; La. Battery, 
Capt. Victor Maurin; Va. Battery, Capt. Joseph D. 
Moore. Artillery loss : k, 1 ; w, 13 = 14. 


Alexander's Battalion, Col. E. P. Alexander : Va. Bat- 
tery (Eubank's); Va. Battery (Jordan's); La. Battery 
(Moody's) ; Va. Battery (Parker's) ; S. C. Battery 
(Rhett's) ; Va. Battery (Woolfolk's). Battalion loss: k, 
6; w, 35; m, 21=62. Washington (La.) Artillery, Col. J. 
B.Walton: 1st Co. (Squires's); 2d Co. (Richardson'si ; 3d 
Co. (Miller's) ; 4th Co. (Eshlemau's). Battalion loss: k, 
4; w, 8; m, 33 = 4.5. 

SECOND ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J. Jack- 
son (m w), Miy.-(;en. Ambrose P. Hill (w), Brig.-Geu. R. 
E. Rodes, Maj.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart. Staflf loss : k, 
2 ; w, 3 = 5. 

LIGHT DIVISION. Miy.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, Brig.-Gen. 
Henry Heth (w), Brig.-Gen. William D. Pender 
(w), Brig.-Gen. James J. Archer. Staff lose: k, 2; 
w, 2 = 4. 

Heth's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Heth. Col. J. M. 
Brockenbrongh : 40th Va.. Col. J. M. Broekenbrough, 
Lieut.-Col. F. W. Cox (w), Capt. T E. Belts; 47th Va.. 
Col. Rol)ert M. Mayo; 5.5th Va.Col. Francis Mallory (k), 
Lieut.-Col. William S. Christian (wi, MiO- A. D. Saunders 
(k). Lieut. R. L. Williams. Maj. Evan Rice : 22d Va. Bat- 
talion, Lieut.-Col. E. P. Tayloc. Brigade loss : k. 33; w, 
270 = 303. Thoinass Brigade, Britx.-Ciou. E. L.Thomas: 
14th Ga.. Col. R. W. F(dsom : 35th Ga.. Capt. John Duke; 
45th Ga., Lieut.-Col. W. L. (Jdce; 49th Ga.. Ma.). 8. T. 
Player. Brigade loss: k. 21: w. 1,'-.6=177. Lanes Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Oon. James H. Lane : 7th N. C. Col. E. G. 
Haywood (w», Lieut.-Col. J. L. Hill (k). Maj. William L. 
Davi<lsoii (w), Capt. N. A. Pool: ISth N. C. C<d Thomas 
J. Purdie (k). Lieut.-Col. Forney (Jeorge (w), Miv). John 
D. Barry ; 28th N. C. Col. 8. D. Lowe. Capt. Edward F. 

id lMckctt'8 divisions ami DoarinK's and Henry's nrtillory battalions. 

ji l.icnit.-Ocn. .Tames Longstrcct, with Hi 
absent in Sdutli-eastern Virffiiiia. 

•V Thp (lash iiKlicato.s tliat th»^ mime of the commanding ollieer lias not been foiiuil lu the " Ulllclal Record8."-EI>ITOKS. 


Lovill; 33(1 N. C, Col. Clark M. Avery (w), Capt. Joseph 
H. Saunders ; 37tli N. C, Col. W. M. Barbour (w). Bri- 
gade loss: k, 161; w, 626; m, 122 = 909. McGowarVs BH- 
ffade, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Mc<Jowan (w), Col. O. E. 
Edwards (w), Col. Abner Perrin, Col. D. H. Hamilton : 
1st S. C. (Prov. Army), Col. D. H. Hamilton, Capt. W. P. 
Shooter; 1st S. C. Rifles, Col. James M. Perrin (m w), 

Lieut.-Col. F. E. Harrison; 12th S. C, ; 13th S. C, 

Col. O. E. Edwards, Lieut.-Col. B. T. Brockman ; 14th S. 
C, Col. Abner Perrin. Brigade loss: k, 46; w, 402; m, 
7 = 455. Archer's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James J. Archer, 
Col. B. D. Fry : 13th Ala., Col. B. D. Fry ; 5th Ala. Bat- 
talion, Capt. S. D. Stewart (k), Capt. A. N. Porter; 1st 
Tenn. (Prov. Army), Lieut.-Col. N. J. George; 7th Tenn., 
Lleut.-Col. John A.Fite ; 14th Tenn., Col.William McComb 
(w), Capt. R. C. Wilson. Brigade loss : k, 44; w, 305; m, 
16 = 365. Pender's Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. D. Pender: 
13th N. C, CoL Alfred M. Scales (w), Lieut.-Col. J. H. 
Hyman; IGth N. C, CoL John 8. McElroy (w), Lieut.- 
Col. William A. Stowe (w) ; 22d N. C, Lieut.-Col. Chris. C. 

Cole (k) ; 34lh N. C, ; 38th N. C, Lieut.-Col. John 

Ashford. Brigade loss: k, 116; w, 567; m, 68 = 751. 
Artillery, Col. R. L. Walker, Maj. William J. Pegram : S. 

C, Battery, Capt. E. B. Brunson ; Va. Battery (Cren- 
shaw's), Lieut. John H. Chamberlayne ; Va. Battery, 
Capt. Greenlee Davidson (m w) ; Va. Battery, Lieut. 
Joseph McGraw; Va. Battery, Capt. E. A. Marye. 
Artillery loss : k, 5 ; w, 28 = 33. 

D. H. HILL'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen. 

8. D. Ramseur. 
Rodes's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes, Col. E. A. 
O'Neal (w). Col. J. M. Hall : 3d Ala., Capt. M. F. Bon- 
ham ; 5th Ala., Col. J. M. Hall, Lieut.-Col. E. L. Hob.son 
(w), Capt. W. T. Rufus (m w), Capt. T. M. Riley; 6th 
Ala., Col. James N. Lightfoot; 12th Ala., Col. Samuel 

B. Pickeus ; 26th Ala., Col. E. A. O'Neal, Lieut.-Col. John 
S. Garvin (w), Lieut. M. J. Taylor. Brigade loss: k, 90; 
w, 538; m, 188 = 816. Colquitt's Brigade, Brig.-Geu. A. 
H. Colquitt : 6th Ga., Col. John T. Lofton ; 19th Ga., Col. 
A. J. Hutchins; 23d Ga., Col. Emory F. Best; 27th Ga., 
Col. C. T. Zachry ; 28th Ga., Col. Tully Graybill. Brigade 
loss: k, 9; w, 128; m, 312 = 449. Ramscnr's Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. S. D. Ramseur (w). Col. F. M. Parker: 2dN. C, 
Col. W. R. Cox (w) ; 4th N. C, Col. Bryan Grimes; 14th 
N. C, CoL R. T. Bennett; 30th N. C, Col. F. M. Parker. 
Brigade loss : k, 151 ; w, 529 ; m, 108 = 788. Dolcs's Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. George Doles : 4th Ga., Col. Philip 
Cook (w), Lieut.-Col. D. R. E. Winn; 12th Ga., Col. 
Edward Willis; 21st Ga., Col. J. T. Mercer; 44th Ga., 
Col. J. B. Estes. Brigade loss : k, 66 ; w, 343 ; m, 28 = 437. 
Iverson's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Iverson : 5th N. 

C, Col. Thomas M. Garrett (w), Lieut.-Col. J. W. Lea 
(w), Maj. William J. Hill (w), Capt. S. B. West;. 12th N. 
C, Maj. D. P. Rowe (k), Lieut.-Col. R. D. Johnston ; 20th 
N. C, CoL T. F. Toon (w), Lieut.-Col. Nelson Slough ; 23d 
N. C, CoL D. H. Christie. Brigade loss: k, 67 ; w, 330; 
m, 73 = 470. Arlillcry, Lieut.-Col. T. H. Carter: Ala. 
Battery, Capt. William J. Reese ; Va. Battery, Capt. W. 
P. Carter; Va. Battery, Capt. C. W. Fry; Va. Battery, 
Capt. R. C. M. Page. Artillery loss : k, 9; m, 37=46. 
EARLY'S DIVISION, Maj.-Geu. Jubal A. Early. 

Gorrfow'sB/vV/af/e, Brig.-Gen. John B.Gordon: 13th Ga., 

; 26th Ga., ; 31st Ga., ; 38th Ga., ; 

60th Ga., ; 61st Ga.. . Brigade loss : k, 16 ; 

w, 145 = 161. Hoke's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert F. 

Hoke (w) : 6th N. C, ; 21st N. C, ; 54th N. 

C, ; 57th N. C, ; 1st N. C. Battalion . 

Brigade loss : If, 35 ; w, 195 = 230. Smith's Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen. William Smith : 13th Va., ; 49th Va., 

; 52d Va., ; 58th Va., Col. F. H. Board. Bri- 

«cade loss: k, 11 ; w, 75= 86. Hays's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 

Harry T. Hays: 5th La., ; 6th La., ; 7th La., 

; 8th La., ; 9th La., . Brigade loss : k, 

63; w, 306=369. Artillery, Lieut.-Col. R. S. Andrews: 
Md. Battery (Brown's) ; Va. Battery (Carpenter's) ; Md. 
Battery (Dciment's) ; Va. Battery (Raiue'e). Artillery 
loss (not reported). 

TRIMBLE'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Colston. 

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. F. Paxton (k), Col. J. H. S. 
Funk : 2d Va., Col. J. Q. A. Nadenbousch; 4th Va., Maj. 
William Terry ; 5th Va., Col. J. H. S. Funk, Lieut.-Col. 
H. J. Williams; 27th Va., Col. J. K. Edmondson (w), 
Lieut.-Col. D. M. Shriver; 33d Va., Col. A. Spengler. 
Brigade loss : k, 54 ; w, 430; m, 9 =493 Second Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. J. R. Jones, Col. T. S. Garuett (k). Col. A. S. 
Vandeventer : 21st Va., Capt. John B. Moseley ; 42d Va., 
Lieut.-Col. R. W. Withei-s ; 44th Va., Maj. N. Cobb, Capt. 
Thomas R. Buckner ; 48th Va., Col. T. 8. Garnett, Maj. 
Oscar White; 50th Va., Col. A. S. Vandeventer, Maj. L. 
J. Perkins. Capt. Frank W. Kelly. Brigade loss: k, 52; 
w, 420 = 472. Third Brigadf (Colston's), Col. E. T. H.War- 
ren (w), Col. T. ^'. Williams (w), Lieut.-Col. S. D. Thru.s- 
ton (w), Lieut.-Col. H. A. Brown : 1st N. C, Col. J. A. 
McDowell (w) ; 3d N. C, Lieut.-Col. S.D. Thruston ; 10th 
Va., Col. E. T. H. Warren, Lieut.-Col. S. T. Walker (k), 
Maj. Joshua Stover (k), Capt. A. H. Sraals; 23d Va., 
Lieut.-Col. Simeon T. Walton ; 37th Va., Col. T. V. Will- 
iams. Brigade loss : k, 128; w, 594; m, 80 = 802. Fourth 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. F. T. Nicholls (w), Col. J. M. Will- 
iams : Ist La., Capt. E. D. Willett ; 2d La., Col. J. M. Will- 
iams, Lieut.-Col. R. E. Burke; 10th La., Lieut.-Col. John 
M. Legett (k); 14th La., Lieut.-Col. D. Zable; 15th La., 
Capt. William C. Michie. Brigade loss : k, 47 ; w, 266 ; 
m, 10 = 323. Artillery, Lieut.-Col. H. P. Jones: Va. 
Battery, Capt. J. McD. Carrington ; Va. Battery 
(Gai-ber's), Lieut. Alexander H. Fultz; Va. Battery, 
Capt. W. A. Tanner ; La. Battery, Capt. C. Thompson. 
Artillery loss (not reported). 

ARTILLERY RESERVE, Col. 8. ClUtchfleld. 

Brown's Battalion, Col. J. Thomp.son Brown : Va. Bat- 
tery (Brooke's) ; Va. Battery (Dance's) ; Va. Battery 
(Graham's) ; Va. Battery (Hupp's) ; Va. Battery 
(Smith's) ; Va. Battery (Watson's). Battalion loss (not 
reported). Mcintosh's Battalion, Maj. D. G. Mcintosh: 
Ala. Battery (Hurt's) , Va. Battery (Johnson's) ; Va. 
Battery (Lusk's) ; Va. Battery (Wooding's). Battalion 
loss (not reported). 

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Brig -Gen. WilUam N. Pen- 
dleton. Sumter (Ga.) Battalion, Lieut.-Col. A. S. Cutis: 
Battery A (Ross's) ; Battery B (Patterson's) ; Battery C 
(Wingfleld's). Battalion loss : w, 3. Nelson's Battalion, 
Lieut.-Col. William Nelson : Va. Battery (Kirkpatrick's) ; 
Va. Battery (Massie's) ; Ga. Battery (Milledge's). Bat- 
talion loss (not rejiorted). 

CAVALRY, Maj.-Geu. James E. B. Stuart. 

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee : 1st Va., 

; 2d Va., ; 3d Va., Col. Thomas H. Owen ; 4th 

Va., Col. Williams C. Wlckham. Brigade loss : k, 4 ; w, 
7 = 11. Third Brigade (engaged in resistiug " the Stone- 
man raid"), Brig.-Gen. W. H. F. Lee: 2d N. C, Lieut.- 
Col. William H. Payne; 5th Va., Col. Thomas L. Rosser ; 

9th Va., Col. R. L. T. Beale; 10th Va., ; 13th Va., 

Col. John R. Chambliss, Jr. ; 15th Va., . Brigade 

loss (not reported). Horse Artillery, Maj. R. F. Beck- 
ham : Va. Battery, Capt. M. N. Moorman ; Va. Battery, 
Capt. James Breathed ; Va. Battery, Capt. William M, 
McGregor. Horse Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 6 = 10. 

The total loss of the Confedeiate Army, based mainly 
upon the reports of brigade and division commanders, 
aggregated 1649 killed, 9106 wounded, and 1708 captured 
or missing = 12,463. 

The return of the Army of Northern Virginia for March 
31st, 1863 (" Official Records," Vol. XXV., Pt. II., p. 696), 
shows an " effective total " of all arms of 57,112. To this 
number there should be added the net increase during 
the mouth of April, a period of " rest and recruiting," of 
perhaps 3000, and say l.''iOO for the reserve artillery of 
Jackson's corps, not reported on the return for March. 
This ad<litioii gives a total of 61,612. Then, deducting 
Hampton's brigade of cav.alry, recruiting south of the 
James River, and numbering, perhaps, 1600, the effective 
force of Lee's Army on the Rappahannock may be 
estimated at not less than 60,000, with probably 170 
pieces of artillery. 




~YT"rHEN, after the Mud March J^ that succeeded 
VV the disaster of Fredericksburg, General 
Burnside, in a fit of humiliation, telegraphed to 
Washington requesting, for the second time, to be 
relieved, the question of his successor was already 
being considered as a probability. Though stung 
by the loud call that went up for McClellan from 
the army that had twice met disaster after part- 
ing with him, the cabinet were not shaken in the 
conclusion that McClellan must not be restored, for 
the jocund Seward, equally with the patient Lin- 
coln, drew the line at a military dictatorship, such 
as would be virtually implied by a second restora- 
tion, under such pressure. But while firm, the 
authorities were circumspect, and concluded that 
it would not be prudent to increase the tension 
between themselves and a possible praetorian 
camp by sending an outsider to take the com- 
mand from Burnside. Subject to this conclusion. 
General Ilalleck and Secretary Stanton favored the 
transfer of Rosecrans, for whom McClellan might 

be expected to say a good word to supplement his 
inherent strength as a repeatedly victorious com- 
mander; but it was then thought injudicious to 
put another Western man in command. 

The choice being narrowed to the Army of the 
Potomac, a process of exclusion began. Franklin 
was under a cloud [see note, p. 21 G] and was con- 
sidered out of the question ; Sumner had many 
qualifications, but his age and growing feebleness 
were beyond remedy ; Couch was a possible second, 
and still more likely third choice ; and, briefly, the 
selection was found to lie among Hooker, Reynolds, 
and Meade. 4- The first-named had a strong popu- 
lar lead, but General Halleck, backed by the 
Secretary of War, contended that there were rea- 
sons of an imperative character why he should not 
be intrusted with an independent command of so 
high a degree of responsibility. Stress was laid 
upon the fact that in the dispositions for the attack 
on Marye's Heights, General Burnside, who at that 
time could have had no valid motive for jealousy 

^ The writer of tliis paper oconpiorl responsible and 
conti(l(iiti;il piiKitidiis at the licadciuartcrs of the Army 
of tlie Potomac ami in tlic War Di paitmeiit.— Kditors. 
3> In liiHofliiial report of t lie liaiipiiliaimoek eanipaigu, 
General IJurnside sayn : "I made four diHtinct attempts, 
between November "'.)tli, I.SC'J, and .Tanuary ■Jr.tli, 1H63. 
The llrst failed for want of pontooim; the Hceond was 
the battle of FrederiekHlmrfr; the third was stopped by 
the I'resident ; and the fourtli wa8 defeatecl by the elc- 
jnents or other eanses. After the Inst attempt to move 
I was, on January '25th, 18GU, relieved of th(> eonmiand of 
the Army of the Potomae." The fourth attempt men- 
tioned by General Burnside has passed into history as 
the "Mud March." The phm was to move Franklin's 
two corps, or the L(>ft Grand Division, to Banks's Ford, 
where Franklin was to cross and seize, the heijrhts on 
the river road north of the Orange Turnpike. Franklin 
was to be supported by Hooker and Sumner, with the 
Ceutcr and Right Grand Divisions. Franklin and 
Hooker marched from their camps and bivouacked 
near Banks's Ford on Jauuarv 20th : but a rata storiu set 

in that evening: makluj? the roads impassable for pon- 
toon wagons, and after several attempts to haul the 
boats to the river by hand the movement was aban- 
doned. The artillery and wagons became mired, and 
the army, with all of its necessary material, was In 
fact foot-fast in the soft, clayey soil that abounds in 
that rtgion. In a dejected mood the army splashed 
back to Its old camps around Falmouth. See also p. 

118.— EDITOR.S. 

1 1 have been told recently, on hearsay testimouy, 
that Sedgwick was sounded and said ho ought not to be 
apiiointed lieeause he was a McClellan nnin. I never 
heard that Sedgwick was ever proposed as suectssor to 
Burnside. and I cannot believe it, knowing the /i»i- 
itrd though warm reganl of .'Secretary Stanton for him. 
Stanton always spoke of Sedgwick as a bravi>, thorough- 
going soldier, who staiil in camp, gave Washington a 
wide berlh, ami did not intrigue against his superiors; 
but I never heard him attribute to Sedgwick such high 
(luallties for a great couumiud as ho imputed to eome 
other olllcere of that army.— C. F. B. 



of Hooker, had intrusted him with no important 
part, although he was present on the field and of 
equal rank with Sumner and Franklin, to whom the 
active duties of the battle were assigned. President 
Lincoln apparently yielded to the views of those in 
charge of the military department of affairs, and 
thereupon Halleck confidentially inquired of Rey- 
nolds if he was prepared to accept the command. 
Reynolds replied that he expected to obey all lawful 
orders coming to his hands, but as the communi- 
cation seemed to imply the possession of an option 
in himself, he deemed it his duty to say frankly 
that he could not accept the command in a volun- 
tary sense, unless a liberty of action should be 
guaranteed to him considerably beyond any which 
he had reason to expect. He was thereupon 
dropped, and the choice further and finally re- 
stricted to Hooker and Meade, with the chances a 
hundred to one in favor of the latter by reason of 
the fixed conviction of the Secretary of War that the 
former ought not to be chosen in any contingency. 
Stanton knew that there were two Hookers in the 
same man. He knew one as an excellent officer, 
mentally strong, clever and tireless, and charming 
(almost magnetic) in address. It was the other 
Hooker on whom he wished to take no chances. 

Hooker and Meade were in camp, attending to 
such military duties as the lull of action gave oc- 
casion for, neither having taste nor talent for 
intrigue, each aware that "something" was afoot, 
but both supposing that the ferment concerned 
Hooker and Reynolds, and, possibly, some third 
man beyond the lines of the army. But there 
were men about Hooker who believed in, and 
hoped to rise with him, and who, at all events, 
could afford to take the chances of success or fail- 
ure with him ; and these men were rich in personal 
and external resources of the kinds needed for the 
combination of political, financial, and social forces 
to a common end. By their exertions, such influ- 
ences had been busy for Hooker ever since the 
recent battle, greatly aided by the unselfish labor 
of earnest men who believed that Hooker's military 
reputation (the pugnacious disposition implied in 
his popular cognomen of " Fighting Joe") and his 
freedom from suspicion of undue attachment to the 
fortunes of General MeClellan, pointed him out as 
the man for the occasion by the unerring processes 
of natural selection. The attitude and character 
of the Secretary of War, however, justified nothing 
but despair until connection was made with a 
powerful faction which had for its object the ele- 
vation of Mr. Chase to the Presidency at the end of 
Mr. Lincoln's term. Making every allowance for 
the strengtli and availability of Mr. Chase, as 
against Mr. Lincoln or any other civilian candi- 
date, his friends did not conceal from themselves 
that the general who should conquer the rebellion 
would have the disposal of the next Presidency, 
and they were on the lookout for the right mili- 
tary alliance when they came into communication 
with Hooker's friends and received their assur- 
ances that, if it should bo his good fortune to 
bring the war to a successful close, nothing could 
possibly induce him to accept other than military 
honors in recognition of his services. General 

Hooker thereupon became the candidate of Mr. 
Chase's friends. Hooker probably knew of these 
dickerings. Certainly Stanton did, through a friend 
in Chase's own circle. 

As soon as Burnside's tenure of the command 
had become a question rather of hours than of 
days, new efforts were made to win over the Sec- 
retary of War, but necessarily without avail, be- 
cause, apart from any personal considerations that 
may have had place in his mind, he had certain con- 
victions on the subject of a kind that strong men 
never abandon when once formed. At this critical 
moment the needed impulse in the direction of 
Hooker was supplied by a person of commanding 
influence in the councils of the Administration, 
and Mr. Lincoln directed the appointment to be 
made. [See Lincoln's letter to Hooker, p. 216.] 

Mr. Stanton's first conclusion was that he should 
resign ; his second, that duty to his chief and the 
public forbade his doing so ; his third, that Hooker 
must be loyally supported so long as there was the 
least chance of his doing anything with the army 
placed in his keeping. This latter resolution he 
faithfully kept, and General Hooker, who soon 
had occasion to know the facts connected with 
his appointment, was both surprised and touched 
by the generoiis conduct of his lately implacable 

Mr. Chase found his situation as sponsor for the 
new commander embarrassing. As a member of 
the cabinet he could freely express his views with 
reference to any military question coming up for 
cabinet discussion, and upon any matter introduced 
to him by the President he had fair opportunity of 
making a desired impression; but further than 
this he could not directly go without disclosing a 
personal interest inconsistent with his place and 
duty. Yet the cirisumstances connected with the 
appointment of Hooker made it imperatively neces- 
sary that the influence of Mr. Chase should be 
exerted in respect of matters that could not for- 
mally come to him for consideration, although, 
on the other hand, they could not safely be in- 
trusted wholly to the keeping of a suspicious and 
probably hostile War Department. Fortunately 
for the perplexed statesman, the influence that 
had proved sovereign when the balance had hung 
in suspense between Hooker and Meade was safely 
and wholly at his service, and, being again resorted 
to, provided a modus Vivendi so long as one was 
needed. Out of all these anomalies a correspond- 
ence resulted between Mr. Chase and General 
Hooker, the publication of which is historically 
indispensable to the saying of the final word on 
the leading events of Mr. Lincoln's administration. 

When General Hooker telegraphed to Washing- 
ton that he had brought his army back to the north 
side of the river, because he could not find room 
for it to fight at Chancellorsville, President Lin- 
coln gi-asped General Halleck and started for the 
front post-haste. He would likewise have taken 
the Secretary of War, in his anxiety, but for the 
obvious indelicacy of the latter's appearance before 
Hooker at such a moment. Mr. Lincoln went back 
to Wasliington that night, enjoining upon Halleck 
to remain till he knew "everything." Halleck 



was a keen lawyer, and the reluctant generals and 
staff-officers had but poor success in stopping any- 
where short of the whole truth. When he got 
back t